There's a previous thread that takes this argument and applies it to the ethics of believers: The moral character of Christians — Banno

You are sort of the king of ad hominem, no? If there is insufficient ad hominem on TPF, you show up and remedy the problem. :roll:

But, on the other hand, our experience seems to be fundamentally temporal. A process. Not something static. If time stops, can we really speak of beatitude or torment? — boundless

The impermanence of emotions and sensations isn't necessarily in conflict with the thought that an emotion or sensation is temporally unbounded. Consider for instance the mood of grief. On the one hand the mood is all absorbing and the grieving cannot comprehend an end to their grief and locate it on a timeline, yet on the other hand the emotions of grief do in fact come to an end, in spite of the inconceivability of the end when in the state of grief.

Well read what I actually wrote: "If everyone turns out fine in the end, then there is no ultimate need to evangelize or even help others." What do you think about that?

If God wills to save every human being and repentance is necessary for salvation, evangelization is a way to cooperate in the process. If universalism were true, ultimately God's will will be realized, independently of people choices to evangelize or not. But this doesn't make evangelization irrelevant. It would be still a way to cooperate with God for the sake of others.

So yeah maybe you are right here, ultimately the result will be the same, but evangelization would be still important.

BTW, even for an anti-universalist the question of evangelization (or spreading one's theistic religion to make the argument more general) is IMHO no less mysterious. If people need to be evangelized in order to be saved and end up not being evangelized because some believers refuse to evangelize (or live wickedly), these people end up outside salvation which would be a problem if God wants the salvation of every human being. That is, the salvation of a person would then depend also on the choices of others.*

*Edit: note that the argument here also applies if christians are unable to evangelize a given person, despite their efforts. That is if being evangelized by Christians is a necessary condition to being saved, and we assume God wants that all human beings will be saved, then it follows that the accomplishment of God's salvific will for that given person can depend on the actions of others and/or their ability to perform their task to evangelize.
So the question of the role of evangelization in the salvation is IMHO a mysterious topic even in the anti-universalist case, at least if one assumes that God wants the salvation of every human being.

I think the best argument against 'universalism' is what I believe is called the 'pastoral argument', that is at least some people would not bother to strive for salvation if they hear that, eventually, all will be saved (incidentally, I believe that ancient universalists tended to not spread that doctrine exactly for this reason...).

1. A man fixes his end in sin
2. Therefore he has the will to sin, everlastingly [or: he sins in his own eternity] — Leontiskos

I believe that my problem isn't (1) but perhaps (2), but I'm not even sure of what that means. Perhaps you are right that I am misunderstanding, I'll try my best now to clarify.

That is, I believe that one can fix his end in sin/evil (and have the, at least implicit, intention to remain 'fixed' in that end) but I doubt that such a fixation can be irrevocable (at least in this life, where we are obviously in a state of limited knowledge, limited freedom of the will and so on).

If however what (1) says is that one has the power to irrevocably fix his own end in sin/evil, then yeah I have my doubts about it even if the intention is to remain in sin/evil forever.

But note that this doesn't contradict the view that God's help and one's faith (trust) in that help is necessary for salvation. I believe that a human being, no matter how strives to be perfectly good, can't avoid make mistakes, errors and so on. There is a disconnect between how we should be and how we can actually live. So, I tend to believe that human beings can't invariably fix our end in God/good and this is why faith in God's help. If one sincerely strives to be good, one has the intention to be always good but this doesn't imply that such an intention ('fixing one's end in') is irrevocable.

BTW, even if one could fix one's end irrevocably in sin/evil I still can't concede that a finite human being can deserve an infinite amount of suffering as an adequate punishment. I can concede that annihilation can be an adequate punishment in such a case because it involves a finite amount of suffering and annihilation is, in some sense, an irrevocable, unending, punishment. But not 'unending pain' (of some sorts).

So, hoping that I made myself clear and I have now a better understanding, could you please answer this question: assuming that, indeed, a human being mind is invariably fixed in sin/evil, why do you believe that a punishment of unending pain is a deserved punishment? Why not, say, annihilation which is still an 'unending' punishment in some sense?

If you believe that because you have trust in the traditional view of hell, that's ok, I guess. But here we are discussing the matter philosophically. In my opinion, the traditional view has difficulties to be justified even in a retributive proportional understanding of 'justice' for the reason I explained in my previous posts and even in this one, where I argued that even if one's fixation in evil/sin is irrevocable, then, the traditional view of hell doesn't necessarily follow.

Someone who thinks we can't will marriage for life will not get married, or admit that a couple can properly perform the act of fixing their joint, earthly end. Someone who admits that the couple can perform that act must also admit that the end can be willed for the term of earthly life. — Leontiskos

I think I can agree with that. But I believe that, unfortunately, even if one has sincerely that will at the moment of marriage, one's will might not irrevocably set. A 'change of mind' (in this case for the worse) is indeed possible. One might seek help from faith in God's help that this bad change of mind won't occur.

So, I guess that I can say that in the case of 'fixing one's end in sin', my point is similar. While one can will to remain in sin forever, such a will is not necessarily irrevocable. If one's will isn't irrevocable, then there is still hope in repentance, in turning away from sin.

In the former case breaking the oath by failing to love at a certain point the spouse is of course a negative 'change of mind' (just like in the case when one breaks the oath to follow the good, to love etc in general). But in the latter case, the possibility of 'breaking the oath' is actually a good thing.

Do you agree with this?

I'm going to leave it there for now. This conversation is beginning to sprawl and becoming unwieldy, and what is needed is for you to attend to the words and arguments on offer, rather than deviating from those words and arguments. If you don't properly read and interpret the words of Aquinas or myself, then I fear that multiplying words will do me no good. Maybe narrowing the conversation will make it easier to attend to the actual words being written. — Leontiskos

I made my sincere efforts to understand your and St Thomas' words. Probably, I got it wrong again. I admit that it is possible. But I now believe that I have a better understanding. What you (and Aquinas) seem to say here is that can make an 'oath' to evil/sin. Yes, we can make oaths. But for the better or the worse at least in this earthly life I don't think that we have the power to be irrevocably faithful to the oaths.

Furthermore, even if we are able to make irreversible 'fixing of the wills'/'oaths', I still believe that one has not show why such an irreversible 'fixation' deserves a form of 'unending torment' as an adequate, proportional punishment even in a purely retributive framework.

Yes, I would agree that the point is to change one's mind and orient it towards the good. But still, I believe that in order to do that, arguably, as a precondition one has to acknowledge one's moral failures and take responsibility for them. I believe that this can be quite a painful and hard experience. This 'purgation' might be the necessary precondition to sincerely change one's mind.

This doesn't mean that one has to indulge in shame and guilt. But certainly, one has to face the awareness of one's moral failures and take responsibility for them, which I believe it is actually a hard thing to do.

The impermanence of emotions and sensations isn't necessarily in conflict with the thought that an emotion or sensation is temporally unbounded. Consider for instance the mood of grief. On the one hand the mood is all absorbing and the grieving cannot comprehend an end to their grief and locate it on a timeline, yet on the other hand the emotions of grief do in fact come to an end, in spite of the inconceivability of the end when in the state of grief. — sime

Ok. But temporal unboundedness is not the same as 'timelessness'. If the mood is unchanging (i.e. the 'flavour' of experiences), experience still seems to remain a process.

I can't imagine a 'timeless' suffering. And I even suspect that an 'eternal bliss' would be an unending process of good experiences. But in contrast to suffering, the experience of 'positive awe' might actually be an approximation of what a 'timeless bliss' might feel like. So, in the case of 'eternal bliss', it may be timeless, after all. I have more difficulties to imagine a 'timeless' negative experience.

Yes, I would agree that the point is to change one's mind and orient it towards the good. But still, I believe that in order to do that, arguably, as a precondition one has to acknowledge one's moral failures and take responsibility for them. I believe that this can be quite a painful and hard experience. This 'purgation' might be the necessary precondition to sincerely change one's mind. — boundless

Please note the words 'can' and 'might'. I am allowing the possibility that for some the repentance could not be accompanied by suffering. But maybe some kind of suffering for the reason stated above is necessary.

That is, if humans don't have the power to sin mortally, then they probably also don't have the power to accept a gift of salvation, or to be deified. The "eternal consequences" that humans cannot effect are bidirectional. Created freedom always has a dual potency, and this is precisely why "Corruptio optimi pessima" (the corruption of the highest is the lowest). It's no coincidence that the same world which holds to a low anthropology has also lost its grasp on human dignity and nobility. The reprobate and the saint disappear simultaneously.

Doesn't this point back to the controversy surrounding the Pelagian heresy though? Man, on the orthodox view, cannot know and strive towards the Good on his own. His nous (intellect and will) are diseased and malfunctioning. Even in writers accused of being Pelagians like St. Jonn Cassian have a large role for grace and the sacraments in the very possibility of the healing of the nous, which is itself a precondition of knowing and choosing the Good as good (i.e. known and willed as good).

The eternal consequences man can effect as man aren't bidirectional. For man to have this capacity in the upwards direction would mean something like Pelagius' conception of the righteous man who attains merit warranting beatitude on his own.

The other issue is that movement upwards, towards God, is classically conceived of as making us "more free." St. Paul used the language of "slavery in sin." So movement in either direction is not the same. As the Imago Dei becomes more disfigured by the curvatus in se of sin man also loses his capacity for self-determination.

TBH, I find the dialectical of nature and grace to generally be unhelpful. I think they are the same thing, looked at from different aspects. If one takes something like Ferdinand Ulrich's conception of "being as gift" it's "grace all the way down." Or, more appropriately, Eros all the way up, Agape all the way down, which is why St. Bernard of Clairvaux's "Ladder of Love" terminates in "love of creatures for God's sake," or "with God's love."

At any rate, I think the larger issue would tend to center around God (and us as Christians) wanting "what is truly best for every creature." It is hard to see how eternal torment could ever be "truly best" for someone, nor how, if we are called to forgive everyone, we should ever want eternal torment for anyone. Is the benefit of God's justice for the damned greater than their suffering? But what of the late repenters? Wouldn't God's mercy be a violation of justice here?

Consider a man born out by the Indus, who never had a chance to hear of Christ and dies as a young adult. He grows up in a violent culture, perhaps part of a low caste. And he does wicked things. Perhaps not abhorrent things, but "lower level mortal sins." And he cannot repent and turn to Christ, for he has never heard the name of Christ. Thus he dies in his sins. Might he benefit from purgation, or even the retributive punishment of justice? Sure. But after the first 9,999 billion years of suffering, does justice still require additional torment to be met out for his 20 miserable years on Earth? More to the point, is continued torment "what is truly best" for him?

Even if one has a strong place for retributive justice, there is a point at which, at least on human scales, it becomes sadistic. There is a plotline in Pierce Brown's Red Rising series where a side character admits to having kept an enemy alive through high tech medical means for decades after decades while subjecting him to all the tortured futuristic science can provide. He has good reason for his wrath. If I recall correctly, the high caste captive had betrayed him, violated his wife, and killed his family, and likely done this to others on a regular basis. But of course, we find the endless nature of the retribution, that it goes on for human lifetimes to be gratitous and indeed demeaning for the original victim. When the side character decides to move on and kill the man, he has attained a sort of moral progress. Yet, depending on how God's "eternal punishment" is conceived, it puts God in the role of the punisher who, though initially justified, seems by all human measures to be demeaning himself by extending his vengeance indefinitely.

The risk here, as I see it, is that if one just passes over this disconnect one opens up a chasm of total equivocity between God's justice and man's, between God's goodness and man's, of the sort that plagues Protestant theology and sets up renewed Euthyphro dilemmas and voluntarism.

Hart has recently further popularized the thesis that Hell is unjust, and if a Christian views Hell as unjust then salvation is not undeserved. That is, if it is unjust for someone to not be saved, then salvation is not gratuitous.

This is a thorny issue. If beatitude in union with God is the natural end of all rational creatures, then it would seem that the denial of this end could be seen as a punishment by itself. Yet, we normally don't think of withholding rewards—i.e., of withholding aid towards a dessert we cannot attain to on our own—as punishment.

What exactly is the nature of the punishment in Hell though? Is it a denial? Is it primarily regret as in St. Isaac of Nineveh? It is sensuous torment, as in the image of Hell as a cosmic torture chamber or some subterranean Satanic kingdom?

I think this is an important issue because it is perhaps not "universalist" to deny that any soul is subjected to sensuous torments of infinite duration (the "cosmic torture chamber"), although it could also be seen that way. If everyone is "beatified to the extent they have made themselves able," this still might allow for a gradation (e.g. the metaphor of all cups filled to the brim, but some cups being smaller than others). And this "differential cup size" might also be taken as a punishment, although it is perhaps a punishment God cannot revoke through mercy without simply replacing sinners with new versions of themselves.

Or perhaps, punishment could consist in the very denial of beatitude and the grief this brings, something like Dante's Limbo. The problem there though is that, unless the will is extrinsically fixed some how, it seems that the damned in Limbo are striving to know and follow the Good as much as they are able.

At any rate, I think Hart would say that focusing on the gratuity of salvation as framed within the confines the infernalist lays out for it misses the point. Creation itself is completely gratuitous; man does not create himself, so it is still "grace all the way down" as seen from the top.

There is also an issue where soteriology ends up reducing the whole of the Christian life to avoiding extrinsic punishment and meriting extrinsic reward. The idea that sin is its own penalty tends to get washed out by the scale of retributive justice.

These look like thoughtful posts. I am aware of many exceedingly able-minded theists who are capable of defending the traditional doctrine of Hell, but don't spend a lot of time on it because of its negative nature. It would be like if someone claimed that murder never happens, and then in order to refute them you had to engage in the dark business of investigating and presenting cases of murder. C. S. Lewis actually said that writing The Screwtape Letters was very taxing for this same reason.

With that in mind, I am going to postpone a response until at least Easter Monday.

No worries. Good Easter to you!

Or perhaps, punishment could consist in the very denial of beatitude and the grief this brings, something like Dante's Limbo. The problem there though is that, unless the will is extrinsically fixed some how, it seems that the damned in Limbo are striving to know and follow the Good as much as they are able. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Great post!

I wanted to make just some thoughts on this.

In some of the strictest 'free-will' conceptions of hell, the unending suffering isn't due to the fact that the will becomes irremediably fixed. The claim is that sinners in hell will continue forever to confirm their choices, even if they are invited in Paradise.

And yet, if St. Augustine was right when he said that our heart is restless until it rests in God, the movements of heart will continue forever. The damned would experience at least perpetual disappointment and forever will seek to rest their heart. So, if unending hell isn't a punishment of God but the result of a perpetual confirmation of one's own choice of being self-excluded from God, one has to leave at least open the possibility that the damned will at a certain point come to sincerely repent (and God in this doctrine of 'eternal hell' would still accept the repentance due to the fact that damnation is purely the result of the choice of the damned). This would not be strictly 'universalistic' as a scenario but certainly if this is the case there would be reason to hope that nobody is forever beyond hope.

If, on the other hand, one assumes that the damned, despite the perpetual disappointment, will certainly never repent, one should explain where this kind of 'fixation' comes from. Personally, in this latter scenario, I believe that the free-will model collapses in a retributive model, where at least the damned is abandoned to his or her fate ('complete desertion' to use the expression of St. John of Damascus term in the Exposition of the Orthodox Faith (Book 2, ch 29 'concerning providence'), who, despite asserting that damnation is due to the stubborn refusal of salvation made by the damned, unending hell is still seen as a form of (retributive) punishment. As an aside, the Damascene has the closest conception of hell of C.S. Lewis that I have encountered in ancient Christian writers). Furthermore, if there is no desire of the Good in the damned in this latter scenario (assuming that the fixation of the will in evil would to just that), would they still experience disappointment? If they do experience disappointment, it would seem that they are still seeking the Good, albeit in the wrong places. If they are still seeking the good, would they be completely beyond hope? So, maybe, disappointment in frustrated desires can't a part of the torment of the damned in this scenario. In any case, if the will is irrevocably fixed, the punishment must be thought as a extrinsical 'deserved' punishment in my opinion.

In some of the strictest 'free-will' conceptions of hell, the unending suffering isn't due to the fact that the will becomes irremediably fixed. The claim is that sinners in hell will continue forever to confirm their choices, even if they are invited in Paradise.

Yes, that's true. That's C.S. Lewis' view in The Great Divorce. The damned are damned just in that they spread out into ever greater isolation and multiplicity according to their own free choices. They can start the painful pilgrimage to Paradise whenever they want, it's just that they see no reason to. They are "at home in Hell." They have made themselves thus.

I am not sure how this is supposed to correspond to "every knee bowing," "all praising God," and "God being all in all," though. It rather suggests the eternal survival of sin, and that some knees will never bow and that some lips will never praise. Whereas visions that involve more extrinsic punishment have knees bowing and lips praising, but only through coercion not sincerity. I suppose God might be "all in all" here, but God is beatitude in some and torment in others (sort of what Pope Benedict says). The difficulty here is that this direct contact with God, experienced as torment, seems incapable of improving the sinner. Hence there is this weird thing where contact with a mortal evangelist might reform man right up to the moment of death, but eternal (painful) union with God Himself is insufficient to ever bring about such change.

And yet, if St. Augustine was right when he said that our heart is restless until it rests in God, the movements of heart will continue forever. The damned would experience at least perpetual disappointment and forever will seek to rest their heart. So, if unending hell isn't a punishment of God but the result of a perpetual confirmation of one's own choice of being self-excluded from God, one has to leave at least open the possibility that the damned will at a certain point come to sincerely repent (and God in this doctrine of 'eternal hell' would still accept the repentance due to the fact that damnation is purely the result of the choice of the damned). This would not be strictly 'universalistic' as a scenario but certainly if this is the case there would be reason to hope that nobody is forever beyond hope.

Maybe, although Lewis' vision doesn't seem inconsistent. His damned spread out in space more and more over time, moving further and further from others as they become folded more inwards and become more spiteful towards all others. Hell is in some ways an education in vice (although some do leave it, and all are free to leave it). People sit around moping all day in a world much like ours.

But, even if these people are "eternally moving" the image is of them diffusing into an ever expanding space. If space is always expanding at a rate at least equal to movement, there is no need for eternal movement to necessitate a return to the "center" of the space. To use a mathematical example, I am pretty sure Poincaré's recurrence theorem only holds if the system is closed and not expanding. Of course, the question would be if man's eternal life is actually infinitely expansive in this way. I suppose the counterargument from people like Talbot would be that man cannot drift arbitrarily away from the Good and still retain a rational nature (and thus still be man). They would have to be replaced by some other substance.

So, maybe, disappointment in frustrated desires can't a part of the torment of the damned in this scenario. In any case, if the will is irrevocably fixed, the punishment must be thought as a extrinsical 'deserved' punishment in my opinion.

That seems fair to me, since I have never seen a good argument for why the will must necessarily be fixed in this way.

I mentioned Dante avoiding the problem of repetent sinners earlier because he does have souls in Hell (Limbo) who do seem to have repented and live in "hopelessness" despite this. His ultimate vision is somewhat unclear though, because he ultimately makes appeals to divine justice being unknowable, even to the beatified (a voluntarist problem perhaps), but provocatively includes some Pagans in Purgatory and Paradise.

I am not sure how this is supposed to correspond to "every knee bowing," "all praising God," and "God being all in all," though. It rather suggests the eternal survival of sin, and that some knees will never bow and that some lips will never praise. Whereas visions that involve more extrinsic punishment have knees bowing and lips praising, but only through coercion not sincerity. I suppose God might be "all in all" here, but God is beatitude in some and torment in others (sort of what Pope Benedict says). The difficulty here is that this direct contact with God, experienced as torment, seems incapable of improving the sinner. Hence there is this weird thing where contact with a mortal evangelist might reform man right up to the moment of death, but eternal (painful) union with God Himself is insufficient to ever bring about such change. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Agreed, it seems implausible. But, of course, those who insist in the non-universalistic readings of those passages mention that there are other passages in St Paul's epistles which affirm that some categories of sinners will not enter in God's Kingdom (if we want to restrict ourselves to St Paul's writings, where most apparently universalist statements are to be found). Of course, these can be read as not implying that they will never enter in the Kingdom, but such a reading is already a harmonization.
That's why I don't think one can rely only on exegesis in these kind of discussions.

I do believe, however, that maybe the point you made about equivocation leads to the strongest arguments that one can make regarding this kind of discussions (and one can also support it with various scriptural passages, I think). To make just an example, if one says that any kind of acceptable meaning of 'justice' involves the fact that people cannot be punished due to other people faults, then St Augustine's position of the 'massa damnata', where everyone inherits guilt, is automatically ruled out as a correct description of how divine justice operates. Also, if one says that a 'just judge' must also take into account the capacities of the transgressors when deciding the punishments, then St Anselm's view that any sin is justly punished with an unending punishment is also automatically ruled out or seriously modified (for instance, the current Catholic Catechism explicitly says that in order for a sin to be mortal one has to commit it with sufficient intent and awareness).

Of course, if one insists that divine justice can punish people for the sins of their ancestors and we have no right to question that idea, then any discussion becomes impossible.

Maybe, although Lewis' vision doesn't seem inconsistent. His damned spread out in space more and more over time, moving further and further from others as they become folded more inwards and become more spiteful towards all others. Hell is in some ways an education in vice (although some do leave it, and all are free to leave it). People sit around moping all day in a world much like ours.
... — Count Timothy von Icarus

interesting, thanks. The point you make about the ever expanding space is very good (and BTW yes Poincare's recurrence argument is valid for finite, closed systems). But IMHO it doesn't preclude the possibility of post-mortem salvation. So, my point that nobody is ever 'beyond hope' I think remains valid.

Regarding, Talbott, yes, I would suppose so. But I don't think that defenders of free-will models of hell would find it convincing. Still, if they are consistent they must leave open the possibility of post-mortem salvation. I didn't know that Lewis allowed that possibility for some of the damned.

That seems fair to me, since I have never seen a good argument for why the will must necessarily be fixed in this way. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Same. At the end of the day, most supporters of the traditional view of hell have adopted a retributivist model of some sort where eternal punishment is deserved.

I mentioned Dante avoiding the problem of repetent sinners earlier because he does have souls in Hell (Limbo) who do seem to have repented and live in "hopelessness" despite this. His ultimate vision is somewhat unclear though, because he ultimately makes appeals to divine justice being unknowable, even to the beatified (a voluntarist problem perhaps), but provocatively includes some Pagans in Purgatory and Paradise. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Thanks for that. Despite being an Italian I never read the whole Comedy, only some famous excerpts (I have some difficulties to read poetry, actually).

Regarding the first kind of souls, after all, if one accepts a form of unending torment as a deserved punishment, post-mortem repentace can be irrelevant. If after repentance one is still being punished, one can argue that the punishment is still just.
Of course, if God gives mercy to the repentant and delivers them from the deserved punishment, but the punishment is deserved, so God could refrain to do that and remain just. Of course, if God's mercy requires to deliver the repentant sinners and God's justice requires to punish them eternally, then one has a conflict between God's mercy and God's justice. So, I suppose the 'simplest' way to resolve this problem is to say that the damned can't repent after death.

On the other hand, if one doesn't accept that unending pain can be a deserved punishment for human beings, then things change (IMO the contention about the possibility for humans to justly deserve a punishment of an infinite amount of suffering is the central one in this debate).

Regarding, Dante's choice to include Pagans in Purgatory and Paradise. It's very interesting indeed.

That is, I believe that one can fix his end in sin/evil (and have the, at least implicit, intention to remain 'fixed' in that end) — boundless

What do you think it means to "fix one's end"? Or even to fix an end? Are you familiar with this language?

Why not, say, annihilation — boundless

One could argue for annihilation from philosophy, but not, I think, from Scripture/theology.

If you believe that because you have trust in the traditional view of hell, that's ok, I guess. But here we are discussing the matter philosophically. In my opinion, the traditional view has difficulties to be justified even in a retributive proportional understanding of 'justice' for the reason I explained in my previous posts and even in this one, where I argued that even if one's fixation in evil/sin is irrevocable, then, the traditional view of hell doesn't necessarily follow. — boundless

Again, if one can philosophically prove that X is unjust, then X is unsupportable via Scripture/theology/tradition. That's why universalists like Hart try to prove such a thing.

I think I can agree with that. But I believe that, unfortunately, even if one has sincerely that will at the moment of marriage, one's will might not irrevocably set. A 'change of mind' (in this case for the worse) is indeed possible. One might seek help from faith in God's help that this bad change of mind won't occur.

So, I guess that I can say that in the case of 'fixing one's end in sin', my point is similar. While one can will to remain in sin forever, such a will is not necessarily irrevocable. If one's will isn't irrevocable, then there is still hope in repentance, in turning away from sin. — boundless

Again:

No one is saying "must." What is being said is, "Can."... — Leontiskos

• Leontiskos: One can have the will to sin everlastingly
• boundless: Yes, but one might not have the will to sin everlastingly

What you say is of course true, and there is no incompatibility here. The doctrine of Hell does not entail that everyone goes to Hell. You require a much stronger thesis, namely, "One cannot have the will to sin everlastingly."

But for the better or the worse at least in this earthly life I don't think that we have the power to be irrevocably faithful to the oaths. — boundless

If you don't think we have the power to be faithful to oaths then you presumably don't believe we have the power to make oaths, just as the person who does not believe that a couple has the power to be faithful to their marriage vows does not believe in marriage. This goes back to my point that some don't think humans are capable of much (e.g. oaths, vows, eternal consequences, etc.).

So yeah maybe you are right here, ultimately the result will be the same, but evangelization would be still important. — boundless

Okay, good.

BTW, even for an anti-universalist the question of evangelization (or spreading one's theistic religion to make the argument more general) is IMHO no less mysterious. If people need to be evangelized in order to be saved and end up not being evangelized because some believers refuse to evangelize (or live wickedly), these people end up outside salvation which would be a problem if God wants the salvation of every human being. That is, the salvation of a person would then depend also on the choices of others.* — boundless

I don't see a problem with any of this. I think what you are saying is, "Salvation couldn't possibly depend on human choices," and the Judeo-Christian tradition just disagrees with you on that.

So the question of the role of evangelization in the salvation is IMHO a mysterious topic even in the anti-universalist case, at least if one assumes that God wants the salvation of every human being. — boundless

In order to oppose universalism, one does not need to hold that all must be explicitly evangelized by humans in order to be saved. What we are asking about is the motive towards salvation. On universalism there is no ultimate motive towards salvation. If the essential goal is salvation, then on universalism the essential goal is inevitable, and need not be sought or pursued. Subsidiary goals can of course be sought, but they won't have any effect on that essential goal.

I think the best argument against 'universalism' is what I believe is called the 'pastoral argument', that is at least some people would not bother to strive for salvation if they hear that, eventually, all will be saved (incidentally, I believe that ancient universalists tended to not spread that doctrine exactly for this reason...). — boundless

Yes, I believe that is precisely what we are discussing.

I don't think we properly recognize how illogical it is to keep a doctrine secret "exactly for this reason." In fact it seems downright sinful to mislead someone in that manner, namely to try to persuade them—via an omission—to labor for something that requires no labor.

If we are charitable then the universalist is relying on paradox, but to formalize a paradox doctrinally in favor of one side of the paradox is surely inadmissible.

I have personal thoughts on this, but I don't take them altogether seriously, since I cannot test supernatural claims.

It makes sense to me that if God is truth, and people choose to reject truth in their lives, then God cannot be at union with these people while still respecting their free will. It could be that when you die, you are with God whether you like it or not, and depending on your disposition, this is experienced either as bliss or as torture. Or it could be that since a sinner does not like God, God sends them far away out of respect for their free will, and they experience this as torture. Now, if it is possible to destroy a soul, then it would make sense that a benevolent God would choose to do that as punishment in place of torturing them. If it is not possible to destroy a soul, then eternal torture would seem to be the only possible outcome of a person choosing on purpose to reject God.

My understanding of the "unforgivable sin" is when someone knows perfectly well what good and evil are, but chooses to call good evil and evil good. Most sins would be forgivable, because if a person sins out of ignorance or weakness, then he could repent. But if a person willfully chooses evil and calls it good, then by he nature of the act, he does not want to and cannot repent. This is backed up by the fact that when Jesus talked about this, it was when Pharisees saw him heal people (an obviously good thing) and said that he did it by the devil (calling an obviously good act evil). Also, the Holy Spirit is called the "Spirit of Truth", so it would make sense that the sin against the Holy Spirit would be to sin against truth itself.

Doesn't this point back to the controversy surrounding the Pelagian heresy though? Man, on the orthodox view, cannot know and strive towards the Good on his own. His nous (intellect and will) are diseased and malfunctioning. Even in writers accused of being Pelagians like St. Jonn Cassian have a large role for grace and the sacraments in the very possibility of the healing of the nous, which is itself a precondition of knowing and choosing the Good as good (i.e. known and willed as good). — Count Timothy von Icarus

Apart from Calvinists and some Lutherans, no Christians really believe in total depravity. Calvinists don't accept a bidirectional potency, and it is true that for the hardcore Calvinist everyone else is a Pelagian, but I'm not sure Calvinists deserve much credit.

More generally, I don't think the anti-Pelagian tradition precludes a bidirectional potency.

The eternal consequences man can effect as man aren't bidirectional. For man to have this capacity in the upwards direction would mean something like Pelagius' conception of the righteous man who attains merit warranting beatitude on his own.

The other issue is that movement upwards, towards God, is classically conceived of as making us "more free." St. Paul used the language of "slavery in sin." So movement in either direction is not the same. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think you are conflating a bidirectional potency with the idea that the two directions must be exactly parallel. Just because movement in either direction is not the same does not mean that there is no bidirectional potency. Indeed, I have never claimed that movement in both directions is the same.

There are mysteries in grace and mysteries in evil, and therefore the nature and relation of the two potencies is quite mysterious, but I don't see any of that supporting universalism (or the other extreme, which is a kind of extreme pessimism).

TBH, I find the dialectical of nature and grace to generally be unhelpful. — Count Timothy von Icarus

If you don't distinguish between nature and grace I don't see how you could talk about Pelagianism at all.

At any rate, I think the larger issue would tend to center around God (and us as Christians) wanting "what is truly best for every creature." It is hard to see how eternal torment could ever be "truly best" for someone, nor how, if we are called to forgive everyone, we should ever want eternal torment for anyone. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Do you think the doctrine of Hell requires that God or Christians must not want what is truly best for everyone? If so, why?

Consider a man born out by the Indus, who never had a chance to hear of Christ and dies as a young adult. He grows up in a violent culture, perhaps part of a low caste. And he does wicked things. Perhaps not abhorrent things, but "lower level mortal sins." And he cannot repent and turn to Christ, for he has never heard the name of Christ. Thus he dies in his sins. Might he benefit from purgation, or even the retributive punishment of justice? Sure. But after the first 9,999 billion years of suffering, does justice still require additional torment to be met out for his 20 miserable years on Earth? More to the point, is continued torment "what is truly best" for him? — Count Timothy von Icarus

You are presupposing injustice here and then finding it in your conclusion. It could be simplified, "Suppose someone does something that does not merit Hell, and God gives him Hell. That's unjust." Yep, but no one thinks that God gives undeserving souls Hell.

Even if one has a strong place for retributive justice, there is a point at which, at least on human scales, it becomes sadistic. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Here's what you yourself said:

Theologically, the focus on "extrinsic punishment" and "extrinsic reward," seems less helpful... — Count Timothy von Icarus

...and yet you are focusing on extrinsic punishment objections. Even Dante avoids those. I actually don't know of any theologians whatsoever who think in terms of extrinsic punishment. The passage I gave from Aquinas addresses this directly, with his points about the "disturbing of an order."

This is a thorny issue. If beatitude in union with God is the natural end of all rational creatures, then it would seem that the denial of this end could be seen as a punishment by itself. Yet, we normally don't think of withholding rewards—i.e., of withholding aid towards a dessert we cannot attain to on our own—as punishment. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think it's pretty basic logic. Something cannot be gratuitous and due at the same time.

Honestly, I don't find Hart to be a very good philosopher or theologian.* Above all he is a rhetorician, and a caustic, uncharitable one. Reading Hart and reading Christopher Hitchens is more or less the same thing, with a different topic and a slightly different style. If I want puffed up abuse with a small side of argument, those are the sort of people I read. If I want serious engagement, I look elsewhere.

I say this because people who lean on Hart tend to eventually draw on that same sort of rhetoric, and the arguments then become thin. The reason Hart appeals to that abusive rhetoric is apparently because he can't "get the job done" without it. Here on The Philosophy Forum I think we need to keep the arguments front and center and not become lost in rhetorical polemics. Beyond that, I want to preempt the idea that Hart counts as an authority, especially for "infernalists"—one of Hart's characteristically rhetorical labels. If someone wants to use one of Hart's arguments then they will have to present them in their own words, and try to find logic in the midst of all that bluster.

When this topic was popular a few years back I tried reading Hart, but it was impossible. The book is not written to convince or persuade. So I turned to Balthasar's first volume on the topic and read that instead. The arguments were fairly bad, but at least the conclusions were more modest.

As I said earlier, I think some forms of universalism are philosophically defensible, but I think they fail when confronted with Scripture and tradition.

What exactly is the nature of the punishment in Hell though? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Lewis' images in The Great Divorce or The Four Loves are quite good. Dante, Aquinas, or even Milton also offer good images. The basic Orthodox approach where the damned are burned by the face of God or love of God is another. More simply, here on Earth it is not hard to find cases of unrepentance, hardness of heart, hopeless fixation on evil, extreme hatred, etc. I need look no further than my own heart to see the basis and possibility for Hell.

Beyond all that, I don't see a need to put God in the dock, especially given that the philosophical attempts at demonstrating injustice don't seem to hold up. There are lots of revealed truths that I don't perfectly understand. That's not a problem unless I want to reject everything that I can't understand well.

I think this is an important issue because it is perhaps not "universalist" to deny that any soul is subjected to sensuous torments of infinite duration (the "cosmic torture chamber"), although it could also be seen that way. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I have never found this objection very interesting. It's as if folks are super concerned about physical fire or sensuous torments—and this might be a materialist hangup. I could tell them that there will be no physical fire but there will be estrangement from God, and they would be relieved. That relief is a kind of irony all its own, as if estrangement from God is small change compared to the prospect of physical fire. :grin:

And this "differential cup size" might also be taken as a punishment — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't really buy all the claims in this thread of, "Might be taken as a punishment." I want more rigorous argumentation than that. I mean, democrats might take an unequal gift as a punishment, but so what? What does it matter that an irrational person might take something as a punishment? I would rather talk about things that are real punishments.

If everyone is "beatified to the extent they have made themselves able," this still might allow for a gradation (e.g. the metaphor of all cups filled to the brim, but some cups being smaller than others). — Count Timothy von Icarus

It is standard orthodoxy to say that there are different levels and experiences in both Heaven and Hell. Once this and the possibility of Limbo are recognized I think many of the injustice arguments dissolve.

The idea that sin is its own penalty tends to get washed out by the scale of retributive justice. — Count Timothy von Icarus

This sort of thing looks like a false dichotomy. It's a pretty old idea that Hell is sin as its own punishment, and that retributive punishment need not be extrinsic.

It rather suggests the eternal survival of sin, and that some knees will never bow and that some lips will never praise. — Count Timothy von Icarus

What are you reading, here? Romans 14? Philippians 2? Again, if we give someone with no horse in the race these verses, will they think they have anything at all to do with universalism? Apart from the fact that such an interpretation contradicts all sorts of other things that Paul himself says, the literal meaning of such phrases has to do with military conquest. For instance, the metaphor applies in a special way to Satan, whose knee will bow, and yet there is nothing implied about Satan being saved or rejoicing in this submission.

With universalism there is a very real danger of wishful thinking - of seeing things that are not there, stretching interpretations beyond their proper bounds, or (in a case like Hart's) using rhetoric as a compensatory strategy. Hart's interpretation of aion in Mt 25:46 is a spectacular example of this. In general I would be cautious of Hart's claims when he is high on his rhetoric horse (e.g. his claims about Biblical scholarship and aion). His ability to mislead is quite unparalleled. N. T. Wright's review of Hart's New Testament translation highlights what happens when a rigorous scholar comes up against Hart's polemically-motivated decisions.


* Granted, he often has his finger on the most pressing and popular theological controversies, even before they emerge as such, but the way he addresses such controversies strikes me as rushed and superficial. The slapdash precedent may be bad for the theological guild altogether - as if we must pronounce strong conclusions on the most difficult and upcoming theological issues even before they are allowed to properly emerge.

What do you think it means to "fix one's end"? Or even to fix an end? Are you familiar with this language? — Leontiskos

To be fair, no. But I think that your example of the wedding made it clear. It is like making a oath. Am I wrong?

One could argue for annihilation from philosophy, but not, I think, from Scripture/theology. — Leontiskos

I see. But can philosophy and scripture/theology contradict each other? If, say, a given interpretation of a scriptural claim is found to be inconsistent with other important doctrines, can we still accept it?

Just to make an example. If one accepts that God doesn't punish people for the sins of something else, can we accept the notion of 'inherited guilt' (I am not going to make a biblical case for the premise, as we in a philosophical forum)? I would say that the latter notion is inconsistent with the former. Philosophy is also helpful to find out these kinds of things.

Again, if one can philosophically prove that X is unjust, then X is unsupportable via Scripture/theology/tradition. That's why universalists like Hart try to prove such a thing. — Leontiskos

Ok.

What you say is of course true, and there is no incompatibility here. The doctrine of Hell does not entail that everyone goes to Hell. You require a much stronger thesis, namely, "One cannot have the will to sin everlastingly." — Leontiskos

But there is a problem, here, I believe. You still have to explain why there is absolutely no hope of break the fixation of the will in sin. I might concede that logically it might be possible for someone to everastingly confirm the choice to sin. But here in this life, it is assumed that we can repent.

If someone makes an oath to be faithful 'as long as he lives' to a terrorist group, he might still break that oath even if when he made the oath he was convinced of the cause. Of course, he might not and we can imagine that the more time he remains faithful to this commitment, the more difficult is for him to renounce it. But he can still change his mind (i.e. repent) at any time and hopefully he does.

So the mere possibility to orient one's view in sin doesn't necessarily imply that the orientation is irrevocable. But if I am not mistaken, it is assumed that at a certain point, this orientation becomes irrevocable.

At most it seems that you are claiming that 'everlasting fixation of the will in sin' is a possibility. But, unless, one is not allowed to repent, then repentance is also a possibility.

If you don't think we have the power to be faithful to oaths then you presumably don't believe we have the power to make oaths, just as the person who does not believe that a couple has the power to be faithful to their marriage vows does not believe in marriage. This goes back to my point that some don't think humans are capable of much (e.g. oaths, vows, eternal consequences, etc.). — Leontiskos

I assumed that it is normal to say, in Christianity, that we 'by ourselves' cannot be morally impeccable, at least without the help of God.

In the case of marriage, I don't see how 'making a sincere oath' necessary implies the ability to remain always faithful to the oath (in fact one can ask God's help to remain faithful precisely because of this). It certainly expresses the sincere intention to respect the oath, but failing to mantiain is also a possibility.
I didn't know that this is controvarsial thing to say.

In general, I don't think that an ability to make a oath implies an ability to remain faithful of it.

I don't see a problem with any of this. I think what you are saying is, "Salvation couldn't possibly depend on human choices," and the Judeo-Christian tradition just disagrees with you on that. — Leontiskos

Sorry, but I think you misunderstood the point I was making. Let me try to explain it again. Let's assume that God desires the salvation of each human being.

Let's assume that 'being evangelized by other people' is a necessary condition for salvation. Let's say that a given person fails to be evangelized because those who could evangelize him or her for some reason could not. Then, this 'missed evangelization' would be a decisive factor in the eternal destiny of the person we are considering, even if he or she did nothing to avoid being evagelized. So, this 'missed evangelization' is the product of external circumstances out of control of him or her. But if 'being evangelized by other people' is a necessary condition for salvation, here we have a person that lost salvation becuase of something that could not control, outside his or her power of choice.

So, if 'being evangelized by other people' is a necessary condition for salvation, it would follow that the salvation of a given person can depend on the choices of others, their abilities or even on circumstances that no one can control. Here it seems that we have a case that one can miss salvation due to factors outside one's choices.

Waht do you think about this? Note that even a proponent of a 'free will defence of hell' (of any kind really) would not accept that one can lose salvation for factors different from one's choices. That's why I believe that this is a problem to at least some 'traditionalist'.

If the essential goal is salvation, then on universalism the essential goal is inevitable, and need not be sought or pursued. — Leontiskos

But universalists still might say that repentance is needed for salvation. One might say that conversion is needed either in this life or after death and being evangelized might be necessary to being able to convert in this life. Not sure why you are insisting that the belief that everyone will be ultimately be saved implies that one can't find rational motives for evangelization, especially if one believes that it is a necessary condition to be saved in this life (I don't believe that all universalist agree on this point, but even if one doesn't believe that being evangelized is a necessary condition for being saved in this life, I would still say that there are rational motives to evangelize...).

In fact it seems downright sinful to mislead someone in that manner, namely to try to persuade them—via an omission—to labor for something that requires no labor. — Leontiskos

Again, not sure how this follows. See the paragraph above. If one still believes that repentance is necessary, them 'it's not something that requires no labor'.

Anyway, I agree with you the pastoral argument is the strongest one. But maybe it is not fatal for universalists.

Do you think the doctrine of Hell requires that God or Christians must not want what is truly best for everyone? If so, why?

Explain how "unending torment with no possibility of improvement," could ever be in "someone's best interest?"

Look at it this way:

Is God is capable of showing mercy on everyone? If the answer is "yes," then you have to explain how it is that it is better for sinners not to receive mercy. If it would be better to receive mercy than justice, and you receive justice rather than mercy, then this cannot be "what is best for you," on pain of contradiction.

But God does show gratuitous mercy on some, and presumably receiving mercy is "what is truly best for them." So how do we explain the difference?

Second, it also needs to be "better for the sinner" that the "second death" of Revelation really be "eternal life, but one of punishment" or else the same situation exists vis-á-vis annihilation.

You are presupposing injustice here and then finding it in your conclusion. It could be simplified, "Suppose someone does something that does not merit Hell, and God gives him Hell. That's unjust." Yep, but no one thinks that God gives undeserving souls Hell.

Of course I'm supposing injustice here. What I'm describing would be considered gratuitous and cruel if any human being did it. It would be cruel and demeaning to the person meeting out "justice" to keep someone alive just to punish them for 100 years, let alone 10,000.

Man's justice is, of course, not God's justice. But it seems like the two terms are in danger of becoming wholly equivocal here if the response is just "something is not evil when God does it."

...and yet you are focusing on extrinsic punishment objections. Even Dante avoids those. I actually don't know of any theologians whatsoever who think in terms of extrinsic punishment. The passage I gave from Aquinas addresses this directly, with his points about the "disturbing of an order."

I am focusing on extrinsic punishment because human beings, while alive, are capable of repentance. If human beings utterly lose this capacity at death, it would seem to require some sort of extrinsic limitation that is placed upon them at death. A capacity they once had is now limited. If man has this "dual potency," it is apparently being constricted at the moment of death.

Whereas if the damned can repent and turn towards God, then the punishment also seems to be extrinsic.

To be fair, no. But I think that your example of the wedding made it clear. It is like making a oath. Am I wrong? — boundless

An oath is an example, yes. It is the language of "means" and "ends." So you might say, "I am going to go to the grocery store today." That would be an example of setting an end. Then you might say, "I will use my car to get to the grocery store." That would be an example of a means to your end. We could say that you have fixed an end regarding going to the grocery store. For further explanation, see ST I-II.1.

When Aquinas talks about someone who "fixes his end," what he presumably means is that someone fixes an end for himself qua person. Marriage is a good example of this because the couple is fixing their joint end in a way that is more substantial than merely going to the grocery store. In this way there is a sense in which one can define their own life vis-a-vis some desired end, or decide that some end is supremely desirable (and one could here think about Paul Tillich's talk of "ultimate concerns").

To fix an end of any kind does not entail that one will never change their mind, but it does entail that one can pursue the end without changing their mind. Hence my point about "can" rather than "must."

I see. But can philosophy and scripture/theology contradict each other? — boundless

Well, as I said, "if one can philosophically prove that X is unjust, then X is unsupportable via Scripture/theology/tradition." Truth does not contradict truth, but not all philosophy and theology is true.

But there is a problem, here, I believe. You still have to explain why there is absolutely no hope of break the fixation of the will in sin. — boundless

Why do I have to explain that? Why don't you have to explain why there is no ability to fix one's end? That's my point about Aquinas: fixing one's end is uncontroversial.

But here in this life, it is assumed that we can repent. — boundless

On what basis? Theologically, it is assumed that we can repent in this life. It is also theologically assumed that we cannot repent beyond this life. So I don't see the argument.

Or we could just reify C. S. Lewis' imagery and say that repentance is always logically possible, but some will never repent. That is an orthodox position. It may or may not be a tenable position within Catholicism, but I don't really want to research that minute question.

The broad stroke simply says that humans are eventually capable of definitive decisions. I don't find that claim problematic.

Of course, he might not and we can imagine that the more time he remains faithful to this commitment, the more difficult is for him to renounce it. But he can still change his mind (i.e. repent) at any time and hopefully he does. — boundless

And if you want to think that way then I would just say that what is psychologically impossible can be logically possible. Someone who is confirmed in a certain decision or way of life will not change their mind, even though it is logically possible. These logical debates are ultimately debates of post-mortem anthropology, which strike me as unfruitful.

In the case of marriage, I don't see how 'making a sincere oath' necessary implies the ability to remain always faithful to the oath (in fact one can ask God's help to remain faithful precisely because of this). It certainly expresses the sincere intention to respect the oath, but failing to mantiain is also a possibility. — boundless

I think you are committing logical errors here, primarily modal errors. If one can promise lifelong fidelity then one must be capable of lifelong fidelity. If one is clearly incapable of lifelong fidelity then one cannot promise lifelong fidelity. You actually agreed to this earlier when you agreed that the person who does not think couples can fulfill the marriage vow do not in fact believe in marriage. It doesn't make any sense to say that the marriage vow is impossible to fulfill and nevertheless promote marriage.

In general, I don't think that an ability to make a oath implies an ability to remain faithful of it. — boundless

Suppose you make a promise that you know you can't keep. Are you promising or lying? I'd say it is merely lying.

Let's assume that 'being evangelized by other people' is a necessary condition for salvation. — boundless

Here's what I said:

In order to oppose universalism, one does not need to hold that all must be explicitly evangelized by humans in order to be saved. — Leontiskos

Strong exclusivism has problems, but they are not the problems of the doctrine of Hell. Tying the two together is no good.

-

I said:

If the essential goal is salvation, then on universalism the essential goal is inevitable, and need not be sought or pursued. — Leontiskos

Your reply was that a universalist might hold that evangelization is, "a necessary condition to be saved in this life."

I don't understand your argument. Are you saying that if the universalist doesn't evangelize someone then that person won't be saved in this life? Hasn't your whole point been that there is no reason to limit our actions to this life? If nothing changes at death then who cares whether they are saved in this life?

If one still believes that repentance is necessary, them 'it's not something that requires no labor'. — boundless

If an end is inevitable then it need not be pursued. A necessary means to an inevitable end is already a contradiction, if the means is supposed to be contingent.

Explain how "unending torment with no possibility of improvement," could ever be in "someone's best interest?" — Count Timothy von Icarus

If I give my kid a choice between broccoli and a candy bar, and I accept his choice of the candy bar, does it follow that I don't care about his best interest? Respecting freedom is a pretty sound motive. To spin this and claim that I don't care about my son because I allowed him to choose would be a pretty tendentious interpretation.

Is God is capable of showing mercy on everyone? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Is mercy just a magic wand that God waves which solves every problem? Traditionally mercy is not seen that way. At the very least it requires a kind of repentance, and repentance is a free act.

I have noted in the past that universalists and Calvinists are extremely close, in that both tend to be quasi-determinists who deny human freedom in one way or another. In either case the outcome is predetermined and freedom is not a real variable. I even suspect that we will see more and more Calvinists follow Barth in that universalist direction.

Of course I'm supposing injustice here. — Count Timothy von Icarus

And to do so is to beg the question. Suppose you said, "What if someone does absolutely everything in their power to cooperate with grace and God damns them anyway?" I would give you the exact same answer, "Then God would be unjust. Why would you presuppose that traditional Christians think God would do that?" It is a strawman. No one thinks the guy who commits a few minor sins will be disproportionately punished for all eternity.

I am focusing on extrinsic punishment because human beings, while alive, are capable of repentance. If human beings utterly lose this capacity at death, it would seem to require some sort of extrinsic limitation that is placed upon them at death. A capacity they once had is now limited. If man has this "dual potency," it is apparently being constricted at the moment of death. — Count Timothy von Icarus

As I said earlier:

I think there are good arguments for the fixity of the will at death even though it’s not a hill I would die on. But I don’t find it plausible, within the Judeo-Christian tradition, to say that the will can never be fixed in anything other than God. — Leontiskos

So let's pretend, for the sake of argument, that death has no substantial effect on us or on our ability to repent. What then? Does it suddenly follow that humans are unable to make definitive decisions (in which they persist)? Does it follow that in the Judeo-Christian tradition the will of intellectual beings can never be fixed in anything other than God?

@Count Timothy von Icarus, @boundless

As far as I am concerned, there are two basic questions here:

1. Is it philosophically demonstrable that the doctrine of Hell is false?
2. Given Christian Scripture and tradition, is the denial of Hell reasonable?

I think the answers are both 'no'.

I'd say we are most concerned with the first question, and I am not yet convinced that either of you would be willing to answer that question in the affirmative. If we agree that the answer to (1) is 'no', then it's not at all clear what we are arguing about.

If I give my kid a choice between broccoli and a candy bar, and I accept his choice of the candy bar, does it follow that I don't care about his best interest? Respecting freedom is a pretty sound motive. To spin this and claim that I don't care about my son because I allowed him to choose would be a pretty tendentious interpretation.

But this analogy is not comparable because presumably your child is capable of later recognizing that broccoli is better for him (perhaps from the consequences of eating too many candy bars). And presumably, when he is no longer constrained by ignorance about what is truly best or weakness of will, and asks for the broccoli, you will give it to him. Nor do we need to suppose that choosing the candy bar removes any future capacity to choose the broccoli.

Further, if he can choose candy bars for eternity and never regret his choice, this would seem to indicate that candy bars are an equally fulfilling good in which man can find his absolute rest (to stretch the analogy a bit too much perhaps).

Is mercy just a magic wand that God waves which solves every problem? Traditionally mercy is not seen that way. At the very least it requires a kind of repentance, and repentance is a free act.

I have noted in the past that universalists and Calvinists are extremely close, in that both tend to be quasi-determinists who deny human freedom in one way or another. In either case the outcome is predetermined and freedom is not a real variable. I even suspect that we will see more and more Calvinists follow Barth in that universalist direction.

I think it just follows from a non-voluntarist notion of freedom. Here would be my contention: no one chooses the worse over the better but for ignorance about what is truly best, weakness of will, or external constraint.

Exactly what sort of "freedom" is being respected here? It seems to me that it is inchoate, irrational, impulse towards some end. It cannot be that ends other than God are known as being better than or equal to God (they aren't). So such a choice arises from ignorance, weakness of will, constraint, or else some sort of irrational impulse of will that, in being arbitrary, hardly seems to be "free."

And I think this goes as well for the post-Reformation Catholic theology that starts positing that rational natures can find their natural end in anything other than God—that anything other than the Good itself can fully satisfy an infinite appetite for Goodness.

So let's pretend, for the sake of argument, that death has no substantial effect on us or on our ability to repent. What then? Does it suddenly follow that humans are unable to make definitive decisions (in which they persist)? Does it follow that in the Judeo-Christian tradition the will of intellectual beings can never be fixed in anything other than God?

I don't know what you mean by "definitive decision." Is this supposed to be some sort of decision whereby, even if we realize we made a mistake in our decision, we will forever continue to be committed to our mistake? But any such commitment would be wholly irrational, born of some sort of defect of will.

The classical theological answer for why man will not be capable of sin in Paradise is that his intellect and will are perfected such that he knows God as truly best and suffers no weakness of will. Man doesn't sin in Paradise for the same reason that someone who is perfectly empowered to walk never trips and falls, not because his will becomes extrinsically fixed by some "definitive choice."

To say that man's will can become definitively fixed in anything but God is to say that man's appetite for infinite Goodness and the Good itself can be fully satisfied (and thus come to rest) by some other (finite) good. That doesn't make sense to me, nor does it make sense with the idea of Hell as a punishment. The person who has come to rest in an end is satisfied. On this view, the sinner is satisfied in sin, no longer desiring anything else.

Plus, the descriptions in Scripture of Hell are not of some attractive, finite good people settle upon instead of God. The "outer darkness" is a place of great wailing and gnashing of teeth. So, no I don't think people can make definitive choices in favor of their own suffering and perdition if this is to mean that, even if they came to know the truth about what was truly best, or ceased to suffer from weakness of will, they would still somehow choose suffering and the absence of the Good. At any rate, such a choice would be wholly irrational and arbitrary, not a "freedom in need of respect."

You seem to be relying on the assumption that one can be equally "free" in choosing the Good as in choosing the nothingness of evil. I think this only makes sense on some sort of voluntarist conception of freedom as bare choice (which I don't think actually makes much sense, because it makes "freedom" collapse into arbitrariness).

Edit: Now, the idea of people drifting ever further from God and never finding rest is another concept, but this would essentially be a slide towards complete nothingness and seems more to me like annihilation, with the end state being the passage of sin into absolute non-being, rather than the eternal survival of sin in some middle state between nothing and apokatastasis.

...
To fix an end of any kind does not entail that one will never change their mind, but it does entail that one can pursue the end without changing their mind. Hence my point about "can" rather than "must." — Leontiskos

Thanks for the clarification, I think that I understand better now.

Well, as I said, "if one can philosophically prove that X is unjust, then X is unsupportable via Scripture/theology/tradition." Truth does not contradict truth, but not all philosophy and theology is true. — Leontiskos

Ok.

I think you are committing logical errors here, primarily modal errors. If one can promise lifelong fidelity then one must be capable of lifelong fidelity. If one is clearly incapable of lifelong fidelity then one cannot promise lifelong fidelity. You actually agreed to this earlier when you agreed that the person who does not think couples can fulfill the marriage vow do not in fact believe in marriage. It doesn't make any sense to say that the marriage vow is impossible to fulfill and nevertheless promote marriage. — Leontiskos

Suppose you make a promise that you know you can't keep. Are you promising or lying? I'd say it is merely lying. — Leontiskos

Good points here! To me this raises an interesting question, though. I believe that most (?) Christians assume that one can't be righteous in an inerrant way without God's help. Our will and our knowledge is impaired and we need God's grace to avoid falling (and not just 'stumbling'). If I am convinced by this thesis how can I make a vow to be rightheous or even to be faithful to God if I am myself aware that I am unable to follow perfectly this vow?

Regarding the couples, I also believe that the couple can ask God's help to be able to commit the vow. So, they might believe that with God's help, they are able to respect the vow even if they themselves are not.

In what follows, I'll concede however that you are right here.

On what basis? Theologically, it is assumed that we can repent in this life. It is also theologically assumed that we cannot repent beyond this life. So I don't see the argument.

Or we could just reify C. S. Lewis' imagery and say that repentance is always logically possible, but some will never repent. That is an orthodox position. It may or may not be a tenable position within Catholicism, but I don't really want to research that minute question.

The broad stroke simply says that humans are eventually capable of definitive decisions. I don't find that claim problematic. — Leontiskos

I see what you mean but even if we assume that we can make definite decisions, the traditional thesis that there is no possibility of repentance after death raises the inevitable question of why it should be so.

If despite being able to make definite choices even in this life we can still repent in this life, it means that having make a definite choice to fix one's will in sin and being able to repent (at least in principle) are not mutually exclusive. Section 1861 of the Catholic Catechism says explicitly that repentance for a mortal sin is possible during life.
If committing a mortal sin is making a definite choice and this doesn't logically preclude the ability to repent, this would mean that in the afterlife the damned are not granted the possibility to repent (either by active punishment by God or by 'desertion' in St. John of Damascus' view).

If, even in principle, the damned could repent, then why we can be sure that some will never repent? If repentance after death is a possibility, then we can't exclude the possibility that all will ultimately repent. Both eternal (self-)damnation of some and repentance of all are possible scenario and we can hope for everyone. This would mean that we can legitimately hope for everyone. So, to me, the view you are expressing here is not logically inconsistent with a hope of universal repentance.

On the other hand, if the damned can't repent, this would imply an infinite retributive punishment of sorts. And in this case, the main question of the thread would arise (how a human being can merit a punishment of unending suffering...)

I don't understand your argument. Are you saying that if the universalist doesn't evangelize someone then that person won't be saved in this life? Hasn't your whole point been that there is no reason to limit our actions to this life? If nothing changes at death then who cares whether they are saved in this life? — Leontiskos

I believe that among the universalists there is no consensus about inclusivism vs exclusivism, for instance. So, I would imagine that on this point there is no agreement.

What I said is that a universalist that believes that 'being evangelized' is a necessary condition to avoid post-mortem purification then the universalist has of course a very rational motive to evangelize.
But even this is not necessary to have a rational motive. An universalist might simply think that 'evangelizing' is a good thing to do, that it can help to avoid the temporary punishment both for him/herself and for others. There are plenty of rational motives that I can see.

Consider, for instance, a patient that suffers from a disease that causes to him suffering but doesn't lead to irreversible damage if left untreated. A doctor sees him and knows that a drug can help him to recover from the illness and to stop his suffering. I highly doubt that anyone can claim here the doctor has no rational motives to prescribe the medication.

If an end is inevitable then it need not be pursued. A necessary means to an inevitable end is already a contradiction, if the means is supposed to be contingent. — Leontiskos

Note that even if the argument were true, this would not exclude the possibility of the redemption of all, if the damned can still repent.

Anyway, if the damned retain their rationality, if they are aware that they can only find peace in God, they would understand that repentance is the better, more rational option. I would say that there is a reason that might explain this apparent determinism and still affirm the necessity of a sincere repentance.

I'd say we are most concerned with the first question, and I am not yet convinced that either of you would be willing to answer that question in the affirmative. If we agree that the answer to (1) is 'no', then it's not at all clear what we are arguing about. — Leontiskos

It depends about what you mean by 'philosophically demonstrable'. I believe that here we are discussing if the traditional view of Hell is consistent with a proportional retributive model of justice. Also, we are discussing if the view that the damned are beyond hope after this life is consistent with a 'free-will defence' of the traditional view of Hell.

As I explained in my posts, I do have my own doubts that there is consistency in both cases.

Considering that Christianity isn't the only theistic religion, I also believe that the discussion we are having here has a wider scope than being a discussion about a specific doctrinal aspect of Christianity.

BTW, I believe that the discussion we are having is also a very interesting way to explore what some concepts of 'justice', 'punishment' etc might imply, a reflection of what abilities we human beings really have and so on.

So, even if we are discussing under these kinds of things in the particular context of a religious doctrine, our reflections can give us interesting food for thought that can be applied in other contexts.

Thanks for the clarification, I think that I understand better now. — boundless

Okay, great.

Good points here! To me this raises an interesting question, though. I believe that most (?) Christians assume that one can't be righteous in an inerrant way without God's help. — boundless

I don't think that really matters. Let's suppose that when one enters into a marriage one believes that one will not be able to be faithful to the marriage vow unless the spouse is helping them. It makes no difference. That condition is already wrapped up in the ability to fulfill the vow. There is no need to think that someone who undertakes a vow must believe that they can fulfill it without outside help. They only need believe that they can fulfill it.

For example, if you join a monastery and take a religious vow, it is both true that you cannot fulfill the vow without God's help, and that you can fulfill the vow. This is because you can fulfill the vow with God's help, and when you take the vow you are presupposing that God will be there to help you. "With God's help," may even be part of the explicit formula of the vow.

Regarding the couples, I also believe that the couple can ask God's help to be able to commit the vow. So, they might believe that with God's help, they are able to respect the vow even if they themselves are not. — boundless

Right.

I see what you mean but even if we assume that we can make definite decisions, the traditional thesis that there is no possibility of repentance after death raises the inevitable question of why it should be so. — boundless

My point is that if the traditional position on the fixity of the will after death is such a hangup for you, then just ignore it. It changes nothing so long as we agree that humans can make definitive decisions (in which they in fact persist).

(It may be worth pointing out that universalists don't need to deny the fixity of the will at death. The fixity of the will at death has much to be said for it, and many universalists don't find it reasonable to question. Instead they claim that we don't have inside knowledge on what happens in someone's soul before they die. I.e. Everyone may secretly repent before they die.)

If, even in principle, the damned could repent, then why we can be sure that some will never repent? — boundless

If you want to hold that we can't be sure that some will never repent, go ahead and hold that. It doesn't logically imply universalism.

Both eternal (self-)damnation of some and repentance of all are possible scenario and we can hope for everyone. This would mean that we can legitimately hope for everyone. So, to me, the view you are expressing here is not logically inconsistent with a hope of universal repentance. — boundless

Rational grounds for hope are always different than rational grounds for assent. What you are effectively doing is switching from Hart's position to Balthasar's, where Balthasar is merely recommending hope. My answer is basically the same: philosophically speaking, sure; theologically speaking, no. By my lights verses like Matthew 26:24 exclude universalism, whether hopeful or firm. If no verses like that existed, then universalism would be theologically possible.

On the other hand, if the damned can't repent, this would imply an infinite retributive punishment of sorts. And in this case, the main question of the thread would arise (how a human being can merit a punishment of unending suffering...) — boundless

And question (1) <here> becomes more and more pertinent as we move along. There is a way in which you and @Count Timothy von Icarus are not paying much attention to what kind of thesis you are supposed to be arguing for. It begins to look like a, "Ready, shoot, aim," approach to the topic.

What I said is that a universalist that believes that 'being evangelized' is a necessary condition to avoid post-mortem purification then the universalist has of course a very rational motive to evangelize. — boundless

The same question arises: why is avoiding post-mortem purification so important? It's not important at all compared to the avoidance of Hell. It seems to merely be a motive of expedience.

But even this is not necessary to have a rational motive. An universalist might simply think that 'evangelizing' is a good thing to do, that it can help to avoid the temporary punishment both for him/herself and for others. There are plenty of rational motives that I can see. — boundless

But again, I never said there are no possible rational motives. I said . The evangelization doesn't need to be done. Of course, it can be done. We are capable of doing all sorts of things that we don't need to do. But it does not need to be done.

See, for example, this clip from N. T. Wright at 13:38. That's a pretty basic Biblical anthropology, where, "human choices in this life really matter."

Note that even if the argument were true, this would not exclude the possibility of the redemption of all, if the damned can still repent. — boundless

I was explaining why the universalist has no ultimate motive, not why the damned don't repent.

It depends about what you mean by 'philosophically demonstrable'. — boundless

What I mean is, Do you think you can demonstrate it on purely philosophical grounds?

I believe that here we are discussing if the traditional view of Hell is consistent with a proportional retributive model of justice. — boundless

We could ask whether Prometheus' punishment could be retributively just under any circumstances. I would say 'no', but that whole framing strikes me as a strawman. I don't personally know of theists who propose such a thing or who worship Zeus.

Considering that Christianity isn't the only theistic religion, I also believe that the discussion we are having here has a wider scope than being a discussion about a specific doctrinal aspect of Christianity. — boundless

A purely philosophical case is in no way a specifically Christian case.

-

BTW, I believe that the discussion we are having is also a very interesting way to explore what some concepts of 'justice', 'punishment' etc might imply, a reflection of what abilities we human beings really have and so on.

So, even if we are discussing under these kinds of things in the particular context of a religious doctrine, our reflections can give us interesting food for thought that can be applied in other contexts. — boundless

That's true, but I don't want to spend my free time endlessly discussing Hell. If we want to have a discussion of justice, I would rather do that in a less fraught context. For example, my thread from a different forum, "Is Justice based on Equality?"

Marriage is also "until death do we part," an oath to stay faithful to an imperfect human being within set bounds of responsibility. I don't think this is really analogous to the will becoming irreversibly and intrinsically"fixed" in anything other than the Good (which would seem to imply an end to appetite, a rest and satisfaction of the will in a finite end).

The more appropriate analogy would be pledging one's eternal soul to a person, or to Satan. I think people can choose to enact such pledges, but they cannot rationally continue in them forever. Holding on to such an oath would be akin to Jephthah burning his daughter.

This is why I initially assumed some sort of external, extrinsic block on repentance or extrinsic punishment despite repentance. I don't think the idea of the will becoming forever at rest in finite goods, or in evil (in the absence of Goodness) makes sense if the will is conceived of in terms of intellectual appetite.

So if we accept 'free will' as the ability to act deliberately between options, we however must assume that, in order to be considered rational, the ethical agent must choose the 'better'.

I agree.

So let's say that a man truly believes that what killing innocent people 'for fun' leads to a state of unending pain for him while he is also aware that refraining to do that allows him to escape that terrible destiny. Despite this awareness and without any coercion of any kind (of internal and/or external factors) or some moment of insanity, he still does it.

To me the choice would be completely inintelligible due to the profound incoherence.

I would say that it would be rational if this man is reasoning in accordance with Reason’s principles; and it is a ‘rationally free choice’, to use your term, if this man’s rational choice is in accordance with what he sincerely believes. None of this per se negates the possibility that one sincerely believes that killing innocent people at the exchange of their well-being is the best option. I agree it would be ‘irrational’ in the colloquial sense of the term, but it meets the criteria you set out for ‘rational freedom’.

I think for your view to work, you would have to demonstrate how it is impossible for someone to believe it is the better choice to do something which will be grave to their own well-being over one which preserves or (perhaps) increases it—even in the case that a normal person would not find it reasonable to choose the former over the latter.

When we talk about ‘rationality’ in colloquial circles, sometimes we merely mean what is reasonable from the purview of a healthy member of our species (or a healthy agent); and this is a much more narrow definition than previously outlined.

There seems to be a lot being said with very few words in that thread you shared; and I would worry that it is too loaded and runs the risk of being an ad hominem and potentially a straw man attack on theists. I would challenge you to demonstrate how someone like. e.g., Aquinas believing in eternal punishment is analogous to a psychopath that likes torturing dogs for fun: I'm not seeing it.

Sorry for the belated response!

Yes, and I have been asking you what form of infinitude is at stake. Is your answer to that question, "There is some form of infinitude at stake, but I am not able to say what that form is"?

My answer was that there are three kinds of things that can be quantified over for the sake of this discussion as it relates to infinitude: (1) dignity, (2) duration, and (3) repetition. My point was that you can pick any of them or all of them for our discussion and my argument will apply.

Dignity refers to the value of the thing in question relative to its nature (and ultimately how good that nature is relative to perfect goodness); duration refers to the amount of time something occurred; and repetition refers to how often it occurred.

The reason my argument will apply to any of the three is not because it is in principle applicable to all three types but, rather, because historically we have not seen any credible examples (by my lights) of any of the three being infinite as it relates to sins. Viz., we have not seen a person take as the direct object of their sin (i.e., the directly offended party) a being with infinite dignity (although someone might argue that God as an offended party in sin counts as a directly offended party); we have not seen a sin committed for infinite duration; and we have not seen a sin committed by a person with infinite repetition.

It's not really related to causal chains. Suppose there is a pipe that helps control water levels in the Great Lakes. Water flows through that pipe at 10 gallons per minute. Now suppose you break the pipe and it is never repaired. If the Earth is destroyed four billion years from now then 2.1024e+16 gallons of water would have flowed through that pipe.* And you might say, "Ah, I merely broke a pipe. I didn't cause 2.1024e+16 gallons of spillage." But in fact you did cause 2.1024e+16 gallons of spillage, by breaking the pipe. The counterargument that breaking a pipe is disproportionate to 2.1024e+16 gallons of spillage simply does not hold water.

I agree with your assessment here; and I would point out that no matter how many gallons of spillage happen due to this person it would not warrant infinite demerit unless the water that spilled was infinite in volume, was spilling for infinite duration, or was itself or a casually derived offended party was of infinite dignity. None of these three are the case in every human example of sin.

This was my complaint with Acquinas, because he attempts to tie the infinite demerit of a sin to God’s infinite dignity since God is an offended party; however, God is not an offended party in the same sense as, e.g., if a human had infinite dignity and was killed by this water spillage: one is an offended party insofar as their authority has violated (in the case of God) whereas the other is causally affected by the sin.

Another noteworthy aspect of this, albeit separate from everything else I have said, is that it also doesn’t seem just to assign infinite demerit to any immoral act against a being of infinite dignity merely because they have infinite dignity. For example, if human’s have infinite dignity (which I don’t concede), then it would not follow that every transgression against a human is thereby of infinite demerit (and thereby requiring infinite punishment)—does it? If I, e.g., insult God with my words, is that equally as immoral as if I were suffocate His will out of my community (by promoting evil)? They would have to be if all transgressions against an infinitely good being are infinitely bad.

...potentially a straw man attack on theists... — Bob Ross

I would characterise the thread quite differently. You can read Lewis' argument and comment on it. The punishment of the damned is infinitely disproportionate to their crimes.

I would characterise the thread quite differently. You can read Lewis' argument and comment on it. The punishment of the damned is infinitely disproportionate to their crimes. — Banno

Well according to the Bible :

Mark 3:28: "Truly, I say to you, all sins will be forgiven the sons of men, and whatever blasphemies they utter".
Mark 3:29: "But whoever blasphemes against the Holy Spirit never has forgiveness, but is guilty of an eternal sin".

These are the rules of the game for the believer. The believer recognizes the book as authority for their religious life. This sin stated as an “eternal” sin, not a “finite” sin. Thus, the punishment is proportional.

Well according to the Bible : — Richard B

So what.

the punishment is proportional — Richard B

An eternal punishment for a transient sin is proportional? Not seeing it.