Apustimelogist
That's only a problem for those that posit that intentionality is fundamental. — noAxioms
boundless
I would not buy that suggestion. More probably the intentionality emerges from whatever process is used to implement it. I can think of countless emergent properties, not one of which suggest that the properties need to be fundamental. — noAxioms
Thus illustrating my point about language. 'Intentional' is reserved for life forms, so if something not living does the exact same thing, a different word (never provided) must be used, or it must be living, thus proving that the inanimate thing cannot do the thing that it's doing (My example was 'accelerating downward' in my prior post). — noAxioms
boundless: Ok, but if intentionality is fundamental, then the arising of intentionality is unexplained. — noAxioms
That would make time more fundamental, a contradiction. X just is, and everything else follows from whatever is fundamental. And no, I don't consider time to be fundamental. — noAxioms
Again, why? There's plenty that's currently unexplained. Stellar dynamics I think was my example. For a long time, people didn't know stars were even suns. Does that lack of even that explanation make stars (and hundreds of other things) fundamental? What's wrong with just not knowing everything yet? — noAxioms
That's what it means to be true even if the universe didn't exist. — noAxioms
Maybe putting in intelligibility as a requirement for existence isn't such a great idea. Of course that depends on one's definition of 'to exist'. There are definitely some definitions where intelligibility would be needed. — noAxioms
A made-up story. Not fiction (Sherlock Holmes say), just something that's wrong. Hard to give an example since one could always presume the posited thing is not wrong. — noAxioms
Again, why is the explanation necessary? What's wrong with just not knowing everything? Demonstrating the thing in question to be impossible is another story. That's a falsification, and that carries weight. So can you demonstrate than no inanimate thing can intend? Without 'proof by dictionary'? — noAxioms
That does not sound like any sort of summary of my view, which has no requirement of being alive in order to do something that a living thing might do, such as fall off a cliff. — noAxioms
wonderer1
Ok. But if there is an 'emergence', it must be an intelligible process. The problem for 'emergentism' is that there doesn't seem any convincing explanation of how intentionality, consciousness and so on 'emerge' from something that does not have those properties. — boundless
Harry Hindu
The map is the first-person view. Is the map (first-person view) not part of the territory?All this seems to be the stock map vs territory speach, but nowhere is it identified what you think is the map (that I'm talking about), and the territory (which apparently I'm not). — noAxioms
I never said that people consider the world as a model. I said that our view is the model and the point was that some people (naive realists) tend to confuse the model with the map in their using terms like, "physical" and "material".Very few consider the world to be a model. The model is the map, and the world is the territory. Your wording very much implies otherwise, and thus is a strawman representation of a typical monist view. As for your model of what change is, that has multiple interpretations, few particularly relevant to the whole ontology of mind debate. Change comes in frequencies? Frequency is expressed as a rate relative to perceptions?? — noAxioms
:meh: Everything is a process. Change is relative. The molecules in the glass are moving faster than when it was a solid, therefore the rate of change has increased and is why you see it as a flowing process rather than a static object. I don't see how it isn't science when scientists attempt to find consistently repetitive processes with high degrees of precision (like atomic clocks) to measure the rate of change in other processes. QM says that measuring processes changes them and how they are perceived (wave vs particle), so I don't know what you mean by, "none of it is science".So old glass flowing is not an actual process, or I suppose just doesn't appear that way despite looking disturbingly like falling liquid? This is getting nitpickly by me. I acknowledge your example, but none of it is science, nor is it particularly illustrative of the point of the topic. — noAxioms
boundless
noAxioms
I deny that requirement. It sort of sounds like an idealistic assertion, but I don't think idealism suggests emergent properties.Ok. But if there is an 'emergence', it must be an intelligible process. — boundless
SureRight, but there is also the possibility that ontological dependency doesn't involve a temporary relation.
I was on board until the bit about not being a time (presumably in our universe) when intentionality doesn't exist. It doesn't appear to exist at very early times, and it doesn't look like it will last.That is, you might say that intentionality isn't fundamental but it is dependent on something else that hasn't intentionality and yet there have not been a time where intentionality didn't exist
But it's not building all the way down, nor all the way up.As an illustration, consider the stability of a top floor in a building. It clearly depends on the firmness of the foundations of the builing and yet we don't that 'at a certain point' the upper floor 'came out' from the lower.
But it hasn't been fully explained. A sufficiently complete explanation might be found by humans eventually (probably not), but currently we lack that, and in the past, we lacked it a lot more. Hence science.Stellar dynamics isn't fundamental because it can be explained in terms of more fundamental processes. — boundless
Maybe we already have (the example from @wonderer1 is good), but every time we do, the goalposts get moved, and a more human-specific explanation is demanded. That will never end since I don't think a human is capable of fully understanding how a human works any more than a bug knows how a bug works.Will we discover something similar for intentionality, consciousness and so on?
I beg to differ. They're just simple models at this point is all. So the goalposts got moved and those models were declared to not be models of actual intentionality and whatnot.But currently it seems to me that our 'physicalist' models can't do that. — boundless
Agree with all that.But if they are 'true' even if the universe or multiverse didn't exist, this means that they have a different ontological status. And, in fact, if the multiverse could not exist, this would mean that it is contingent.
Mathematics seems to come in layers, with higher layers dependent on more fundamental ones. Is there a fundamental layers? Perhaps law of form. I don't know. What would ground that?Mathematical truths, instead, we seem to agree are not contingent. — boundless
Good pointGiven that they aren't contingent, they can't certainly depend on something that is contingent. So, they transcend the multiverse (they would be 'super-natural').
Just so. So physical worlds would not depend on science being done on them. Most of them fall under that category. Why doesn't ours? That answer at least isn't too hard.If the physical world wasn't intelligible, then it seems to me that even doing science would be problematic.
Agree again. It's why I don't come in here asserting that my position is the correct one. I just balk at anybody else doing that, about positions with which I disagree, but also about positions with which I agree. I have for instance debunked 'proofs' that presentism is false, despite the fact that I think it's false.There is no evidence 'beyond reasonable doubt' to either position about consciousness that can satisfy almost everyone.
Close enough. More of a not-unemergentist, distinct in that I assert that the physical is sufficient for emergence of these things, as opposed to asserting that emergence the physical is necessary fact, a far more closed-minded stance.Would you describe your position as 'emergentist' then? — boundless
This is irrelevant to emergence, which just says that intentionality is present, consisting of components, none of which carry intentionality.Still, I am hesitant to see it as an example of emergence of intentionality for two reasons.
First, these machines, like all others, are still programmed by human beings who decide how they should work. — boundless
It recognizes 2 and 3. It does not recognize the characters. That would require a image-to-text translator (like the one in the video, learning or not). Yes, it adds. Yes, it has a mechanical output that displays results in human-readable form. That's my opinion of language being appropriately applied. It's mostly a language difference (to choose those words to describe what its doing or not) and not a functional difference.To make a different example, if you consider a mechanical calculator it might seem it 'recognizes' the numbers '2', '3'
Cool. So similar to how humans do it. The post office has had image-to-text interpretation for years, but not sure how much those devices learn as opposed to just being programmed. Those devices need to parse cursive addresses, more complicated than digits. I have failed to parse some hand written numbers.Secondly, the output the machine gives are the results of statistical calculations. The machine is being given a set of examples of associations of hand-written numbers and the number these hand-written numbers should be. It then manages to perform better with other trials in order to minimize the error function.
I don't know what the territory is as you find distinct from said map.The map is the first-person view. Is the map (first-person view) not part of the territory? — Harry Hindu
Fine, but I'm no naive realist. Perception is not direct, and I'm not even a realist at all. A physicalist need not be any of these things.I said that our view is the model and the point was that some people (naive realists) tend to confuse the model with the map in their using terms like, "physical" and "material".
Change over time, yes. There's other kinds of change.You do understand that we measure change using time
Fine, so one can compare rates of change, which is frame dependent we want to get into that.and that doing so entails comparing the relative frequency of change to another type of change
I suppose so, but I don't know how one might compare a 'rate of continuous perception' to a 'rate of continuous observed change'. Both just happen all the time. Sure, a fast car goes by in less time than a slow car, if that's what you're getting at.Do you not agree that our minds are part of the world and changes like anything else in the world, and the time it takes our eye-brain system can receive and process the information compared to the rate at which what you are observing is changing, can play a role in how your mind models what it is seeing.
Well that's wrong. Glass was never a solid. The molecules in the old glass move at the same rate as newer harder glass, which is more temperature dependent than anything. But sure, their average motion over a long time relative to the window frame is faster in the old glass since it might move 10+ centimeters over decades. What's any of this got to do with 'the territory' that the first person view is supposedly a map of?Everything is a process. Change is relative. The molecules in the glass are moving faster than when it was a solid
I see the old glass as moving due to it looking like a picture of flowing liquid, even though motion is not perceptible. A spinning top is a moving object since its parts are at different locations at different times, regardless of how it is perceived.therefore the rate of change has increased and is why you see it as a moving object rather than a static one.
boundless
I deny that requirement. It sort of sounds like an idealistic assertion, but I don't think idealism suggests emergent properties. — noAxioms
I was on board until the bit about not being a time (presumably in our universe) when intentionality doesn't exist. It doesn't appear to exist at very early times, and it doesn't look like it will last. — noAxioms
But it hasn't been fully explained. A sufficiently complete explanation might be found by humans eventually (probably not), but currently we lack that, and in the past, we lacked it a lot more. Hence science. — noAxioms
Maybe we already have (the example from wonderer1 is good), but every time we do, the goalposts get moved, and a more human-specific explanation is demanded. That will never end since I don't think a human is capable of fully understanding how a human works any more than a bug knows how a bug works. — noAxioms
Mathematics seems to come in layers, with higher layers dependent on more fundamental ones. Is there a fundamental layers? Perhaps law of form. I don't know. What would ground that? — noAxioms
Good point — noAxioms
Just so. So physical worlds would not depend on science being done on them. Most of them fall under that category. Why doesn't ours? That answer at least isn't too hard. — noAxioms
Agree again. It's why I don't come in here asserting that my position is the correct one. I just balk at anybody else doing that, about positions with which I disagree, but also about positions with which I agree. I have for instance debunked 'proofs' that presentism is false, despite the fact that I think it's false. — noAxioms
Close enough. More of a not-unemergentist, distinct in that I assert that the physical is sufficient for emergence of these things, as opposed to asserting that emergence the physical is necessary fact, a far more closed-minded stance. — noAxioms
This is irrelevant to emergence, which just says that intentionality is present, consisting of components, none of which carry intentionality.
OK, so you don't deny the emergence, but that it is intentionality at all since it is not its own, quite similar to how my intentions at work are that of my employer instead of my own intentions. — noAxioms
It recognizes 2 and 3. It does not recognize the characters. That would require a image-to-text translator (like the one in the video, learning or not). Yes, it adds. Yes, it has a mechanical output that displays results in human-readable form. That's my opinion of language being appropriately applied. It's mostly a language difference (to choose those words to describe what its doing or not) and not a functional difference. — noAxioms
Cool. So similar to how humans do it. The post office has had image-to-text interpretation for years, but not sure how much those devices learn as opposed to just being programmed. Those devices need to parse cursive addresses, more complicated than digits. I have failed to parse some hand written numbers.
My penmanship sucks, but I'm very careful when hand-addressing envelopes. — noAxioms
That would be an interesting objective threshold of intelligence: any entity capable of [partially] comprehending itself. — noAxioms
Harry Hindu
It was a question to you about the distinction between territory and map. Is the map part of the territory? If there isn't a distinction, then that is basically solipsism. Solipsism implies that the map and the territory are one and the same. One might even say there is no map - only the territory as the mind is all there is.The map is the first-person view. Is the map (first-person view) not part of the territory?
— Harry Hindu
I don't know what the territory is as you find distinct from said map. — noAxioms
What does it even mean to be a physicalist? What does "physical" even mean? When scientists describe objects they say things like, "objects are mostly empty space" and describe matter as the relationship between smaller particles all the way down (meaning we never get at actual physical stuff - just more fundamental relationships, or processes) until we arrive in the quantum realm where "physical" seems to have no meaning, or is at least dependent upon our observations (measuring).Fine, but I'm no naive realist. Perception is not direct, and I'm not even a realist at all. A physicalist need not be any of these things. — noAxioms
Like...? You might say that there are changes in space but space is related to time. So maybe I should ask if there is an example of change independent of space-time. Space-time appears to be the medium in which change occurs.Change over time, yes. There's other kinds of change. — noAxioms
Ever seen super slow motion video of a human's reaction time to stimuli? It takes time for your mind to become aware of its surroundings. You are always perceiving the world as it was in the past, so your brain has to make some predictions. Solid objects are still changing - just at a much slower rate.I suppose so, but I don't know how one might compare a 'rate of continuous perception' to a 'rate of continuous observed change'. Both just happen all the time. Sure, a fast car goes by in less time than a slow car, if that's what you're getting at. — noAxioms
I don't understand. Is the picture not physical as well for a physicalist?A non-naive physicalist would say that things like intentionality supervene on actual physical things, and not on the picture that our direct perceptions paint for us. I never suggested otherwise. — noAxioms
Maybe I should try this route - Does a spinning top look more like a wave than a particle, and when it stops does it look more like a particle than a wave? Is a spinning top a process? Is a top at rest a process - just a slower one? Isn't the visual experience of a wave-like blur of a spinning top the relationship between the rate of change of position of each part of the top relative to your position is space and the rate at which your eye-brain system can process the change it is observing. If your mental processing were faster then it would actually slow down the speed of the top to the point where it will appear as a stable, solid object standing perfectly balanced on its bottom peg.I see the old glass as moving due to it looking like a picture of flowing liquid, even though motion is not perceptible. A spinning top is a moving object since its parts are at different locations at different times, regardless of how it is perceived. — noAxioms
noAxioms
Doing science is how something less unintelligible becomes more intelligible.If physical processes weren't intelligible, how could we even do science — boundless
OK, that's a lot different than how I read the first statement.I was saying that if there was a time when intentionality didn't exist, it must have come into being 'in some way' at a certain moment.
I don't think the video was about intentionality. There are other examples of that, such as the robot with the repeated escape attempts, despite not being programmed to escape.Merely giving an output after computing the most likely alternative doesn't seem to me the same thing as intentionality.
In my records, if you agree with [mathematics not being just a natural property of this universe, and thus 'supernatural'], you are not a 'physicalist'. Depends on definitions. I was unaware that the view forbade deeper, non-physical foundations. It only asserts that there isn't something else, part of this universe, but not physical. That's how I take it anyway.
Partially intelligible, which is far from 'intelligible', a word that on its own implies nothing remaining that isn't understood.If we grant to science some ability to give us knowledge of physical reality, then we must assume that the physical world is intelligible.
Not sure where you think my confidence level is. I'm confident that monism hasn't been falsified. That's about as far as I go. BiV hasn't been falsified either, and it remains an important consideration, but positing that you're a BiV is fruitless.Like sarcasm, sometimes the 'level of confidence' comes out badly in discussions and people seem more confident about a given thing than they actually are. — boundless
I'm saying that alternatives to such physical emergence has not been falsified, so yes, I suppose those alternative views constitute 'possible ways in which they exist without emergence from the physical'.More of a not-unemergentist, distinct in that I assert that the physical is sufficient for emergence of these things, as opposed to asserting that emergence from the physical is necessary fact, a far more closed-minded stance. — noAxioms
Not sure what you mean here. Are you saying that the physical is sufficient for emergence but there are possible ways in which intentionality, consciousness etc emerge without the physical?
Just like you're questioning that a machine's intentions are not its own because some of them were determined by its programmer.Good point. But note that if your intentions could be completely determined by your own employer, it would be questionable to call them 'your' intentions.
No, since I am composed of parts, none of which have the intentionality of my employer. So it's still emergent, even if the intentions are not my own.Also, to emerge 'your' intentions would need the intentionality of your employer.
That seems to be self contradictory. If it's fundamental, it isn't emergent, by definition.there remains the fact that if intentionality, in order to emerge, needs always some other intentionality, intentionality is fundamental.
The calculator doesn't know what it's doing, I agree. It didn't have to learn. It's essentially a physical tool that nevertheless does mathematics despite not knowing that it's doing that, similar to a screwdriver screwing despite not knowing it's doing that. Being aware of its function is not one of its functions.Again, I see it more like a machine doing an operation rather than a machine 'recognizing' anything. — boundless
Agree.I still do not find any evidence that they do something more than doing an operation as an engine does.
Don't agree. The thing in the video learns. An engine does too these days, something that particularly pisses me off since I regularly have to prove to my engine that I'm human, and I tend to fail that test for months at a time. The calculator? No, that has no learning capability.This to me applies both to the mechanical calculator and the computer in the video.
Dabbling in solipsism now? You can't see the perception or understanding of others, so you can only infer when others are doing the same thing.An interesting question, however, arises. How can I be sure that humans (and, I believe, also animals at least) can 'recognize' numbers as I perceive myself doing?
OK. It varies from case to case. Sometimes it is. The 'you are here' sign points to where the map is on the map, with the map being somewhere in the territory covered by the map.TIt was a question to you about the distinction between territory and map. Is the map part of the territory? — Harry Hindu
Different people use the term different I suppose. I did my best a few posts back, something like "the view that all phenomena are the result of what we consider natural law of this universe", with 'this universe' loosely being defined as 'all contained by the spacetime which we inhabit'. I gave some challenges to that definition, such as the need to include dark matter under the category of 'natural law' to explain certain phenomena. Consciousness could similarly be added if it can be shown that it cannot emerge from current natural law, but such a proposal makes predictions, and those predictions fail so far.What does it even mean to be a physicalist?
All correct, which is why I didn't define 'physical' in terms of material, especially since they've never found any material. Yes, rocks are essentially clusters of quantum do-dads doing their quantumy stuff. There are no actual volume-filling particles, so 'mostly empty space' should actually get rid of 'mostly'.When scientists describe objects they say things like, "objects are mostly empty space" and describe matter as the relationship between smaller particles all the way down (meaning we never get at actual physical stuff - just more fundamental relationships, or processes) until we arrive in the quantum realm where "physical" seems to have no meaning, or is at least dependent upon our observations (measuring).
e.g. The air pressure changes with altitude.Change over time, yes. There's other kinds of change. — noAxioms
Like...?
In simplest terms, the function y = 0.3x, the y value changes over x. That being a mathematical structure, it is independent of any notion of spacetime. Our human thinking about that example of course is not independent of it. We cannot separate ourselves from spacetime.So maybe I should ask if there is an example of change independent of space-time.
Sure, one can model rigid balls bouncing off each other, or even simpler models than that if such serves a pragmatic purpose. I realize that's not what's going on. Even the flow of time is a mental construct, a map of sorts. Even you do it, referencing 'the past' like it was something instead of just a pragmatic mental convenience.You are always perceiving the world as it was in the past, so your brain has to make some predictions.
...
The simplified, cartoonish version of events you experience is what you refer to as "physical", where objects appear as solid objects that "bump" against each other because that is how the slower processes are represented on the map.
Depends on the nature of the map. If you're talking about perceptions, then it would be a perception of relative motion of two things over a shorter vs longer period of time, or possibly same time, but the fast one appears further away. If we're talking something like a spacetime diagram, then velocity corresponds to slopes of worldlines.How would you represent slow processes vs faster processes on a map?
Sure it is, but the mental picture is not the intentionality, just the idea of it.I don't understand. Is the picture not physical as well for a physicalist?
I don't understand this. A mirage is a physical thing. A camera can take a picture of one. No intentionality is required of the camera for it to do that. I never suggested that intentionality supervenes on any picture. Territories don't supervene on maps.How do you explain an illusion, like a mirage, if not intentionality supervening on the picture instead of on some physical thing?
Yes, my experience and subsequent mental assessment of state (a physical map of sorts) influences what I choose to do. Is that so extraordinary?I don't know what it means for intentionality to supervene on actual physical things. But I do know that if you did not experience empty space in front of you and experienced the cloud of gases surrounding you you then your intentions might be quite different. Yet you act on the feeling of there being nothing in front of you, because that is how you visual experience is.
Probably a good question. In context of the title of this topic, I'm not actually sure about the former since I don't find baffling what others do. Third person is simply a description, language or whatever. A book is a good third person view of a given subject. First person is a subjective temporal point of view by some classical entity. Those biased would probably say that the entity has to be alive.This talk of views seems to be confusing things. What exactly is a view? A process? Information?
It never looks like either. You're taking quantum terminology way out of context here. Quantum entities sometimes have wave-like properties and also particle-like properties, but those entities are never actually either of those things.Maybe I should try this route - Does a spinning top look more like a wave than a particle, and when it stops does it look more like a particle than a wave?
Yes to all.Is a spinning top a process? Is a top at rest a process - just a slower one?
Yea, pretty much. My eyes cannot follow it, even if they could follow linear motion at the same speed.Isn't the visual experience of a wave-like blur of a spinning top the relationship between the rate of change of position of each part of the top relative to your position is space and the rate at which your eye-brain system can process the change it is observing.
I'd accept that statement. Clouds look almost static like that, until you watch a time-lapse video of them. You can see the motion, but only barely. In fast-mo, I've seen clouds break like waves against a beach.If your mental processing were faster then it would actually slow down the speed of the top to the point where it will appear as a stable, solid object standing perfectly balanced on its bottom peg.
Harry Hindu
I can't think of a case where the map is never part of the territory, unless you are a solipsist, in which case they are one and the same, not part of the other.OK. It varies from case to case. Sometimes it is. The 'you are here' sign points to where the map is on the map, with the map being somewhere in the territory covered by the map.
You solipsism question implies that you were asking a different question. OK. Yes, the map is distinct from the territory, but you didn't ask that. Under solipsism, they're not even distinct. — noAxioms
I may make a distinction between an idea and something that is not an idea (I'm not an idealist). But I do not make a distinction between their existence. Santa Claus exists - as an idea. The question isn't whether Santa Claus exists or not. It does as we have "physical" representations (effects) of that idea (the cause) every holiday season. The question is, "what is the nature of its existence?". People are not confused about the existence of god. They are confused about the nature of god - is it just an idea, or does god exist as something more than just an idea?Your prior post did eventually suggest a distinction between a perceived thing (a 3D apple say) and the ding an sich, with is neither 3D nor particularly even a 'thing'. — noAxioms
boundless
Doing science is how something less unintelligible becomes more intelligible. — noAxioms
There are other examples of that, such as the robot with the repeated escape attempts, despite not being programmed to escape. — noAxioms
Partially intelligible, which is far from 'intelligible', a word that on its own implies nothing remaining that isn't understood. — noAxioms
Not sure where you think my confidence level is. I'm confident that monism hasn't been falsified. That's about as far as I go. BiV hasn't been falsified either, and it remains an important consideration, but positing that you're a BiV is fruitless. — noAxioms
I'm saying that alternatives to such physical emergence has not been falsified, so yes, I suppose those alternative views constitute 'possible ways in which they exist without emergence from the physical'. — noAxioms
No, since I am composed of parts, none of which have the intentionality of my employer. So it's still emergent, even if the intentions are not my own. — noAxioms
Don't agree. The thing in the video learns. An engine does too these days, something that particularly pisses me off since I regularly have to prove to my engine that I'm human, and I tend to fail that test for months at a time. The calculator? No, that has no learning capability. — noAxioms
Dabbling in solipsism now? You can't see the perception or understanding of others, so you can only infer when others are doing the same thing. — noAxioms
More importantly, what assumptions are you making that preclude anything operating algorithmicly from having this understanding? How do you justify those assumptions? They seem incredibly biased to me. — noAxioms
noAxioms
You've been leveraging the word now for many posts. Maybe you should have put out your definition of that if it means something other than 'able to be understood', as opposed to say 'able to be partially understood'.Well, it depends on what we mean by 'intelligible'. — boundless
First of all, by whom? Something understood by one might still baffle another, especially if the other has a vested interest in keeping the thing in the unintelligible list, even if only by declaring the explanation as one of correlation, not causation.A thing might be called 'intelligible' because it is fully understood or because it can be, in principle, understood completely*.
Yup. Thus I have opinions. Funny that I find BiV (without even false sensory input) less unreasonable than magic.I believe that you believe that some alternatives are more reasonable than the others
One person's reasonable doubt is another's certainty. Look at all the people that know for certain that their religion of choice (all different ones) is the correct one. Belief is a cheap commodity with humans, rightfully so since such a nature makes us more fit. A truly rational entity would not be similarly fit, and thus seems unlikely to have evolved by natural selection.but you don't think that there is enough evidence to say that one particular theory is 'the right one beyond reasonable doubt'.
If the machine was intentionally made, then yes, by definition. If it came into being by means other than a teleological one, then not necessarily so. I mean, arguably my first born came into being via intentionality, and the last not, despite having intentionality himself. Hence the condition is not necessary.My point wasn't that the programmer's intentionality is part of the machine but, rather, it is a necessary condition for the machine to come into being. — boundless
A similar argument seeks to prove that life cannot result from non-living natural (non-teleological) processes.If the machine had intentionality, such an intentionality also depends on the intentionality of its builder, so we can't still say that the machine's intentionality emerged from purely 'inanimate' causes.
That makes it sound like it rewrites its own code, which it probably doesn't. I've actually written self-modifying code, but it wasn't a case of AI or learning or anything, just efficiency or necessity.'Learning' IMO would imply that the machine can change the algorithms according to which it operates — boundless
They have machines that detect melanoma in skin images. There's no algorithm to do that. Learning is the only way, and the machines do it better than any doctor. Earlier, it was kind of a joke that machines couldn't tell cats from dogs. That's because they attempted the task with algorithms. Once the machine was able to just learn the difference the way humans do, the problem went away, and you don't hear much about it anymore.I might be wrong, of course, but it doesn't seem to me that I can explain all features of my mental activities in purely algorithmic terms (e.g. how I make some choices).
Technically, anything a physical device can do can be simulated in software, which means a fairly trivial (not AI at all) algorithm can implement you. This is assuming a monistic view of course. If there's outside interference, then the simulation would fail.I might concede, however, that I am not absolutely sure that there isn't an unknown alogorithmic explanation of all the operations that my mind can do.
Again, I'm missing your meaning because it's trivial. I have a map of Paris, and that map is not part of Paris since the map is not there. That's easy, so you probably mean something else by such statements. Apologies for not getting what that is, and for not getting why this point is helping me figure out why Chalmers finds the first person view so physically contradictory.I can't think of a case where the map is never part of the territory, unless you are a solipsist, in which case they are one and the same, not part of the other. — Harry Hindu
So I would say that the idea of Santa exists, but Santa does not. When I refer to an ideal, I make it explicit. If I don't, then I'm not referring to the ideal, but (in the case of the apple say), the noumena. Now in the apple case, it was admittedly a hypothetical real apple, not a specific apple that would be a common referent between us. Paris on the other hand is a common referent.Santa Claus exists - as an idea.
If that were so, there'd not be differing opinions concerning that existence, and even concerning the kind of existence meant.People are not confused about the existence of god.
Harry Hindu
How does this example of your map representative of your mind as a map? Your map is always about where you are now (we are talking about your current experience of where you are - wherever you are.) As such, your map can never be somewhere other than in the territory you are in. If it makes it any easier, consider the entire universe as the territory and your map is always of the area you are presently in in that territory.Again, I'm missing your meaning because it's trivial. I have a map of Paris, and that map is not part of Paris since the map is not there. That's easy, so you probably mean something else by such statements. Apologies for not getting what that is, and for not getting why this point is helping me figure out why Chalmers finds the first person view so physically contradictory. — noAxioms
Your idea is a common referent between us, else how could you talk about it to anyone? One might say that the scribbles you just typed are a referent between the scribbles and your idea and some reader. If ideas have just as much causal power as things that are not just ideas, then maybe the problem you're trying to solve stems from thinking of ideas and things that are not just ideas as distinct.So I would say that the idea of Santa exists, but Santa does not. When I refer to an ideal, I make it explicit. If I don't, then I'm not referring to the ideal, but (in the case of the apple say), the noumena. Now in the apple case, it was admittedly a hypothetical real apple, not a specific apple that would be a common referent between us. Paris on the other hand is a common referent. — noAxioms
The differing opinions concerning whether god exists or not is dependent upon what the nature of god is. Is god an extradimensional alien or is god simply an synonym for the universe?If that were so, there'd not be differing opinions concerning that existence, and even concerning the kind of existence meant.
Yes, there is also disagreement about the nature of god. I mean, you're already asserting the nature by grammatically treating the word as a proper noun. — noAxioms
noAxioms
One's current experience can be of somewhere other than where you are, but OK, most of the time, for humans at least, this is not so.Your [mental] map is always about where you are now (we are talking about your current experience of where you are - wherever you are.) — Harry Hindu
My mental map (the first person one) rarely extends beyond my pragmatic needs of the moment. I hold other mental maps, different scales, different points of view, but you're not talking about those.If it makes it any easier, consider the entire universe as the territory and your map is always of the area you are presently in in that territory.
Does that follow? I cannot counter it. If the causal connection is not there, the map would be just imagination, not corresponding to any territory at all. I'll accept it then.My point is that if the map is part of the territory - meaning it is causally connected with the territory - then map and territory must be part of the same "stuff" to be able to interact.
I think the point of dualism is to posit that the brain doesn't do these things. There are correlations, but that's it. Not sure what the brain even does, and why we need a bigger one if the mental stuff is doing all the work. Not sure why the causality needs to be through the brain at all. I mean, all these reports of out-of-body experiences seem to suggest that the mental realm doesn't need physical sensory apparatus at all. Such reports also heavily imply a sort of naive direct realism.It doesn't matter what flavor of dualism you prefer - substance, property, etc. You still have to explain how physical things like brains and their neurons create an non-physical experience of empty space and visual depth.
It 'existing' depends significantly on one's definition of 'exists'. Just saying.Our mental experience is the one thing we have direct access to, and are positive that exists — Harry Hindu
Speak for yourself. For the most part I don't confuse this when talking about the physical nature of the world. Even saying 'the world' is a naive assumption based on direct experience.So when people talk about the "physical" nature of the world, they are confusing how it appears indirectly with how it is directly
OK, but I experience an imagined map, and imagined things are processes of the territory of an implementation (physical or not) of the mechanism responsible for such processes.since our map is part of the territory we experience part of the territory directly
That it is, and I didn't suggest otherwise.Your idea is a common referent between us, else how could you talk about it to anyone?
Idealism is always an option, yes, but them not being distinct seems to lead to informational contradictions.One might say that the scribbles you just typed are a referent between the scribbles and your idea and some reader. If ideas have just as much causal power as things that are not just ideas, then maybe the problem you're trying to solve stems from thinking of ideas and things that are not just ideas as distinct.
boundless
You've been leveraging the word now for many posts. Maybe you should have put out your definition of that if it means something other than 'able to be understood', as opposed to say 'able to be partially understood'. — noAxioms
So I must deny that physicalism has any requirement of intelligibility, unless you have a really weird definition of it. — noAxioms
One person's reasonable doubt is another's certainty. — noAxioms
There are more extreme examples of this, like the civil war case of a woman getting pregnant without ever first meeting the father, with a bullet carrying the sperm rather than any kind of intent being involved. — noAxioms
A similar argument seeks to prove that life cannot result from non-living natural (non-teleological) processes. — noAxioms
We change our coding, which is essentially adding/strengthening connections. A machine is more likely to just build some kind of data set that can be referenced to do its tasks better than without it. We do that as well. — noAxioms
They have machines that detect melanoma in skin images. There's no algorithm to do that. Learning is the only way, and the machines do it better than any doctor. Earlier, it was kind of a joke that machines couldn't tell cats from dogs. That's because they attempted the task with algorithms. Once the machine was able to just learn the difference the way humans do, the problem went away, and you don't hear much about it anymore. — noAxioms
Technically, anything a physical device can do can be simulated in software, which means a fairly trivial (not AI at all) algorithm can implement you. This is assuming a monistic view of course. If there's outside interference, then the simulation would fail. — noAxioms
Harry Hindu
Aren't I? What type of map is the third person one? How does one go from a first person view to a third person view? Do we ever get out of our first-person view?My mental map (the first person one) rarely extends beyond my pragmatic needs of the moment. I hold other mental maps, different scales, different points of view, but you're not talking about those. — noAxioms
How is talk about first and third person views related to talk about direct and indirect realism? If one is a false dichotomy, would that make the other one as well?And I must ask again, where is this all leading in terms of the thread topic? — noAxioms
noAxioms
Fine, but it was especially emergence that I was talking about, not science.So, yeah I would say that intelligibility is certainly required to do science. — boundless
Worse, I hold beliefs that I know are wrong. It's contradictory, I know, but it's also true.I hold beliefs that I admit are not 'proven beyond reasonable doubts'
Being an intentional entity by no means implies that the event was intended.Good point. But in the [conception/marriage by bullet] case you mention one can object the baby is still conceived by humans who are intentional beings.
That's at best emergence over time, a totally different definition of emergence. Planet X didn't exist, but it emerged over time out of a cloud of dust. But the (strong/weak) emergence we're talking about is a planet made of of atoms, none of which are planets.An even more interesting point IMO would be abiogenesis. It is now accepted that life - and hence intentionality - 'came into being' from a lifeless state.
I suggest that they've simply not been explained yet to your satisfaction, but there's no reason that they cannot in principle ever be explained in such terms.However, from what we currently know about the properties of what is 'lifeless', intentionality and other features do not seem to be explainable in terms of those properties.
What do you mean by this? Of what are we aware that a machine cannot be? It's not like I'm aware of my data structures or aware of connections forming or fading away. I am simply presented with the results of such subconscious activity.We change our coding, which is essentially adding/strengthening connections. A machine is more likely to just build some kind of data set that can be referenced to do its tasks better than without it. We do that as well. — noAxioms
Note that we can also do that with awareness.
A Chinese room is a computer with a person acting as a CPU. A CPU has no understanding of what it's doing. It just does it's job, a total automaton.As a curiosity, what do you think about the Chinese room argument?
It's not like any of my neurons understands what it's doing. Undertanding is an emergent property of the system operating, not a property of any of its parts. The guy in the Chinese room does not understand Chinese, nor does any of his lists. I suppose an argument can be made that the instructions (in English) have such understanding, but that's like saying a book understands its own contents, so I think that argument is easily shot down.I still haven't find convincing evidence that machines can do something that can't be explained in terms like that, i.e. that machines seem to have understanding of what they are doing without really understand it.
Same way you do: Practice. Look at millions of images with known positive/negative status. After doing that a while, it leans what to look for despite the lack of explanation of what exactly matters.Interesting. But how they 'learn'?
I think so, similar to us. Either that or they program it to learn how to learn, or some such indirection like that.Is that process of learning describable by algorithms? Are they programmed to learn the way they do?
OK. Can you name a physical process that isn't? Not one that you don't know how works, but one that you do know, and it's not algorithmic.This IMO assumes more than just 'physicalism'. You also assume that all natural process are algorithmic.
One does not go from one to the other. One holds a first person view while interacting with a third person view.How does one go from a first person view to a third person view? — Harry Hindu
Anesthesia?Do we ever get out of our first-person view?
Haven't really figured that out, despite your seeming to drive at it. First/Third person can both be held at once. They're not the same thing, so I don't see it as a false dichotomy.How is talk about first and third person views related to talk about direct and indirect realism?
I see no such connection between them that any such assignment of one would apply to the other.If one is a false dichotomy, would that make the other one as well?
Harry Hindu
Can you provide an actual example of this?One does not go from one to the other. One holds a first person view while interacting with a third person view. — noAxioms
An example of first/third person held at once would be useful as well.Haven't really figured that out, despite your seeming to drive at it. First/Third person can both be held at once. They're not the same thing, so I don't see it as a false dichotomy. — noAxioms
Sure, but that would also get us out of the third person view, so I haven't seen you make a meaningful distinction between them (doesn't mean you haven't - just that I haven't seen it).Do we ever get out of our first-person view?
Anesthesia? — noAxioms
It appears to be a false dichotomy because we appear to have direct access to our own minds and indirect access to the rest of the world, so both are the case and it merely depends on what it is we are talking about. I wonder if the same is true of the first/third person dichotomy.Direct/indirect realism seem to be opposed to each other (so a true dichotomy?), and both opposed of course to not-realism (not to be confused with anti-realism which seems to posit mind being fundamental. — noAxioms
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