I don't really understand what you are asking but I'll try to answer your questions to the best of my ability.

That leaves the question, what is form - assuming the question is meaningful. — tim wood

Form is, as I said, what the thing is. And, since all things have a whatness unique to themselves, it is what individuates one thing from another. It doesn't make much sense to ask what is form because that's like asking what is the form of form. You could ask such a question, but since each form is different from every other form, there cannot be an answer because that would require that all forms are in some way the same. But form is a principle of distinction, not a principle of sameness, while matter is what all material things have in common, so it is the principle of sameness.

As all that is subject to sensation refers back to matter, form cannot be a matter of sensation. Not hard, soft, rough, smooth, hot, cold, etc. But form must be perceived. — tim wood

Form is what is perceived, we perceive differences. Matter is not perceived. We do not perceive sameness, we infer it through reference to memory, 'things have stayed the same', 'the same things are here that were here yesterday', etc.. However, what I was explaining to Wayfarer, is that we do not perceive the entirety of a thing's form, the complete form in its perfections which are proper to it being the thing which its, we perceive an abstracted form. This is why Aristotle has two distinct senses of "form" corresponding with primary and secondary substance. Form is "actual" and Aristotle outlines two very distinct senses of that word.

That leaves a question as to what is in or about matter that lends itself to discrimination due to form. And it would seem to me that whatever it is would lie in the matter itself. — tim wood

Matter is strictly potential, specifically the potential for change. Being the potential for change, it does not itself actually change. Think of concepts like inertia, and the conservation laws of mass and energy. The potential for change does not itself change. In reality, "matter" is purely conceptual, but I believe it refers to something real, something we do not understand, but we know it as temporal continuity. So I think, the fact that many things here in my room today, are the same things which were here yesterday, despite the numerous changes which have occurred in the meantime, is due to their matter. The matter being the potential for change, which does not actually change.

Thus a warm furry kitten is not a red brick, and this difference due to the differences in their matter. — tim wood

Clearly the difference between a kitten and a brick is a difference of form.

This user has been deleted and all their posts removed.

Let's start with this: is M itself material or immaterial? Maybe this way: is M a something or a no-thing? It seems clear it must be a something. — tim wood

Strictly speaking, matter is potential. What gives it actuality is form. Matter without form, as "prime matter" which Aristotle pondered, is a no-thing, because things have a definite form. In my understanding, Aristotle rejected prime matter as an impossibility, but this is still debated.

To say that it is in itself unintelligible can only mean that by itself M is not any particular something. — tim wood

Yes, that is what Aristotle says. What you call "by itself" is what would be prime matter. Prime matter was proposed by some ancients, as the fundamental stuff which makes up all reality. It could have any form, infinite possibility, and as such, it cannot itself have any form. It's infinite possibility, and that's what makes it unintelligible. He also provided an argument to demonstrate that it is physically impossible.

F, apparently, is the what-it-is of a particular something. Thus F alone would appear to be simply a descriptive general term for that which every particular F has and is. In other words, no actual particularity, no actual F. It seems reasonable to accommodate this in the abbreviation by changing F to PF. — tim wood

I don't quite follow this. But I understand the law of identity as assigning the form directly to the particular, as in the thing itself. That's what Wayfarer seems to disagree with, saying that A was not interested in particulars.

So far, then, all things known by their admixture of M and PF. And for so long as the urge to translate M and PF into stuff and shape/form, i.e., into modern scientific concepts, is resisted, good. And that is the great problem that swims just below the surface breaching and breaking through the surface, devouring Aristotelian sense.

It is the scientific method against Aristotle's dialectic. In Kantian terms, Aristotle could do no better than to make the world conform to sense, sense being the final arbiter, while modern science tries to make sense conform to the world, the world being final arbiter. And that leaves Aristotle as an historical figure, his ideas enduring either as historical curios or vestigially. — tim wood

I don't follow this at all.

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It seems that M absent F is a no-thing, because were it a thing, it would have F. But if M a no-thing, a nothing, a not anything, and not just an aspect of F, then, not being, how can it be? It apparently has by itself no substance and no predicates. As such, any proposition of the form M is x is nonsense on its face. Yes? No? — tim wood

That's right, withot form, matter would be a no-thing, pure potential. As potential, it neither is nor is not. That's what we were discussing earlier, whether possibility, under the Aristotelian conception, violates the law of excluded middle. This I argue, is what makes it unintelligible.

F without M seems also nonsensical. The distinguishing characteristic of both M and F would then be particularity. They require a particular something in which to be. But if every-thing is simply an instantiation of M and F necessarily together, than what does "is" mean? Where does being come from; what is being? And if M and F exhaustive of the constituents of everything, being cannot be a part of any thing. That leaves being itself as a predicate, which as such is only in the mind of the one predicating - a product purely of that mind, an idea and apparently useful fiction. — tim wood

I don't see how any of this is irrelevant. But form without matter is not left as nonsensical, because form is demonstrated to be prior to matter as cause of a material thing being the thing which it is. Matter is not necessary for particularity, as the essence of a thing is its form. This is what allows for the immaterial forms of Christian metaphysics. That the particulars appear to us as composed of matter and form, does not necessitate that they are not caused by independent forms, prior to material being.

it seems that none of these concepts is problem-free. Which is to say they don't actually work. — tim wood

Having problems is not the same as not working. Human knowledge and understanding will likely never obtain the level of perfection. That implies that even though the things we do have problems, they still work for us. We live with problems. One issue which Aquinas took up. is that because the human intellect is united. and dependent on matter, its ability to understand forms will always be impaired.

I believe in a hard version of the PSR: everything must have a reason/explanation/ground. No exception; not for the fundamental laws of nature or for the PSR itself.

The fundamental laws of nature do not exist necessarily and so must have an external reason to exist.
The PSR has an internal reason to exist (reason type 3). As defended in this post, the PSR is a principle of metaphysics which means it is part of the fabric of reality. And the statement "a thing that is part of the fabric of reality exists" is a tautology and is therefore necessarily true.

This [purpose] is automatically true if you presuppose PSR. This should be true for all types, not necessarily requiring a free-will system. — PartialFanatic

A thing that exists or occurs out of necessity (reasons type 1 and 3) do not need a purpose to explain why they exist or occur. E.g., a water stream looks for the path of least resistance, not purposely but simply out of causal necessity from the laws of nature such as gravity and friction.

In addition, I feel there is a lack of distinction between existential reason (reason for existence) and purpose (reason to exist) in "Man itself" section, although I feel that it is irrelevant to the core argument. — PartialFanatic

I believe these are the same as what is described in the OP as efficient cause and final cause. Indeed, if man is designed, then they would have a reason for existence (efficient cause) as well as a reason to exist (final cause). They would also have the other two causes: material cause (a physical body) and formal cause (a design).

My understanding is that modal collapse or necessitarianism is not strictly speaking impossible, but it is undesirable because it leads to absurd conclusions. It trivializes modal reasoning, and modal logic would be reduced to only very specific applications that would not be metaphysically true. As such, necessitarianism is best to be avoided if possible.

There are no absurd conclusions at all. It doesn't trivialize modal reasoning, because we can still conceptualize how things might have been in counterfactual conditions. We all make use of this, learn from it. "If I hadn't done X then Y (an unfortunate consequence) would not have occurred." Lesson: in the future, avoid doing X.

Concieiving this way doesn't imply that X was metaphysically contingent. Consider why you made decision to do X. If it was an impulse, then something led to the impulse (e.g. the scent of freshly baked cookies induced an impulse to eat one). If X was a deliberative decision, it was consequence of the factors that came to mind. that you weighed in a certain way. There's no obvious source of contingency, so why believe it was actually contingent? Conceivability can lead to modal illusion.

So I don't think it's reasonable to ever assume contingency, unless one can point to a source of contingency.

After doing a bit of research, it seems that modal collapse or necessitarianism is problematic because it removes the freedom that seems intuitive in metaphysics, possible outcomes, decision-making, responsibility, etc. Let's take your example:

"If I hadn't done X then Y (an unfortunate consequence) would not have occurred. Lesson: in the future, avoid doing X."
The underlined sentence is a prescriptive statement, a "should", which implies a freedom to do X or not. If all prescriptive statements were going to occur necessarily, then the prescription is merely an illusion. "I should" becomes "I will (or not)". Why make an effort to learn, grow, or improve if the future is fixed?

So even though we can conceptualize how things might have been in counterfactual conditions, I dispute that this would have any use, even for future cases.

The underlined sentence is a prescriptive statement, a "should", which implies a freedom to do X or not. If all prescriptive statements were going to occur necessarily, then the prescription is merely an illusion — A Christian Philosophy

If I decide not eat cookies (a "should"), this decision establishes a disposition- a factor that will influence, but not necessitate, my future behavior. The craving induced by the scent may create a disposition that may be stronger. The prior disposition is not an illusion, it was simply ignored and the impulse acted on.

I accept compatibilism- an account of free will that is consistent with determinism. It does not entail fatalism. Fatalism is the view that you have no real choices. Compatibilism is the view that our choices are under our control. Choices are the product of internal factors: knowledge, beliefs, desires, wishes, genetic predispositions, learned conditioned responses, dispositions, impulses, mood...

These factors were all caused, but they are bundled uniquely into each of us. They are what make us who we are.

Under compatibilism, we can still entertain past possibilities - the things one might have done, but it correctly recognizes that something would have had to be different: some missing bit of knowledge, improved impulse control. I don't see that libertarian free will can do any more: decisions are still based on reasons. And new experiences and knowledge change us, so that our future decisions will be made on a different basis.

I understand your view of compatibilism but I don't understand why this does not entail fatalism. If all choices are the product of factors (internal or external) and all these factors are caused by something else, then all our choices are caused by something else. Given a specific set of factors, all originating outside of ourselves, the outcome is inevitable.

I don't see that libertarian free will can do any more: decisions are still based on reasons. — Relativist

In other words, you are asking how libertarian free will could be compatible with the PSR.
Libertarian free will is defined as: "the ability to choose without being compelled by external factors (meaning factors other than our will)". Since the "ability to choose freely" is contained in the definition of libertarian free will, then the explanation for our free choice exists inherently in the power of free will (reason type 3 in the OP).

Another way to say the same thing: if we suppose that we have the power of libertarian free will, then how do we explain our ability to choose without being compelled by external factors? Answer: because we have the power of free will; that's precisely what the power is supposed to do.

More details are provided in the following video: https://youtu.be/k_PoOKDVUdc
The full video is 21 minutes long, but you can skip to timestamp 15:28 for this specific topic.

I don't see that libertarian free will can do any more: decisions are still based on reasons.
— Relativist
In other words, you are asking how libertarian free will could be compatible with the PSR. — A Christian Philosophy

No. I'm pointing out that because decision making is consistent with determinism (and thus, the PSR)- there is no basis for insisting we have libertarian free will. You choose to believe we have it, but I do not accept that as a premise.

I understand your view of compatibilism but I don't understand why this does not entail fatalism. If all choices are the product of factors (internal or external) and all these factors are caused by something else, then all our choices are caused by something else. — A Christian Philosophy

Here's the logic you may be applying:

Assume A causes B, and B causes C, then:
A causes C (the logic is transitive)- Implying B is irrelevant. This is a fatalist view.

My point is that B is not irrelevant. Logic is transitive, but causation is not. Our acts of will are "B", and the mental processing that we perform is essential for C to occur.

Compare this to a computer: input- processing- output. The processing is a necessary step - essential to producing the output. "A" consists of the physical parts of the computer, the software, electricity running through the circuits, and the specific input it was given. All those components are essential to producing the output ("C").

I'm pointing out that because decision making is consistent with determinism (and thus, the PSR)- there is no basis for insisting we have libertarian free will. — Relativist

Sure. I accept the burden of proof to defend the existence of libertarian free will. For now, I'll continue to argue that compatibilist free will leads to fatalism.

Our acts of will are "B", and the mental processing that we perform is essential for C to occur. — Relativist

B is essential for C to occur, but this does not dismiss fatalism. E.g. cog A is connected to cog B which is connected to cog C. Cog B is essential for cog C to spin, but cog B has no control over the outcome. Adding complexity to the system, like a computer process or a compatibilist mental process, does not change the fact that there is no control from any of the parts.

B is essential for C to occur, but this does not dismiss fatalism. E.g. cog A is connected to cog B which is connected to cog C. Cog B is essential for cog C to spin, but cog B has no control over the outcome. — A Christian Philosophy

Two problems with this:
1. We have agency:
- the capacity to act intentionally
-the capacity to initiate action
-we reflect on, and care about, our actions

2. Fatalism entails an attitude of futility in the face of future events. If you're sick, your recovery (or death) is fated to occur - and this will occur regardless of whether or not you seek medical care. This is obviously not the case: we typically choose to act a certain way in order to achieve a desireable outcome. We choose medical care because we anticipate that it will improve our chances of recovery.

I agree that we have real agency, and yet this is not possible under necessitarianism where all actions from every part, like cogs, are necessary.

I agree that fatalism is a wrong view, and yet under necessitarianism, we have no power over future events since the future is fixed.

I agree that we have real agency, and yet this is not possible under necessitarianism where all actions from every part, like cogs, are necessary. — A Christian Philosophy

Assertion without argument. You refuted none of the 3 aspects of agency I identified:
-the capacity to act intentionally
-the capacity to initiate action
-we reflect on, and care about, our actions

I agree that fatalism is a wrong view, and yet under necessitarianism, we have no power over future events since the future is fixed. — A Christian Philosophy

You're ignoring everything I said. If you're very sick, you choose to seek medical care because you believe it improves your chances of recovery. If you lacked that belief, you wouldn't bother. A fatalist wouldn't bother, because he assumes his outcome is fated to occur and any actions he takes are futile.

Compatilists refer to the "principle of alternate future possibilities" - the set of choices before us. I am free to make a choice among options before me. This is distinguished from the "principle of alternate possibilities" (implying past choices were contingent) that most incompatibilists consider essential to libertarian free will. This principle implies that our past choices could have differed from what they were.

A compatibilist, like me, recognizes that our actions influence the future, and so we make choices accordingly. In one sense, past choices could have been different - but only if there were something different, like a different (or stronger) belief.

Your choices seem free to you, I'm sure. You agreed the decision process is consistent with the PSR, so exactly what can you show to be inconsistent with determinism?

Given the lack of progress in the discussion, it's possible we are not going to reach an agreement. I can try a few more times to show why I disagree but then we may have to call it quits.

Compatilists refer to the "principle of alternate future possibilities" — Relativist

Necessitarianism does not allow for alternate future possibilities, right?

Your choices seem free to you, I'm sure. You agreed the decision process is consistent with the PSR, so exactly what can you show to be inconsistent with determinism? — Relativist

My choices seem free, and compatibilist free will is consistent with the PSR. But under necessitarianism and compatibilism, no choice is actually free. Thus, necessitarianism and compatibilism are inconsistent with the observation that my choices seem free.

My choices seem free, and compatibilist free will is consistent with the PSR. But under necessitarianism and compatibilism, no choice is actually free. Thus, necessitarianism and compatibilism are inconsistent with the observation that my choices seem free. — A Christian Philosophy

You have not identified an inconsistency. Here's how you defined "libertarian free will":

"the ability to choose without being compelled by external factors (meaning factors other than our will)" — A Christian Philosophy

This definition matches a compatibilist definition of free will. Our choices are entirely the product of internal factors (whims, beliefs, desires, needs...). Surely you don't deny that all these internal factors have causes, do you? What aspect of the decision making process is uncaused?

I can try a few more times to show why I disagree but then we may have to call it quits. — A Christian Philosophy

Remember, you said:

I accept the burden of proof to defend the existence of libertarian free will. — A Christian Philosophy

Of course you disagree, but my point all along has been that your alleged "proof" of God depends on unsupported assumptions.

Necessitarianism does not allow for alternate future possibilities, right? — A Christian Philosophy

Correct, but this overlooks that our intentional acts, help cause the future through the choices we make- through our agency. Our motivations are all real, and they are part of who we are. The knowledge we employ can be true, and our reasoning can be valid.

You have identified no point in the decision making process at which an alternate decision could have been made - given the person's beliefs, perceptions, state of mind, set of factors that happened to come to mind, etc. You obviously want to believe there's something outside the deterministic chain of causation - a soul, for example. Which implies circularity in your argument.

"the ability to choose without being compelled by external factors (meaning factors other than our will)"
— A Christian Philosophy

This definition matches a compatibilist definition of free will. Our choices are entirely the product of internal factors (whims, beliefs, desires, needs...). — Relativist

Here is one misunderstanding. When you speak of "internal factors", I think you mean any factors inside the body: beliefs, desires, genes, etc; and by "external factors" you mean things in the environment. I mean something else: Imagine we have a libertarian free will - we can also call it a soul for the sake of clarity. In this context, any cause other than our free will or soul is an "external factor" and it includes not only the environment but also beliefs, desires, genes, etc. In that light, my definition of libertarian free will does not match a compatibilist definition of free will.


Secondly, I dispute that necessitarianism is compatible with intentions, free choice, control, and agency. Consider the statement "water streams look for the path of least resistance". The word "look" is used here in a non-technical sense. Metaphysically, water streams do not literally look for anything as they are just molecules driven by gravity and friction.

Likewise, under necessitarianism, we might say we have intentions, free choices, control, and agency; but only in a non-technical sense. Metaphysically, there is no real intention, free choice, control, or agency since everything is just a cog in a large system.

any cause other than our free will or soul is an "external factor" and it includes not only the environment but also beliefs, desires, genes, etc. In that light, my definition of libertarian free will does not match a compatibilist definition of free will. — A Christian Philosophy

So you're simply stipulating that a soul exists, and on this basis - you "prove" a god exists.

To be clear, I have not been trying to convince you that compatibilism is true. Rather, I'm explaining my point of view. You reject it, and that's fine - I realize my position is inconsistent with theism.

However, I would like you to realize that God's existence can only be "proven" by stipulating certain metaphysical assumptions - assumptions that no naturalist would accept.

Embrace your faith, but recognize it depends on FAITH.

I only brought the word "soul" because you brought it up in your previous comment. If it does not speak to you, we can just drop the word entirely and simply use "will". Regardless, the point remains that the definition of libertarian free will does not match the definition of compatibilist free will.

So you're simply stipulating that a soul exists, and on this basis - you "prove" a god exists. — Relativist

The OP does not presuppose the existence of souls. The current discussion on free will is more like a tangential topic.

To be clear, I have not been trying to convince you that compatibilism is true. Rather, I'm explaining my point of view. You reject it, and that's fine - I realize my position is inconsistent with theism. — Relativist

I understand that your position is inconsistent with theism and that's fine, but as per the second paragraph in my previous comment, your position is also inconsistent with the existence of any real metaphysical agency - which you seem to believe in.

position is also inconsistent with the existence of any real metaphysical agency - which you seem to believe in — A Christian Philosophy

Identify this alleged inconsistency. The comment you referred to doesn't do it:

I dispute that necessitarianism is compatible with intentions, free choice, control, and agency. Consider the statement "water streams look for the path of least resistance". The word "look" is used here in a non-technical sense. Metaphysically, water streams do not literally look for anything as they are just molecules driven by gravity and friction. — A Christian Philosophy

Water streams are not capable of intentional behavior. Human minds are.

Our minds retain memories, develop beliefs. We perceive needs and develop wants. Streams of water do not.

the point remains that the definition of libertarian free will does not match the definition of compatibilist free will. — A Christian Philosophy

It matches the definition you provided:

"the ability to choose without being compelled by external factors (meaning factors other than our will)". — A Christian Philosophy

You may have a different concept of what is meant by "the will", but I regard this to refer to our capacity for intentional behavior - not as some non-physical object. This capacity exists, in varying degrees, in other animals. Example: thirst establishes an intent to drink water, and engage in behaviors to achieve that.

This capacity for intentional behavior, perception, memory etc is the product of evolutionary forces on the development of our central nervous system. Your specific brain was "caused" by the physical development that began with a zygote. From birth, onward- we learn, establishing knowledge that influences our thinking. The collection of all these things (central nervous system, innate cognitive ability, memories, conditioned responses, etc are what makes us who we are. And we are organisms that engage in intentional behavior guided entirely by what is within us. You are trying to define us into non-existence.

From birth, onward- we learn, establishing knowledge that influences our thinking. The collection of all these things (central nervous system, innate cognitive ability, memories, conditioned responses, etc are what makes us who we are. — Relativist

Not an argument against compatibilism, but for info, under libertarian free will, all these things are real and they inform and influence our decisions but do not compel - like a king listening to his advisers, the free will has the final say.

Identify this alleged inconsistency. — Relativist

In summary, real metaphysical agency (not merely the perception of agency) necessitates freedom, i.e. contingency. Since necessitarianism does not allow for contingency, it is not compatible with real metaphysical agency. I don't believe I can explain why any better than what I have done previously, so if you disagree, we can just agree to disagree.

under libertarian free will, all these things are real and they inform and influence our decisions but do not compel - like a king listening to his advisers, the free will has the final say. — A Christian Philosophy

Either these things necessitate the decision, or there is some randomness to the decision. Consider any deliberative decision a person makes: he evaluates from a set of options that have come to mind; he weighs pros and cons, based on his prior-existing beliefs and dispositions, and finally makes a reasoned choice. How could your "king" make a different choice, given the complete set of mental conditions that led up to it? He couldn't, unless the deliberative process included some random element (e.g. randomness in the set of options that came to mind, the weights assigned, the antecedent beliefs...). If the difference is randomness, that's not a manifestation of some additional control.

So the decision-making process does not seem to be a meaningful point of distinction between compatibilism and incompatibilism.

real metaphysical agency (not merely the perception of agency) necessitates freedom, i.e. contingency. — A Christian Philosophy

That is a unique definition of "agency". You're attempting to "win" this debate by creating a non-standard definition of agency that is inconsistent with compatibilism. I previously pointed you to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on agency (again here). As I noted, agency entails
-the capacity to act intentionally
-the capacity to initiate action
-reflection on, and caring about, our actions

In the compatibilism/incompatibilism debate among philosophers, the term "agent," is not in dispute. Rather, they debate what sorts of freedoms human agents require (for example) to be held morally accountable.

I'm also curious how you account for free will given God's foreknowledge. You are not free to make a choice other than the one God knows you will make. No alternatives are possible.

Either these things necessitate the decision, or there is some randomness to the decision. — Relativist

Libertarian free will (LFW) and randomness are similar in that they are both free (i.e. not determined), but a free-willed behaviour is ordered towards a deliberate end where as randomness is not. You can see a diagram in this video at time 0:51.

agency entails
-the capacity to act intentionally
-the capacity to initiate action
-reflection on, and caring about, our actions — Relativist

Can you explain the "capacity to initiate action"? It seems to me that if the entire causal chain is determined, then there is never a point where an action is initiated by the agent, since, as you said, all the things necessitate the agent's decision.

I'm also curious how you account for free will given God's foreknowledge. — Relativist

God's foreknowledge does not entail fate; rather, He observes us in the future as though it is happening in real time. As an analogy ... suppose we have LFW and I videotape your free-willed behaviour for one day. If I watch the video, I foreknow what your behaviour in the video will be since I already observed it. This does not change the fact that we have LFW.

Libertarian free will (LFW) and randomness are similar in that they are both free — A Christian Philosophy

But how can a person have actually made a decision that differs from the one actually made? I have been arguing that, irrespective of LFW or compaitibilism, our choices are made due to a set of mental factors, and that GIVEN those factors, no alternative decisions are possible. Can you falsify this?

You seem to apply this logic:

1. We have LFW (premise).
2. LFW entails our choices are contingent
3. Therefore our choices are contingent (i.e. there are non-actualized possibilities)

I can understand that you believe premise 1, but you haven't provided an argument that establishes this premise. If your logic is different, then please provide it.

Can you explain the "capacity to initiate action"? It seems to me that if the entire causal chain is determined, then there is never a point where an action is initiated by the agent, since, as you said, all the things necessitate the agent's decision.

I choose to lift my arm, and voilà : my arm lifts. I can initiate this action any time I like. I am lifting it, not forces outside of me. Another example: I am writing this response to you - I initiate every keystroke, not something external to me.

God's foreknowledge does not entail fate; rather, He observes us in the future as though it is happening in real time. — A Christian Philosophy

This contradicts omniscience. Omniscience entails knowledge without a process of learning or observing.

I asked the question because I wondered if you embraced Molinism. The Molinist view: God knows every freely-willed choice you will make in every metaphysically possible world. He "chooses" to create the world that results in the best possible world. (God's "choice" is not deliberative; he knows the correct choice through omniscience).

But how can a person have actually made a decision that differs from the one actually made? I have been arguing that, irrespective of LFW or compaitibilism, our choices are made due to a set of mental factors, and that GIVEN those factors, no alternative decisions are possible. Can you falsify this? — Relativist

Alternative decisions are possible if we have the power of LFW which gives us exactly that: the ability to make alternative decisions. This power would be irreducible to any underlying mechanism, otherwise it would not be free.

I could provide arguments to defend LFW, but to understand them, it is best to first understand the scope and limitations of LFW. For that, I recommend watching the video on free will. Sorry to keep pushing it, but I think it's the fastest way to describe LFW. It's 20 min long but you can just watch the first 12 minutes.

I choose to lift my arm, and voilà : my arm lifts. I can initiate this action any time I like. I am lifting it, not forces outside of me. — Relativist

There are no physical forces outside of you but all the factors that necessitate your actions originate from outside of you.

This contradicts omniscience. Omniscience entails knowledge without a process of learning or observing. — Relativist

There are different views on God's omniscience. To obtain omniscience through observing (at least for knowledge about free willed behaviours) is still a form of omniscience. And God can still be omniscient at all times if He stands outside of time.

Thanks for sharing the view about Molinism; I did not know about this. At first glance, it sounds promising.

Alternative decisions are possible if we have the power of LFW which gives us exactly that: the ability to make alternative decisions. — A Christian Philosophy

You've simply restated your assertion, and haven't considered the decision process.

Deliberative decisions entail a series of thoughts that lead to a decision. These thoughts entail consideration of immediate perceptions (sounds smells, tastes, shapes. textures...), beliefs, dispositions, and conditioned responses. All of which are considered within a specific state of mind (e.g. mood, energy, feelings). The particular sequence of thoughts (which even your "king" must go through) leads to a decision. It makes no sense to suggest that the same sequence of thoughts (by the same "king"), in the same state of mind, could have reached a different conclusion, because there can be no reason for it. Simply declaring that LFW accounts for other, non-actual, possibilities ignores these mental processes.

Could one of the intermediate thoughts have differred? No, because each intermediate thought developed similarly, or is simply a recall of a prior belief, disposition (transient attitude, general dispositions, mood), some immediate sensory perceptions (e.g. smell, sight, sound), or a conditioned response to a prior thought or sensation.

So why do we tend to think we could have chosen differently? Because we are reflecting on a past choice based on our new mental context - different state of mind, the benefit of lesson learned, gaining additional knowledge, or considering additional impacts that were previously overlooked. Entertaining these counterfactuals creates an illusion of contingency.

In your video, you claimed that we ought to trust our intuition that we could have made a different choice. My above analysis counters that: when reflecting back, we are considering a past choice from a new perspective. This does not entail winding the clock back to the prior set of mental conditions.

Another issue: you claimed Occam's razor (principle of parsimony) should be applied to this intution of contingency, suggesting it's a "simpler explanation". That is a misstatement of parsimony. Newton's gravitational theory is simpler than General Relativity (GR), but we choose GR because it explains the fuller set of facts.

The fullest set of relevant facts includes everything we know about the natural world, which is mostly a product of science. The success of physics at describing the evolution of the universe through laws, is strong evidence that the universe evolves strictly according to laws - implying determinism is true. So it becomes UNparsimonious to assume humans are an exception to determinism. What could account for this exception? A deterministic universe could not produce an object that behaves INdeterministically.

A theist would reply that God accounts for this indeterminacy - he directly creates a soul/will/"king". That takesGod's existence for granted. To actually prove free will exists, you would assume the burden to prove God exists. God+LFW is inherently unparsimonious, compared to compatibilism. So your "Occam's razor" argument fails.

I'll defer addressing your moral argument for now, but it will also fail.

There are no physical forces outside of you but all the factors that necessitate your actions originate from outside of you. — A Christian Philosophy

You are committing 2 errors:

1) You assume that if A causes B, and B causes C, then B lacks causal efficacy. This is absurd.

2) You ignore the fact that every part of a person has been caused even under your paradigm. You came into existence from the development of a zygote that was created from your parents union (they were each created the same way). This established (i.e. caused) your intrinsic nature.

As you matured, you were shaped by your environment (a causal effect). It influenced what you came to believe and how you think. You are changed a bit by every new experience, each of which you process through the lens of your existing world view- an ever evolving perspective that shapes your subjective interpretations of the experiences.

You can interject your belief that there is a non-physical inner soul/will/"king", that is part of your core identity, but even so - this thing did not pop into existence uncaused. You assume God caused it. So even if your LFW paradigm is correct, everything about you was still caused.

Simply declaring that LFW accounts for other, non-actual, possibilities ignores these mental processes. — Relativist

These mental processes are not ignored in LFW. They are part of the decision mechanism but they only serve to inform, not compel. The mental process serves to predict the end goal of the choice, called motive. If there is no conflict between two types of motive, then the decision mechanism is very much as you described under compatibilism, i.e., the strongest motive wins. But if there a conflict between two types of motive, i.e. pleasure vs moral duty, then the agent is free to choose between the two motives.

So why do we tend to think we could have chosen differently? Because we are reflecting on a past choice based on our new mental context - different state of mind, the benefit of lesson learned, gaining additional knowledge, or considering additional impacts that were previously overlooked. Entertaining these counterfactuals creates an illusion of contingency. — Relativist

This would explain why we might choose differently after a change of factors, but not why we perceive that we are free to choose for a given set of factors. As an analogy: In a mathematical formula, the result may change if the variables in the formula change; but for a given set of variables, we do not expect more than one possible result.

To actually prove free will exists, you would assume the burden to prove God exists. — Relativist

This is not necessary. The current topic is only to determine whether LFW exists; and we can know that something exists without knowing where it comes from, which is a different topic. Also, many people who believe in LFW do not believe in God.

You assume that if A causes B, and B causes C, then B lacks causal efficacy. This is absurd. — Relativist

I don't dispute that B has causal efficacy. I dispute that B has agency, as agency requires the capacity to initiate an action, and B does not initiate the action.

You ignore the fact that every part of a person has been caused even under your paradigm. — Relativist

Yes, there is a cause to our existence, including our power of free will. But once we have it, it gives us the power to initiate an action. LFW allows us to select between choices A and B, i.e., to initiate the action to actualize contingent world A or B.

These mental processes are not ignored in LFW. They are part of the decision mechanism but they only serve to inform, not compel. — A Christian Philosophy

My point is that the process is identical whether its LFW or Compatibilist. The only difference is that you assume the mind is an actual source of ontological contingency. But you have not established this to be the case through any stated reasoning. You've described your opinion, but not stated an argument that shows why I should accept it.

The mental process serves to predict the end goal of the choice, called motive. If there is no conflict between two types of motive, then the decision mechanism is very much as you described under compatibilism, i.e., the strongest motive wins. But if there a conflict between two types of motive, i.e. pleasure vs moral duty, then the agent is free to choose between the two motives. — A Christian Philosophy

That's totally unconvincing. I take exception with both your terminology and your assumptions.

The mental process I described applies whether or not LFW is true, and you've ignored it in your account and simply repeated your overly simplistic description.

A choice can be before us for a variety of reasons, such as the pursuit of a goal, or entering a forced choice situation that requires choosing an option. The end result of the process isn't a "prediction", it's the decision - and I'm referring to the final decision, often immediately preceding the act. There are often many motivations, not just 1 or 2 "motives". I prefer to call them "dispositions", as a more general term than motive. There are conscious dispositions and subconscious ones. A few examples: a preference of color, a pleasant scent, a sense of pride, a desire for pleasure (sexual, aesthetic, comradery...), and even a disposition to do good, among countless many others. Beliefs are closely tied to dispositions, and are critical to the process because they are essential to the thought process.

Some dispositions are stronger than others, and the relative strengths will fluctuate over even short periods of time (example: mood swings). Same with beliefs: some are more strongly held (more certain) than others, and they also vary in relative importance. Some dispositions and beliefs have emotive qualities, meaning that they may trigger happiness, anger, affection, hatred, pleasure, etc. Every emotion is connected to beliefs and dispositions.

Morals are both dispositions and beliefs. One may be disposed to do good things in general, or specific good things in particular. But what we consider to be "good" entails a belief.

Your description omits all these factors, and I think it's self-evident that something like this is going on.

I'll now interject the compatibilist view of moral accountability that I had deferred.

It is appropriate to hold oneself (or another person) accountable for a bad act because we know he could have chosen not to do it. Here's how he could have: if he had a stronger disposition to do good, a stronger belief that the act is bad, had he considered the consequences, been more empathetic, or if he more strongly believed the "sin" could have eternal consequences, he would not have done it (my list is illustrative, not exhaustive). With oneself, there are lessons learned (new, or strenthened beliefs) from the consequences of the act, so future choices may improve.

With regard to misbehavior by others. social approbation is added- public shame or even punishment. To the degree this is public, the observed process influences members of the public to gain similar lessons learned, vicariously.

So why do we tend to think we could have chosen differently? Because we are reflecting on a past choice based on our new mental context - different state of mind, the benefit of lesson learned, gaining additional knowledge, or considering additional impacts that were previously overlooked. Entertaining these counterfactuals creates an illusion of contingency.
— Relativist

This would explain why we might choose differently after a change of factors, but not why we perceive that we are free to choose for a given set of factors.

Yes it does! It's PRECISELY why we perceive that we could have made a different choice.

To deny this, you would have to assume that fantasizing about a past choice entails a perfect duplication of the mental conditions that led to the decision. If it is NOT perfect, then it is not a valid basis for claiming this is a good reason to believe a different choice was actually possible.

To actually prove free will exists, you would assume the burden to prove God exists.
— Relativist
This is not necessary. The current topic is only to determine whether LFW exists; and we can know that something exists without knowing where it comes from, which is a different topic. Also, many people who believe in LFW do not believe in God. — A Christian Philosophy

OK, let's not assume God. Early in the discussion, you agreed that ontological contingency requires a source of contingency. If there's no God, then human life came to exist as a product of deterministic laws of nature. A deteministic law cannot be a source of ontological contingency. Case closed. This is why I said you needed a God who could create beings that behave with true contingency.

You assume that if A causes B, and B causes C, then B lacks causal efficacy. This is absurd.
— Relativist
I don't dispute that B has causal efficacy. I dispute that B has agency, as agency requires the capacity to initiate an action, and B does not initiate the action. — A Christian Philosophy

It sounds ludicrous to claim I do not initiate the raising of my arm. You've given me no reason to doubt that I am initiating the action. You just seem to make a personal judgement based on a framework you invented.

That framework simply describes what you believe; you've provided no reason for me to accept it. To do that, you would need to show it's superior to other frameworks.