Yes we have free, but will complicates the issue.

Perhaps the answer is, we do in some things, and we don't in others. As to which concepts or aspects of existence, being, and behavior belong to which category, that's not something any man would know.

Yes we have free, but will complicates the issue. — Punshhh

Please, exactly what issue will be rendered complicated by one exercising free will?

Perhaps the answer is, we do in some things, and we don't in others. As to which concepts or aspects of existence, being, and behavior belong to which category, that's not something any man would know. — Outlander

So, you disagree with the aspects of existence, being and behaviour that I proposed - the aspect of increasing wealth? I propose that the increase in wealth is indeed an aspect of our existence, our being and our behaviour - it is an aspect that is indeed known to any and all man.

So, you disagree with the aspects of existence, being and behaviour that I proposed - the aspect of increasing wealth? I propose that the increase in wealth is indeed an aspect of our existence, our being and our behaviour - it is an aspect that is indeed known to any and all man — Pieter R van Wyk

Not particularly, no. We're largely self-serving beings after all, sure. Otherwise, it's not likely we'd be here.

Another way of framing the topic, rather properly underscoring the dynamic, is to say it is technically possible in theory, but not applicable due to the nature of human manifestation. We don't have control of whether or not we are born healthy, enfeebled, prone to anger, really laid back, smart, dumb, poor memory, great memory, poor sight, great sight, etc. Neither do we have any control over the events and information that we go through or are exposed to, particularly at a young age. All these things contribute to the type of person, or rather what type and state of mind we will have or end up having. These things also define not only what our perceived "hand" that has been dealt in life is but also what we perceive as not only the best options and possible actions or outcomes but the only ones at that.

We are free to move about and navigate the maze that is our life, sure, but it remains a maze that has been created, or at least influenced, by just about every single person living or dead. Every person on Earth has shaped and continues to shape this maze for us, every single person except ourselves.

My position remains that the concept of free will is incoherent. Let me be clear: I'm not agreeing with the position "there is no free will", I am saying that that position is "not even wrong" because it's meaningless.

A reasoned choice is the product of reasoning: the product of (knowledge of) past events and individual predilections: both of which can be traced to causes outside of the self.

Determinism is a red herring here, because IME no one can give an account of how free will would work and make sense even in a non deterministic universe.

My position remains that the concept of free will is incoherent. Let me be clear: I'm not agreeing with the position "there is no free will", I am saying that that position is "not even wrong" because it's meaningless.

A reasoned choice is the product of reasoning: the product of (knowledge of) past events and individual predilections: both of which can be traced to causes outside of the self.

Determinism is a red herring here, because IME no one can give an account of how free will would work and make sense even in a non deterministic universe. — Mijin

If some people's notion of free will is incoherent, one option is to advocate for dispensing with the notion altogether. Another one is the seek to capture the right but inchoate ideas that animates it. The idea of free will clearly is conceptually related to the idea of determinism, on one side, and to the idea of personal responsibility, on the other side. Sam Harris and Daniel Dennett have argued over which one of those two attitudes—eliminativist or revisionist, roughly—is warranted. Sam Harris has complained that although some compatibilist conceptions of free will may be more plausible (although he also thinks it's still incoherent), arguing that people are reasonable to believe that they have free will on that ground is cheating because he thinks the idea of compatibilist free will is, at best a trivial notion, and it doesn't match the unreasonable idea that ordinary people really entertain when they think about free will. This is the point of their (Harris and Dennett's) debate about "Madagascar". The core of the disagreement seems to be whether straightening up the popular and intuitive concept of free will amounts to a minor revision (which I think it does, like Dennett,) or to a wholesale replacement (like Harris thinks it does).

Dennett, also shows, I believe, why Harris's eliminativist position isn't tenable and may be motivated by his own misconceptions about free will, which he tends to project onto others. (The charge can be levied against some professional philosopher too, like Galen Strawson). That's because even Harris clearly sees the tight connection between the concept of free will, as confused as some people's conceptions of it may be, and the concepts of personal and moral responsibility. So, relinquishing the concept altogether, rather than straightening it up or disentangling it from misleading connotations, yields a denial that people are personally and/or morally responsible for what it is that they have done, which is a bullet that Harris is happy to bite, although he tends forgets that he has done so whenever the topic veers away from the philosophical context.