The point I would press here is again that what makes science work is not a series of logical rules, but a group of sociological rules. — Banno

Allow me to disagree somewhat. Sociologism in scientific theory starts from the abstraction of theories from their logical, technological, historical, phenomenological, and referential contexts. In general, competing theories have something in common in any of these dimensions of science. Often, competing theories share the same problem (historical, physical referential, etc.) to be solved, as is the case with string theory and quantum gravity, which seek to unify forces. Both theories have the forces of nature as common references. These theories were not created for sociological reasons but because of a restriction that phenomena and physical referential problems impose on the formulation of theories. For me, it is only after this abstraction of theory applied to theory that we can consider the subjectivity (or intersubjectivity) of the scientist as the cause of the formulation of theories. But that ignores a whole series of dimensions that surround and impose restrictions on the creation of theories beyond their sociological field.

What these examples show is not just that abduction is sometimes mistaken, but that it leads to a lack of progress, and that other, wildly differing background assumptions are instead needed to progress our understanding. — Banno

What bollocks. Abduction starts the game of pragmatic reasoning as you have to have a belief to doubt. All abduction is saying is that we can pick up this game from some generally sensible point. We don't start naked but already can call on some kind of useful paradigm.

Abduction is followed by the deduction of general consequences and the inductive confirmation that comes as the observational evidence piles up. Or doesn't. If we find the original paradigm wanting, we become receptive to the alternatives. Some new better basis of abduction is sought.

The point I would press here is again that what makes science work is not a series of logical rules, but a group of sociological rules. It's not a special type of logic - induction or abduction - that makes science effective, but the open interplay between scientists. — Banno

Why did you omit mention of deduction I wonder? And if everything is sociology, then how is any type of logic special?

What makes Peircean pragmatism special is that it identifies an epistemic method with a structure that combines logic into a generalised process of inquiry. It is logic put to proper work and not some noodling branch of maths. Set theory for beginners.

Then the obvious...

theories were not created for sociological reasons but because of a restriction that phenomena and physical referential problems impose on the formulation of theories. — JuanZu

The sociology is constrained by the reality. And that is pretty much the whole bleeding point of having an epistemic method. To dig ourselves out of the hole of subjectivity in some fashion where we don't also lose sight of our socially-constructed self-hood.

Pragmatism just sets up the usual thing of being a semiotic organism at a more abstracted level. We learn to speak in terms of equations and observables.

We see how folk operate at their everyday level of sociological belief construction and feel, well, things could be more rigorously done than that. And after the wheels of the scientific approach get moving, the sociology finds itself having to react to the rapid advances in pragmatic knowledge that follows.

Mostly trying to put the problem child in its place. Telling it that is nothing so special after all. Because beauty, truth, god, mind, values, faith, perfection. Or postmodernism, relativism, diversity and other forms of sociological blah, blah, blah.

From what I know of Feyerabend, he appears to be discussing the creative processes of scientists: they are not following an abductive script. Rather. They have hunches/insights that they pursue in their research and sometimes these bear fruit.

However, if we focus on the process of new theory becoming generally accepted as true, abduction does apply. Theories DO get falsified, revised, and replaced - consistent with abduction.

So if we're focussing on advancing knowledge, creativity is critical. But more often, in everyday life, we are making epistemic judgements on incomplete data - and there ARE objective means of evaluating the possible explanations - as I discussed in my last post. If you deny the efficacy of abduction, then you have no basis to reject conspiracy theories.

A neat example that supports the hypothesis that "abduction" - understood as accepting the best hypothesis - is central to scientific method. — Banno

Nah, I’m not claiming that. To clarify my position:

What is central to the scientific method of the empirical sciences (in contrast to what some term “the science of mathematics” and such, which have no such method) is communal verification via empirical means (aka, peer review and replicability of test results) that falsifiable hypotheses are not in fact false and, thereby, are likely to be true. No honest to goodness scientist ever claims in the conclusion of a scientific article that, because the falsifiable hypothesis empirically tested for is statistically evidenced to have a probability of error equal to or lesser than 0.000 (that’s that max that, at least in my days, gets to be reported), the given hypothesis has been “proven” true. Likely to be true, sure, but this then goes without saying.

All I’m claiming is that abduction plays its relatively minor part in the overall picture of the empirical sciences—a minor role that nevertheless sometimes is crucial enough. All falsifiable hypotheses (regarding what in fact is the case) are products of induction and/or abduction—imagination, creativity, and intuition are paramount to the process of arriving at good falsifiable hypotheses. And when it comes to paradigm shifts, such as was the case with both the Theory or Relativity and the Theory of Evolution when first presented, there too some abduction typically applies, this in addition to all inductions. Still, were these major theories not falsifiable via the scientific method and thereby empirically verifiable, they then wouldn’t be empirically scientific. M-theory, and string theory in general, is quite interesting for a great number of reasons. But until it becomes falsifiable empirically, as many others have stated, it just isn’t empirical science. Same can be said for Multiple World Interpretations. Lamarckian evolution which likewise emerged via abduction, at the very least in its crude original format (e.g., giraffes have longer necks because they continually strive to eat the leaves of taller trees and thereby pass down this striving in the physically manifested longer necks of offspring) on the other hand, was and remains a falsifiable scientific theory … one which has been falsified, and is thereby known to be false.

Abduction is basically trial-and-error heuristics produced via intuition (to which the non-conscious aspects of mind play a large role) that seeks to best explain some set of givens. Again, on its own it’s as good as imaginative guesswork—which isn’t saying a lot for it as a means of reasoning. It’s the explanatory power of certain abductions that give these certain abductions any merit in the empirical sciences. This, again, from testable hypotheses to relatively grand theories regarding how things work. And explanations, to hold any power (i.e., “ability to accomplish”, here, to accomplish adequate understanding of the relevant subject matter), will best account in valid manners for both what is and what is not there empirically. Hence no contradiction within the theory, yes, but more importantly nor between the theory and the best empirical evidence gained to date. For one example, once we obtained sufficiently strong telescopes and saw no Vulcan, the explanatory power of the “Vulcan theory” could have only crumbled, at least to all those who where honest with themselves. Your other two examples of Brownian motion and of previous accounts of astronomy likewise don’t take into account a) all the data known at the respective times and b) all the data which has been since then accumulated.

Going back to the ToR and QM, it is fact that—while both account for a lot and thereby produce great results—the two utilize fundamentally incompatible frameworks. There is thereby a fundamental contradiction between the two. Given all the data we currently have, do we then have any means of appraising which of the two is mistaken (here assuming that they’re not both in some fundamental way mistaken)? Same then with competing paradigms of the past when appraised from the perspectives of the past. Given a greater collection of data regarding the physical universe, say at the end of the next millennium, does it not stand to reason that at this future point in time we might then hold a theory of physicality that grants far greater understandings in noncontradictory manners—such that we at that point will look back to now as a time period with mistaken theories?

Notice that in each case, abduction leads to the confirmation of the accepted paradigm, where what was needed was a change to that very paradigm. Abduction as a counterproductive process. — Banno

As with all trial-and-error heuristics, most abductions are bound to be wrong. Yes, of course. Notwithstanding, for any paradigm shift to ever occur one must first conceive of a new paradigm from outside the boundaries of the old that better accounts for the known data. This will not be a process of deduction, nor will it typically be one of induction (generalization from particulars, for example), but instead will typically commence with what we in retrospect will then likely claim to be a flash of insight, as per the Eureka moment; this then yet being abduction. One which happens to eventually produce a better understanding regarding what is by newly devised deductions and inductions, which yet pivot on the given roundabout abduction. But again, without being falsifiable, it will not be science (not of the empirical kind).

We have before us quite different notions of abduction. Sometimes it is talked of as the process of forming an hypothesis. We know that, for any set of observations, there are innumerable possible explanations. Simply having available a range of hypotheses is insufficient. We must choose between them. — Banno

There are not innumerable possible plausible explanations. It is not abduction that might inform as to which explanation is most plausible but induction, which really just consists in the (vast) network of empirical knowledge we already have in place.

Abduction is simply the business of imagining explanations in ways informed by current scientific understanding.

Please, disagree.

Science is a human enterprise, and as such is communal. A picture of how science works must include the social aspects, looking at the communication between scientists. Competing theories may have a shared reference, although since before Feyerabend and Kuhn it has been understood that those references are themselves embedded in theory. The sociology of science is not the whole story, but it is a part of the story.

Go back to your OP

Hume concluded that fundamental beliefs, such as the existence of an external world or the existence of the self, are not rationally justifiable but are legitimate because they are the result of experience and custom. — JuanZu

More recent developments in Philosophy show us how experience and custom are themselves grounded in the community in which we live. To doubt requires a background of presumed certainty. Those fundamental beliefs are what enable doubt.

Again, science is not just a social enterprise, but it is in part a social enterprise.

What we can take from Hume is that induction has not been validated. Our beliefs in what are loosely called the external world or the existence of the self are not deduced from first principles, nor inducted from some finite set of observations, but presumed as the background against which our enterprises - including science - can occur.

Abduction is worse. The SEP notes that Peirce’s conception of abduction shifts over his long career, making it hard to pin down a coherent, stable doctrine. Peirce apparently thought abduction was about inventing hypotheses, not justifying them; and so is nothing more than conjecturing. The schematic form he offers, mentioned previously, amounts to adopting an idea one already has - hence my somewhat hyperbolic accusation of confirmation bias. What is certain is that abduction is no improvement on induction, and certainly cannot overcome Hume's objections.

From what I know of Feyerabend, he appears to be discussing the creative processes of scientists — Relativist

His work is a bit broader than just that. His classic formulation, "anything goes", is of course mistaken; but the interesting bit is how it is mistaken - what it is that restricts which ideas are considered scientific and which are not.

Of course scientists are creative. Calling there creativity "abduction" and locking it down to Peirce's simplistic schema is denigrating that creativity. Positing abduction as a response to Hume's scepticism is piling obfuscation on top of misunderstanding.

The activities in which scientists engage are not algorithmic, not mechanical. Those accounts of scientific method that set it out as such do science a disservice.

What is central to the scientific method of the empirical sciences (in contrast to what some term “the science of mathematics” and such, which have no such method) is communal verification via empirical means (aka, peer review and replicability of test results) that falsifiable hypotheses are not in fact false and, thereby, are likely to be true. — javra

This is a simple logical truth - a hypotheses being unfalsified does not make it more likely to be true. On this we agree. We could take a Bayesian approach to selecting amongst competing hypotheses, but note well that this is not adopting induction. There is a world of difference between an hypothesis being unfalsified and it's being more likely than other hypotheses. Popper’s point was exactly that: science isn’t about confirming hypotheses through accumulation of positive cases (which falls afoul of Hume’s problem of induction), but about weeding them out through falsification. A hypothesis standing unrefuted is not “more true,” it’s just “not yet eliminated.”

A very large part of The Logic of Scientific Discovery is a frequentist defence of falsification. The probability of a universal law (e.g., "all swans are white") is always zero in the strict mathematical sense, because it makes infinitely many claims about unobserved cases. The case he made was the defence of a statistical definition of the corroboration of an hypothesis that survives a sever attemtp at falsification. But this could not be made to fly.

The problems were many, but the Duhem–Quine problem is central. An hypotheses is never tested in isolation, but in unison with a vast array of other hypotheses, each of which might account for any falsification. Lakatos’ research programmes, Kuhn’s paradigms, and Bayesian epistemology all tried to capture what Popper’s model missed.

As with all trial-and-error heuristics, most abductions are bound to be wrong. Yes, of course. Notwithstanding, for any paradigm shift to ever occur one must first conceive of a new paradigm from outside the boundaries of the old that better accounts for the known data. This will not be a process of deduction, nor will it typically be one of induction (generalization from particulars, for example), but instead will typically commence with what we in retrospect will then likely claim to be a flash of insight, as per the Eureka moment; this then yet being abduction. One which happens to eventually produce a better understanding regarding what is by newly devised deductions and inductions, which yet pivot on the given roundabout abduction. But again, without being falsifiable, it will not be science (not of the empirical kind). — javra

Nice. But is it right, or even fair, to lump all this together and call it "abduction", and then to set it out in some gross oversimplification such as

The surprising fact, C, is observed.
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course.
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true. — SEP article

As I said to @Relativist, that is surely a derogation of science.

And then that further point, to relate this back to 's OP: abduction, in any of it's many guises, does not solve Hume's problem of induction.

Sure, science involves hunches, guesses, paradigm shifts — all the messiness Feyerabend loved. But dignifying that by calling it “abduction” is a mistake. To reduce the process to some syllogism like “C is surprising, A would explain C, so maybe A” is a derogation of what actually happens in science. And crucially, none of this rescues us from Hume’s problem. Surviving falsification, or being the most elegant hypothesis, does not make a theory more true. What drives science is not a special logic, but the interplay of criticism, communal testing, and background certainties.

And crucially, none of this rescues us from Hume’s problem — Banno

This. If anything, abduction is a description of the problem.

Perhaps, but given it's abstruseness, I'm not sure we should even grant that.

:up:

More recent developments in Philosophy show us how experience and custom are themselves grounded in the community in which we live. — Banno

Like wow. Who woulda thunk? Speaking here for the anthropological and psychological science that provided the evidence that might have disturbed the dogmatic slumbers of philosophy.

Abduction is worse. The SEP notes that Peirce’s conception of abduction shifts over his long career, making it hard to pin down a coherent, stable doctrine. — Banno

Yep. Peirce's account of abduction goes right off the rails where he turns spiritualist on the issue. His il lume naturale, or the natural human instinct for making correct guesses. It is like his writings on agapism, or the cosmological principle of creative growth through love.

So Peirce – as a philosopher and scientist – can be pinged on exactly these grounds of being embedded in some rather over-powering sociological context. The social pressure to conform his views to the religiosity and transcendentalism of his place and time was immense. It cost him his career at Harvard. It paid him to lean into it when he was dirt poor and living off Christian charity in rural obscurity.

Peirce is a good example of how the most penetrating mind is also caught in the web of whatever is its very particular social context. And his account of abduction breaks down exactly because he is being forced towards explanations that are plainly not natural to the way he started out in his argument.

What is certain is that abduction is no improvement on induction, and certainly cannot overcome Hume's objections. — Banno

So you can't have it both ways. You can't claim that sociology is both important and then not important in how the method of pragmatic reason was formulated.

Again, perhaps you don't even understand Peirce's tripartite cycle of abduction, deduction and inductive confirmation. Or maybe – for sociological reasons – you give your distorted reading that favours the metaphysical prejudices of some other time and place.

But whatever. Scholars of pragmatism have no problem separating the logic of abduction, deduction and inductive confirmation from the sudden lurch towards religiosity once Peirce reached the issue of how humans in practice get good at striking upon clever hypotheses.

If that fact needs its own explanation, then others here are already stating the obvious that some pragmatic paradigm always exists as a launch point. And the departure can be either an extension or a rejection of that paradigm would say. It is another sociological fact of science that often its most creative minds have crossed over from some other discipline and so have the advantage of some other paradigm.

We don't have to believe that abduction is about divine inspiration. A proper sociological understanding of science – or maths, or philosophy – can show how novelty is generated by quite everyday habits of thought. Even art school sets out to train its students to hone their vision by the application of a pragmatic process of invention.

So yes, everything humans do has a socially constructed context. But who would you turn to get real answers about the reality of that in the end? Probably not a logician or philosopher. At least not unless they had studied the available social and psychological science.

Well, much appreciated. Kind of you to say.

:up:

Given posts such as these, seems that the only difference between us in all that’s been so far said concerns whether or not the word and corresponding conceptualization of “abduction” ought to be employed.

To put it in ways I think you might understand, I’m here simply utilizing the language of a given language game with that community which utilizes the language game.

In favor of its use, we do in part sometime reason about what is via use of creative heuristical concepts which, once spurred—in what I find to be great analogy to natural selection—then get culled such that only those most fitting to there given context of subject matter get to survive and thereby procreate within the (here implicitly addressed, scientific) culture of commonly accepted ideas of what is possibility the case.

In opposition to its use, it can (as can be found in this thread) be easily enough misconstrued as being something other than imaginative guesswork (namely, to account for some as of yet unaccounted for given), this since its proclaimed to be a form of reasoning.

I can see it both ways, so I’m impartial as to whether or not the term should be used. (I’ll likely use it among those that do and vice versa.)

As to likelihood, I find that this converges with epistemological issues of justifications for sustained beliefs regarding what is true. Although I differ in some ways from it (with these differences being relatively trivial), I so far find Susan Haack’s foundherentism to be adequate for the task. In a very imperfect summation of what I have in mind: the justification hybrid of foundationalism and coherentism works by means of noncontradictory, hence consistent, coherency between communally verified empirical data (all of which stems from knowledge by acquaintance which is, again, communally verified, and verifiable by all in principle) and the unfalsified theses (from grand theories to individual hypothesizes that are conceptually embedded with the former, all, again, falsifiable) regarding this data. When the theoretical / conceptual sum of falsifiable ideas cohere in consistent manners, this then increases the likelihood of the given sum being correct about what in fact is, hence true. Conversely, whenever there are found inconsistencies, then something somewhere is known to be amiss. This then is resolved by further communal experimentations and, on occasion, new theses / paradigms that better account for the accumulated data in consistent manners. At any rate, point being, a sum of experience-grounded justifiable beliefs regarding what is true (which within science must all be falsifiable) which, as given cohort, hold no contradictions within nor any contradictions with other cohorts of such beliefs gives no indication of being false, i.e. wrong, i.e. untrue. The greater such cohort of beliefs, the greater the strength of the cohort, and so the greater the likelihood of it being true. Hence, this ideal then exhibits the greater likelihood of both the cohort at large and all its individual parts being true. But, I will add, never infallibly so. A great case in point to this effect is the Theory of Evolution via natural selection; details still need to be ironed out, of course, and certain minor suppositions might eventually be evidenced wrong, but, overall, it is exceedingly likely to be true; and this due to the aforementioned justification.

This being a different topic but I thought it might be worth mentioning.

there's a lot in that, a fair bit of it being quite agreeable, some less so.

Here's, I think, the first use of "abduction" in this thread:

Here's how I approach it: some explanation is needed for the constant conjunction of past regularities. I judge that the "inference to best explanation" for this is that there exist laws of nature that necessitate this behavior. Inferring a best explanation is rational - it's a form of abductive reasoning. — Relativist

Leaving aside why there must be such an explanation, a careful look will show that "abduction" doesn't provide such an explanation. "Inference to best explanation" is utterly hollow, until one sets out what a best explanation is. Further, is the mooted "natural law" an explanation of what happens, or just a description - "for every action there is an opposite and equal reaction" sets out what happens; does it explain what happens?

It's apparent that many here think "abduction" provides an explanation, tricking themselves into not taking Hume seriously. Science does not gain its force from deduction, induction, or abduction.
Laws are descriptions, not explanations. What matters is the communal practice of testing, contesting, revising. “Abduction” just papers over the real philosophical problem (Hume’s), instead of answering it.

So there's good reason to question the use of abduction hereabouts.

there's a lot in that, a fair bit of it being quite agreeable, some less so. — Banno

cool.

Here's, I think, the first use of "abduction" in this thread: — Banno

Yup, I'm aware of it. (see my last comment)

Laws are descriptions, not explanations. — Banno

They can become so when entertaining Aristotelian notions: natural laws then here become formal causes (i.e., determinants) that effect (formationally determine) all that physically is, thereby serving as one explanation (which converges with other types of causes and, thereby, explanations) for what is. Nowadays, gravity is taken to be a universally applicable principle of the cosmos, so I find no reason not to deem it a natural law. We then use the notion of gravity to explain why an object thrown up into thin air will always come back down to earth (and, of course, a whole lot more: why do we have air to breath on this planet? One reason/cause/determinant for a breathable atmosphere is gravity.). And formational determinancy can conform to counterfactual theories of causality: e.g., without gravity, there would be no atmosphere; therefore, gravity is a partial cause/reason for the atmosphere on Earth.

Still, science addresses a heck of a lot more than natural laws. Cognitive science, neuroscience, biology, ethology (my strong points when it comes to science) for example all address aspects of what is via the scientific method which, though of course partly determined by natural laws, have practically nothing to do with them (at least not in terms of their study).

“Abduction” just papers over the real philosophical problem (Hume’s), instead of answering it. — Banno

Hey, at the very least in this, we see eye to eye.

So there's good reason to question the use of abduction hereabouts.
1h — Banno

You haven't provided one. You've argued that science does not progress through abduction, which is a fair point, but that doesn't imply abduction is not truth directed.

Leaving aside why there must be such an explanation, a careful look will show that "abduction" doesn't provide such an explanation. — Banno

Abduction doesn't provide explanations, it COMPARES explanations. I've brought up conspiracy theories, and argued that it is irrational to embrace them - based on abdduction.

Good stuff.

entertaining Aristotelian notions... — javra

...happens a lot more then it perhaps ought, around these fora. A favourite grump of mine.

But if I may advocate for the devil, let's look at gravity. It's the force of attraction between two masses, and explains all sorts of things, from balls falling to the motion of satellites... or does it describe that motion - that the motion depends on the combined mass and the square of the distance between the bodies... is that an explanation of what happens, or a description?

But gravity is the curvature of space-time! There's an explanation. Only that curvature is itself a mathematical description, one that as you note is incompatible with the other half of physics, which describes things in very different terms.

So we get to this:

We then use the notion of gravity to explain why an object thrown up into thin air will always come back down to earth... — javra

Does it explain why? Or does it just detail the description of the motion?

Now my point would be that it doesn't matter. What we get is a brilliant and useful way of working out what will happen - description or explanation, be damned.

Further, is the mooted "natural law" an explanation of what happens, or just a description - "for every action there is an opposite and equal reaction" sets out what happens; does it explain what happens? — Banno

A very odd take. Laws appeal to symmetries. So they are grounded in mathematical logic.

The third law seems a good example where no one would much think it describes the world as ordinarily experienced. But once we grasp the principles of Galilean relativity, then we could frame things in this way.

So sure, we might only observe correlations and not causes. But then the maths of symmetry have an unarguable logic. We can’t just make that shit up for sociological reasons. We have deep metaphysical principles that explain how the world is exactly the way it is.

Following the symmetries is how metaphysics and then natural science got so good at causal accounts of the world. So good that dramatic failures of correlation became required for folk to re-examine their mathematical arguments.

There were pretty good reasons to expect supersymmetry to show up once our particle colliders got into Higgs energy territory. But that now looks a busted dream.

This doesn’t mean we then should junk symmetry as the foundation of causal explanations. But it does suggest that some wrong assumptions got built in somewhere along the line. We need to find some further subtlety of the maths that we’ve been missing. This is what particle physics in particular has been doing the past 100 years.

Correlations might tell you about observable events. But symmetries tell you about the logical structure of Being. The necessary causes of there being events to be observed, even when those events are essentially probabilistic and so more on the inductive side of the fence.

I've brought up conspiracy theories, and argued that it is irrational to embrace them - based on abdduction. — Relativist

Seems to me you missed the argument. Oh well.

Let's look at conspiracy theories. The classic analysis for my eye comes from Watkins, in his Confirmable and Influential Metaphysics. Watkins was a disciple and defender of of Popper.

In the paper, Watkins points out that some hypotheses are neither confirmable nor falsifiable. Such hypotheses have the logical form of an uncircumscribed existential statement - one in which nothing is said about where or when the item in question occurs. This is the logical structure of many conspiracy theories.

Let's look at an example. The government is hiding evidence of alien landings. This asserts the existence of some thing - alien landings - but nothing is said here about where or when. However the government responds, it is open to the believer to maintain their position. If they open area 51 to inspection, the theorist can say that the evidence has been moved elsewhere. If they deny that there is any evidence, that reinforces the idea of a conspiracy.

Where is abduction here?

Is it irrational to embrace conspiracy theories? Consider MKUltra, the Tuskegee Syphilis Study or Watergate. These were conspiracy theories until the time and place of the incidents were fixed.

It is not irrational to believe in conspiracies.

...happens a lot more then it perhaps ought, around these fora. — Banno

I gather that much. But there's something to not throwing out babies with their bathwater.

Now my point would be that it doesn't matter. What we get is a brilliant and useful way of working out what will happen - description or explanation, be damned. — Banno

I can deal with that. Just wanted to mention that you're looking at explanations for gravity and at descriptions of what it physically is. I was myself only addressing gravity per se as explanation (hence, even if I might not hold a true belief regarding its global properties and nature given what I know about today's physics, I yet know that it is). For me, then, if a kid asks me why does a ball thrown up into the air always come down - or else an adult asks why a human can't walk on water - I will yet answer with "be-cause of gravity". :wink:

"be-cause of gravity" — javra

:wink:

And is that better than "Be-cause it is the will of the Flying Spaghetti Monster"?

I think not. What makes gravity a better account is F=Gm₁m₂/r².

It's what we do that counts, the use to which we can put the theory, and F=Gm₁m₂/r² is much more useable than "Because it is the will of the Flying Spaghetti Monster".

You've argued that science does not progress through abduction, which is a fair point, but that doesn't imply abduction is not truth directed. — Relativist

Science doesn't progress solely via abduction, but it certainly could not progress at all, or even get off the ground, without it.

And is that better than "Be-cause it is the will of the Flying Spaghetti Monster"? — Banno

Well, without getting into the nitty gritty, the notion of gravity coheres into all other notions we hold without contradiction: as to simplistic definitions, masses attract masses, larger ones more so than smaller ones. No maths needed for this falsifiable little understanding of what goes on cosmically.

The Flying Spaghetti Monster, on the other hand, is no match for the will of the invisible and inaudible house fairy residing underneath my carpet. That aside, only unicorns can find any of these falsifiable. And I ain't no unicorn. So ... gravity is thereby a far better explanation in the JTB realm of things for me to give.

What makes gravity a better account is F=Gm₁m₂/r². — Banno

I was joking, yes, but in all sobriety, how would a child or most average adults be benefited by being given this equation? Rather than being told a more simple account of what gravity is, such as the one aforementioned. I very much like the quote, "make things as simple as possible, but no simpler," and this is very much context relative.

Besides, the point remains, gravity can serve as an explanation.

Laws appeal to symmetries. So they are grounded in mathematical logic. — apokrisis

Noether’s theorem links symmetries to conservation laws - is that were you would go? Isn't describing things in terms of symmetry still describing them?

"For every action there is an opposite and equal reaction" is interpreted as "momentum is conserved" which in turn is understood as "the Universe is symmetrical in space, hence momentum is conserved".


Bigger and bigger descriptions. Still descriptions. Awesome descriptions.

Ok, so what is it?

Besides, the point remains, gravity can serve as an explanation. — javra

I'll accept that, if you will accept that the explanation is no more than a more usable description. :wink:

Ok, so what is it? — Banno

Abduction? Nothing more nor less than creating explanatory hypotheses. I'm not seeing the difficulty you are apparently having with the idea.

Nothing more nor less than creating explanatory hypotheses. I'm not seeing the difficulty you are apparently having with the idea. — Janus

If that's all it is, then fine. Add the word "best" - "creating the best explanatory hypotheses" - and it falls apart.

So where you say

There are not innumerable possible plausible explanations. — Janus

"plausible" adds the normative element that lets confirmation bias in. We can now reject all the explanations we take as implausible.

But further, in the context of this thread, do you take abduction as helping answer Hume's scepticism?