There seems to be an assumption amongst some folk here that we have to understand what water is before we can begin to make use of the word "water". That either we understand what water is, and then learn to use the word, or we have the word, and learn to apply it.

But is that right? That "Water before word" or "Word before water" exhausts all the possibilities?

Couldn't we learning to use the word be learning what water is? So being given a glass of water and told "this is water", or being asked to "go and draw some water at the creek" or someone saying "I have warmed the water in the bath for you" - these are both learning what water is and learning how "water" is used.

I'd suggest, and have done previously, that learning to use a name and learning what it is it stands for are pretty much the same thing.

And I'll stretch this to concepts in general.

If I'm right, we might be dubious about triadic models that want to have a third thing between the name and the named. But this is a whole 'nuther thing.

(added: This is basically Wittgensteinian, but good constructivist pedagogy, too. )

There seems to be an assumption amongst some folk here that we have to understand what water is before we can begin to make use of the word "water". That either we understand what water is, and then learn to use the word, or we have the word, and learn to apply it.

But is that right? That "Water before word" or "Word before water" exhausts all the possibilities? — Banno

To put my cards on the table I don't think that's right. I wouldn't put such a hard distinction between meaning and the thing talked about, though perhaps that's fuel for another thread?

Does that help? — Banno

It may eventually. Still dully mulling. I'm thankful for the reply either way.

“if water is H2O, then water is necessarily H2O.”

This says something about necessity.

It says nothing about water. Or H2O.

It says every time though, “if x is y, then x is necessarily y.”

What is essential to water?
Being H2O?
Well if water is H2O, water is necessarily H2O.
That doesn’t do any new work for either question.

Logic (x, if, y, then necessarily”) structures language about the content and the world (water, H, 2 Os).

Yes, in a way, but I think reality comes first. I think we have to have some familiarity with water before we have any sensible familiarity with "water." Familiarity with water is a precondition for familiarity with the English sign "water." — Leontiskos

Heh -- well as long as it's the reality I understand then I'm OK with that ;)

Much of this is right, but again, the crucial point you are failing to recognize is that neither Aristotle nor Lavoisier mean that anyone who does not mean what they mean must therefore be wrong. That is a very strange reading. No one is claiming to have a complete and exclusive understanding of water. — Leontiskos

I'm starting to think this is just something of a misunderstanding that I haven't figured out yet. I'm not saying either believed they had the complete or exclusive reading, even in what they meant.

I am referencing what they meant and relating it to what we know about reality, though, to make a point about "How do we know what is real?"

I think the key here is that when Lavoisier says, "Water is H2O," he could be saying two different things:

M: "Water is H2O, and if anyone, past or future, says anything else about water, they are wrong."
N: "Water is H2O, and there are all sorts of other true things that can be said about water."

You seem to take Aristotle to have said something like (M), but that's not generally what a scientist means when they say, "Water is such-and-such." If all scientists are saying things like (M) then there can be no growth in knowledge and therefore Aristotle's approach is wrong. But given that scientists are usually saying things like ( N) there is no true barrier to growth in knowledge - either individually or communally. — Leontiskos

I'm taking the "M" translation to demonstrate a point -- these are both very intelligent persons who have done scholarly work on water, one philosophical and the other scientific -- though with the added qualification that Aristotle's scholarly work has a kind of proto-scientific thing going on in his philosophy.

The "N" translation I take for granted, in a sense. Yes, we can figure out ways to reconcile them.

Because learning occurred and knowledge grew. Lavoisier knows more about water than Aristotle did. Aristotle would expect this to be the case for later scientists. — Leontiskos

I agree that Aristotle would accept and expect this -- but I don't think he'd predict what's different. Namely that the atomic theory is correct, that water does not act in accord with any teleology, and it's not a fundamental element.

But then, in comparing the meanings between the two, it doesn't seem they mean the same thing after all... even if they refer to the same thing, roughly.

Since we are talking about Searle an Semiotics, it is worth noting that Searle's formalisation of speech acts - a semiotic theory - has had considerable influence in areas of AI. It's apparently widely used in dialogue systems, multi-agent communication, natural language processing, and in formal languages. You might enjoy this: What is Speech Act Theory in AI?

- Right... I guess I would need you to set out the thesis that you believe to be at stake. I wrote that post with your emphasis on falsehood in mind. You have this idea that Lavoisier must have falsified something in Aristotle. The whole notion that we can grow in knowledge presupposes that we have something which is true and yet incomplete, and which can be built upon.

For myself it seems that if we accept a realist metaphysics, and our meanings change, then we have to accept the very real possibility that most of what we know is false -- that it's "good enough" to begin with setting out a problem or understanding something... — Moliere

It is odd to say that it is false. If it is "good enough" to begin understanding, then it simply cannot be wholly false. If it is wholly false then it is not good enough to begin understanding.

If I know something about water, and then I study and learn more about water, then what I first knew was true and yet incomplete. It need not have been false (although it could have been). Note, though, that if everything I originally believed about water was false, then my new knowledge of water is not building on anything at all, and a strong equivocation occurs between what I originally conceived as 'water' and what I now understand to be 'water'.

For Aristotle learning must build on previous knowledge. To learn something is to use what we already know (and also possibly new inputs alongside).

I agree that Aristotle would accept and expect this -- but I don't think he'd predict what's different. — Moliere

Right. He knows that there is more to be learned about water even though he does not know that part of that is H2O.

But then, in comparing the meanings between the two, it doesn't seem they mean the same thing after all... even if they refer to the same thing, roughly. — Moliere

Right, good. Let's just employ set theory with a set of predications about water:

• Aristotle: Water: {wet, heavy unlike fire}
  
  • [Call this AW]
• Lavoisier: Water: {wet, heavy unlike fire, H2O}
  
  • [Call this LW]

On this construal Lavoisier's understanding of water agrees with Aristotle in saying that water is wet and heavy unlike fire, but it adds a third predication that Aristotle does not include, namely that water is composed of H2O.

What is the relation between AW and LW? In a material sense there is overlap but inequality. Do Aristotle and Lavoisier mean the same thing by "water"? Yes and no. They are pointing to the same substance, but their understanding of that substance is not identical. At the same time, neither one takes their understanding to be exhaustive (and therefore AW and LW do not, and are not intended to, contradict one another).

Now the univocity of the analytic will tend to say that either water is AW or else water is LW (or else it is neither), and therefore Aristotle and Lavoisier must be contradicting one another. One of them understands water and one does not. There is no middle ground. There is no way in which Aristotle could understand water and yet Lavoisier could understand it better.

If one wants to escape the problematic univocity of analytical philosophy they must posit the human ability to talk about the same thing without having a perfectly identical understanding of that thing. That is part of what the Aristotelian notion of essence provides. It provides leeway such that two people can hit the same target even without firing the exact same shot, and then compare notes with one another to reach a fuller understanding.

To put my cards on the table I don't think that's right. I wouldn't put such a hard distinction between meaning and the thing talked about, though perhaps that's fuel for another thread? — Moliere

The OP asked “what is real? how do we know it?”
I’d say “what is real” asks about “the thing talked about” and “how do we know it” asks, at least in part, about “meaning”.

My gut says we have to be perceiving (how we know) at least simultaneously as we perceive things to question (what we know).

Perceiving is like a “how” and a “what” at the same time.

Couldn't learning to use the word “water” be learning what water is? — Banno

Like the thing/object takes shape as the word/name gets a meaning/use.

Interesting.

…these are both learning what water is and learning how "water" is used. — Banno

I see the need for simultaneous learning as grappling with the problem of identity.

We can watch a river flow into the ocean and carve out “water” from the land. And learn more about rivers and oceans and uses of “water” and see the ocean has salt, while the river does not. And then modify the meaning of “water” by pointing only to the river and excluding the salty ocean which you now name “saltwater”

So I think the iterative process of learning what water is, is aligned with the iterative process of what “water” means, but this is only because names like “water” are affixed to uses and meanings, but the things they designate are changing things, requiring revisions to the words and their meanings/uses.

So I think I see why you said that, but I think I disagree with why you said it.

The word “water” takes shape simultaneously as the thing water takes shape, but not because “learning what water is and how ‘water’ is used are the same”; it is because what water is is a moving target and trying to affix a name “water” to a moving target requires a simultaneous learning of water and “water”.

So the moving target of the world still comes first before we think/say “world” and then start to learn about what we said, and learn about saying it.

But is that right? That "Water before word" or "Word before water" exhausts all the possibilities? — Banno

But this is a strawman. No one has said that there must be a temporal precedence between encountering water and encountering the word 'water'. The point is that one does not use a word like 'water' correctly if they have no familiarity with water, and yet one can certainly have familiarity with water without having familiarity with the word 'water'. There is a causal precedence between water and 'water', not a temporal one (although in most cases one will encounter water before encountering 'water').

Perhaps. What is it the critic wants to conclude - that our use of the word is grounded in a pre-linguistic understanding of what water is? Perhaps we learn to drink and wash before we learn to speak. But learning to drink and wash is itself learning what water is. There is no neat pre-linguistic concept standing behind the word, only the way we interact with water as embodied beings embedded in and interacting with the world. Our interaction with water is our understanding of water.

So on one hand we have a triadic {water – concept-of-water – use of water}; on the other just water being used.

It's an obviously Wittgensteinian approach, focusing on the use rather than invoking a perhaps mythical "concept of water". It's also much closer to how we learn - by doing.

I was just thinking of more straightforward examples, like if we had never seen an animal, nor any picture or drawing, it could still be described to us. Or, had we never seen a volcano erupt, it could still be explained in terms of comparisons to fire, etc. I just wanted to head off the counter that we don't always need sense experience to competently speak of things. No one has ever seen a phoenix, but we can learn to speak of them too.

This works because you can use comparisons, analogy, composition and division, etc. But some prior exposure to things is necessary. It can't just be linguistic signs and their meanings (it could be just signs, if you take light interacting with the eye, etc. as a sign).

The causal priority of things is needed to explain why speech and stipulated signs are one way and not any other. If one wants to say that act of knowing water and knowing 'water' are co-constituting, one still needs the prior being of water to explain why knowing water and 'water' is not the same thing as knowing fire and 'fire' or why, if 'water' was used for fire, that would involve knowing a different thing with the same stipulated sign.

Actually, I see this later point has come up here ( ; ).

No doubt, how we act vis-á-vis fire would be different from how we act vis-á-vis water, even if we called fire 'water,' but this action, and the "usefulness" driving it, doesn't spring from the aether uncaused, but has to do with differences between fire and water.

I am a big fan of some thinkers who put a heavy focus on language here, such as Sokolowski or parts of Gadamer, but I also think it's precisely philosophers of language who are apt to make claims like: "that which can be understood is language." Would a mechanic tend to make the same claim? Is understanding how to fix a blown head gasket primarily a manner of language? Or throwing a good knuckleball? What are the limits of knowing for people with aphasia who can no longer produce or understand language (or both)? I think that's a difficulty with co-constitution narratives as well. They tend to make language completely sui generis, and then it must become all encompassing because it is disconnected from the rest of being. I think it makes more sense to situate the linguistic sign relationship within the larger categories of signs.

What is it the critic wants to conclude - that our use of the word is grounded in a pre-linguistic understanding of what water is? Perhaps we learn to drink and wash before we learn to speak. But learning to drink and wash is itself learning what water is. There is no neat pre-linguistic concept standing behind the word, only the way we interact with water as embodied beings embedded in and interacting with the world. Our interaction with water is our understanding of wate

This just might be an misunderstanding. Some pre-linguistic understanding of water might well exist (indeed, this seems clear in babies), but that's not really the issue. The point is that water exists, has determinant being/actuality, prior to being interacted with by man. Otherwise, we wouldn't interact with water any differently than we would fire, except through the accidents of co-constitution. But co-constitution that is one way, instead of any other (e.g. water for washing, fire for cooking) presupposes that there are prior, determinant properties of both. There would be no reason for us to interact with any one thing differently from any other if this weren't the case. "Act follows on being."

So on one hand we have a triadic {water – concept-of-water – use of water}; on the other just water being used.

This is misunderstanding the triadic sign relation. The sign vehicle could be the "concept of water" in some relation, but in general it will be the interpretant.

A basic relation in sight would be:

Object: water
Sign vehicle: light waves bouncing off water and to the eye
Interpretant: person

But light only reflects of water differently than a tree because the two are already determinantly different. The difference doesn't come after the fact. Co-constitution theories have difficulty with this because they often lack a notion of essences/essential properties (or a strong one) and so they are left with the problem that whenever something is known differently it has seemingly changed and become a new thing.

I think you'd see, rereading, that this isn't accurate.

How so? I'm genuinely confused here? What exactly would be your explanation of why relativism and pluralism re truth is wrong? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Ah, I think I see the misunderstanding. You're using "pluralism" and "relativism" interchangeably and synonymously, where I'm drawing a distinction. Do you think I shouldn't do so? Pluralism, as I understand it, allows different epistemological perspectives, with different conceptions of what is true within those perspectives. It also encourages discussion between perspectives, including how conceptions of truth may or may not converge. Relativism (about truth) would deny even this perspectival account as incoherent. (A very broad-brush picture of a hugely complicated subject, of course.)

I was just thinking of more straightforward examples, like if we had never seen an animal, nor any picture or drawing, it could still be described to us. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Like, "Water is transparent"? It seems like my example is an instance of this, but I am certainly open to other concrete examples.

It may be confusing that I used the word "sensible" . I was using it metaphorically. The point was not that we cannot have an indirect understanding of water, say, through a proposition about transparency.

The causal priority of things is needed to explain why speech and stipulated signs are one way and not any other. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, I agree.

I think that's a difficulty with co-constitution narratives as well. They tend to make language completely sui generis, and then it must become all encompassing because it is disconnected from the rest of being. I think it makes more sense to situate the linguistic sign relationship within the larger categories of signs. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think someone might say the chicken came before the egg, and another person might say that they know of a chicken that came from an egg. As you say, the priority is causal. The claim is not that no chickens come from eggs.

Co-constitution, especially in the context of my discussion with Moliere, looks to be a quibble. Even in the case of language acquisition it usually isn't true. For example, a child's first words are never co-constituted with the reality they signify.

But the point I was making with Moliere is <If one does not have familiarity with water, then they will not be able to use the sign 'water' successfully>. ("Successfully" is a better word than "sensibly.") Both Aristotle and Lavoisier are assuming that the substance water has a precedence to our understanding of it, and that is the key. If there were no external substance of water then @Moliere's argument would hold good. In that case there would be no adjudicability between Aristotle and Lavoisier.

But learning to drink and wash is itself learning what water is. There is no neat pre-linguistic concept standing behind the word, only the way we interact with water as embodied beings embedded in and interacting with the world. Our interaction with water is our understanding of water. — Banno

The problem here is that it commits you to the idea that dogs and ducks understand water, when in fact they don't. Walker Percy's study of Helen Keller vis-a-vis his own deaf daughter bears out the fact that Helen's understanding of water was not present until she was seven years old—long after she had been interacting with water. Interaction is not understanding; language does aid understanding; but one will not be able to successfully use the sign 'water' if they have no familiarity with water (either directly or indirectly). It can be said that the sign and the sign-user emerge simultaneously, but it remains true that the signified is causally prior to the sign, in much the same way that the non-sign-user (e.g. Helen before she was 7) is prior to the sign-user (e.g. Helen after she reached age 7). Much of this goes back to the quote.

Ah, I think I see the misunderstanding. You're using "pluralism" and "relativism" interchangeably and synonymously, where I'm drawing a distinction. Do you think I shouldn't do so? Pluralism, as I understand it, allows different epistemological perspectives, with different conceptions of what is true within those perspectives. It also encourages discussion between perspectives, including how conceptions of truth may or may not converge. Relativism (about truth) would deny even this perspectival account as incoherent. (A very broad-brush picture of a hugely complicated subject, of course.) — J

Classically, if X is true then everything which contradicts X is false. Since both pluralism and relativism reject this notion, the person who wants to avoid truth claims is aligned with pluralism and relativism (at least so far as this consideration goes).

Similarly, if one wants to oppose pluralism or relativism, the most straightforward way is to say, "There are truths and the principle of non-contradiction holds." We could adapt @Count Timothy von Icarus' challenge to you as follows: If this standard way of opposing pluralism and/or relativism is unavailable to you, then on what grounds do you disagree with pluralism and/or relativism?

(We could ask whether pluralism entails relativism, but the simpler approach is to focus on relativism itself and leave pluralism on the back burner.)

As Spinoza said, "Omnis determinatio est negatio."

Pluralism, as I understand it, allows different epistemological perspectives, with different conceptions of what is true within those perspectives.

This just seems like relativism though, as in "what is true is relative to systems that theoretical reason (truth) cannot decide between." Here is why I think this:

Either different epistemic positions contradict each other or they don't.

If they don't, then they all agree even if they approach things differently.

Whereas, if there can be different epistemological perspectives that contradict one another and they are equally true (or not-true, depending on which perspective we take up?) then what determines which perspective we take up then? Surely not truth, theoretical reason, since now the truth sought by theoretical reason is itself dependent on the perspectives themselves (which can contradict each other).

If we appeal to "usefulness" here, it seems we are appealing to practical reason. But there is generally a convertability between the practical and theoretical, such that practical reason tells us what is "truly good." Yet this cannot be the case here, since the truth about goodness varies by system. Hence, "usefulness" faces the same difficulty.

Dialtheist logics normally justify themselves in very particular ways, e.g. through paradoxes of self-reference. So their scope is limited to rare instances with something like a "truth-glut." We might find these cases interesting, and still think they can be resolved, perhaps through a consideration of material logic and concrete reasons for why some alternative system is appropriate for these specific outliers. But this isn't the same thing as allowing for different epistemologies and so different truths.

The straightforward denial of truth, e.g. moral anti-realism, actually seems less pernicious to me here. Reason simply doesn't apply to some wide domain (e.g. ethics), as opposed to applying sometimes, but unclearly and vaguely.

It also encourages discussion between perspectives, including how conceptions of truth may or may not converge.

And a denial of contradiction doesn't? Why? Does denying contradiction or having faith in the unity of reason require declaring oneself infallible?

You could frame it the opposite way just as easily. Because in relativism one need not worry about apparent contradiction, one need not keep at apparent paradoxes looking for solutions. Nor does one need to fear that opposing positions might prove one wrong. One can be right even if one is shown to be wrong, and so we can rest content in our beliefs. As reason becomes a matter of something akin to "taste" it arguably becomes easier to dismiss opposing positions out of hand.

This at least comports with common experiences in the fields where relativism has become dominant, where students and professors report frequent self-censorship and "struggle session" events within the context of an ideology that nonetheless promotes a plurality of equality valid epistemologies and "ways of knowing." Marxism is in decline, but this is also still an area where "history" (power) is often appealed to as the final authority ("being on the right side of history").

Relativism (about truth) would deny even this perspectival account as incoherent. (A very broad-brush picture of a hugely complicated subject, of course.)

IDK, this seems like how most relativism re truth is framed (as opposed to from anti-realism, which is the common framing for ethics).

I'm trying to decide if I have anything helpful to add here. I quite understand that if you think in terms of "theoretical reason (truth)," it's going to make a pluralist perspective hard to engage with. Do you see that the very question under consideration is whether theoretical reason is truth?

This may have no appeal for you, but I was quite pleased with the papers cited (by Chakravartty and Pincock) in the "Epistemic Stances . . . " thread. I thought those two philosophers did an excellent job making big issues clear within a smaller, manageable discussion. Would you be willing to read them, perhaps guided by some of the comments in the thread? At the very least, you'd see that the "either it's foundationally true or it's merely useful" binary is not the only stance available.

I apologize, but I just don't know how to make the larger case that these perspectives are worth understanding. As you know, I don't think the argumentative back-and-forth on such large questions does much good, since the problem is rarely one of bad argument. My preference has always been to adduce the pros and cons of a position by seeing how it works with an actual philosophical question -- such as whether there can be voluntary epistemic stances if you're a scientific realist.

This may be no consolation, but our difficulty finding common ground is helping me quite a bit in something I'm trying to write, concerning the persistence of fundamental disagreement as a characteristic of philosophy! I suspect we would each describe the reasons in this case quite differently, and that is part of (I shall argue) why it's so hard to overcome. Finding agreement about how to describe a disagreement is itself often elusive.

If I've understood you, you are saying that water is around before we learn about it. Yep.

What I've suggested is that learning what water is and learning to wash, cook drink and talk about water are the same.

That suggestion does not rely on water not being around until we learn to wash, drink and talk about it.

I hope that's clear.

The problem here is that it commits you to the idea that dogs and ducks understand water, when in fact they don't. — Leontiskos

We'll have to disagree here.

Walker Percy's study of Helen Keller vis-a-vis his own deaf daughter bears out the fact that Helen's understanding of water was not present until she was seven years old—long after she had been interacting with water. — Leontiskos

That's a somewhat ableist misinterpretation.

“As the cool stream gushed over one hand she spelled into the other the word water, first slowly, then rapidly. I stood still, my whole attention fixed upon the motions of her fingers. Suddenly I felt a misty consciousness...and somehow the mystery of language was revealed to me.”

Notice "my whole attention fixed upon the motions of her fingers", not "my whole attention fixed upon the cool stream gushed over one hand". Keller understood the difference between having water on her hand and not having water on her hand prior to understanding the sign for water. Percy emphasises that though Keller had felt water before, she lacked the symbolic framework—the naming of water via language—until that pivotal moment.

Ableist, becasue it minimises the intelligence and perceptiveness of pre-linguistic or non-verbal individuals, and misses the real problem, which is isolation from language, not failure to understand the world.

Percy emphasises that though Keller had felt water before, she lacked the symbolic framework—the naming of water via language—until that pivotal moment. — Banno

Yes, hence my whole point that the water goes before the 'water'.* Without some contact with water the sign 'water' has nothing to signify.

We'll have to disagree here. — Banno

If you want to say that dogs "understand" water and you want to take issue with the Aristotelian approach, then the first thing to do is to get clear on the difference between canine "understanding" and human understanding.


* At the very least, causally

Yes, hence my whole point that the water goes before the 'water'.* Without some contact with water the sign 'water' has nothing to signify. — Leontiskos

If I've understood you, you are saying that water is around before we learn about it. Yep.

What I've suggested is that learning what water is and learning to wash, cook drink and talk about water are the same.

That suggestion does not rely on water not being around until we learn to wash, drink and talk about it.

I hope that's clear. — Banno

...you want to take issue with the Aristotelian approach... — Leontiskos

Me? Never! :lol:

If dogs don't understand water, why do they go to the bowl? How is it that ducks manage to land on the pond so much more often than do Cockatoos? Random movement? You don't have a dog, I hope.

The straightforward denial of truth, e.g. moral anti-realism, actually seems less pernicious to me here. Reason simply doesn't apply to some wide domain (e.g. ethics), as opposed to applying sometimes, but unclearly and vaguely. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes, I agree. The straightforward denial of truth is certainly more transparent and coherent than the equivocal re-definition of truth.

As reason becomes a matter of something akin to "taste" it arguably becomes easier to dismiss opposing positions out of hand. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Right. This happened right in this thread, when @Moliere claimed that because Aristotle views water "teleologically" and Lavoisier views it as H2O, therefore Lavoisier has falsified Aristotle. Moliere—who it seems to me does not have a great grasp of the PNC—imputed contradiction where none exists. Often it is the case that if people had a better understanding of the PNC they would see that there is less disagreement than they suppose. The PNC is a remarkably mild principle. It allows an enormous amount of space for reason to play.

I don't think anyone here has denied that there are true sentences.

Certainly not I.

@J?

@Moliere?

Here's the main paragraph concerning the issue from Identity and Necessity:

"In recent philosophy a large number of other identity statements have
been emphasized as examples of contingent identity statements, dif-
ferent, perhaps, from either of the types I have mentioned before. One
of them is, for example, the statement "Heat is the motion of molecules."
First, science is supposed to have discovered this. Empirical scientists in
their investigations have been supposed to discover (and, I suppose, they
did) that the external phenomenon which we call "heat" is, in fact,
molecular agitation. — Banno

"

As I have indicated, and seem to harp on; these identity statements that Kripke likes to use to support his views on a posteriori necessary truths seem to have issues.

Norman Malcolm, in his paper "Kripke on Heat and Sensations of Heat", nicely articulates some of these issues with calling "Heat is the motion of molecules", an identity statement. He says,

A remark repeated by Kripke again and again is that heat is identical with rapid molecular motion. I find this a puzzling assertion. It looks like a metaphysical proposition than a scientific one. I don't doubt that as the water in a pan becomes hotter the motion of the water molecules increases in rapidity, and as the water cools the rapidity of molecular motion decreases. Although science could establish this correlation, how could it establish that heat is identical with rapid molecular motion? Actually, I don't even understand the assertion either that heat is, or that it is not, "identical" with rapid molecular motion. Or rather, I think I do understand it if "identity" here just means the same as "correlation'. But if "identity" is supposed to mean something that is in addition to correlation, then I am completely puzzled as to what sort of scientific observation could determine either that heat is, or that it is not, identical with rapid molecular motion. Therefore, I doubt whether it is meaningful to say either that this supposed identity holds or that is doesn't hold; and, a fortiori, I doubt that it is meaningful to say that it holds necessarily."

In a foot note, Malcolm provides a reference from Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science" where he explains Boyle-Charles law from the kinetic theory of gases. Malcolm nowhere finds any indication that this law is establishing an identity statement based on Nagel's exposition.

I think we can both agree that the observations to establish "heat" on one side of the identity statement is very different when compared the observations to establish "motion of molecules" on the other side of the identity statement. So, it is difficult to imagine how observations will determine identity.

What about "correlation"? Correlation is typically defined by a relationship between two or more variables, where changes in one variable are associated with changes in another. It indicates that variables tend to move together, either in the same or different directions, but it doesn't necessarily imply one variable causes the other. One might say that science looks for natural correlations.

There is another type of correlation, one might call conventional. For example, the relationship between English language and the language of Morse code is one of isomorphism, based on one-on-one correlations, settled by arbitrary stipulation. I don't believe Kripke thinks he is nor scientists are stipulating that "heat is motion of molecules."

So, if the scientist is not discovering the identity statement, and Kripke is not stipulating the identity statement, how is this identity statement being established. Does common sense establish it? Does our intuition establish it? How does one go from "a = a" to "Heat is motion of molecules"? Just assume "Heat" and "Motion of molecules" refer to the same thing and all will make sense. O.K., but what was that "a posteriori" suppose to be establishing again in that "a posteriori necessary truth"

Thanks. That's an excellent post. I have great respect for Malcolm, his work always gives me pause. Kripke on Heat and Sensations of Heat and Kripke and the Standard Metre are amongst the most challenging responses to PWS and Naming and Necessity.

And I think much of his criticism is spot on. I think he shows us that Kripke's ideas about necessity have been misapplied when he comes to use them to talk about minds and sensations.

I would first like to ask you a question. The aim here is to make sure that we are addressing the same problem. So if you will, consider this.

Malcolm, I think quite rightly, takes Kripke to task for equating a sensation and a physical characteristic. So consider this: What if Kripke had argued instead that the temperature of a sample was the mean kinetic energy of its molecules? Now the problems of sensation have been removed, and we have an equivalence between two physical expressions. We then also, as you mentioned, have the maths linking mean kinetic energy directly to temperature:

$\langle E_k \rangle = \frac{3}{2} k_B T$

My question is, if we make this change, does the objection you have in mind dissipate? Or are the problems that Malcolm suggests still there?

Again, this is by way of checking for agreement. I hope this removes Kripke's error of equating a sensation and a physical characteristic. Is there still an objection, after this? I think that much of the metaphysical stuff Kripke suggests still stands.

Thanks. It's fun to move past just explaining Kripke to some real critique.

I don't think anyone here has denied that there are true sentences.

Certainly not I.

@J? — Banno

Yes, there are true sentences. They are true because we have a context in which they appear. I think what bothers some people is that "true in a context" is seen as some inferior species of being Truly True. It's hard, perhaps, to take on board the idea that context is what allows a sentence to be true at all. If a Truly True sentence is supposed to be one that is uttered without a context, I don't know what that would be.

I haven't read the Malcolm essays. Does he suggest "supervenience" as another possible way of cashing out the notion of "identity"? Probably not, since I'm not sure the term was current at the time. But it's a good alternative to both "brute identity" and mere "correlation." On this view, heat would be the experience we humans (usually) have when coming into contact with the specified molecular activity. The heat experience depends on the molecular activity, it isn't only correlated with it. And it's also distinct, in that we can meaningfully talk about the molecular situation without having to claim that something is hot.

When Kripke talks about "the statement 'Heat is the motion of molecules'" and says, "First, science is supposed to have discovered this," I wonder how strictly he means this. Stipulating an identity is, I agree, not something science can do. My suggestion is that, in this case, philosophers shouldn't do it either, but instead opt for something like the more common-sensical "supervenience."

Right. This happened right in this thread, when Moliere claimed that because Aristotle views water "teleologically" and Lavoisier views it as H2O, therefore Lavoisier has falsified Aristotle. — Leontiskos

I don't believe that Aristotle was falsified by Lavoisier.

Falsification is a much more complicated maneuver than disagreement on fundamentals. Disagreement on fundamentals -- such as whether water is an element or not, or whether water is composed of atoms or not -- don't so much falsify each other as much as they both make claims that cannot both be true at the same time. This is because they mean different things, but are referring to the same object.

I would say with respect to reasoning about reality -- deciding "What is real?" -- the PNC is not violated, of course, but they can't both be true either. Water is either a fundamental element which does not divide further into more fundamental atoms, or it is a composition of other more fundamental elements and so does divide further, or something else entirely (in which case both thinkers are false when making the universal claim -- there's an implicit universal claim in both, namely that All water is such and such. This is how I read them anyways, which is where the conflict arises. They can't both be true such that All water is such and such ((and not the other thing)))

The thinkers are very far apart from one another in terms of time, who they are talking to, the problems they're trying to address, and so forth, and yet are talking about the same thing -- at least I think so. So the variance between the two can only be accounted for by looking to the meanings of the terms, which in turn is how we can come to understand how people have made inferences about fundamental matter in the past, and thereby can serve as a kind of model for our own inferences.

For my part I don't believe in essences or even that water must be H2O. The lectern example of Kripke's makes more sense to me, but even then I'm hesitant to make necessary claims with respect to the object -- hence why I'm speaking about meanings, inferences, and all the rest.

What water is seems to me more of scientific than philosophical question, but then I know that barrier is another bit where we're likely not in agreement, since for Aristotle the question of science and philosophy isn't as separate. His whole philosophy has large parts dedicated to ancient science and he's making use of philosophical arguments.

My guess is that the various empirical "methods" -- which really just amount to norms of collective argument -- probably handle claims about reality better than universal claims about what something is or is not. But then the picture of nature that arises isn't exactly one of a harmonious whole.
 
EDIT: Also, to head off something I see-- just because science is good at one thing doesn't mean philosophy is overturned or useless or anything like that. I think it stands on its own without the need for the sciences, but that its methods are good for the reflective practice of science, which is where we begin to clarify what it is we mean.


I, for one, am in favor of there being true sentences.

Ableist, becasue it minimises the intelligence and perceptiveness of pre-linguistic or non-verbal individuals, and misses the real problem, which is isolation from language, not failure to understand the world. — Banno

:up:

Rather than the object or referrent serving as a ground for meaning I rather think it's the linguistic community that's more important in determining "What is real?" specifically because that's the "home" of meaning. It's how terms come to refer in the first place, to be able to name and predicate in the first place depends upon how those around us name and predicate.

Yes, there are true sentences. — J

And do people who contradict those sentences hold to falsehoods? Do false assertions exist? Or have we managed a world where there are truths but no falsehoods? You seem to dance around these simple questions continually.

And if you are to say, "No, they probably just have a different context, and are not really contradicting anything at all," then do you have an actual method for determining when someone has contradicted a sentence and when they "hold to a different context/stance"? Because if you don't have such a method then I'm not sure how it is substantive to claim that they probably have a different context.

It's hard, perhaps, to take on board the idea that context is what allows a sentence to be true at all. If a Truly True sentence is supposed to be one that is uttered without a context, I don't know what that would be. — J

Psychologizing ad hominem is pretty easy. "It's hard, perhaps, to take on board the idea that some people are right and some people are wrong. If a Truly True sentence is supposed to be one that is immune to contradiction, I don't know what that would be. Given that people purport to disagree all the time, it would be pretty amazing if no one were actually disagreeing."

I don't believe that Aristotle was falsified by Lavoisier.

Falsification is a much more complicated maneuver than disagreement on fundamentals. Disagreement on fundamentals -- such as whether water is an element or not, or whether water is composed of atoms or not -- don't so much falsify each other as much as they both make claims that cannot both be true at the same time. This is because they mean different things, but are referring to the same object. — Moliere

If you believe that Lavoisier said something true, and that it contradicts Aristotle, then you are committed to the idea that Lavoisier has falsified Aristotle. You can't claim that and then simultaneously say that Lavoisier has not falsified Aristotle. So your reasoning throughout the thread to the effect that Lavoisier caused Aristotle's assertions to be false is sensible, given those conditions.

I would say with respect to reasoning about reality -- deciding "What is real?" -- the PNC is not violated, of course, but they can't both be true either. Water is either a fundamental element which does not divide further into more fundamental atoms, or it is a composition of other more fundamental elements and so does divide further, or something else entirely — Moliere

Okay, sure. Water cannot be divisible and indivisible. This is a true contradiction. Yet this is the first time I've seen you presenting Aristotle as a proponent of indivisibility. Earlier you were talking about teleology.

Again, if Lavoisier proved that water is divisible and Aristotle held that it is indivisible, then Lavoisier has falsified Aristotle. But this is different from what we were discussing earlier:

I think you've presented a canard of "teleology," but let's accept it for the sake of argument. Does "water is H2O" contradict "Water wants to sit atop Earth"? It looks like Lavoisier did not contradict Aristotle even on that reading. — Leontiskos

-

The thinkers are very far apart from one another in terms of time, who they are talking to, the problems they're trying to address, and so forth, and yet are talking about the same thing -- at least I think so. So the variance between the two can only be accounted for by looking to the meanings of the terms, which in turn is how we can come to understand how people have made inferences about fundamental matter in the past, and thereby can serve as a kind of model for our own inferences. — Moliere

Good, I agree. :up:

What water is seems to me more of scientific than philosophical question, but then I know that barrier is another bit where we're likely not in agreement, since for Aristotle the question of science and philosophy isn't as separate. His whole philosophy has large parts dedicated to ancient science and he's making use of philosophical arguments. — Moliere

There is no strict division between philosophy and science. Aristotle is generally referred to as a scientist, perhaps the first, and yet this does not disqualify him as a philosopher. Srap just deleted a great post on this in J's new thread, focusing on psychology and phenomenology ...lol.

is my most recent post to you, by the way.

If a Truly True sentence is supposed to be one that is uttered without a context, I don't know what that would be. — J

The view from nowhere. The god's-eye view. What's being asked is, might there be some alternative? There's. lot to unravel there, but we can't start from assuming monism.

Does he suggest "supervenience" as another possible way of cashing out the notion of "identity"? — J

No, although he might be considered as anticipating such things.

Kripke was too lax with his use of "heat". Hence the suggestion of moving to temperature, which is less ambiguous.

I don't see that we can say that, to follow through, heat supervenes on the mean energy of the item's molecules. The temperature, and so the mean energy of the molecules, of a wooden and a metal spoon may be the same, but the spoon will feel colder. The sensation of heat does not supervene on temperature, not vice versa.


Added: the article is at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9205.1980.tb00409.x