Yes we have free, but will complicates the issue.

Perhaps the answer is, we do in some things, and we don't in others. As to which concepts or aspects of existence, being, and behavior belong to which category, that's not something any man would know.

Yes we have free, but will complicates the issue. — Punshhh

Please, exactly what issue will be rendered complicated by one exercising free will?

Perhaps the answer is, we do in some things, and we don't in others. As to which concepts or aspects of existence, being, and behavior belong to which category, that's not something any man would know. — Outlander

So, you disagree with the aspects of existence, being and behaviour that I proposed - the aspect of increasing wealth? I propose that the increase in wealth is indeed an aspect of our existence, our being and our behaviour - it is an aspect that is indeed known to any and all man.

So, you disagree with the aspects of existence, being and behaviour that I proposed - the aspect of increasing wealth? I propose that the increase in wealth is indeed an aspect of our existence, our being and our behaviour - it is an aspect that is indeed known to any and all man — Pieter R van Wyk

Not particularly, no. We're largely self-serving beings after all, sure. Otherwise, it's not likely we'd be here.

Another way of framing the topic, rather properly underscoring the dynamic, is to say it is technically possible in theory, but not applicable due to the nature of human manifestation. We don't have control of whether or not we are born healthy, enfeebled, prone to anger, really laid back, smart, dumb, poor memory, great memory, poor sight, great sight, etc. Neither do we have any control over the events and information that we go through or are exposed to, particularly at a young age. All these things contribute to the type of person, or rather what type and state of mind we will have or end up having. These things also define not only what our perceived "hand" that has been dealt in life is but also what we perceive as not only the best options and possible actions or outcomes but the only ones at that.

We are free to move about and navigate the maze that is our life, sure, but it remains a maze that has been created, or at least influenced, by just about every single person living or dead. Every person on Earth has shaped and continues to shape this maze for us, every single person except ourselves.

My position remains that the concept of free will is incoherent. Let me be clear: I'm not agreeing with the position "there is no free will", I am saying that that position is "not even wrong" because it's meaningless.

A reasoned choice is the product of reasoning: the product of (knowledge of) past events and individual predilections: both of which can be traced to causes outside of the self.

Determinism is a red herring here, because IME no one can give an account of how free will would work and make sense even in a non deterministic universe.

My position remains that the concept of free will is incoherent. Let me be clear: I'm not agreeing with the position "there is no free will", I am saying that that position is "not even wrong" because it's meaningless.

A reasoned choice is the product of reasoning: the product of (knowledge of) past events and individual predilections: both of which can be traced to causes outside of the self.

Determinism is a red herring here, because IME no one can give an account of how free will would work and make sense even in a non deterministic universe. — Mijin

If some people's notion of free will is incoherent, one option is to advocate for dispensing with the notion altogether. Another one is the seek to capture the right but inchoate ideas that animate it. The idea of free will clearly is conceptually related to the idea of determinism, on one side, and to the idea of personal responsibility, on the other side. Sam Harris and Daniel Dennett have argued over which one of those two attitudes—eliminativist or revisionist, roughly—is warranted. Sam Harris has complained that although some compatibilist conceptions of free will may be more plausible (although he also thinks it's still incoherent), arguing that people are reasonable to believe that they have free will on that ground is cheating because he thinks the idea of compatibilist free will is, at best a trivial notion, and it doesn't match the unreasonable idea that ordinary people really entertain when they think about free will. This is the point of their (Harris and Dennett's) debate about "Madagascar". The core of the disagreement seems to be whether straightening up the popular and intuitive concept of free will amounts to a minor revision (which I think it does, like Dennett,) or to a wholesale replacement (like Harris thinks it does).

Dennett, also shows, I believe, why Harris's eliminativist position isn't tenable and may be motivated by his own misconceptions about free will, which he tends to project onto others. (The charge can be levied against some professional philosopher too, like Galen Strawson). That's because even Harris clearly sees the tight connection between the concept of free will, as confused as some people's conceptions of it may be, and the concepts of personal and moral responsibility. So, relinquishing the concept altogether, rather than straightening it up or disentangling it from misleading connotations, yields a denial that people are personally and/or morally responsible for what it is that they have done, which is a bullet that Harris is happy to bite, although he tends forgets that he has done so whenever the topic veers away from the philosophical context.

A reasoned choice is the product of reasoning: the product of (knowledge of) past events and individual predilections: both of which can be traced to causes outside of the self. — Mijin

Is this why you think that the concept of free will is incoherent? Why?

If some people's notion of free will is incoherent, one option is to advocate for dispensing with the notion altogether. Another one is the seek to capture the right but inchoate ideas that animate it. The idea of free will clearly is conceptually related to the idea of determinism, on one side, and to the idea of personal responsibility, on the other side. Sam Harris and Daniel Dennett have argued over which one of those two attitudes—eliminativist or revisionist, roughly—is warranted. — Pierre-Normand

True, but I think it's a bit misguided, or maybe gets us off on the wrong foot. (I mean their descriptions, not that you are misguided)
For example, Sam Harris, Stephen Law, Alex O' Conner etc will say that they don't believe that there is free will -- tacitly agreeing that "free will" has been well-defined as something which could potentially exist in some reality.

But their reasons for thinking it free will not exist are more fundamental than just talking about Determinism. They talk about where the will comes from, and that random events could not be called free will.

Therefore I think they would struggle to describe any universe that would have this concept. And, furthermore, the scrutiny should then be placed on the concept itself; basically questioning the premise that I just mentioned -- that free will is a meaningful concept that could exist.

It’s quite simple, in my understanding, and is discovered in the answer to the question “who or what controls my actions?”

In other words, it’s a matter of sourcehood and identity. If something other than me controls my actions, then I do not have free will. If I control my actions, then I have free will.

In the debate so far, determinists and those who otherwise deny free will have never found any other source of the control of our actions, and the identity of that outside controller remains a mystery to them. And until that occurs, one ought to side with the existence of free will.

Is this why you think that the concept of free will is incoherent? Why? — SophistiCat

Apologies -- I've repeated my position on this so many times, on so many forums that I can forget the need to explain myself on a different site.

1. The concept usually gets framed first around Determinism. The reasoning is that, if the universe is Deterministic I might think I chose coffee or tea, but actually that choice was predictable from the big bang. I only had the illusion of choice.
Fine.

2. Then, when it's pointed out that the universe may well not be determinstic, thanks to quantum indeterminancy, this is usually handwaved away. How can randomness be called choice?

3. But to me, (1) and (2) combined leave a bad smell. In (1) it seemed that the issue was with our decisions being predictable, being integrated in the causal chain of events. When the suggestion (2) arrives that this may not be the case, apparently it's still insufficient to have free will.
So, to me, at this point we should be asking What exactly do we mean by free will, and is it something which could even potentially exist?

4. And basically I've never heard a satisfactory answer to (3). No-one can seem to breakdown how a "true" free will decision would be made, or what it even really means.
The popular "Could have chosen differently" is quite a woolly definition. Every reasoned action I've made in my life I did for reasons, that I could have told you at the time. And some of those reasons were more important to me than others. When we talk about "could have chosen differently" what do we mean in this picture -- that I could have been aware of different things, or would value different things more highly? But these things can also be traced to events / properties external to me.

1. The concept usually gets framed first around Determinism. The reasoning is that, if the universe is Deterministic I might think I chose coffee or tea, but actually that choice was predictable from the big bang. I only had the illusion of choice.
Fine.

2. Then, when it's pointed out that the universe may well not be determinstic, thanks to quantum indeterminancy, this is usually handwaved away. How can randomness be called choice?

3. But to me, (1) and (2) combined leave a bad smell. In (1) it seemed that the issue was with our decisions being predictable, being integrated in the causal chain of events. When the suggestion (2) arrives that this may not be the case, apparently it's still insufficient to have free will.
So, to me, at this point we should be asking What exactly do we mean by free will, and is it something which could even potentially exist? — Mijin

I rather think you should begin by asking the bolded question. You may even find that the question of determinism vs indeterminism isn't as relevant to free will as all that, belying your first and second points. In any case, these first two points prompt the conclusion that free will is impossible, not that it is meaningless.

The popular "Could have chosen differently" is quite a woolly definition. Every reasoned action I've made in my life I did for reasons, that I could have told you at the time. And some of those reasons were more important to me than others. When we talk about "could have chosen differently" what do we mean in this picture -- that I could have been aware of different things, or would value different things more highly? But these things can also be traced to events / properties external to me. — Mijin

You seem to be conflating the two main criteria of free will: alternative possibilities and agency (ownership of decisions). In any case, I think you are right to question the meaning of at least the first of these (you should also question the second). They aren't necessarily as straightforward and literal as they may first appear.


NB: I wouldn't normally derail a thread like this, but seeing that this is yet another pathetic attempt at self-promotion by one of our resident crackpots, I have no regrets.

The core of the disagreement seems to be whether straightening up the popular and intuitive concept of free will amounts to a minor revision (which I think it does, like Dennett,) or to a wholesale replacement (like Harris thinks it does). — Pierre-Normand

I am not even certain that we should be talking about revision here. That Harris's concept of free will is out of touch with its common meaning is obvious. It is less obvious in the case of Dennett. The trouble is that when people are confronted head-on with the question of what free will is, their conceptualizations may not align with how they actually understand and use the concept. I think the project should begin with the study of the meaning or meanings (qua use), and only then can we proceed to critique and revision.

I am not even certain that we should be talking about revision here. That Harris's concept of free will is out of touch with its common meaning is obvious. It is less obvious in the case of Dennett. The trouble is that when people are confronted head-on with the question of what free will is, their conceptualizations may not align with how they actually understand and use the concept. I think the project should begin with the study of the meaning or meanings (qua use), and only then can we proceed to critique and revision. — SophistiCat

I agree on pretty much all counts. "Free will" as such doesn't have much of an ordinary use, though, outside of legal contexts. It has a semi-technical use in scientific contexts where people purport to deny its existence, mostly (as in, say, neuroscience or classical behaviorism). The use in legal contexts is sensitive to the practical requirements of common law where warranted ascriptions of personal responsibility and questions of deterrence and extenuating circumstances are at issue that tend to be freer of muddled misconceptions.

Anthony Kenny does a very good job in his little book "Freewill and Responsibility" of clarifying the concept in its relations to various categories of mens rea (from strict liabilities, through negligence or recklessness, to specific intent.) This yields a sort of thick compatibilist notion that goes beyond mere freedom from "external" circumstances and extends outside of legal contexts to those of warranted reactive attitudes like praise and blame. In those more ordinary contexts, the question seldom arise of one having acted "of their own free will." We rather ask more ordinary questions like, "could they have done better?" or "is their action excusable?" Something like the Kantian dictum "must implies can" finds its ordinary applications.

From a valid understanding of systems and the emergence of classes of systems, the answer is evident:
"Yes and no! If a decision is independent of the fundamental purpose of any company - to increase its wealth, of which the human asking the question is a component, the answer is yes, we have free will. However, if the decision has any possible influence on the company's purpose of increasing wealth, the option that offers the best chance to increase wealth must be chosen. Then, no free will exists. The only alternative to this option is to leave the company or to be forced to leave the company." — Pieter R van Wyk

In good systems fashion, we are generally constrained and so our freedoms are suitably particularised. There is some collective direction to which our individual choices are entrained.

So a corporation requires its workforce to be aligned with its goals and to make their choices accordingly. Workers can do whatever they like to the degree it fits that larger outcome.

But a corporation is not a particularly good model of a natural system. It is by design rather narrowly focused on a profit optimisation goal. And so workers are equally constrained in their scope of creative freedom.

A university might be a better model of the kind of society we desire. There we would expect considerable academic freedom. But also these days, a rather corporate concern about achieving a university ranking score and student population.

So from a systems perspective, free will is not a difficult issue. Global constraints are what we expect. Local degrees of freedom are also what we expect. What binds the two sides of the equation is how well the whole can shapes its parts, and how good a job those parts do in sustaining the whole.

Any social system is intentional. Its very structure expresses its general goal. But that intentionality is divided between the constraints the system seeks to impose globally and the freedom its parts have to keep the whole structure flying along to where it wants to go.

I'm doing a thesis on this right now. Thanks for initiating this thread.