The past event E was contingent if the causal factors (C) that produced E had the potential (at the time) to produce E or ~E. IOW, both E and ~E were possible. — Relativist

For those reading along, the standard definition of contingency is roughly just that an event is contingent if it is true in some but not all possible worlds.

This has the great advantage of not involving any notion of causality or temporality.

One of the things happening in this side conversation is that modality, temporality and causality are being mixed together with little clear idea of how they interact - that is, without a suitable logic.

One of the great advantages of possible world semantics is that it can be used to provide such logics.

The composition may change in terms of NaCl, etc., but if you do not have H2O then you do not have water. Your response? — NotAristotle

Please take a look at my earlier response to this. But I like to address this in a little different way.

Let us say some fictitious community commonly calls a particular liquid "warder". One day they decide to place the liquid in a pot and place it over a fire to see what would happen. After several hours, they notice the liquid was gone, and there was a white powder remaining. In amazement, they thought the liquid was transformed in the white powder by the heat of the fire. They called this powder "warder" as well, for them it was just a transformation into a different physical state, a solid.

Centuries past, the community developed an Atomic Theory of Matter. Soon they discovered that the liquid they called "warder" was composed of 98% H2O and 2% NaCl. When they perform the same experiment of heating in the pot, they discovered the white powder they called "warder" was compose of 100% NaCl. But even with this discovery, they continue to refer to both liquid and white power as "warder". Have they made some error in this case? What is the nature of this error? Scientifically there is no error, the composition they got right. An error in naming? But one can use the same name to refer to multiple object anytime in language, context will clarify any confusion. If you say there was some metaphysical error committed here, well what was it? I don't think we can make any sense of what a "metaphysical error" would be in this case.

For those reading along, the standard definition of contingency is roughly just that an event is contingent if it is true in some but not all possible worlds.

This has the great advantage of not involving any notion of causality or temporality. — Banno

IOW, it ignores the controversies. I have inferred that the controversies are the topic of this theead.

it ignores the controversies... — Relativist

Clarifies, would be a better word.

Your

You're conflating possibility with potential. There is no potential for a different past, but we can consider whether a past event was necessary or contingent. — Relativist

is pretty much right. Contingency is modal, potential is causal, such that if we mix the two, then we ought keep close track of which is which.

Unfortunately your definition of contingency mixes causality and and modality. If it were a definition of determinacy, it would work.

Unfortunately your definition of contingency mixes causality and and modality. If it were a definition of determinacy, it would work. — Banno

I wasn't "defining" possibility, I was discussing the ontology of possibilty - pertinent to the discussion of
"The Possibilism-Actualism Debate", referenced in the Op.

There are no metaphysically possible worlds unless there is contingency in the world, and this implies an ontological basis. You aren't obligated to participate in discussing that, but it is erroneous to suggest it's not a legitimate issue that directly relates to the topic.

RIghto. Carry on.

Sure, but in the situation we're talking about every possible world is actual, and there's no definition as to what actual means. So "actual" is meaningless. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is like saying because there is no definitive definition of “pain” the concept of pain becomes meaningless.

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Then there is the source of my empirical experience, which is not one of the possible worlds (as these are what are in the model), therefore not actual. So I concluded that it is an illusion. — Metaphysician Undercover

No one has directly seen a quark, but only theorised about them. The Merriam Webster dictionary defines “illusion” as “something that deceives or misleads intellectually”. “Illusion” would be the wrong word to describe our understanding of quarks. Similarly with theorised possible worlds.

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No, the actual world we live in is not actual, the possible worlds are actual. — Metaphysician Undercover

It depends what the expression “the actual world we live in” is referring to.

Is it referring to i) the world as we perceive it through our senses or ii) the external world that is causing our sensations?

The reasoning is inescapably circular! — Relativist

There is an escape.

Essence does not play a part in Kripke’s Rigid Designator.

As the Wikipedia article of Naming and Necessity writes:

Kripke's theory of naming, presented in his book "Naming and Necessity," argues against the descriptivist theory of names, proposing instead that names refer to objects through a causal chain originating from an initial act of naming. This means that a name's reference is fixed by its original use, rather than by a set of descriptive properties associated with the name.

Hesperus is Phosphorus is necessarily true as both refer to the same thing, Venus. That Hesperus and Phosphorus have the same identity is only known a posteriori because of empirical observation.

In Kripke’s theory of naming, there is an initial naming of a person, their baptism. In a sense, JL Austin’s performative utterance.

There is then a recursive process, a causal link between this baptised object and future objects.

For example, in possible world 5, there is a causal chain going back from Aristotle 5 to the original baptised Aristotle, meaning that Aristotle 5 is necessarily baptised Aristotle. In possible world 9, there is a causal chain going back from Aristotle 9 to the original baptised Aristotle, meaning that Aristotle 9 is necessarily baptised Aristotle. Therefore, Aristotle 5 is necessarily Aristotle 9. This means that Aristotle is a rigid designator because necessarily and causally linked to all other Aristotles.

Thereby, the baptised Aristotle = casually linked to {Aristote 1 in possible 1, Aristotle 2 in possible world 2, Aristotle 3 in possible world 3, etc}

This is an extensional definition. No intensional definition is required.

Knowing that baptised Aristotle is causally linked to Aristotle 1 tells us nothing about Aristotle’s essence.

For example that a snooker ball moves when hit by a snooker cue tells us nothing about the intrinsic nature or essence of either the snooker ball or snooker cue.

Kripke's Rigid Designator avoids such philosophical problems as to the nature of essence because based on a particular theory of naming.

You're conflating possibility with potential. — Relativist

As I explained, it's ontological possibility, and this is very similar to "potential", but potential I consider to be the broader term than ontological possibility.

The past event E was contingent if the causal factors (C) that produced E had the potential (at the time) to produce E or ~E. IOW, both E and ~E were possible. — Relativist

Sure, all physical things and actions can be understood as "contingent". That means their existence is dependent on causation. The point though, is that by the nature of time, once a contingent action occurs, it is impossible that it did not occur. Therefore the nature of time is such that, as time passes something which is seen to be contingent (existing only as an idea, and requiring causation), may become necessary (having physical existence).

Because of this (the nature of time), it is incorrect to talk about past activities, which are known to be true, as possibilities. Such things do not fulfill the criteria of ontological possibility (they are impossible to be otherwise), nor epistemic possibility (they are known to be true).

After the event, it will remain a historical fact that E was contingent (E and ~E were possible). — Relativist

Yes, E "was" contingent, and both E and ~E "were" possible. Notice the use of the past tense. However, we cannot represent both "E and ~E as possible" now, accept by epistemic possibility. If we do not know which is the case. We know that it is possible that either E or ~E occurred, and by the law of excluded middle it is necessary that one or the other is the case, but we do not know which. That is the basis of epistemic possibility. then we can use logic to try to figure out which. At that time though, when it was present, then both E and ~E were possible in the ontological sense. In this case, when it is at the present and neither one has occurred, neither one is necessary, and the law of excluded middle is violated.

So there is a significant difference between epistemic possibility and ontological possibility. One violates the law of excluded middle the other does not. And, in the case of "E and ~E were possible", at that time referred to in the past, if we know which one occurred, then there is no epistemic possibility. When we look back in time, and we know what happened, even though the event "was" contingent, it is now known as necessary, there is no "possibility" involved in any sense of the word, and alternatives are counterfactuals.

This has the great advantage of not involving any notion of causality or temporality. — Banno

How could that possibly be an advantage? You just plunge yourself deeper into the fantasy world of Platonism, and completely disrespect the reality of temporality. Advantage for what, sophistry?

One of the things happening in this side conversation is that modality, temporality and causality are being mixed together with little clear idea of how they interact - that is, without a suitable logic. — Banno

Exactly, it is "without a suitable logic". This is because the logicians prefer to drift off into their fantasy world of Platonism, with complete disrespect for what the metaphysicians are telling them. Some will even say that metaphysics is an unnecessary waste. And so, we are left without a suitable logic to deal with temporal reality.

One of the great advantages of possible world semantics is that it can be used to provide such logics. — Banno

Obviously that is false, "possible worlds" cannot provide that. It completely distances itself from temporal reality by not distinguishing between the sense of "possibility" which violates the law of excluded middle (ontological possibility), and the sense of "possibility" which does not violate the law of excluded middle (epistemic possibility). Further, it allows within that muddled mix in the concept of "possibility", a contradictory sense of "possibility", the counterfactual, which is not a "possibility" in any real sense.

Clearly "possible worlds" in itself, cannot provide for these three very different senses of "possibility". It might provide for one of those senses, but then the others require something different, due to the substantial difference between them. It is the matter of trying to squeeze all these substantially different senses of "possibility" into one "possible worlds" model, which causes the problem.

That is like saying because there is no definitive definition of “pain” the concept of pain becomes meaningless. — RussellA

You left out the other condition, "pain" must refer to everything as well. If pain refers to everything, as "actual" refers to all possible worlds, and there is no definition for "pain", then it's meaningless.

No one has directly seen a quark, but only theorised about them. The Merriam Webster dictionary defines “illusion” as “something that deceives or misleads intellectually”. “Illusion” would be the wrong word to describe our understanding of quarks. Similarly with theorised possible worlds. — RussellA

I disagree, I think quarks are illusory. They exist as theoretical particles, but cannot be produced for observation due to the strong force. What is indicated is that the strong force is not understood, and mass in general is not understood, and "quarks" are just posited to account for that lack of understanding. The concept of "quark" misleads intellectually, by producing the illusion that something not understood is understood.

Is it referring to i) the world as we perceive it through our senses or ii) the external world that is causing our sensations? — RussellA

It doesn't matter. Even the experience of our perceptions must be put into descriptive words before it becomes a part of the modal model. If the modal model is "the actual", then our perceptions are not.

Sure, all physical things and actions can be understood as "contingent". That means their existence is dependent on causation. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, that's not what contingent means. Suppose necessitarianism is true. Necessitarianism is the theory that every that event that occurs (past and future) occurred necessarily. IOW there are contingent events and no objects that exists contingently.

Under this theory, laws of nature necessitate their result. Where A and B are states of affairs, if A causes B, through a law of nature, then A necessarily causes B. If you have a ball in your hand, and you release the ball, it will necessarily fall to the ground (assuming there is nothing in the environment to impede the fall). Classical laws of nature work like this.

Contrast this with a quantum event, whose outcome is a consequence of quantum uncertainty. The specific result was not necessary (under most interpretations of QM). It was contingent. And yet, it was caused. So causation can either produce its effect necessarily or contingently. It becomes a historical fact that the effect was contingent vs necessary.

You left out the other condition, "pain" must refer to everything as well. If pain refers to everything, as "actual" refers to all possible worlds, and there is no definition for "pain", then it's meaningless. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is a difference between “pain refers to everything” and “pain refers to everything that is painful.”
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The concept of "quark" misleads intellectually, by producing the illusion that something not understood is understood. — Metaphysician Undercover

Perhaps that is true. In the same vein, every concept we have misleads intellectually by producing the illusion that something not understand is understood.

For example, we have the concept of numbers, but who knows what a number is. We have the concept of pain, but who knows what pain is. We have the concept of consciousness, but who knows what consciousness is.

All concepts may mislead us, but what other choice do we have?
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Even the experience of our perceptions must be put into descriptive words before it becomes a part of the modal model. If the modal model is "the actual", then our perceptions are not. — Metaphysician Undercover

I perceive that the sun is shining. In my actual world the sun is shining.

I imagine a possible world in which the sun is not shining. It is possible that there is an actual world where the sun is not shining.

Actual worlds may exist or possibly exist.