, is it worth my time to reply? There's a lot in your post, which I appreciate, but as a result there are multiple issues to discuss. Is there a point in my proceeding? Are you open to attempting to express your ideas in a more standard form? Let's look at just the first point.

1. An OG exists autonomously. This means without dependencies of any kind (causal or otherwise). If it had such a dependency it could not be the OG — Relativist

You introduce "autonomous" and "dependent". Perhaps we can get more clarity by sticking to truth functional operatives.
So you have here something like that nothing implies an OG; that nothing else has to be true in order for an OG to be true. That is, for any fact p, both p and ~p imply the OG.

This gives us (p v ~p)⊃OG. That is, regardless of what other states of affairs hold, OG will be true. Stated otherwise, OG is a necessary truth. So you do not need to show that OG is necessary, since you have assumed it. ☐OG. See the tree proof.

All that just for Point one.

Now look at point two.

2. For an object, X, to be ontologically contingent, there must be some C that accounts for X, but C could have accounted for ~X. Example: assume quantum collapse is not determinate, and C is a quantum collapse in which X emerged. X is contingent because C could have collapsed to Y. I express this as:
C accounts for (X or Y), or more generally: C accounts for (X or ~X). — Relativist

Here you have C⊃(X v ~X). Now (X v ~X) is a tautology, and so necessarily true. If the consequent of an implication is true, then the whole implication is true. That is, ☐( X v ~X), and so ☐(C⊃(X v ~X)).

So again you do not need to demonstrate that C⊃(X v ~X) is necessary. You have assumed it. But you cannot conclude that C is necessary. Nor that it is contingent. See the tree proof.

3. If an object is not contingent (as identified in #2) then it is necessary. — Relativist

Take care here. Contingency is not the same as possibility. An object that is not contingent may also be impossible.

4. Compare this to the outcome of a deterministic law of nature: the law: C causes X. Because it's deterministic, it means: C necessarily causes X. If C is contingent, then there X inherits this contingency (whatever accounts for the contingency of C, also accounts for the contingency of X). — Relativist

Here we run into the problem of what it is for A to cause B. IF it's just A⊃B, then all sorts of things we would not usually call causes will count as causes. So "cause " is not often understood as "implies".

We do not know if C is necessary or contingent or impossible.

So you cannot get to your point five.

5. An OG is not contingent because there is no C that accounts for the OC (that would entail a dependency - see#1). Therefore it exists necessarily. — Relativist

But that doesn't matter, since you assumed that OG is necessary at step one.

What this shows is that you haven't proved ☐OG, but assumed it.

Now, was that worth my time?

Are you open to attempting to express your ideas in a more standard form? — Banno

No. IMO, that obfuscates the ontology. I did not assert the OG exists necessarily as a premise. Rather, it's necessity follows from my ontological account of contingency and the nature of the OG (here, you could refer to the facts about the OG).

Many philosophers treat contingency as the default: X exists contingently unless provably necessary. I believe this is wrong. Contingency should be accounted for ontologically. What is actually contingent in the world? Classical laws of nature necessitate the outcome, so they don't introduce contingency. If everything in the universe were a consequence of classical laws of nature, where would contingency come in?

Quantum collapse seems to have contingent outcomes (deterministic interpretations notwithstanding). But in these cases, the contingency is accounted for as I described: the thing that accounts for the outcome could have NOT produced that specific outcome. There could be other sources of contingency operating similarly.

By definition, an OG is not accounted for by anything ontologically prior, so it can't fit my assumption that contingency must be accounted for as I described.

When you translate this to facts and apply logic, it risks collapse the reasoning into the entailment of those facts.

But you could cut through all this and focus on the OG: either it is contingent or necessary. Either it's contingency needs to be accounted for or its necessity. Ignore my arguments and its a coin toss. But BECAUSE of my arguments (I have more supporting arguments, BTW). I'm on the side of it being necessary.

No — Relativist

Ok. Then we'll leave it there. Seems you haven't followed what I wrote anyway, so I'll cut my losses.

First let's look at the idea of ontological grounding. What we want is for an explanation as to why the world is as it is, and not some other way. If something could have been otherwise, it cannot explain why something is necessarily the case. So any ontological grounding must be necessary. But then it would be the same in every possible world. And in that case, it could not explain why this world is as it is. — Banno

I don't think I agree with this. The nature o time explains both, why things could have been otherwise, and also why whatever is, is necessarily the case. Everything which has reached the present and is progressing into the past is necessarily the case. The past cannot be changed. However, the future is full of possibility, so there was the possibility that before the last bit of time passed, different possibilities could have been actualized, therefore things could have been otherwise.

What this means is that the law of non-contradiction is not violated when you have an Einstein across different worlds because the entire modal structure demands he be different across differing worlds in non-essential ways. — Hanover

Then it's not a true "rigid designator", if this means "the same individual". By the law of identity, "same" means having all the same properties, essential and accidental. So, all you are saying is that the so-called "rigid designator" does not identify the same individual, but similar individuals, individuals of the same type, sharing essential properties. Saying that they are "the same" when there is differences would be a violation of the law of identity, so the "rigid designator" violates the law of identity i it defines "the same" individual.

But what I've been telling you is that it's not a problem for modal logic. It doesn't mean modal logic collapses, it just means modal logic inconsistent with those other three laws of logic which stipulate what we can truthfully say about a thing. But modal logic is intended to be applied toward possibility, not truth, so they have different fields of application. So there is no problem. That is, unless someone wants to try and make them consistent with each other, conflate the fields of application, then that person creates an unnecessary problem for oneself.

Let's forget this possible worlds interpretation of modal logic for the moment, because it's just a distraction, and get right to the point. Let's consider the reality of decision making, when a person considers distinct and contrary possibilities in the act of deliberation. When I deliberate, I put myself into distinct and contrary situations, as distinct possibilities (possible worlds). I consider myself bringing an umbrella, and I consider myself not bringing an umbrella. Clearly I am considering two contradictory scenarios, which I mull over at much the same time. In my deliberation, it makes no sense to ask which one is the case, which one is true, because it is my decision which will determine that. I am not concerned with what is true.

What I think, is that it's not really me, in either one of those contrary scenarios, it's just an imaginary me. Therefore the supposed person in the two contrary scenarios, really has no identity at all. Identity is something which things have. Imaginary things do not have an identity. This is similar to the "me" in a dream, it's not the real me, it's an imaginary me. The two versions of "me", in tomorrow's scenario, are in no way the real me, with my identity, as they are just imaginary, no different from if I imagined that tomorrow I was the president of the United States. The mistaken interpretation of modal logic is in the assumption that the objects in these possible scenarios have identity as real objects.

If we let go of this idea, that the imaginary thing has an identity, (the me of tomorrow who in one version carries an umbrella, and in another does not carry an umbrella, or could even be the PotUS), then it's very easy to understand the real nature of possibility, and the usefulness of modal logic. What we are considering is possibilities, and identity, along with truth and falsity have no bearing whatsoever. And when we work with the logic of possibilities what guides the decision is what we ought to conclude, not what is true or false.

I don't think I agree with this. The nature o time explains both, why things could have been otherwise, and also why whatever is, is necessarily the case. Everything which has reached the present and is progressing into the past is necessarily the case. The past cannot be changed. However, the future is full of possibility, so there was the possibility that before the last bit of time passed, different possibilities could have been actualized, therefore things could have been otherwise. — Metaphysician Undercover

Events in the past are not necessarily true. They still might have been otherwise. You might not have written the thread to which this is a response, for example. It makes sense to discuss such possibilities, and to make inferences about them. So if you had not written that post, I would not be writing this reply. That's a sound argument. The sort of sound argument that your system denies.

Then it's not a true "rigid designator", if this means "the same individual". By the law of identity, "same" means having all the same properties, essential and accidental. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, here we just must agree to disagree. This is not what. I take as identity. Me in a red shirt is the me in a blue shirt. If you require this sort of identity, then we can't initiate a conversation of possible worlds for analysis of hypothetical claims.

Saying that they are "the same" when there is differences would be a violation of the law of identity, so the "rigid designator" violates the law of identity i it defines "the same" individual. — Metaphysician Undercover

You don't have two yous simultaneously in a given world. You're comparing separate workds.

If we let go of this idea, that the imaginary thing has an identity, — Metaphysician Undercover

The fictionalization of the multiple worlds is assumed for the purposes of performing the logic (except by some who take rather extreme untenable views), meaning you're attempting to impose far too much ontological status on the worlds .

Let's forget this possible worlds interpretation of modal logic for the moment, — Metaphysician Undercover

Well sure, you can dispense with all formal logic and still make decisions, argue, and philosophize fully. The point of symbologic logic is to create a methodology to test your reasoning, but if we forget the whole rigamarole, I agree, that does simplify our discussion about whether to grab an umbrella.

So his system is consistent, but useless for any sort of modal reasoning, and leads directly to fatalism. — Banno

Well, that frames the issue and maybe it's been asked before, but if not, allow me:

@Metaphysician Undercover, do you agree p(x)⊃□p(x) (if something is true, it must necessarily be true)?

If not, fill in the blank. if something is true, then _________.

Events in the past are not necessarily true. They still might have been otherwise. — Banno

In order to properly represent the true nature of time, there are subtle differences of language which we must respect. "X could have been otherwise", and "X is necessarily true" are not inconsistent. This is because "could have been" refers to the past, and "is" refers to the present time. So, at that past time referred to by "could have been", things could have happened differently. But now, 'that ship has sailed' (as they say), and what occurred is necessarily the case.

It makes sense to discuss such possibilities, and to make inferences about them. So if you had not written that post, I would not be writing this reply. That's a sound argument. The sort of sound argument that your system denies. — Banno

Why do you think I deny that? I haven't proposed a system. I'm just pointing out potential problems of application and interpretation of modal logic.

This is the difference between applying modal logic to the past, and applying it to the future, which I have been explaining. We can talk about the possible different pasts, like if I had not written the last post, but we respect the fact that I did write that post. So there is an actual past, which I described as "necessary", and we respect that as a true fact. This is not a "system", it's just a description of how we understand the nature of time.

However, I can look to the future, and consider the possibility of deleting, and therefore not posting this post. In this case, looking toward the future, there is no actual 'necessary' fact, no truth to the matter. I might either post or not post. Therefore the application of modal logic toward the future must be interpreted in a way which is completely different from the way that the application of modal logic to the past is interpreted.

Well, here we just must agree to disagree. This is not what. I take as identity. Me in a red shirt is the me in a blue shirt. If you require this sort of identity, then we can't initiate a conversation of possible worlds for analysis of hypothetical claims. — Hanover

I'm just adhering to the law of identity, (a thing is the same as itself), and I am attempting to maintain its intended meaning. In the meantime, I ought to out that many common modern definitions of "identity" by logicians, are inconsistent with the law of identity. There are some people on this forum for example, who argue that "=" in mathematics signifies identity, such that "2+2" has the same identity as "4".

To take your example, the object referred to by "me", takes off the red shirt, and puts on the blue shirt, and you maintain your identity as the same object. "Identity", by the law of identity, allows for changes over time, because it puts the identity of the thing within the thing itself. If we make identity what we say about the thing, rather than placing it within the thing, then we can arbitrarily decide which features are essential to the thing, such as wearing a red shirt perhaps. Then we might distinguish the person with the red shirt, from all the others with different coloured shirts, and 'identify' the person that way. That's a pragmatic sense, it serves the purpose. However, if someone else comes along with a red shirt, then there is a problem. So, the law of identity provides a much more rigorous form of identity by putting the identity right into the object itself, the substance, and so we general identify through the observed temporal continuity of the object.

I do not see why you think that insisting on proper adherence to "identity" removes the possibility of modal logic. As I've been arguing, it's only a matter of how modal logic is interpreted. Even in traditional propositional logic, the name is a subject, not an object, and predication involves a subject and predicate. If our subject is "Hanover", we can make all sorts of predications, and there is no need for an object which conforms. Hanover could be imaginary. It's only in the interpretation, when we judge for truth, that we take an object which is supposed to correspond with this subject. The fundamental three laws apply to how we judge for truth, this means that they apply to the interpretation of the premises.

So, all that matters is that we maintain the proper separation between subject and object. In the case of modal logic, the subject is completely abstract, imaginary. There is no corresponding object, as I explained in the last post, and relations to any true existing object must be established by other premises, which escape the judgement of truth or falsity. That's the principal point, we cannot judge the premises by truth and falsity, because they are possibilities.

Rather than saying it is a problem of modal logic, I believe it is a problem to be found more in the way that traditional propositional logic has been corrupted in many interpretations. Many interpretations do not make the subject/object distinction, assuming that the name is an object, and truth is taken for granted. Then interpretations of modal logic are confused with interpretation of propositional logic because there is no more subject/object distinction. Once this happens we have no way to distinguish imaginary conceptual "objects" from real substantial "objects".

You don't have two yous simultaneously in a given world. You're comparing separate workds. — Hanover

The interpretation of "separate worlds" is irrelevant. If the rigid designator signifies "the same object", when you are talking about two different objects (in different worlds or whatever) then the law of identity, is violated, regardless of how you want to attempt to justify it. That is the purpose of the law of identity, it puts identity into the substance, and puts an end to all such sophistry. You can continue in your description of same person in different worlds, and deny the law of identity. Some philosophers, like Hegel, denied that law's usefulness usefulness, and simply proceeded without it. But I think it's a good idea to recognize the difference, and understand when the law of identity is being followed, and when it is not.

The fictionalization of the multiple worlds is assumed for the purposes of performing the logic (except by some who take rather extreme untenable views), meaning you're attempting to impose far too much ontological status on the worlds . — Hanover

The assumption of separate worlds is not at all necessary for the purpose of the logic. It is assumed for interpretive purposes only. We can assume separate possibilities instead of separate worlds, and this is a more appropriate interpretation, because it doesn't give a specific possibility the status of being a world.

Well sure, you can dispense with all formal logic and still make decisions, argue, and philosophize fully. The point of symbologic logic is to create a methodology to test your reasoning, but if we forget the whole rigamarole, I agree, that does simplify our discussion about whether to grab an umbrella. — Hanover

The formal logic which deals with possibilities does not require that we interpret each specified possibility as a distinct world. That is what produces the interpretive problem, because then you want to put the same object (rigid designator) into different worlds, and that's nonsense. We need to respect the reality that these are simply distinct possibilities, not separate worlds. It creates the interpretive difficulty, because then you want to place the same object (rigid designator) in different worlds. But that's inconsistency, because if its different worlds it ought to be different objects as well. And this is only overcome by employing arbitrary principles of sameness.

Well, that frames the issue and maybe it's been asked before, but if not, allow me:

@Metaphysician Undercover, do you agree p(x)⊃□p(x) (if something is true, it must necessarily be true)? — Hanover

It doesn't really frame the issue, because I have no system here, I am simply pointing out the difference between two distinct systems, not promoting one or the other. One system leads to fatalism, yes, but that's not "my system".

I agree that what is true is necessarily true, that is due to the nature of time, what has been done cannot be undone. And that's what I told Banno above, at the beginning of this post where I discuss "could have been different". Banno wants to ignore the reality of the difference between past and future, and make "could have been different" equivalent to "could be different", such that what is the case, what is true is not necessarily true. This leads to a lack of distinction between future possibilities, and past necessities, which could also be represented as possibilities, such as in the use of counterfactuals.

I agree that what is true is necessarily true, that is due to the nature of time, what has been done cannot be undone. And that's what I told Banno above, at the beginning of this post where I discuss "could have been different". — Metaphysician Undercover

No, you don't agree with the question I posed due to the nature of time because the nature of time has nothing to do with the question i asked.

Metaphysical necessity means things could not have been different -- full stop -- period. Temporal necessity means things are fixed once done.

So, standing at the Rubicon, must Cesaer cross? Just yes or no.

And of course that event is now in the past, but that doesn't change the analysis. Metaphysical necessity would mean it could not have been but the way it was. If that's what you're saying, you're speaking deterministic/ fatalistic language.

But, if you do agree with the statement p(x)⊃□p(x), even if it's for an invalid reason, you reject modal logic and you accept fatalism. That's just the necessary consequence.

If the rigid designator signifies "the same object", when you are talking about two different objects (in different worlds or whatever) then the law of identity, is violated — Metaphysician Undercover

You're just showing the consequences of pure hard determinism. That is, If I would have worn a blue shirt and not the red one I actually wore, I would not be me because I am the thing that was to wear a red shirt. That's who I am. All properties in your analysis are essential, and there is no rigid me, so loss of the shirt I was to wear creates a whole new identity.

You're just performing a reductio of your own position and spelling out the consequences. If you're arguing against free will, then just be clear about it.

By the law of identity, "same" means having all the same properties, essential and accidental. — Metaphysician Undercover

(I stopped following this carefully, so if what I'm saying has already been addressed, please ignore)

About the "law of identity": You do realize you're begging the question of what the entity is that's supposed to be "the same"? If you understand "Jill" to refer to every single component and property of the person designated as Jill -- "all properties, essential and accidental" -- at the time of designation, T1, then yes, anything that isn't that "Jill" will not be "the same." But that isn't in any way a proof that there are no other ways to understand what "Jill" refers to. You can't say this is true "by the law of identity." And indeed, this extreme version -- molecule-to-molecule identity -- is most unlikely to be invoked in any ordinary discourse I can think of.

I think you've been seduced by the apparent simplicity of the Law of Identity (capitalized, to indicate its usual formulation) that says only "A = A" without any further indication of what can count as an A.
It's up to us; the so-called Law is neutral on the subject. The problem is that, depending on the context, what counts as an A in good standing will vary quite a bit. With persons, the variation is enormous, though as you know, I think Kripke got the right handle on it with his idea of what a proper name may be said to name.

Everything which has reached the present and is progressing into the past is necessarily the case. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yet

"X could have been otherwise", and "X is necessarily true" are not inconsistent. — Metaphysician Undercover

So now you allow for necessary truths that could have been otherwise. That's not what a necessary truth is.

The bit where I said:

I'd caution agains attempting to show that there is an inconsistency in Meta's logic. He may simple add ad hoc hypotheses in order to escape. — Banno

Again, there is a point wee our conversation becomes too ridiculous to continue.

Why do you think I deny that? — Metaphysician Undercover

Because you sad as much.

I haven't proposed a system. I'm just pointing out potential problems of application and interpretation of modal logic. — Metaphysician Undercover

You have proposed a system. We've been pointing out that the consequences of that system.

What has been shown is that you have a profound misunderstanding of modality, that you are incapable of recognising.

Oh, well.

Nice try.

If something could have been otherwise, it cannot explain why something is necessarily the case. So any ontological grounding must be necessary. But then it would be the same in every possible world. And in that case, it could not explain why this world is as it is. — Banno

I agree that the ontological grounding (OG) must exist necessarily and so it is the same in all possible worlds. But now we can entertain the idea that the OG is a designer with free will, which is something the OP points to. With this, we preserve the idea of possible worlds (free will means the OG is free to have chosen otherwise), and have a possible explanation for the actual world (it was freely chosen) even if the specifics of that explanation are not known to us.



I agree with your points 1, 3, 4, and 5.
I don't agree with point 2 but I hope this is not critical and that we can leave it alone because I'd rather not venture into any quantum discussion.
I choose point 7 over 6 but I must change it slightly:

7. If you are committed to an OG, then you should reject any version of a PSR that requires everything to have an explanation. You could accept "necessary" and/or "autonomous" as sufficient explanation. — Relativist

I believe that inherent existence is a sufficient explanation that fulfills the PSR for the OG. You also called that "de re necessity" earlier.

But now we can entertain the idea that the OG is a designer with free will, which is something the OP points to. — A Christian Philosophy

You've got bigger problems than that.

The OG is supposed to explain why things are as they are. If the OG is compatible with every possible world, it can't do this. If, the reason any particular university is as it is, is the OG made it so, then the OG can't explain why this universe rather than some other.

No, you don't agree with the question I posed due to the nature of time because the nature of time has nothing to do with the question i asked.

Metaphysical necessity means things could not have been different -- full stop -- period. Temporal necessity means things are fixed once done.

So, standing at the Rubicon, must Cesaer cross? Just yes or no.

And of course that event is now in the past, but that doesn't change the analysis. Metaphysical necessity would mean it could not have been but the way it was. If that's what you're saying, you're speaking deterministic/ fatalistic language.

But, if you do agree with the statement p(x)⊃□p(x), even if it's for an invalid reason, you reject modal logic and you accept fatalism. That's just the necessary consequence. — Hanover

You present me with two senses of "necessity" then you limit yourself to one. I accept temporal necessity, past things are fixed, but I reject metaphysical necessity. I accept that things could have been otherwise. How do you conclude that this means I reject modal logic?

You're just showing the consequences of pure hard determinism. That is, If I would have worn a blue shirt and not the red one I actually wore, I would not be me because I am the thing that was to wear a red shirt. That's who I am. All properties in your analysis are essential, and there is no rigid me, so loss of the shirt I was to wear creates a whole new identity. — Hanover

It's not determinism at all, it's what you called "temporal necessity". You are the person who actually wore the red shirt. That is true fact, which cannot be otherwise. This does not imply that it could not have been otherwise. You having worn the blue shirt is an imaginary scenario. And, we can talk about that imaginary scenario as a counterfactual. This is a statement about the past, at the present time, and the fact that you wore the red shirt cannot be changed at this time. This does not imply that at that past time, before you chose which shirt to wear, you were destined to wear the red one. You had free choice and possibility at that time. Just because it's a true and necessary fact right now, which cannot be changed, that you wore the red shirt yesterday, does not imply that you were destined to wear that shirt. The nature of time is relevant.

The past has been determined, the future has not been determined. On what premise do you conclude that just because we cannot change that fact, that you wore the red shirt, and this is a necessary aspect of the object I call "you", that you wore the red shirt yesterday, we must also conclude that yesterday, before you chose to do that, it was necessary that you chose the red. There is nothing to support that conclusion unless we premise that past and future have the same type of properties. This is the point, the past is substantially different from the future, we must respect this fact, therefore logic applied to the past must be different from logic applied to the future. They are substantiated differently.

About the "law of identity": You do realize you're begging the question of what the entity is that's supposed to be "the same"? If you understand "Jill" to refer to every single component and property of the person designated as Jill -- "all properties, essential and accidental" -- at the time of designation, T1, then yes, anything that isn't that "Jill" will not be "the same." But that isn't in any way a proof that there are no other ways to understand what "Jill" refers to. You can't say this is true "by the law of identity." And indeed, this extreme version -- molecule-to-molecule identity -- is most unlikely to be invoked in any ordinary discourse I can think of. — J

The law of identity refers to the thing, not its parts. It is not proven, but a fundamental assumption, taken as a sort of self-evident truth. However, some philosophers see reasons to reject it. Perhaps you do too. But when it is rejected, individuation becomes arbitrary because we do not allow that there are real, true principles of unity which constitute "a thing". And that is contrary to empirical observation, as we see unified things.

So now you allow for necessary truths that could have been otherwise. That's not what a necessary truth is. — Banno

That's what you think. Hanover has already distinguished two senses of necessity, and there are more. I think that a proper understanding of contingency will reveal to you that as much as all things are contingent, the past causes, which caused the existence of the current contingent things are necessary for their current existence. And, since all things are contingent, your sense of "necessary truth", as a thing which could not have been otherwise, is an ideal which is irrelevant to actual existence, as something impossible. All things could have been otherwise, unless you conclude a necessary being like God. But this has little, if any, bearing on the fact that they cannot be other than they have been.

So now you allow for necessary truths that could have been otherwise. That's not what a necessary truth is.
— Banno

That's what you think. — Metaphysician Undercover

No. It's what "necessity" is. Something is necessarily so if it could not have been otherwise.

And more. Check out the SEP article on modal logic and you will see that the modal framework can be use din deontological and temporal situations; indeed, it has a general applicability. So those alternate"senses" you want to appeal to are also well catered for by modal logic.

..all things are contingent... — Metaphysician Undercover

Not if p(x)⊃□p(x), which is what you claimed at the start. :roll:

The bit in which you change your claims, not to correct yourself but to contradict those who point out your own errors.

I don't know if you are sincere or just a contrarian bot.

But there is a reason I usually ignore your posts.

You present me with two senses of "necessity" then you limit yourself to one. I accept temporal necessity, past things are fixed, but I reject metaphysical necessity. I accept that things could have been otherwise. How do you conclude that this means I reject modal logic? — Metaphysician Undercover

There was no ambiguity on my part, and no introduction by me of temporal necessity. That was your doing, and I indicated it had no bearing on our conversation.

My specific question was:

"@Metaphysician Undercover, do you agree p(x)⊃□p(x) (if something is true, it must necessarily be true)?"

This question is precise. The symbolic form cannot be interpreted as anything other than me asking your view on metaphysical necessity.

If you disagree with the proposition in the question, you allow for possible other worlds. If not, then not. If you think there can't be other worlds even if there are other possible outcomes in any given situation, then you make zero sense because that's what an other world is.

No. It's what "necessity" is. Something is necessarily so if it could not have been otherwise.

And more. Check out the SEP article on modal logic and you will see that the modal framework can be use din deontological and temporal situations; indeed, it has a general applicability. So those alternate"senses" you want to appeal to are also well catered for by modal logic. — Banno

Aren't you contradicting yourself? First you say "It's what necessity is". Then you say that alternate senses are catered to as well. If there are other senses, then clearly that one sense is not "what necessity is".

Not if p(x)⊃□p(x), which is what you claimed at the start. :roll:

The bit in which you change your claims, not to correct yourself but to contradict those who point out your own errors.

I don't know if you are sincere or just a contrarian bot.

But there is a reason I usually ignore your posts. — Banno

You still don't understand what I am saying about the relevance of time. Looking backward in time, all things are necessary. Looking forward in time, all things are possible. This implies that all things at the present, i.e. "what is", are contingent, meaning dependent on something else, for existence. Being dependent on something else for existence ( a cause) i.e. being contingent, does not imply that once it exists its existence is not necessary. To the contrary, as we say, a contingent thing's existence is necessitated by its causes, implying that once caused, its existence is necessary. The fact that it is necessary once caused does not prevent us from classifying it as a contingent thing, because that cause itself was not necessary at that time.

If you disagree with the proposition in the question, you allow for possible other worlds. — Hanover

By your restriction of "necessary", I disagree. I didn't read the symbols, only the interpretation in words, and the sense of "necessary" I was using was what you call "temporal necessity".

But, I still don't see how you claim the nature of time is irrelevant to the application and interpretation of modal logic. Logic is useless if not applied to the real world, therefore the real nature of time is highly relevant.

Aren't you contradicting yourself? — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, no. Rather, you haven't been able to understand what is being said.

And again, this is not just my view. It is the standard approach to modality.

You still don't understand what I am saying about the relevance of time. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think I do. I also think that your view is mistaken.

Looking backward in time, all things are necessary. — Metaphysician Undercover

Then it was a necessity that Caesar crossed the Rubicon - it could not have been otherwise. Again, if it is necessarily true, it is true in all circumstances. And if that is so, Caesar had no choice.

You want to claim that it is not necessarily true until it becomes a past event. This is mistaking modality for temporality.

Again, plainly we can consider what might have occurred had Caesar not crossed the Rubicon. Therefore it is possible that Caesar not have crossed the Rubicon. If this were not so, we would not be able to consider the possibility.

But it could not have be otherwise in the actual world. Once he crossed the Rubicon, his, and indeed our, fates were set.

And this is not a contradiction becasue Caesar crossed the Rubicon in the actual world, but we can stipulate another in which he didn't.

All the imagined contradictions you ply us with dissipate when modal logic and possible world semantics are understood.

So again, I think both and I have a very good grasp of what you are trying to claim, but that we have a better grasp of the Possible World Semantics you refuse to read about, and so can see where you are mistaken.

Let's take a look at how PWS deals with Caesar.

"Caesar crossed the Rubicon" is possible, but not necessary.

That is, there are possible worlds in which Caesar crossed the Rubicon; and there are possible worlds in which Caesar did not cross the Rubicon. There are also possible worlds in which there is no Caesar, and possible worlds in which there is no Rubicon.

The possible worlds in which Caesar crossed the Rubicon include the actual world.

Now from this actual world, in 2025, we can't access any possible world in which Caesar did not cross the Rubicon.

But from the actual world, in 48BC, prior to his crossing, we could access those possible worlds in which he didn't cross the Rubicon.

And, to top it all off, in none of all of those possible worlds, the ones in which Caesar crossed the Rubicon, the ones in which Caesar did not cross the Rubicon, the ones without a Caesar and the ones without a Rubicon, did Caesar both cross and not cross the Rubicon.

So there is no contradiction here.

And notice that, since we can supose "Caesar" to be a rigid designator, we are talking about the very same individual in each of those possible worlds in which he exists. We are not supposing that someone else, who happened to be very much like Caesar, crossed the Rubicon.

Doing that would be to move from a Kripke-style response to Lewis's counterparts.

But, I still don't see how you claim the nature of time is irrelevant to the application and interpretation of modal logic. Logic is useless if not applied to the real world, therefore the real nature of time is highly relevant. — Metaphysician Undercover

What of the question: if I'd have missed the train, I'd have never met my future wife.

Do you not see how we might wish to assess that claim, despite it being temporally impossible for me to go back in time and miss the train, but it not being metaphysically impossible? That is, a possible world exists where I missed the train, but I actually caught it in the actual world.

We are assessing a real world concern - what might have been, despite that event not having happened. We call that a counterfactual. Where do counterfactuals occur? In possible worlds. Ta da!

I don't agree with point 2 but I hope this is not critical and that we can leave it alone because I'd rather not venture into any quantum discussion. — A Christian Philosophy

Point 2 defined the ontological basis for contingeny, and it is critical. I referred to quantum collapse only to illustrate how to apply the contingency principle. Notice that I said, "assume" it is not determinate.Point 5, which you agreed with, depends on point 2.

I believe that inherent existence is a sufficient explanation that fulfills the PSR for the OG. You also called that "de re necessity" earlier. — A Christian Philosophy

I reject de re necessity It treats necessity as an ontological property. IMO, an OG is necessary simply because could not have bern otherwise. It could not have been otherwise because there is nothing ontologically prior that accounts for (OG or ~OG) (the principle I explained in #2).

we can entertain the idea that the OG is a designer with free will, which is something the OP points to. With this, we preserve the idea of possible worlds (free will means the OG is free to have chosen otherwise), — A Christian Philosophy

Possible world semantics is just a convenient means of entertaining counterfactuals under some implicit or explicit modality. The "idea of possible worlds" is intact irrespective of whether or not there is metaphysical contingency in the world.

My issue is that IF there is metaphysical contingency in the world, THIS is what needs to be accounted for. @Banno's question (how do we explain why this world is as it is?) has an answer: because it could only have been otherwise if there is metaphysical contingency in the world. But we don't know if there is. It's conceptually possible there's an OG with free will that accounts for contingency. It's also conceptually possible quantum indeterminacy (or perhaps some unknown feature of the world) accounts for indeterminacy.

Then it was a necessity that Caesar crossed the Rubicon - it could not have been otherwise. Again, if it is necessarily true, it is true in all circumstances. And if that is so, Caesar had no choice. — Banno

OK, you are refusing to accept what Hanover called "temporal necessity". This sense of necessity implies that past actions, and the present state of being are "necessary" because it is impossible that they are otherwise.

Also, "true in all circumstances" is a meaningless phrase because "circumstances" refers to spatial temporal context, and truth relates to the particularities of the circumstances. Under no circumstances did Caesar not cross the Rubicon, or else it would be false that Caesar crossed the Rubicon.

You are slipping into nonsensical babble.

Again, plainly we can consider what might have occurred had Caesar not crossed the Rubicon. Therefore it is possible that Caesar not have crossed the Rubicon. If this were not so, we would not be able to consider the possibility. — Banno

Nonsense, people can and often do, dream up all sorts of impossible scenarios, in their imaginations. In the following sense, possibilities are no different than truths. Just because people say it is possible (or true) doesn't mean that it is possible (or true). Possibility is limited by what is impossible, just like truth is limited by falsity.

And this is not a contradiction becasue Caesar crossed the Rubicon in the actual world, but we can stipulate another in which he didn't. — Banno

Sure, people can stipulate whatever they want, but that doesn't mean that what they stipulate is possible.

The possible worlds in which Caesar crossed the Rubicon include the actual world.

Now from this actual world, in 2025, we can't access any possible world in which Caesar did not cross the Rubicon. — Banno

By what principles do you stipulate that one possible world is actual? This seems to be a categorical difference, so there must be some criteria to be applied. And, if we cannot ( meaning it is impossible to) access any "possible world" in which Caesar did not cross the Rubicon, what sense does it make to call these "possible"?

Further, we now have the problem I've been trying to bring to your attention. Looking forward in time, there is no such thing as "the actual world" because that would imply fatalism. Therefore if our interpretation of modal logic applied to the past, "include the actual world", we clearly need different system of interpretation for the future which has no actual world.

But from the actual world, in 48BC, prior to his crossing, we could access those possible worlds in which he didn't cross the Rubicon. — Banno

See, this is the point. looking forward in time at 48BC, there is no actual world of 2025. Looking backward from 2025, there is an actual world of 2025. From this, it ought to be very obvious to you, that the limitations placed on possibility (producing what I called impossible) are very different when looking forward in time, from what they are looking backward int time, due to the reality of "the actual world". Once you introduce in "the actual world", you are compelled to abide by the limitations this concept imposes. This implies that we cannot apply the same principles of logic to the past as we do to the future. So any logic which attempts to extend the past into the future must respect this difference.

So there is no contradiction here. — Banno

The possibility of contradiction we were discussing, was in the case of applying modal logic to the future. Your example is of the past, and due to the difference I just explained, that example is irrelevant to this matter. So, to put it in plain simple terms, Caesar stands in front of the Rubicon in 48BC, that being "now" for Caesar. Caesar considers the following: "in one world I cross", "in another world I do not cross". The designations of one possible world and another, are irrelevant, because these are not separate worlds, only separate thoughts for that man. Clearly, Caesar considers contradictory thoughts, at the same time, "I cross", "I do not cross". Why would anyone want to place these contradictory thoughts into separate possible worlds, to create the illusion that there is no contradiction going on, just for the purpose of hiding the reality that decision making involves contradiction? The fact of the matter is that contradiction is inherent to decision making and we need to respect this fact, rather than trying to hide it through a separation of distinct worlds.

Do you not see how we might wish to assess that claim, despite it being temporally impossible for me to go back in time and miss the train, but it not being metaphysically impossible? That is, a possible world exists where I missed the train, but I actually caught it in the actual world.

We are assessing a real world concern - what might have been, despite that event not having happened. We call that a counterfactual. Where do counterfactuals occur? In possible worlds. Ta da! — Hanover

I agree, that counterfactuals are useful in some circumstances. Probably their usefulness is not as substantial as many people believe, because examples like yours, and Banno's, are pretty much useless examples, where counterfactual use just plunges us into imaginary worlds, with imaginary principles of connectedness, fantasy having no bearing on reality. I believe though, that they are useful in some form of probability context, producing artificial (AI perhaps) statistics or something like that. But even this is a bit deceptive because artificially produced statistics are not real statistics, therefore that type of use may be misleading.

Anyway, that's a digression. The point I am trying to bring to Banno's attention, is that "possible worlds" interpretation is useful when looking backward in time, to create (supposed) realities which are distinct from the actual reality (therefore actually impossible even though they are called "possible", by my description above), but this usefulness depends on the assumption of an "actual world" for comparison purposes.

But, when we look forward in time, the "possible worlds" interpretation is not at all applicable, and actually might be very misleading ontologically. This is because, amongst the multitude of supposed "possible worlds" there is no actual world, that would be fatalism. Therefore each world must start with a basic objective equivalence to every other world. Then, to weight the worlds according to probability, we must assume an actual world in the past, and apply inductive principles of probability, according to how we understand time to unfold. Further, we must consider what our own freely willed actions can and cannot influence, by way of preference. Therefore the situation is very complex.

The critical point is that our "preference" already enters into the descriptive practices which constitute the described "actual world", as prejudice, and simply the nature of language use and its evolved freedoms and limitations. This means that the basic and fundamental equivalence o the relation between possible worlds and the assumed actual world, which is required as the foundation for future possible worlds, is impossible to establish. The "actual world" is already weighted. Therefore instead of "possible worlds" as the starting point when looking toward the future, we need to hand priority to "preferred worlds" when looking toward the future, because this provides a better representation of reality.

The law of identity refers to the thing, not its parts. — Metaphysician Undercover

OK, but this again is assuming that what constitutes "thing" and "parts" is uncontroversial and obvious. Do you want to say that Jill is a different "thing" if a couple of the microbes in her biome die between T1 and T2? What would make such an interpretation of "thing" attractive? The point is that we have to interpret it, because nothing in "A = A" will tell us how to do it.

agree, that counterfactuals are useful in some circumstances. Probably their usefulness is not as substantial as many people believe, because examples like yours, and Banno's, are pretty much useless examples, where counterfactual use just plunges us into imaginary worlds, with imaginary principles of connectedness, fantasy having no bearing on reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm going to end the conversation here because you're shifting to an allowance for modal logic, but now asserting just pragmatic irrelevance.

I simply disagree with this assessment, and I question the thoughtfulness of the comment. If you think classic logic has relevance, then you simply can't dispense with modal logic because modal logic opens itself to logical issues beyond what can be handled in classic logic. Hypothetical counterfactuals result in vacuous truths in classic logic, and that is why modal logic is needed.

I dont pretend there isn't nuance in these positions, but you don't elicit that nuance with your comments. You just hazard objections and see where they land, stubbornly insist upon the validity of your objections, and then eventually concede something or another to keep the conversation meandering.

With Wiiki, Google, the SEP, countless other online resources, and even ChapGpt to sort through all this, we should be able to engage in this conversation at a more elevated level and share among ourselves areas of real confusion. So maybe spend a few days on your own with an open mind toward understanding the basis of the modal logic enterprise before critiquing it.

An agent having the power of free will implies two things.
1. The agent has many things to choose from (in this case, many possible worlds can be designed).
2. The agent can select one of the many things at will (select to design the actual world).

Point 2 defined the ontological basis for contingeny — Relativist

If the main point of point 2 is to describe out contingency would work, then I accept the description. I would then also add free will as another possible way to get contingency.

Overall, it seems we are almost in agreement, except for the possibility of inherent existence and quantum. I'm not hopeful on reaching an agreement on quantum but it may be worth spending more time discussing the possibility of inherent existence.

The "idea of possible worlds" is intact irrespective of whether or not there is metaphysical contingency in the world. — Relativist

How could that be? If we found out that all outcomes in the actual world occur out of necessity, then conceiving a possible world with some different outcome would necessarily have a logical error in it.

(in this case, many possible worlds can be designed — A Christian Philosophy

Better to see them as stipulated.

But yes, free will implies the capacity to make a choice. What do you want me to conclude from that?

What remains is that the OG (a dreadful phrase) can't do the job it was invented for. That god can create any possible world does not explain why he created this one. And if god created this world out of necessity, then it could not be other than it is. Modal collapse.

OK, you are refusing to accept what Hanover called "temporal necessity". — Metaphysician Undercover

That's quite a misrepresentation, given that what I did was to point to how temporal necessity can itself be accommodated by formal modal logic. Here's more on Prior’s basic tense logic TL from SEP, including a section on how it uses a Kripke-style semantics.

The other supposed objections you raise have either been or can be dealt with within the standard framework. In particular, the treatment of accessibility answers your main misunderstanding. Explaining this repeatedly is tedious.

You are slipping into nonsensical babble. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's not me.