Ok. I think later in Negative Dialectics he tries to work through examples. Maybe that will clarify it for me. Do you speak German?

I’m still a bit confused about that too. I think it’s because he kind of rushes through it impatiently. But maybe we are just getting hung up on something minor.

Otherwise :cool:

Do you speak German? — frank

No, and please, no more of these frankisms (random questions with mysterious hidden motivations).

No, and please, no more of these frankisms (random questions with mysterious hidden motivations). — Jamal

I thought maybe you could read the lecture in German and talk about the translation. I would suspect the translation before deciding that Adorno didn't understand dialect.

I see what you mean, good point :up:

I’m just going to have to remember to compare translations or check the original when we get stuck.

Yeh, fair enough.

Also, more thoughts on the same subject --

I'm wondering to what extent Adorno is distinguishing himself from Hegel and Kant's conception of logic, and whether or not his negative dialectics would be read in a sort of the logic of objects sense, or propositional logic, or what-have-you.

For instance here I'm thinking about how for Kant the form of a judgment is--

I think = "X", where "X" is of the form "A is B", which themselves are governed by the categories in some fashion. So when we have "I think"red balloon float"" what we mean, logically, is "I think there is an object which is red" and "I think there is an object which is a balloon" and "I think there is an object which floats" and "I think these are all the very same object" (EDIT: Just to give an idea of what I'm thinking through -- the forms of thought and how we render them into sentences here and how Adorno means what he means)

And how we now have Adorno's rendition of Hegel as well as his own account of himself to compare all this with -- getting a sense for "What do we include in the category "logic"?"

EDIT: FWIW, I'm not satisfied with that at all. I remain interested because these are the things I find hard to articulate.

That might be a big topic! I might say something about it tomorrow.

Yeah it’s interestingly odd that he openly states that a motif — maybe we can say a theme — of his philosophy is working out why he hates synthesis so much, as if it's a journey of self-discovery. As if his personal antipathy to synthesis is a clue to what's bad about it. — Jamal

Heh. If the translation is giving the right meaning I'd quote it as an example of how philosophy is often a work on the self, even when directed to other ends and not emphasizing that.

I also really liked Adorno's example of nuclear weapons: — Jamal

I was hesitant but upon rethinking I can see it with respect to international relations -- them's with nukes get more power so countries want nukes in order to have power and these are the very things which would make the pursuit of power pointless -- because we'll all die.

Cool. If not no worries -- I think it's a huge topic that I return to all the time and then get lost in. :D

eh, I can read German well enough to check for trolling, but I have no faith in myself beyond that. I'd just be guessing based on my understanding of the English I think. (Once upon a time I made a mistake with respect to spot checking -- not that the other translation is wrong, just started to notice how the Pluhar translation has a particular interpretation which doesn't match the others -- not in drastic ways, only on those points where people start saying what Kant *really* meant lol)

what Žižek seeks to do doesn't seem far from what I see as Adorno's goal, though one can seriously doubt that the latter's thinking leads anywhere good, politically. But the idea that Adorno ends up on neutral ground doesn't really fit with how I read his Dialectic of Enlightenment and Minima Moralia, where (arguably) we see negative dialectics in action. — Jamal

Likely, there was a double misunderstanding: first, I misunderstood your interpretation of the example of the market situation as an illustration of Adorno’s notion of contradiction. And second, you misinterpreted my quote from “Mapping Ideology” as Zizek’s attempt to criticize Adorno. His target was Orthodox Marxism as well as Althusser’s structural Marxism. And I think that you are right and Zizek is
quite close to Adorno.

reality itself is contradictory, that the contradictions are not just in and between the concepts that are applied to it. Things are more complex, and (I want to put it stronger than this but I'm not sure how) we need to keep ourselves open to the existence of contradictions. Because that is how we actually experience the world. (that's a bit better) — Jamal

I agree with your last point and will try to elaborate on it. Likely, Adorno’s notion of contradiction is unseparated from his approach to non-identity, which is not a concept itself, but a major domain
of contradiction’s application. Let me bring a quote from Henry Pickford article on Adorno.
article

"Under current conditions the only way for philosophy to give priority to the object is dialectically, Adorno argues. He describes dialectics as the attempt to recognize the nonidentity between thought and the object while carrying out the project of conceptual identification. Dialectics is “the consistent consciousness of nonidentity,” and contradiction, its central category, is “the nonidentical under the aspect of identity.” Thought itself forces this emphasis on contradiction upon us, he says. To think is to identify, and thought can achieve truth only by identifying. So the semblance (Schein) of total identity lives within thought itself, mingled with thought’s truth (Wahrheit). The only way to break through the semblance of total identity is immanently, using the concept. Accordingly, everything that is qualitatively different and that resists conceptualization will show up as a contradiction. “The contradiction is the nonidentical under the aspect of [conceptual] identity; the primacy of the principle of contradiction in dialectics tests the heterogeneous according to unitary thought [Einheitsdenken]. By colliding with its own boundary [Grenze], unitary thought surpasses itself. Dialectics is the consistent consciousness of nonidentity.”
If I understand this quote correctly, the domain of non-identity refers to a complex sphere of (non)relations between our conceptual schemes and the world. The vast complexity of reality eludes our intellectual efforts. However, what is contradictory is not reality itself, but the ongoing disarray and imbalance between our actual experience, our sense of things, and the totality of our intellectual apparatus.

I think the contradiction he's talking about is that we treat something like the Absolute as a substantial thing (substantial in the Aristotelian sense, as an independent thing).

But we can show that the Absolute isn't independent after all. We conceive if it against a background of disunity, the non-Absolute. This situation generalizes.

"It collides with its own boundary". He's saying it as poetically as he possibly can.

The meaning of "non-identity", and the importance of "contradiction" is presented on page 8. Simply put, "A=B" seems to imply that A is identical with B, as an identity statement. However, evidence indicates that B is not A. This demonstrates that identity in this form is actually a "coercion" of logic, where we are coerced to accept A=B as identity. If we do not accept this coercion, then A=B as identity, is viewed as self-contradictory itself. Such resistance to this coercion is also characterized as contradiction, allowing the law of non-contradiction to be applied in support of the coercion. Therefore, we accept one or the other, and deny the one not accepted, as contradictory. But either way, contradiction is the base of our thinking. One concept of "contradiction" contradicts the other so that the two oppose each other. The view of "non-identity", I conclude, is the view that sees the identity claim of "A=B" as self-contradicting.

Now you may well say, this discrepancy is not necessarily a
contradiction. But I believe that it offers us a first insight into the necessity
of dialectical thinking. Any such predicative judgement that A is B,
that A = B, contains a highly emphatic claim. It is implied, firstly,
that A and B are truly identical. Their non-identity not only does not
become manifest; if it does manifest itself, then according to the
traditional rules of logic, predicative logic, that identity is disputed. Or
else we say: the proposition A = B is self-contradictory because our
experience and our perception tell us that B is not A. Thus because
the forms of our logic practise this coercion on identity, whatever
resists this coercion necessarily assumes the character of a contradiction.
If, therefore, as I observed at the outset, the concept of contradiction
plays such a central role in a negative dialectics, the explanation
for it is to be found in the structure of logical thought itself, which
is defined by many logicians (though not in the way it operates in the
various current trends in mathematical logic) by the validity of the
law of contradiction. And what this means then is that everything
that contradicts itself is to be excluded from logic – and, in fact,
everything that does not fit in with this positing of identity does
contradict itself. Thus the fact that our entire logic and hence our
entire thinking is built upon this concept of contradiction or its denial
is what justifies us in treating the concept of contradiction as a central
concept in a dialectics, and in subjecting it to further analysis.

He ends the lecture with a question about his use of "negative" as a defining term of his dialectics:

Given that the concept of dialectics contains the element
of negativity precisely because of the presence of contradiction, does
this not mean that every dialectics is a negative dialectics and that
my introduction of the word ‘negative’ is a kind of tautology?

He outlines the issues derived from Hegel, how thought itself acts to negate, seeming to imply that the subject needs to negate itself, but the question is left to be fully answered at a later time.

LND, Lecture 1 (continued)

I hope nobody minds these mini-essays; they help me to get to grips with the reading, and I hope to respond to others later.

I want to look at identity and nonidentity. They're so central to Adorno's philosophy, and he starts using the terms at the very beginning of the lecture course, but as far as I can see he never really defines them.

Negative dialectics...

sets out to be a dialectics not of identity but of non-identity. We are concerned here with a philosophical project that does not presuppose the identity of being and thought, nor does it culminate in that identity. Instead it will attempt to articulate the very opposite, namely the divergence of concept and thing, subject and object, and their unreconciled state. — p.6

I think of identity in two ways:

(a) Subject-object identity: identity between the concept and the thing, the prioritization of the subject and the loss of aspects of reality in the act of conceptualization. This is what Adorno is referring to as the identity of being and thought, but there's another side to it...

(b) Object-object identity: identity between the objects brought under the concept, the flattening out of difference, the loss of thisness.

Different commentators vary in their focus. Brian O'Connor goes for subject-object:

identity: A misunderstanding of the relationship between subject and object in which the concepts or systems of concepts of a subject (person, philosopher, scientist, etc.) are taken to be identical with the object. This misunderstanding is not primarily philosophical: it is determined by the prevailing form of social reason (instrumental reason) which is geared towards ‘the domination of nature’. — Brian O'Connor, Adorno, p.200

Alison Stone goes for object-object first and then links it back to subject-object:

When I conceptualize something as an instance of a kind, I see it as identical to all other instances of the same kind. This means that conceptual thinking gives me no knowledge about what is unique in a thing, for example, about what is special about this dog as distinct from all other dogs. Having no access to what is unique, conceptual thinking sees it only as an instance of a kind. In that sense, one “identifies” things with the universal kinds under which one takes them to fall. — Alison Stone, Adorno and Logic

(Incidentally @Moliere, that essay by Alison Stone is quite interesting for placing Adorno in the context of logic in connection with Kant and Hegel)

It probably works like this: subject-object identity is the primary source of the problem, and object-object identity is a consequence. In other words, our cognitive hubris leads to the erasure of difference among things in the world.

When Adorno makes a distinction between presupposition and culmination in saying that negative dialects is "a philosophical project that does not presuppose the identity of being and thought, nor does it culminate in that identity," there is more to it than meets the eye. I think it presumes the following breakdown of subject-object identity:

1. Epistemological identity: thought can fully capture what it is that the thought is about. The idea behind this is an expected identity, an expectation that reality can be reduced to a concept.

2. Ontological identity: if being is no more than thought then reality is made of thought and we have metaphysical idealism, and that's where Hegel goes. If one cannot think the object, know it, attain objectivity concerning it, without concepts, and concepts capture being completely, according to (1), then objectivity and truth are conceptual through and through. It's a short step from there to the claim that thought is not just a medium but is rather the unfolding of reality itself. Reality is itself entirely conceptual, the real is the rational.

(BTW, my very un-Adornian architectonic, with breakdowns, numbered lists, bullet-points etc., is just an aid to thinking rather than an attempt to uncover the secret structure of Adorno's philosophy, so don't take it too seriously)

But what about that "short step"? On reflection, it's not really such a short a step from conceptual mediation to full-on idealism. Is it important to understand Hegel's justification? I'm thinking not, but in any case we know that Adorno is against it.

But that's not all he's against: he's against (1) as well. In some ways he prefers to stick with Kant, to keep in mind the limits of thought; after all, I've said a few times recently that Adorno's philosophy demonstrates humility in the face of reality. But where he differs from Kant, I'm thinking, is that he believes it's possible, not to bridge the phenomena-noumena gap like Hegel, but to stand by the edge, gazing across in wonder to the other side — and to stay there, not walk away as Kant does. This is sounding mystical, but I think Adorno will deny it is, since what it will amount to is a way of making space for the nonidentical in conceptual reflection after all.

So, going back to his statement that negative dialectics neither presupposes not culminates in identity, we can see that he is not just against the metaphysical idealist conclusion (the culmination) but is also against the epistemological premise (presupposition). The problem of identity thinking starts early, and is a problem even when it doesn't lead to full-on metaphysical idealism (especially when, as it turns out).

In what I've been saying, I seem to be equating the nonidentical with things in themselves. Is that right, I wonder?

Well, not exactly, because the nonidentical is present in experience, featuring importantly in our lives; the nonidentical comes along with the objects of experience rather than being left behind in the noumenal realm, even if it remains unshaped by the understanding (an impossible situation for Kant). Another way of saying this is that unlike things in themselves, the nonidentical does not remain unavoidably indeterminate. I guess this casts some doubt on my metaphor of gazing across the gap.

Anyway, what's so bad about identity?

• The administered society: Bureaucratic systems reduce individuals to case files and numbers. Individuals are treated according to general rules or categories, regardless of their unique characteristics and situations.
  
• Mass culture: Entertainment is formulaic rather than allowing for genuine artistic novelty. Sameness under the guise of variety and freedom of choice.
  
• Enlightenment and scientific rationality: Science often treats the world as fully intelligible through quantification and classification. What cannot be measured or conceptualized is dismissed as irrelevant or even non-existent. This is the expectation I was talking about, the confidence that the concept can exhaust the object. I wrote something about that in reference to wolf-packs in the "Magical powers" thread a couple of years ago.
  
• Stereotyping and prejudice: Individuals are treated merely as representatives of group identities — race, nationality, religion, sexual orientation — and their unique features are ignored. Individuals are collapsed into presumed essences. Note that as a critique this works against aspects of Left-wing thought as well as Right.
  
• Philosophical systems: Hegel, despite the dialectical subtlety that impresses Adorno so much, finally prioritizes his totalizing system, in which contradictions are ultimately resolved on the side of the subject.
  
• The economy: This is especially significant for Adorno and from what I've read he uses it as a model of identity thinking quite often. In capitalist exchange, unique objects are reduced to abstract equivalents, i.e., money. The particular is subsumed under the general category of commodity, erasing qualitative differences for the sake of exchangeability. Everything becomes fungible and is otherwise devalued.

So identity thinking is everywhere.

According to Adorno, the most fundamental form of ideology, serving perhaps as a kind of meta‐theory of ideology, is identity itself — Blackwell Companion to Adorno, p.470

So identity thinking for Adorno is the basic template for ideology. Identity is the primitive or underlying form of these variously bad ways of thinking (and of treating people).

With all of that, we can see why nonidentity is at the centre of Adorno's philosophy. It is what resists all that identity thinking that produces suffering, oppression, and the flattening of life.

Well, I've spent a lot of time looking at identity, and that pretty much works as a negative definition of nonidentity.

But here's another couple of useful definitions:

nonidentity: What concepts or systems of concepts do not capture in an object is its irreducible particularity. In any act of conceptualization, therefore, there will be nonidentity because there can be no final identity between concepts and the object. The nonidentical properties of an object are not indeterminate (in the manner of Kant’s thing-in-itself ). They are what actually constitute the object’s ‘own identity’ though they are elusive to concepts. — Brian O'Connor, Adorno

The nonidentical are dissonant particular qualities of our material and ideological world that resist categories, push against containers, and rebel against smooth logics and harmonious equations. — Blackwell Companion to Adorno, p.145

However, it is possible in principle to recognize that things are never simply identical to these kinds (or to the other instances of a given kind) but always have a unique side as well. Adorno does not assert that things are wholly unique. He believes that things can be brought under concepts. But falling under concepts is not all there is to things. Each thing is also unique; this aspect of things is the “nonidentical” element in them – that element by virtue of which things are identical neither to the kinds they embody nor to other instances of those kinds. — Alison Stone, Adorno and Logic

One minor puzzle: what about the nonconceptual? Nonidentical and nonconceptual point in the same general direction, and they overlap, but to what degree do they have the same extension? The nonidentical is specifically whatever resists and eludes conceptual capture, whereas the nonconceptual seems to be a more neutral term, pointing to a posited (for methodological or linguistic convenience) mind-independent reality, or the objective pole of the subject-object opposition, treated as if prior to conceptualization (there is an uninterpreted reality, at least notionally).

There must be a pretty close parallel: to identify, to make identical in thought — this is a way of describing conceptualization. So what escapes this, the nonidentical, is at the same time the nonconceptual.

That'll do.

I'm wondering to what extent Adorno is distinguishing himself from Hegel and Kant's conception of logic, and whether or not his negative dialectics would be read in a sort of the logic of objects sense, or propositional logic, or what-have-you. — Moliere

This will be a crazy simplification, but I always find within myself an impatient desire to deal with this topic once and for all, as if I have a sense that it's not that important (I'm not for a moment questioning your interest in it, btw). My intuition is that it's kind of a red herring. I think that for all three of these philosophers, formal logic, which Kant called general logic, is basic, uninteresting, and mostly uncontroversial. But when they talk about logic they use the term more expansively. When K and H in particular talk about it they're talking about how reason actually operates within their systems, and H in particular pushes against general logic by refusing to go along with Kant's identification of the antinomies in the transcendental dialectic as logical failures, but rather regarding them as examples of some higher kind of "logic" (dialectics)

Adorno does something similar: he is looking for a logic, or better put, a rationality, that is better than mere formal logic. I mean, not as a replacement but as an essential supplement. (I think he also wants to just ignore the developments of logic from Frege onwards, probably thinking of them as either irrelevant or else as examples of instrumental rationality).

I tend to think the concerns about Hegel's violations of formal logic are exaggerated or misguided, but I'm sure there is a lot more to say about it.

The meaning of "non-identity", and the importance of "contradiction" is presented on page 8. Simply put, "A=B" seems to imply that A is identical with B, as an identity statement. However, evidence indicates that B is not A. This demonstrates that identity in this form is actually a "coercion" of logic, where we are coerced to accept A=B as identity. If we do not accept this coercion, then A=B as identity, is viewed as self-contradictory itself. Such resistance to this coercion is also characterized as contradiction, allowing the law of non-contradiction to be applied in support of the coercion. Therefore, we accept one or the other, and deny the one not accepted, as contradictory. But either way, contradiction is the base of our thinking. One concept of "contradiction" contradicts the other so that the two oppose each other. The view of "non-identity", I conclude, is the view that sees the identity claim of "A=B" as self-contradicting. — Metaphysician Undercover

Nicely put!

If I understand this quote correctly, the domain of non-identity refers to a complex sphere of (non)relations between our conceptual schemes and the world. The vast complexity of reality eludes our intellectual efforts. — Number2018

Yes, but note that Adorno thinks the role of philosophy is to make that intellectual effort after all, only without extinguishing the complexity, difference, uniqueness, etc.

However, what is contradictory is not reality itself, but the ongoing disarray and imbalance between our actual experience, our sense of things, and the totality of our intellectual apparatus. — Number2018

Makes sense, but I'm still confused about it. Certainly, Adorno is explicit that contradicitons are in reality itself.

I think of identity in two ways:

(a) Subject-object identity: identity between the concept and the thing, the prioritization of the subject and the loss of aspects of reality in the act of conceptualization. This is what Adorno is referring to as the identity of being and thought, but there's another side to it...

(b) Object-object identity: identity between the objects brought under the concept, the flattening out of difference, the loss of thisness. — Jamal

I think we need to differentiate between "identity" as it is used in first order logic or predicate logic, and "identity" as it occurs in Aristotle's law of identity.

The law of identity states that a thing is the same as itself. This places identity within the thing itself, as a form of object-object identity, recognizing the uniqueness of the particular thing, as the thing's identity. This is a relationship which a thing has only with itself, it is the same as itself. In logic, a thing's "identity" is something we assign to the thing.

There is actually a huge difference between these two, because first order logic then takes "identity" to mean "equal to". So in logic there may be two distinct things which share the "same" identity by being equal to each other, while the law of identity restricts "same" to a relation which one thing has only to itself. It may be argued that sameness by the law of identity is a special type of equality, an equality relation which a thing has only with itself, but it's really meaningless to say that a thing is equal to itself, when what is meant is "same". The difference between "equal" and "same" appears to be paramount in the proposed dialectics.

In common practise, this difference is the difference between "same type", and "same" in an absolute sense. So you and I can be said to have the same car (similar make, model, colour), but we do not actually drive the same car in an absolute sense. One sense of "same" bases identity, or sameness in the type, the other bases sameness in the thing itself. The sense of "same" used by modern logicians is qualified or restricted for the purpose of the logical procedure, so that it really means same in a specific way which is designed for, and relevant to that procedure, the differences being dismissed as differences which do not make a difference. This is really a meaning of similar.

Adorno's "non-identity" appears to be a rejection of the form of identity employed by logicians, the one which is really equality, being a specified similarity. We see that a multitude of objects subsumed under the same concept are deemed as the same by virtue of that concept, and Adorno denies this sameness with the term "non-identity". However, he has not, at this point, denied that distinct things have a true identity within themselves, as dictated by the law of identity. So "non-identity" does not negate the law of identity in its traditional form, it negates identity in the logical form, as equality.

Adorno's "non-identity" appears to be a rejection of the form of identity employed by logicians, the one which is really equality, being a specified similarity. We see that a multitude of objects subsumed under the same concept are deemed as the same by virtue of that concept, and Adorno denies this sameness with the term "non-identity". However, he has not, at this point, denied that distinct things have a true identity within themselves, as dictated by the law of identity. So "non-identity" does not negate the law of identity in its traditional form, it negates identity in the logical form, as equality. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think this fits with my understanding. And it’s not a rejection of identity as used by logicians so much as an accusation that predication is tantamount to such identity. I was reading about this difficult issue earlier today. How do we interpret Adorno’s insistence that predicative judgments imply identities, i.e., that bringing two things under the same concept amounts to equating them? So far I’ve had to settle with the view that there is such a tendency — but Adorno’s claim is stronger.

My intuition is that it's kind of a red herring. I think that for all three of these philosophers, formal logic, which Kant called general logic, is basic, uninteresting, and mostly uncontroversial. But when they talk about logic they use the term more expansively. When K and H in particular talk about it they're talking about how reason actually operates within their systems, and H in particular pushes against general logic by refusing to go along with Kant's identification of the antinomies in the transcendental dialectic as logical failures, but rather regarding them as examples of some higher kind of "logic" (dialectics)

Adorno does something similar: he is looking for a logic, or better put, a rationality, that is better than mere formal logic. I mean, not as a replacement but as an essential supplement. (I think he also wants to just ignore the developments of logic from Frege onwards, probably thinking of them as either irrelevant or else as examples of instrumental rationality). — Jamal

That makes lots of sense to me.

I tend to think the concerns about Hegel's violations of formal logic are exaggerated or misguided, but I'm sure there is a lot more to say about it. — Jamal

It's also something of a hobby-horse of mine.

What I would not say is that interesting uses of contradiction, even if they don't fit some formal definition of contradiction, do not -- unto itself -- undermine a philosophy. Too many negations -- what I'd say is one can use contradiction in interesting ways without at the same time undermining your philosophy. The "formal" concerns arise, but may not be interesting or relevant.

And I can see just treating the topic with respect to the reading group as a side-thread -- for purposes of this thread the questions about formalization of logic and dialectics, while an interesting question, is not what's being pursued here. For Adorno there is no such bar to hop over, and here he is demonstrating his method on his own terms.

I hope nobody minds these mini-essays; they help me to get to grips with the reading, and I hope to respond to others later. — Jamal

I love them! Since this is new material for me I don't feel able to put my thoughts into structures or find relevant resources to bounce off of so it's very helpful.

Yes, but note that Adorno thinks the role of philosophy is to make that intellectual effort after all, only without extinguishing the complexity, difference, uniqueness, etc. — Jamal

An example of someone who does this is Schopenhauer. After observing that subject and object are two poles of one concept (along with cause and effect), he posits a One whose will pervades the universe, and all else is sort of illusory. That view extinguishes the things we value the most.

edit: although I wouldn't say Schopenhauer was wrong, just incomplete.

what I'd say is one can use contradiction in interesting ways without at the same time undermining your philosophy. The "formal" concerns arise, but may not be interesting or relevant. — Moliere

Yes indeed. The issue for me has always been to decide whether, when Adorno and Zizek and Marx come out with their arresting paradoxes, it’s just the dialectical style, as in a form of rhetoric, or if it’s just a great way of thinking, as in a method — or if they’re saying the world is really paradoxical and contradictory.

I suppose you’re right. But then, Adorno was pretty much saying that every philosopher had imposed their concepts extinguishingly on the world.

I love them! Since this is new material for me I don't feel able to put my thoughts into structures or find relevant resources to bounce off of so it's very helpful. — Moliere

Thank you, I’m glad to hear it. I just hope I can maintain the energy.

We assigned ourselves a lot, and from someone whose done the same in the past and failed I'm guessing being gentle with ourselves will get us to the end -- bursts of energy and some quiet isn't bad, and with one another to motivate us to go along I'm sure we'll finish this one.

:up: :strong:

suppose you’re right. But then, Adorno was pretty much saying that every philosopher had imposed their concepts extinguishingly on the world. — Jamal

Even British empiricists? How?

Even them, I think. I don’t know off the top of my head.

However, what is contradictory is not reality itself, but the ongoing disarray and imbalance between our actual experience, our sense of things, and the totality of our intellectual apparatus.
— Number2018

Makes sense, but I'm still confused about it. Certainly, Adorno is explicit that contradicitons are in reality itself. — Jamal

Could you provide the exact quote from Negative Dialectics? Allow me to refer you to the following quote:
"Not every experience that appears as primary can be denied point-blank. If conscious experience were utterly lacking in what
Kierkegaard defended as naïveté, thought would be unsure of itself, would do what the establishment expects of it, and would become still more naïve. Even terms such as “original experience,” terms compromised by phenomenology and neo-ontology, denote a truth while pompously doing it harm. Unless resistance to the façade stirs spontaneously, heedless of its own dependencies, thought and activity are dull copies. Whichever part of the object exceeds the definitions imposed on it by thinking will face the subject, first of all, as immediacy; and again, where the subject feels altogether sure of itself—in primary experience—it will be least subjective The most subjective, the immediate datum, eludes the subject’s intervention. Yet such immediate consciousness is neither continuously maintainable nor downright positive; for consciousness is at the same time the universal medium and cannot jump across its shadow." (p.39)

Adorno explicitly points out the existence of a gap between 'a part of the object' and 'the definitions imposed on it by thinking.' This fissure has been mediated by 'the most subjective, immediate datum, that eludes the subject’s intervention.' Doesn’t this domain of our immediate experience constitute the locus of non-identity and become the primary instance of contradiction?