I see what you mean. As I said, however, it's difficult to harmonize what the Bible seems to say in various places. — boundless

I think we have to establish a proper methodology if we are to avoid begging the question in these matters.

The first way to do that is to speak and listen at a single pace. I think Matthew 26:24 is incompatible with universalism, and presumably I don't need to explain why. You seem to, "See what I mean." So then, speaking and listening at a single pace, you might go on to present something in Scripture that you see as supporting universalism:

For instance, 1 Tim 2:3-4 seems to say that God's will is that all people shall be saved. St Augustine... — boundless

I'm not very concerned with what Augustine says (and he may well be stretching the text). I'm more interested in your argument that 1 Tim 2:3-4 supports universalism.

Verse 4 does seem to support universalism in a prima facie way, but I think that if we simply bring in the immediate context of v. 1 that thesis loses a lot of its steam. "God wills all men to be saved, and therefore it is good and acceptable in his sight that we pray and intercede for all men." The rationale here does not seem to imply universalism, given that praying for a man does not guarantee his salvation. The rationale is that God has a goal and that we contribute to that goal with prayers and intercessions. The fact that the prayers and intercessions are fallible is—in this context—actually evidence that the goal is fallible. If Paul had omitted vv. 1-2 then vv. 3-4 would have had a more universalistic ring.

Further, I think the fallibility of God's (antecedent) will was the most plausible exegetical interpretation in the first place. "God wills to save all men," does not mean, "God will save all men," and this is particularly true in the Hebrew context. Finally, I don't see how this cuts against non-universalism, for I don't know of any non-universalists who deny the universal salvific will of God. Note too that in the verses preceding verse 1 Paul is talking about those who have made shipwreck of their faith, which is certainly in tension with the interpretation that all will be saved. Similarly, verse 15 gives an explicit condition for salvation, thus implying that the condition (and the salvation) may not occur. So I think the initial interpretation is incorrect, and that there are also three contextual cues that the interpretation is incorrect.

Now let's look at your objection to my verse:

I also believe that St John Paul II said that despite what that verse you cite about Judas, the Church never made any definite pronouncements on people who are forever in Hell and this includes even Judas. — boundless

I don't find this to be a strong argument at all. A pope's comments are worth very little in comparison with Scripture, especially when he is not teaching formally. I also think that the claim that the Church has never pronounced on anyone who is lost is demonstrably incorrect, and involves a remarkable whitewashing of ecclesial history (but we don't need to get lost in that debate). In fact, if someone thinks the Church has never made such a pronouncement, apparently they haven't read Matthew 26:24, where the Head of the Church seems to do exactly that. Of course, someone could argue that Judas is saved and nevertheless it is better that he had never been born, but that seems like an impossible argument. I think those who try to engage in those sorts of mental gymnastics must be pre-biased (literally pre-judiced) in favor of a particular outcome.

That was our first step. I pointed to Matthew 26:24 and you pointed to 1 Timothy 2:3-4. At this point in the theological discussion, both of us having presented one pericope, I think the universalist interpretation is less plausible. I think the Matthew text has more anti-universalist weight than the Timothy text has pro-universalist weight.

Another example is St John Chrysostom's — boundless

So it is odd to look for someone who you think made a bad argument (e.g. Augustine or Chrysostom), isolate their bad argument, and then infer that the oppose conclusion must be true. This is a form of invalid reasoning. I could also find people who made (putatively) bad arguments for universalism, but this would not disprove universalism. Better to actually try to make an argument for universalism from Scripture.

(I actually pointed out the problems with two scriptural arguments presented in this thread, in <this post > and <this post>.)

Now let's take another step in the theological discussion. A second verse that I find quite convincing is Luke 13:23-28. I don't know how one could read that without bias and come to the conclusion of universalism. Granted, if there were verses that support universalism as strongly as these sorts of verses oppose universalism, then the "harmonization" question would become pertinent.

Ok, but anyway as I see it, if you allow the logical possibility that one can repent, then the logical conclusion is simply that no one will be beyond hope of repentance (assuming that they will exist forever). — boundless

Yep, again:

Specifically, if we say that no one ever moves beyond the possibility of repentance, then Balthasar's position is secured, but Hart's is not. So what you say is right: if no one ever moves beyond the possibility of repentance, then hopeful universalism is rationally permissible. — Leontiskos

-

So either the damned - or some of them - will lose the ability to repent or even if they do, they will not be given mercy from God. If we assume that they will lose the ability to repent, it seems to me that, based on what we have said so far, the damned will either not given the possibility to do so or they will not be allowed to do so. So, in other words, it is either an active punishment of God or a complete 'abandomnemnt/desertion'.
But it it is so, then, we have to think eternal damnation as an extrinsic punishment again. — boundless

I don't follow much of this, grammatically or logically. You may have to restate it in a different way.

Note that if Matthew 26:24 is true then Judas will not be saved. I'm not too concerned about whether his lack of salvation has a logical cause, or a psychological cause, or some other cause. Either way the outcome is the same. And again, at some point we have to wonder whether your term "logical possibility" has a specific meaning at all. It looks a lot like a tautology, "If everyone can repent forever, then everyone can repent forever."

I doubt that a Christian universalist would say that evangelization or repentance is unnecessary. — boundless

I spoke about evangelization, not repentance, and I think an intellectually rigorous universalist would have to admit that evangelization is not necessary. Even on your own analogy the only reason to evangelize is to lessen pain, and the lessening of pain is in no way necessary.

But anyway, do you think that the main reason that one should have to evangelize, do good etc is to avoid unending torment? — boundless

I think that if our ultimate goal does not require evangelization, then evangelization is not ultimately necessary. The goal is salvation, not avoiding unending torment. Nevertheless, try to make sure that your arguments rise above a mere emotional appeal.

Maybe at a certain point, the patient will be convinced by his painful experience to take the serious medication — boundless

And maybe he won't. We have no empirical or Scriptural reason to believe that every patient eventually takes medicine. Just the opposite.

So, maybe... — boundless

As has so often been the case in this conversation, you keep saying "maybe" when your conclusion requires that you say "necessarily." "Maybe" won't cut it for universalism, and we have already put hopeful universalism to bed (by agreeing that it is philosophically possible on the supposition of the 'maybe').

Or maybe the illness is not fatal but leads 'only' to agonizing pain but the patient refuses to take the medicine. If the pain could go along forever, will the patient simply forever say 'no' to the medication if he or she will suffer agonizing pain? — boundless

God here begins to look like the guy who tortures you until you finally give in. Or who sets up the universe in such a way that you will suffer until you finally give in.

Assuming that the medicines are necessary for the patient's well-being, compassionate doctors will try to convince the patient to accept them as long as is possible for them to do so. — boundless

Sure, and that's why the Church keeps at it.

The 'hard' universalists would say that at a certain point the 'patient' (sinner) will be convinced to take the 'medication' ('salvation') possibly by the painful experience (where the pain might be regret, a painful experience of loneliness and so on). The 'hopeful' universalists would say that there will be always hope that the 'patient' will be convinced. — boundless

Yes, correct.

The traditionalist would say that the 'patient' at a certain point is beyond hope or is actively condemned to not take the 'medication' or even to not desire it. — boundless

If the "hard" universalist says that at a certain point the patient will be convinced to take the medication, then the traditionalist says that some patients will never take the medication.

Unfortunately, I won't be able to respond in the following days. I hope to come back by mid or the end of next week. — boundless

No problem at all!

On your reckoning that would be a syllogism, given that it is a series of assertions.

That’s fair. What I should have said is that the major and minor premise of a syllogism are both assertions.

I am not going to enter into prolonged interaction with the theory given that it feels a bit like a new OP.

Fair enough.

Are you claiming that there are immoral acts which are not sins?

In principle, a sin is a concept which extends the concept of immorality; such that the former is an offense, at least in part, to God. We could also word this as the immoral act is simultaneously a non-sin and sin act: the offended party which is not God being the non-sin immoral act, and the offended party as God as the sin immoral act. I prefer to just say sin is any immoral act which, at least in part, offends God to keep things simpler.

What we are asking is whether you have the burden of proof to show that there is nothing infinite about human acts

True, but I think this burden is sufficed given that humans have finite dignity, a human cannot repeat a sin infinitely since they live for a finite duration, and the consequences of the sins cannot be infinite if the universe is not eternal. I think all three of those statements are widely accepted as true.

That’s fair. What I should have said is that the major and minor premise of a syllogism are both assertions. — Bob Ross

Sure, but the key point is that if you give a controversial premise then you must defend it. P2 is part of what we are differing over, and therefore it cannot be assumed (without begging the question).

In principle, a sin is a concept which extends the concept of immorality; such that the former is an offense, at least in part, to God. We could also word this as the immoral act is simultaneously a non-sin and sin act: the offended party which is not God being the non-sin immoral act, and the offended party as God as the sin immoral act. I prefer to just say sin is any immoral act which, at least in part, offends God to keep things simpler. — Bob Ross

But that doesn't answer the question I asked. If there are no immoral acts which are not sins, then your defense doesn't work (because in that case there is no immoral act that does not offend a party with infinite dignity).

True, but I think this burden is sufficed given that humans have finite dignity, a human cannot repeat a sin infinitely since they live for a finite duration, and the consequences of the sins cannot be infinite if the universe is not eternal. I think all three of those statements are widely accepted as true. — Bob Ross

If humans are not eternal then Hell doesn't exist. If humans are eternal then it is possible for an act to cause infinite "spillage."

The "order" is charity, or friendship with God, and Hell is basically the absence of that friendship. To destroy a friendship is like breaking a pipe, on my analogy.

But yes, humans are eternal beings on Christianity. — Leontiskos

I am aware of all of this and repeat the question/s... For a believer, that is meaningless. Their God is good. A God who allows child cancer is also good (yes, they come up with ifs and buts for this). The point is that for the believer, there is no problem of Evil.
I am largely noting the ridiculousness, given I am a non-believer.

Lewis doesn't seem to understand that nature of belief, for this purpose. It isn't Evil if it comes from God. Plain and simple.

It isn't Evil if it comes from God. Plain and simple. — AmadeusD

If you abandon human notions of goodness, evil and justice, then you can say anything and get away with it. The idea of an omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent God being good, given the suffering in the world is incoherent because the only coherent notion of goodness we have to work with is the human one.

It amounts to a form of willful blindness that allows the God that the believer cannot, for other reasons give up, to be exonerated and thought to be not only good but the source of all good in some incomprehensible way. "God moves in mysterious ways".

To me it seems totally irrational and morally repugnant. And you only have to look at the history of the church to see how this irrational and immoral notion of good predominated and has led to unspeakable human suffering. As if life were not already difficult enough. It's truly a pernicious and disgusting mode of thought!

Yes, that is the ridiculousness of it, for sure.

But that doesn't answer the question I asked. If there are no immoral acts which are not sins, then your defense doesn't work (because in that case there is no immoral act that does not offend a party with infinite dignity).

No, you are absolutely correct; and that’s what I was arguing. The aspect of the sin which pertains to offending God is an offense against a being with infinite dignity; but whether or not the sin as it pertains to the direct object offended (e.g., the other human, the dog, the tree, etc.) is not.

There’s two interesting points here:

1. “With respect to the sin qua offending God, are all sins thereby equal?”. If infinite dignity warrants infinite demerit and offending God is to offend something with infinite dignity, then the part of the sin which offends God warrants infinite demerit. Every immoral act is a sin because every immoral act goes against God’s will, so, therefore, every immoral act—i.e., every sin—warrants the same infinite demerit. This doesn’t seem right though: like I said before, murdering a human vs. a rabbit doesn’t seem to violate God’s will the same and thusly to the same degree—but how then could they have the same demerit? It seems like infinite dignity does not per se warrant infinite demerit of an act which offends it.

2. “With respect to the sin qua offending the direct object (e.g., the human), an infinite punishment seems disproportionate to such an act or choice with finite duration and repetition which pertains to two or more beings with finite dignity—unless, to your point, the consequences are infinite”.

If humans are not eternal then Hell doesn't exist. If humans are eternal then it is possible for an act to cause infinite "spillage."

Hell doesn’t have to exist for God to punish you after you die; at least not in the strict sense of being a place absent of God for eternity. Likewise, we are talking about the causes in the universe of one’s sins and not in Hell; so I don’t understand how humans being eternal in the sense of living in another place than the universe after dying necessitates their act in the universe may have infinite spillage. A human could be eternal in this sense and the universe is finite in time; which would mean that their sin would not be capable of infinite spillage.

There’s two interesting points here — Bob Ross

I agree, and those points follow from the argument you gave. I am just looking at that argument and seeing where it leads.

Hell doesn’t have to exist for God to punish you after you die; at least not in the strict sense of being a place absent of God for eternity. — Bob Ross

So then instead of, "If humans are not eternal then Hell doesn't exist," you could read, "If humans are not eternal then eternal punishment doesn't exist." It doesn't matter. The point is that if humans are not eternal then there is nothing to object to (and the person who believes in Hell obviously believes humans are eternal).

Likewise, we are talking about the causes in the universe of one’s sins and not in Hell; so I don’t understand how humans being eternal in the sense of living in another place than the universe after dying necessitates their act in the universe may have infinite spillage. A human could be eternal in this sense and the universe is finite in time; which would mean that their sin would not be capable of infinite spillage. — Bob Ross

I said that for Aquinas the infinite spillage flows out of the broken relationship between two eternal beings, namely God and a human. So if you believe that God and humans are eternal then the infinite spillage is possible. The question of whether "the universe" is eternal is not relevant to the argument I gave.

Where does it come from?

Can offenses against "finite dignities" come in gradations?

- Lots of strawmen being discussed among the atheists.

"Wisdom is vindicated by her deeds."

Where does what come from?

Pretty simple. God's being loving and merciful is incompatible with his damning folk for eternity. Any retort is ad hoc sophistry.

Further, those who believe that damning folk for eternity is a good thing show questionable moral judgement.

So then instead of, "If humans are not eternal then Hell doesn't exist," you could read, "If humans are not eternal then eternal punishment doesn't exist.

I thought by 'eternal' you meant having a part of oneself that is not subject to time. I don't see how this is necessitated from eternal punishment; e.g., God could revive people.

Yes. E.g., murder is a larger offense than saying something mean.

Goodness

Okay, then why can't an offense against a being with infinite dignity come in gradations?

Do you mean kindness?

That depends, when you said:

the only coherent notion of goodness we have to work with is the human one — Janus

did you mean kindness?

That's a good point: I like that.

Thanks, yeah I think you may be on to something when you say the desert is not merited due to the infinite dignity of the offended. I would tentatively suggest the desert is due to the objective nature of the offense, that is to say, the intentions and actions of the offender.

That depends, when you said:
the only coherent notion of goodness we have to work with is the human one
— Janus

did you mean kindness? — NotAristotle

Sure. We are talking about goodness in relation to treatment of others, we are not talking about being good at sports, or art or science or whatever, no?

Okay, where does kindness come from?

↪Janus
Okay, where does kindness come from? — NotAristotle

From fellow feeling, empathy, compassion, love. It can be observed in many other animals, it's not unique to humans. Where do you think it comes from?

I think the real issue is that when considering the dignity of the offended the punishment is supposed to proportionately reflect it; but how can a finite punishment proportionately reflect a being that has infinite dignity being offended?

With a being with finite dignity, we could scale up or down the punishment depending on the ends, means, and circumstances involved when the dignity is the same because the dignity has a finite weight (because it is finite itself and so a proportionate weight will likewise be finite); but with an infinitely meritorious being, this gets tricky fast.

from God.

Doesn't sound plausible given that the God of the bible is anything but kind. What reason do you have for thinking the kindness of animals and humans came from God?

I think we have to establish a proper methodology if we are to avoid begging the question in these matters. — Leontiskos

Well, I believe that some universalists would argue that that passage on Judas means that it would be better if was aborted. Not sure I am find it convincing - after all, it is undeniable that it does seem to suggest that he would be better for him to have never coming into existince. Assuming that you are right and it disproves even 'hopeful' universalism, it's hard to get a coherent theological picture from the Bible*.

What you say about that 1 Tim 2:3-4 is also true. Even if we accept that 'everyone' really means 'all human beings without exception', the text merely says that it is God's desire to save everyone. To make another example John 3:17 taken at face value would imply that God's intention is to 'save the world'. This of course doesn't by itself imply that, indeed, everyone will be saved.

But on the other hand, IMHO the Christian tradition has been insistent to describe God in classical theistic terms. God is omnipotent, omniscent, God's will is changeless and so on. How can God desire the salvation of the 'world' if He already knows that some will not be saved? If God is omnipotent, can God's will be frustrated?

So, it would seem to me that a classical theist way to understand the passages that seem to indicate God's universal salvific will is to simply deny that God's will is to 'offer the possibility of salvation' to all or something like that. Otherwise, the loss of someone would be a tragedy, a frustration of God's changeless plans.

* There are, indeed, some Biblical passages that seem to indicate that God 'changed his mind'. In Exodus 32:7-14 we do find a passage like that. Taken literally, it says that God changed his mind. But a classical theist would find such a literalist way to interpret the passage unacceptable. So, it would seem that nobody takes literallyeverything that the Bible says about God. Interestingly, if Moses' prayer did change God's plans, this would actually reinforce give an additional argument to the universalists. 1 Tim 2:1 says that we shall pray for everyone because it actually helps them. Anyway, a classical theist reading of the passage of the Exodus is clearly 'on surface' against what the text 'literally' says.

It seems to me then that a 'exegetical debate' doesn't give us compelling arguments.

That was our first step. I pointed to Matthew 26:24 and you pointed to 1 Timothy 2:3-4. At this point in the theological discussion, both of us having presented one pericope, I think the universalist interpretation is less plausible. I think the Matthew text has more anti-universalist weight than the Timothy text has pro-universalist weight. — Leontiskos

Probably you are right. But then, if we want to really have a theological debate, we need to get a coherent picture of God, it would seem.

So it is odd to look for someone who you think made a bad argument (e.g. Augustine or Chrysostom), isolate their bad argument, and then infer that the oppose conclusion must be true. This is a form of invalid reasoning. I could also find people who made (putatively) bad arguments for universalism, but this would not disprove universalism. Better to actually try to make an argument for universalism from Scripture. — Leontiskos

Yes, sorry for that. Anyway, I didn't want to 'prove' universalism by questioning their arguments. I just wanted to point out that even in those times there wasn't a consensus on how to interpret some ambigous passages.

Anyway, point taken, I should have at least clarify why I 'invoked' St Chrysostom's thoughts.

And again, at some point we have to wonder whether your term "logical possibility" has a specific meaning at all. It looks a lot like a tautology, "If everyone can repent forever, then everyone can repent forever." — Leontiskos

Yes, that's a tautology, but it is a tautology that follows from what we have been saying and agreeing upon. We agreed that in this life it is said that it is always possible to repent, even if we can fix in sin our own will. So the possibility of repentance can't be excluded by the claim that we can make 'mortal sins'. Arguably, this is also true in the afterlife, unless either it is seen as an extrinsic punishment of God or God doesn't give them other chances to repent. But why would God not allow the possibility of a sincere repentance at a certain point?

Does God change His mind? Did God decide from the start that the possibility of salvation is offered during life and after death there is no chance?

Asking these questions is important to understand the picture of God a doctrine is making.

I think that if our ultimate goal does not require evangelization, then evangelization is not ultimately necessary. The goal is salvation, not avoiding unending torment. Nevertheless, try to make sure that your arguments rise above a mere emotional appeal. — Leontiskos

Frankly, I am not sure why you think I am making 'emotional appeals'. I'll just ignore this insinuation.

The point is that an universalist might still say that evangelization (in some form) is needed for repentance. Of course the universalist says that salvation can happen after this life, so evangelisation is this life isn't strictly necessary for salvation. But it is certainly a cooperation to God's salvific plan (which is the salvation of all in the universalist view).

As has so often been the case in this conversation, you keep saying "maybe" when your conclusion requires that you say "necessarily." — Leontiskos

In philosophical discussions I use always terms like 'maybe', 'it seems' and so on because I recognize that I can be wrong. I can't exclude that I might miss something in my reasoning, so I'll say 'it seems to me', 'maybe' ans so on.

God here begins to look like the guy who tortures you until you finally give in. Or who sets up the universe in such a way that you will suffer until you finally give in. — Leontiskos

You seem to have missed the point here. In the analogy it isn't God who tortures but the illness. If you like, remove the word 'illness' and think about, say, a substance abuse. Arguably, the torment of the patient would be caused by free actions of the patient himself or herself, at least initially. The compassionate doctors will try always to heal the patient. Assuming that the doctors will try forever to heal the patient, will the patient at a certain point be irrecuperable.

Sure, and that's why the Church keeps at it. — Leontiskos

And yet, at a certain point, it seems that God and the Church simply stop to do that. Is it because the sinners at a certain point will be irrecuperable? If so, why?

Yes, correct. — Leontiskos

Good!

If the "hard" universalist says that at a certain point the patient will be convinced to take the medication, then the traditionalist says that some patients will never take the medication. — Leontiskos

Yes, I agree.

But note one thing, however. Let's assume that the illness is caused by the patient's free choices (like in the case of substance abuse). That is, the patient is actually responsible for his or her ill-being.
In both the 'universalist' and 'traditionalist' cases, the doctors want to save the patient. Only in one case, however, the doctors' will is realized. In the other, it won't.
In the form case, the end is the hoped one.
In the latter case, the end is tragic. Of course, it is not a refutation of the latter scenario, but it is interesting to note that.

Well, I believe that some universalists would argue that that passage on Judas means that it would be better if was aborted. Not sure I am find it convincing - after all, it is undeniable that it does seem to suggest that he would be better for him to have never coming into existince. — boundless

It seems like the same conclusion would follow even if the text means that it would have been better for Judas to have been aborted.

What you say about that 1 Tim 2:3-4 is also true. Even if we accept that 'everyone' really means 'all human beings without exception', the text merely says that it is God's desire to save everyone. To make another example John 3:17 taken at face value would imply that God's intention is to 'save the world'. This of course doesn't by itself imply that, indeed, everyone will be saved. — boundless

I think that's right. I think we could find lots of examples in Scripture where God desires or wills to do something and yet that thing does not ultimately materialize.

But on the other hand, IMHO the Christian tradition has been insistent to describe God in classical theistic terms. God is omnipotent, omniscent, God's will is changeless and so on. How can God desire the salvation of the 'world' if He already knows that some will not be saved? If God is omnipotent, can God's will be frustrated? — boundless

Classical theism has always distinguished God's antecedent from consequent will (or else has drawn other divisions that amount to the same thing). That said, the body of literature on foreknowledge or predestination and future contingents is very large.

It seems to me then that a 'exegetical debate' doesn't give us compelling arguments. — boundless

All we need to ask is whether it is more plausible to affirm or deny universalism, given some text. Whether the text pushes us in one direction or another. What someone finds "compelling" is fairly subjective.

Probably you are right. — boundless

I'm glad you agree.

Yes, sorry for that. Anyway, I didn't want to 'prove' universalism by questioning their arguments. I just wanted to point out that even in those times there wasn't a consensus on how to interpret some ambigous passages.

Anyway, point taken, I should have at least clarify why I 'invoked' St Chrysostom's thoughts. — boundless

Fair enough.

Yes, that's a tautology, but it is a tautology that follows from what we have been saying and agreeing upon. We agreed that in this life it is said that it is always possible to repent, even if we can fix in sin our own will. — boundless

I think my example of the opium addict contradicted this idea. Empirically speaking, it seems that it is not always possible to reverse direction. Doctrinally speaking, we do not foreclose hope for the living. But here we are talking about the "logical" point, and that is what I was questioning. That is what seems tautological.

Arguably, this is also true in the afterlife — boundless

Based on what argument? It seems like you want to assume that the afterlife is no different than earthly life, and I can't think of any reason to assume that. Almost everything we do in earthly life is changed by death. Why think the ability to repent is different? There is nothing else in earthly life to which we would be tempted to say, "I'll save that for after I die," and yet you seem to think that repentance could be saved for after we die. That cuts across the grain of all our earthly experience, and I think Christianity is being deeply rational when it says that repentance too cannot be postponed until after death. The urgency found in Scripture testifies to just the opposite.

The point is that an universalist might still say that evangelization (in some form) is needed for repentance. Of course the universalist says that salvation can happen after this life, so evangelisation is this life isn't strictly necessary for salvation. — boundless

Right, and as I've said, the logical contradiction is more pronounced than that. The universalist can say that Z is inevitable, that Z cannot occur without Y, and that Y cannot occur unless we do X. But this is a contradiction. They are holding that Z is inevitable and that it depends on a contingent X. Nothing which depends on a contingent event is inevitable. The universalist who thinks the free and contingent act of evangelization is necessary is actually involved in a logical contradiction. This is why universalists who leave religion behind are being eminently rational.

Frankly, I am not sure why you think I am making 'emotional appeals'. I'll just ignore this insinuation. — boundless

Okay, sorry, I must have misread you.

God here begins to look like the guy who tortures you until you finally give in. Or who sets up the universe in such a way that you will suffer until you finally give in. — Leontiskos

You seem to have missed the point here. In the analogy it isn't God who tortures but the illness. If you like, remove the word 'illness' and think about, say, a substance abuse. Arguably, the torment of the patient would be caused by free actions of the patient himself or herself, at least initially. The compassionate doctors will try always to heal the patient. Assuming that the doctors will try forever to heal the patient, will the patient at a certain point be irrecuperable. — boundless

Where does the illness come from? It comes from the universe that God set up. So it still looks like the universalist God "sets up the universe in such a way that you will suffer until you finally give in."

If suffering tends to produce a certain outcome, then infinite suffering will necessarily produce that outcome. On this view there are some people who decide to love God freely, and there are others who are forced to love God after an extended period of suffering pushes them into that outcome. Even on Manichean dualism this looks like a problematic view, namely because it is coercive.

And yet, at a certain point, it seems that God and the Church simply stop to do that. Is it because the sinners at a certain point will be irrecuperable? If so, why? — boundless

Because that's what reason tells us. It's also what Scripture tell us. Death constitutes a finality. That's the reasonable position. It is far less reasonable to hold that things can be postponed until after death than to hold that things must be done before death. The position that repentance can be postponed until after death can be logically possible and highly unreasonable at one and the same time. Perhaps we have been focusing too heavily on logical possibility. On purely philosophical premises, everything apart from a formal contradiction is logically possible, which means that almost everything is logically possible.

But note one thing, however. Let's assume that the illness is caused by the patient's free choices (like in the case of substance abuse). That is, the patient is actually responsible for his or her ill-being.
In both the 'universalist' and 'traditionalist' cases, the doctors want to save the patient. Only in one case, however, the doctors' will is realized. In the other, it won't.
In the form case, the end is the hoped one.
In the latter case, the end is tragic. Of course, it is not a refutation of the latter scenario, but it is interesting to note that. — boundless

Yep.