Interesting thread, . I am relatively new to Adorno. I looked at Wikipedia, Britannica, IEP, SEP, and read the SEP section on Negative Dialectics. His project reminds me a lot of Erich Przywara's Analogia Entis, for Przywara was also of German descent, born fourteen years before Adorno and dying 13 years after him. One can actually see in all sorts of German thinkers of that era the identification of the evils of fascism with excessive and overly programmatic intellectual certitude.

I will go read the first lecture before trying to say anything more substantial.

I see. Well, if the belief that any philosophy loses its legitimacy when it oversteps the boundaries of material experience and claims metaphysical knowledge makes you an ontological antirealist, then I guess you're right. He is against ontology insofar as it aims for an ultimate answer, an unhistorical, un-socially-mediated truth about what the world is made of at bottom, which is a project doomed to failure.

On the other hand, he does aim to "prioritize the object" and he is a kind of materialist. The world of experience is not entirely amenable to concepts, and it's unpredictable, because there is more to it than the subject puts into it, even though there's a subject-object reciprocity.

I'm used to thinking it was just the Frankfurt School who reacted like that so it's interesting to learn there were many others. On the other hand, Adorno seemed to be thinking along those lines pretty early, before fascism got into power in Germany.

I will go read the first lecture before trying to say anything more substantial. — Leontiskos

The more the merrier.

On the other hand, he does aim to "prioritize the object" and he is a kind of materialist. The world of experience is not entirely amenable to concepts, and it's unpredictable, because there is more to it than the subject puts into it, even though there's a subject-object reciprocity. — Jamal

True. The idealism that bugged him is the alienation of the subject to the object. That shows up in two places: in Kant (as the thing-in-itself problem), and in Marx's ideas about a commodity's exchange value (which means a commodity's value has become abstract for the sake of exchange, rather than use.) Adorno become convinced that these two cases of it are linked, and that what Marx outlined (in the first chapter of Kapital) is the real source of the Kantian thing-in-itself problem. In fact, for Adorno, it goes beyond being a feature of bourgeois culture (as it was for Lukacs), and becomes an organizing feature of human consciousness.

Also for Adorno, history unfolds similarly to music: the present moment has a sense of momentum as it arises out of the past, and the future takes shape according to the inner logic of the cultural story that's being played out. This is his belief in the unity of form and content. The "form" part is like the composition itself, the notes on paper. The content is a unique playing of that composition. Adorno says the orchestra never purely expresses the notes of the form, but rather the whole thing proceeds just like any events in time: arising from the past, and constrained by meaning to fall forward. It's almost like he's saying every musical production is like jazz in a way, with the form as a touchstone. Human history is like jazz.

LND, Lecture 2

At the end of the first lecture Adorno distinguishes negative dialectics from idealist dialectics (exemplified by Hegel) and also from dialectical materialism, the official philosophy of the Soviet Union and its friends. But he anticipates an objection: what justifies the label "negative" to this distinct strand of dialectics, since all dialectical philosophy is importantly negative anyway, in that it proceeds by contradiction and critique:

thought itself – and thought is tied to subjectivity – is negativity, and to that extent negativity, and especially dialectical thinking, is negative dialectics from the outset. — p.11

The second lecture aims to answer this objection by explaining the unique way in which negative dialectics is negative. Adorno does this by (a) comparing his philosophy to Hegel's, showing how it negates the latter's positivity, and (b) describing some of the other relevant meanings of negativity.

The editors have given this lecture the title "The negation of negation," which is the Hegelian move that Adorno is criticizing in (a). I got a bit lost in Adorno's Hegelian excursions but I get it now.


The negation of the negation is positive (Hegel)

Adorno puts it like this:

You must be mindful of the fact that you once learnt in arithmetic that a minus number times a minus number yields a plus, or, in other words, that the negation of negation is the positive, the affirmative. This is in fact one of the general assumptions underlying the Hegelian philosophy. — p.14

Personally I don't really see the need for this analogy, since the idea of double negation in logic and ordinary language is simple enough: "It's not the case that I am not wearing a hat" (negation of negation) means that I am wearing a hat (positive).

Anyway, negative dialectics is different from Hegelian dialectics in that the negation of the negation does not result in a positive. It is not an "affirmation," as it is in Hegel's synthesis or sublation, where contradictions are reconciled and there is progress to a higher stage.

Adorno goes on to describe how the negation of the negation works in Hegel. I'll quote him and then put it into my own words:

The idea that he develops repeatedly as early as the Phenomenology, admittedly with a somewhat different emphasis, and then above all in the Philosophy of Right, in the very crude form in which I have explained it to you – this idea is that the subject, which as thinking subject criticizes given institutions, represents in the first instance the emancipation of the spirit. And, as the emancipation of the spirit, it rep- resents the decisive transition from its mere being-in-itself to a being-for-itself. In other words, the stage that has been reached here is one in which spirit confronts objective realities, social realities, as an autonomous, critical thing, and this stage is recognized as being necessary. But Hegel goes on to reproach spirit for restricting itself in the process, for being itself narrow-minded. This is because it elevates one aspect of spirit in its abstractness to the status of sole truth. It fails to recognize that this abstract subjectivity, which is itself based on the model of Kant’s practical reason and, to a certain extent, on Fichte’s subjective concept of free action – that this subjectivity is a mere aspect that has turned itself into an absolute; it overlooks the fact that it owes its own substance, its forms, its very existence to the objective forms and existence of society; and that it actually only becomes conscious of itself by conceiving of the seemingly alien and even repressive institutions as being like itself, by comprehending them as subjective and perceiving them in their necessity. Here we see one of the crucial turning points of Hegel’s philosophy, not to say one of its decisive tricks. It consists in the idea that subjectivity which merely exists for itself, in other words, a critical, abstract, negative subjectivity – and here we see the entrance of an essential notion of negativity – that this subjectivity must negate itself, that it must become conscious of its own limitations in order to be able to transcend itself and enter into the positive side of its negation, namely into the institutions of society, the state, the objective and, ultimately, absolute spirit. — p.14

In other words, the progressive thinker as subject stands against their social context, criticizing the institutions of the status quo, and in such a negative stance represents the emancipation of the spirit (think of Enlightenment thinkers criticizing monarchy). But this negation of institutions, this so-called abstract freedom or abstract subjectivity, is one-sided and unbalanced: it forgets that the ability to critique institutions is itself a product of institutions (like universities). Therefore another negation is required, the negation of the original critical stance, leading to a reconciliation in which the subject's freedom is no longer abstract but is mediated by institutions (parliament limits the power of the monarchy). This last stage is the positive outcome of the process.

In Hegel's philosophy, being-in-itself is unreflective existence, whereas being-for-itself is subjectivity that is self-aware and asserting its independence.

So the Hegelian scheme looks like this:

1. Being-in-itself: Monarchy as historically necessary

2. Being-for-itself: Critique arises from monarchy's contradictions

3. Sublation (Aufhebung): Institutions are reformed through their own negation (e.g., constitutionalism, preserving monarchy while taking on Enlightenment criticism)

I think this is the basic form of the dialectic, and it involves determinate negation (which might just refer to stage 2, I'm not sure). The process can also be represented with thesis-antithesis-synthesis, but the risk of that model is that it suggests external conflict, where in fact Hegel's emphasis is on internal antagonism, unravelling from within.


Adorno's critique

Adorno congratulates Hegel for pointing out that stage 2 is one of self-deception: no man is an island, the subject is a product of "the institution" (which here can refer to any identifiable social structure, like a social class, and not just official ones). The critical subject is not independent of what they are criticizing.

Human beings are in fact ζωον πολιτικóν, ‘political animals’, in the sense that they can only survive by virtue of society and social institutions to which, as autonomous and critical subjectivity, they stand opposed. And with his criticism of the illusion that what is closest to us, namely our own self and its consciousness, is in fact the first and fundamental reality, Hegel has – and this is something we must emphasize – made a decisive contribution to our understanding of society and the relationship of individual to society. Without this Hegelian insight, a theory of society as we understand it today would not really have been possible. – So what I am saying is that he destroyed the illusion of the subject's being-in-itself and showed that the subject is itself an aspect of social objectivity. — p.16

Adorno, who studied the Critique of Pure Reason with a private tutor around the age of 16 or 17, had taken on board Kant's "Refutation of Idealism"—which says that the existence of the external world is a necessary condition for self-awareness over time—and he identifies a similar thrust in Hegel, who advances beyond Kant by socializing and historicizing that subjectivity.

Adorno thinks this is great, but the problem is that Hegel is too uncritical of the reformed institutions. The dialectical movement resolves in the institutions, giving them the upper hand, as if the self-asserting subjectivity, so-called abstract freedom, represented a wayward child who had to be brought to heel.

Adorno sees this as oppressive or at the very least potentially and actually so, because it can result not in a properly mediated freedom but a regression of the subject back to the state of unfreedom:

However – and this is precisely the point at which criticism of Hegel has to begin if we are to justify the formulation of a negative dialectics – we must ask this question: is this objectivity which we have shown to be a necessary condition and which subsumes abstract subjectivity in fact the higher factor? Does it not rather remain precisely what Hegel reproached it with being in his youth, namely pure externality, the coercive collective? Does not the retreat to this supposedly higher authority signify the regression of the subject, which had earlier won its freedom only with great efforts, with infinite pains? — p.16

He gives the sad example of Lukacs, one of Adorno's intellectual heroes, who, in a feat of doublethink, denied the correctness of his own position in criticizing the institution of the Communist Party, of which he was a member—while at the same time knowing that his position was better than theirs. Thus he sided with objectivity against his own subjectivity. This was the "coercive collective" in action.

I believe that I do not have to spell out for you the implications of such a statement. It would imply simply that, with the assistance of the dialectic, whatever has greater success, whatever comes to prevail, to be generally accepted, has a higher degree of truth than the consciousness that can see through its fraudulent nature. In actual fact, ideology in the Eastern bloc is largely determined by this idea. A further implication is that mind would amputate itself, that it would abdicate its own freedom and simply adapt to the needs of the big battalions. To accept such a course of action does not appear possible to me. — p.17

So this is why, for Adorno, the negation of the negation does not automatically result in a positive, in an affirmation, in anything we ought to be affirming.

In the rest of the lecture, he leaves behind the Hegelian stuff and defines negativity in other, more intuitive, ways, most notably the idea of "abstract positivity," which I believe can be related to the contemporary concepts of toxic positivity and cruel optimism. I may cover that in another post.

Just to add: for Hegel, the experience of freedom can only happen in a social situation. We give one another freedom:

The key point, for Hegel, is that only the free will of an individual can ground the free will of another (Stillman 1980). Something is mine when mutually recognized as my possession by another. This is the first appearance of right where the activity of my free will in taking possession is free, and not mere arbitrariness. It is this agreement between two individuals forming a kind of contract which is so important for Hegel. This is because mutual recognition becomes a vehicle for how we can develop further a more concrete understanding of freedom as right in the world. If such recognition was under threat, this would unsettle how we can ground our free will in a free will of another. — SEP article on Hegel's Philosophy of Right (PR)

That article also notes that there are some who read Hegel and ditch the mysticism that it's couched in. I'm sure @Count Timothy von Icarus will see that Adorno's explanation of Hegel (in your quote) has Neoplatonic undercurrents. We don't need to explore that, (unless we do need to).

Just to add: for Hegel, the experience of freedom can only happen in a social situation. We give one another freedom — frank

Yes, Adorno makes that point explicitly in the lecture. Maybe I wasn't clear.

That article also notes that there are some who read Hegel and ditch the mysticism that it's couched in. — frank

Surely that describes all Hegelians these days?

Yes, Adorno makes that point explicitly in the lecture. Maybe I wasn't clear. — Jamal

You drew attention to the fact that self awareness is dependent on being in a social arena. I don't think you mentioned the part about how freedom requires intersubjectivity, so that as Hegel's narrative progresses, freedom disappears. In other words, if the Proletariat actually turned into what Marx thought it would, there wouldn't be any freedom. Are we on the same page there?

Surely that describes all Hegelians these days? — Jamal

No.

In contrast, the metaphysical reading counters that anti-metaphysical interpretations take a one-sided approach to Hegel’s work (Beiser 2005, Goodfield 2009, Rosen 1984, Taylor 1975, Thompson 2018). Hegel conceived his PR to be a part of a wider system. Isolating any one text from its wider context may appear to inoculate any such reading from metaphysical claims elsewhere in Hegel’s system. However, only a reading that grasps the full metaphysical foundations of his thought will do justice to his self-understanding (Houlgate 2005). — SEP

Are we on the same page there? — frank

I don't know, because I have no opinion on the disappearance of freedom as Hegel's narrative progresses. I'll keep it in mind though :up:

No. — frank

By "ditch the mysticism" I took you to mean a rejection of the mysticism among those who embrace his philosophy otherwise. Your more recent quotation from SEP shows only (setting aside concerns about mystical vs metaphysical) that interpeters of Hegel interpret Hegel's philosophy as mystical, and I'm not arguing with that.

Cool. How do you think Adorno understood Hegel's use of the term "absolute spirit" in this quote?

Here we see one of the crucial turning points of Hegel’s philosophy, not to say one of its decisive tricks. It consists in the idea that subjectivity which merely exists for itself, in other words, a critical, abstract, negative subjectivity – and here we see the entrance of an essential notion of negativity – that this subjectivity must negate itself, that it must become conscious of its own limitations in order to be able to transcend itself and enter into the positive side of its negation, namely into the institutions of society, the state, the objective and, ultimately, absolute spirit. — p.14

I don't know, what do you think?

I guess we could first look at what Hegel meant by it. I agree with this guy:

Given the evidence for Hegel’s place in the Hermetic tradition, it seems surprising that so few Hegel scholars acknowledge it. The topic is often dismissed as unimportant or uninteresting (it is neither). Usually, it is treated as relevant only to Hegel’s youth (which is false). Surely one reason for this attitude is disciplinary specialization. Few scholars of the history of philosophy ever study Hermetic thinkers. Another reason is the recent tendency among influential Hegel scholars to argue that it is wrong-headed to treat Hegel as having any serious interest in metaphysics or theology at all, let alone the sort of exotic metaphysics and theology that we find in Hermeticism. This is the so-called “non-metaphysical reading” of Hegel. As Cyril O'Regan has pointed out, it goes hand in hand with an “anti-theological” reading. For instance, David Kolb writes, “I want most of all to preclude the idea that Hegel provides a cosmology including the discovery of a wondrous new superentity, a cosmic self or a world soul or a supermind.” But this is exactly what Hegel does.

The phrase “non-metaphysical reading” seems to have originated with Klaus Hartmann who, in his influential 1972 article “Hegel: A NonMetaphysical View,” identified Hegel’s system as a “hermeneutic of categories.” Other well-known proponents of Hartmann’s approach include Kenley Royce Dove, William Maker, Terry Pinkard, and Richard Dien Winfield.

The non-metaphysical/anti-theological reading relies on ignoring or explaining away the many frankly metaphysical, cosmological, theological, and theosophical passages in Hegel’s writings and lectures. Thus the non-metaphysical reading is less an interpretation of Hegel than a revision. Its advocates sometimes admit this — Hartmann, for instance — but more often than not they offer their “reading” in opposition to other interpretations of what Hegel meant. It is, furthermore, no accident that the same authors finish out their “interpretation” by tacking a left-wing politics onto Hegel, for they are, in fact, the intellectual heirs of the nineteenth-century “Young Hegelians” who also gave non-metaphysical, anti-theological “interpretations” of Hegel. The non-metaphysical reading is simply Hegel shorn of everything offensive to the modern, secular, liberal mind. This does not, however, imply that I am offering an alternative “right Hegelian” reading of Hegel. I am simply reading Hegel. In so doing, I hope to contribute to the “nonpartisan, historical and textual analysis” of Hegel’s thought called for by Louis Dupré.

Such a reading, I am convinced, places Hegel’s philosophy squarely in the tradition of classical metaphysics. In this view, I am in accord with the broadly “ontotheological” interpretation of Hegel offered by Martin Heidegger, who coined the term, and by such scholars as Walterjaeschke, Emil Fackenheim, Cyril O'Regan, Malcolm Clark, Albert Chapelle, Claude Bruaire, and Iwan Iljin. “Ontotheology” refers to the equation of Being, God, and logos. Hegel’s account of the Absolute is structurally identical to Aristotle’s account of Being as Substance (ousia): it is the most real, independent, and self-sufficient thing that is. Hegel identifies the Absolute with God, and does so both in his public statements (his books and lectures) and in his private notes — and with a straight face, without winking at us. Hegel does not offer the categories of his Logic as mere “hermeneutic devices” but as eternal forms, moments or aspects of the Divine Mind (Absolute Idea). He treats nature as “expressing” the divine ideas in imperfect form. He speaks of a “World Soul” and uses it to explain how dowsing and animal magnetism work. He structures his entire philosophy around the Christian Trinity, and claims that with Christianity the “principle” of speculative philosophy was revealed to mankind.” He tells us — again with a straight face — that the state is God on earth.

I see no reason not to take Hegel at his word on any of this. I am interested only in what Hegel thought, not in what he ought to have thought. To be sure, Hegel’s appropriation of classical metaphysics and Christianity is transformative; Hegel is no ordinary believer. But his metaphysical and religious commitments are not exoteric. He believes that his Absolute and World Soul, and so forth, are real beings; they are just not real in the sense in which traditional, pious “picture-thinking” conceives of them. If Hegel departs from the metaphysical tradition in anything, it is in dispensing with its false modesty. Hegel does not claim to be merely searching for truth. He claims that he has found it. — Glenn Magee

Cool, thanks.

Cool, thanks. — Jamal

:up: As for what Adorno made of it, I'm still trying to formulate that. He spent a lot of time sunk deep in the quasi-mystical. He tried to learn Hebrew because one of his friends became an expert in Jewish Kabbalah. But what I notice from Buck-Morss's outline is that while others around him are tipping over into lunacy, he keeps his head. For Adorno, truth is about facts. Hegel would have said we only ever encounter partial-truths. The final truth would reside in the Absolute (sort of).

I think when he describes the descent of the spirit into human life (which is what that lecture portion you quoted is about), he's describing what Marxists around him believed. He's explaining what's wrong with the picture the Marxists are embracing. The reason Lukacs stifled himself was this belief that they were cruising into this great mystical reunification between the subject and the object, between humanity and the Absolute. God was waking up and looking out onto a human world. That's what the Proletariat was supposed to be. This isn't just about emancipation. In fact, as Adorno shows, it's not about emancipation at all. This is a religious vision. Adorno wasn't buying it.

What did he really believe about the universe? I think he would have said we need to temper the drive to answer questions like that.

- Adorno's unfettered dialectics ... eliminates ontology altogether. His rejection of any
ontological stipulation in favor of an infinite dialectics which penetrates
all concrete things. and entities seems inseparable from a certain arbitrariness, an absence of content and direction ... — Kracauer, History, p.207

I think this is a typical reaction by those averse to dropping ontology. It seems to leave one floating on air?

I think Magee's particular thesis is too maximalist, in part because much of what he designates as "Hermetic" is also a part of the broader medieval tradition Hegel was familiar with, or the Patristics he was exposed to as a theology student. However, it's nonetheless an important point. Gary Dorian makes a similar case in "Kantian Reason and Hegelian Spirit" and so does Robert M. Wallace in his work (plenty of others too).

I still recommend Pinkard's "Hegel's Naturalism" sometimes because it's a good introduction and I think the deflated Hegel is easier for people to wrap their minds around. However, it's ironic that Pinkard uses Hegel's "Aristotlianism" to deflate him, since it presupposes the modern analytic deflationary readings of Aristotle to make sense.

I feel like "mysticism" is not the best term here though. Really what bothers modern sensibilities is just metaphysics and the transcendent in general. Philosophy need not appeal to any sort of mystical experience to fall afoul of this bias in contemporary thought (particularly analytical thought). Which I feel is unfortunate. I think "anti-metaphysics" tends to actually just assume a very particular sort of metaphysics, and then this position essentially just "cheats" on justifying itself by pretending it is "just the skeptical, agnostic position."

It's interesting to think about how to frame this sort of move (which is very common in contemporary philosophy) in dialectical terms. The basic move is "we must be properly skeptical and will just bracket this confusing question and move on," with this "bracketing" actually just resulting in adopting a particular metaphysics (e.g. nominalism, materialism, etc.)

I feel like "mysticism" is not the best term here though. Really what bothers modern sensibilities is just metaphysics and the transcendent in general. Philosophy need not appeal to any sort of mystical experience to fall afoul of this bias in contemporary thought (particularly analytical thought). Which I feel is unfortunate. I think "anti-metaphysics" tends to actually just assume a very particular sort of metaphysics, and then this position essentially just "cheats" on justifying itself by pretending it is "just the skeptical, agnostic position." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Well said.

In other words, the progressive thinker as subject stands against their social context, criticizing the institutions of the status quo, and in such a negative stance represents the emancipation of the spirit (think of Enlightenment thinkers criticizing monarchy). But this negation of institutions, this so-called abstract freedom or abstract subjectivity, is one-sided and unbalanced: it forgets that the ability to critique institutions is itself a product of institutions (like universities). Therefore another negation is required, the negation of the original critical stance, leading to a reconciliation in which the subject's freedom is no longer abstract but is mediated by institutions (parliament limits the power of the monarchy). This last stage is the positive outcome of the process. — Jamal

I interpret this negation of the negation in the following way. The rebellious subject sees the institutions of society as restrictive and infringements on freedom, and therefore acts to negate the validity of them. An example of this is when I argued that "society" is not a proper object, but a concept. That would be a step toward negating the validity of those institutions. But Hegel implies that this gets the subject nowhere, because the subject is actually dependent on these institutions, so it ends up rebounding back upon the subject requiring a negation of one's own negation. Therefore the subject is forced to negate that negation for one's own support.

Now, Adorno says that this is a feature consistent throughout most of Hegel, but also points out that there was a time when Hegel did not accept this principle.

Now it is quite remarkable, a historical fact, and one that is perhaps
of key importance for what I wish to explain to you today, that this
negation of the negation that is then postulated as a positive is a
notion that the young Hegel sharply criticizes in essays which Nohl
published with the title of Early Theological Writings.6 In their central
thrust these youthful essays amount to an attack on positivity, in
particular on positive religion, positive theology, in which the subject
is not ‘at home’ [bei sich] and in which this theology confronts him
as being something alien and reified. And since it is reified and external
and particular, it cannot be the absolute that religious categories
claim it to be. Moreover, this is an idea that Hegel does not repudiate
or abandon later on; he merely reinterprets it. In general, he
abandoned or rejected very few of his ideas. What he mainly did was to
change their emphasis, albeit sometimes in a way that turned them
into their opposites. — p15

Further, there is another possible conclusion, to this issue with the institutions of society. This is the approach described by Plato in The Symposium. In this dialogue the student is being educated on the principles of "love". The student learns to see that institutions are beautiful. This requires no denial or affirmation of any specific institution, only a recognition that each, in its own way, has beauty. And there is no possible reason for them all to be beautiful other than the fact that they participate in the Idea of Beauty.

I believe that in the Platonic approach the double negation is averted, by averting the first negation. Through the teachings of love, the primary desire to negate the institutions is averted by demonstrating the natural beauty of an institution as artificial, a form of art. And when the subject proceeds to inquire how is it possible that an institution, which is fundamentally an infringement on one's freedom, could be beautiful, the person is lead to the reality of the Idea, which transcends all such things. Hegel posits the Idea as prior to, and transcending the state and its institutions, but gets there in a faulty way, so this position is unsupported.

Another topic which comes up in the second lecture is Hegel's distinction between "being-in-itself" and "being-for-itself" (p14). To me, the former represents a passive being, while the latter represents an intentionally active being. I believe that this distinction will help us to understand the sense of "negative" which Adorno is attempting to circumscribe. In a way "No" is at the heart of morality, as the capacity to resist acting on temptations. And this type of negativity, known as will power, is not quite the same as a simple opposition to yes. It's more like the means by which deliberation is capacitated.

This resisting action, which is like the skeptic's "suspending judgement", which allows clear thinking, is the reason I believe he associates negative dialectics with critical thinking:

I would suggest that
the two terms – critical theory and negative dialectics17 – have the
same meaning. Perhaps, to be more precise, with the sole difference
that critical theory really signifies only the subjective side of thought,
that is to say, theory, while negative dialectics signifies not only that
aspect of thought but also the reality that is affected by it. — p20

Good interpretations, and worded better than mine :up:

Nothing to add yet, just reporting in to say I'm caught up. Everyone's essays and reflections are helping to read along. EDIT: (not much to say yet other than it looks like Lecture 3 is a continuation of the argument from Lecture 2, and neat to see him further differentiating himself from Hegel. I'm still in "absorb" mode)

Good interpretations, and worded better than mine :up: — Jamal

Thank you. I'm going to take a look at the senses of "negative" referred to. I'm intrigued by the way that "negative" is associated with bad, and "positive" is associated with good, almost to the point of a necessary relation in common usage, yet "no" is not necessarily associated with bad, nor is "yes" necessarily associated with good.

Yeah it's interesting. It almost looks like he's chosen the evaluative descriptor, "negative," as a nay-saying gesture, which an uncharitable person might think is hardly better than the yay-saying he criticizes (or thinks is stupid).

I'm still in "absorb" mode — Moliere

:cool:

I'm in regurgitation of partly digested philosophical material mode.

Well I appreciate it cuz it's helping me.

Much easier to start a new thinker with some easier to digest thoughts than the thinker himself.

So, he goes through a bunch of meanings for "positive" and distinguishes two principal uses, "positive" in the sense of good, and positive in the sense of what is posited, or postulated as actual fact. The latter is the sense associated with positivism, and he warns about a sort of equivocation whereby the word "positive" in positivism has connotations from the other meaning, good, approvable, and ideal.

I will add that there is another sense of "positive" which sort of bridges between those two principle senses, it is the sense of a sort of certitude about what is the actual fact. "I am positive that I put the file in the folder, therefore unless someone removed it, it must be there." This appears to signify the positive attitude which Adorno's negative dialectics is opposed to, as a sort of Socratic skepticism. In analogy, the positivists are to Adorno, like the sophists were to Plato.

‘

For this reason,
therefore, we might say, putting it in dialectical terms, that what
appears as the positive is essentially the negative, i.e. the thing that
the negation of negation is to be criticized.
And that is the motive, the essential motive, for
the conception and nomenclature of a negative dialectic. — p18-19

So he describes his negative dialectics as a form of critical theory which goes beyond conventional critical theory, by affecting not only the way that we think, but also the way that we act. By affecting the way that we act, it has an affect on reality itself. This proposition we can reflect back on Hegel's distinction between "being-in-itself" as passive critical thought, and "being-for-itself" as active negative dialectics.

In this context, I remember very well a junior seminar
I gave with Paul Tillich shortly before the outbreak of the Third
Reich. A participant spoke out very sharply on one occasion against
the idea of the meaning of existence. She said life did not seem very
meaningful to her and she didn’t know whether it had a meaning.
The very voluble Nazi contingent became very excited by this and
scraped the floor noisily with their feet. Now, I do not wish to maintain
that this Nazi foot-shuffling proves or refutes anything in particular,
but I do find it highly significant. I would say it is a touchstone
for the relation of thinking to freedom. It raises the question whether
thought can bear the idea that a given reality is meaningless and that
mind is unable to orientate itself; or whether the intellect has become
so enfeebled that it finds itself paralysed by the idea that all is not
well with the world. It is for this reason in my view that the theoretical
notion of a positivity that represents the sum of all negativities is
no longer possible – unless philosophy wishes to live up to its reputation
of worldly innocence, something it always deserves most when
it attempts to become overly familiar with the world and to ascribe
a positive meaning to it. — 19-20

He then proceeds to dismiss the positivist interpretations of Hegel, which I interpret as addressing them as a sort of misinterpretation. They are misinterpretations because they focus on a part, but not the whole of Hegel's work. This thinking, which accepts a part as the whole leads to that positivist notion which he rejects, that the sum of all negatives produces something positive. Further, he explains how dialectics must address the primary question of the hypostasis of mind, which is very appealing to the philosophical mind which apprehends it.

We shall see that the thesis of the identity of concept
and thing is in general the vital nerve of idealist thought, and indeed
traditional thought in general. Furthermore, this assertion of the
identity of concept and thing is inextricably intertwined with the
structure of reality itself. And negative dialectics as critique means
above all criticism of precisely this claim to identity – a claim that
cannot of course be tested on every single object in a kind of bad
infinity, but which certainly can be applied to the essential structures
the negation of negation confronting philosophy either directly
or as mediated through the themes of philosophy.
Furthermore, dialectics as critique implies the
criticism of any hypostasization of the mind as the primary thing, the
thing that underpins everything else. — 20-21

The lecture is concluded by assertions that he adheres firmly to Hegelian principles.

Adorno knew the guy who invented the term reification. The negation of the negation is a reification. Remembering that is what negative dialectics is about.

What is it a reification of, "society"?

No. We'd have to start by explaining what's meant by negation of the negation. It's Hegel.