Is buddhism merely a dark art that carries its adherent or new recruit to seek only beauty?

s buddhism merely a dark art that carries its adherent or new recruit to seek only beauty? — Alexander Hine

Or What is the spiritual outcome in practicing Buddhism?

Can we find a taxonomy that fills the gap between,
the knowledge that a desire has been grounded in
illusions?

A summary, gleaned from bot scraping web sources, informs what Buddhism claims as
its grounds.

Quote:

Practicing Buddhism leads to profound spiritual transformation, ultimately aiming for enlightenment and liberation from suffering.

Core Goal
Buddhism's ultimate spiritual outcome is attaining Nirvana, a state of complete awakening where the cycle of birth, death, and rebirth (Samsara) ends, extinguishing greed, hatred, and delusion. This liberation arises from realizing the Four Noble Truths—suffering's existence, its cause in craving, its cessation, and the path to end it via the Noble Eightfold Path. Practitioners cultivate wisdom, ethical conduct, and mental discipline to transcend ego and dukkha (unsatisfactoriness).

Key Spiritual Benefits
Mindfulness and Clarity: Regular meditation fosters deep self-awareness, revealing impermanence and reducing mental clutter for inner peace.

Compassion and Oneness: Practices build empathy (karuna), dissolving self-centered boundaries and promoting interconnectedness with all beings.

Five Spiritual Powers: Faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, and wisdom strengthen, cleansing perception and diminishing confusion.
​

Long-Term Transformation
Consistent practice shifts one's worldview toward non-attachment and equanimity, yielding serenity, fearlessness toward death, and purposeful living. While Nirvana is the pinnacle, interim outcomes include emotional resilience and ethical harmony, supported by both tradition and modern studies on meditation.


End Quote.

I’m suggesting that salvation may not be all that, uh, mystical or grand, and that religion helps to fulfill basic needs such as meaning, purpose, and connection, for those who have difficulty fulfilling such needs on their own. — praxis

Thank you for the second attempt.

I think to be clear you should give your version of what enlightenment is because it seems different to the general notion of it. I am getting the sense you are just seeing enlightenment as some kind of self help style self-actualisation akin to ticking all the boxes on Maslow's hierarchy of needs?

I would say it would extinguish those existential issues by coming to the realisation they don't matter, as in the removal of the needs (loss of attachment/desire).

The Theravadins traditionally rejected this 'negativistic' view but nevertheless maintained that there is no consciousness in Nirvana — boundless

For those interested on this peculiar view of Nirvana, I compiled some textual evidence on this post: https://ancientafterlifebelifs.blogspot.com/2026/02/on-nature-of-nibbana-nirvana-in.html

I think to be clear you should give your version of what enlightenment is because it seems different to the general notion of it. — unimportant

The realization or actual experience of emptiness or the true nature of being. More mundanely, it's an experience or brain state.

I am getting the sense you are just seeing enlightenment as some kind of self help style self-actualisation akin to ticking all the boxes on Maslow's hierarchy of needs? — unimportant

Not at all, in fact the Buddhist project is rather uninterested in self-overcoming because such a project embraces life and suffering in order to grow and reach for full potential.

I would say it would extinguish those existential issues by coming to the realisation they don't matter... — unimportant

That sounds like nihilism to me. I would like to think that people and things still matter to enlightened Buddhists.

For those interested on this peculiar view of Nirvana, I compiled some textual evidence on this post:

I had a look, but got stuck on the meaning here;

But when the Aggregates are described as empty and not-self,15 nirvana is characterized not as their opposite but as their intensification: it is ultimately empty (paramasunna) and that which has ultimate meaning (or: is the ultimate goal, paramattha, Patis II 240).

(The second paragraph in the Stephen Collins section)

Is it suggesting that ultimate meaning (paramattha) is the intensification of not-self? I can’t work it out, can you shed any light on it?

Honestly, I'm not sure. I compiled that list in 2018 but even at the time I wasn't sure about that. Notice that Harvey mentions that in some instances Nirvana is described as the opposte of the aggregate even with the respect of 'not-self'.

My hypothesis is that the text means that you can know Nirvana only when you have an insight on not-self. Indeed, in one sutta the Buddha is reporter to have said that notions of self can only arise when the aggregate of feeling is present:

Ānanda, the one who says ‘Feeling is not my self, but my self is not without experience of feeling. My self feels; for my self is subject to feeling’—he should be asked: ‘Friend, if feeling were to cease absolutely and utterly without remainder, then, in the complete absence of feeling, with the cessation of feeling, could (the idea) “I am this” occur there?’.”

“Certainly not, venerable sir.” — DN 15, Ven Bodhi translation

So since in Nirvana without remainder all aggregates stop, Nirvana can't be regarded as a 'self' in any meaningful terms.

In that list I also forgot to mention in the post that there is a post-canonical text that explicitly refutes the idea that Nirvana is some form of consciousness while commenting a sutta that seems to say the opposite. So, Nirvana is not just a 'mere absence', it is an unconditioned ultimate (i.e. non illusory) 'entity' (for a lack of a better word) but neither a form of consciousness according to the 'commentarialTheravada'. Certainly a peculiar view.

Indeed, in one sutta the Buddha is reporter to have said that notions of self can only arise when the aggregate of feeling is present:

Yes, I think I’m getting the feeling for it now. My first thought is a reference to a transfiguration of the aspect of the self which is constituted of/in the aggregate. Also if there is a reference to ultimate meaning (paramattha), the self and not-self may lose their distinction, while in a sense remain, reconciled.

This brings me to a thought I have often had regarding Buddhist conceptions of nirvana. If the self etc is annihilated in the realisation of nirvana. Whom is experiencing the exalted state?
I know this might sound like a simplistic question, but there is a deeper issue in it. Or rather if there is total annihilation, such that all is left is a state of non-existence, whom, is, present, in it? Who, or what remains?

I’m not expecting an answer to it, particularly. Just expressing the question that immediately occurred to me on learning the Buddhist conception of nirvana.

It’s very important to grasp that the term ‘anatta’, which means ‘not self’ or ‘no self’ is always used as an adjective in the Pali (early Buddhist) texts. All things (or experiential states) are said to be ‘without self’ (also to be annica, impermanent, and dukkha, unsatisfying). But when asked ‘is there a self or not?’ the Buddha declines to answer (ref).This is very important. It is mistaken to say that ‘the Buddha says there is no self’. But nor that there is a self. Why? To affirm that the self exists is to fall into the mistaken view of eternalism, the idea that there is a permanent unchanging self which migrates from life to life, or which underlies but is different from all experiences. To say that there is no self is to fall into the mistaken view of nihilism, which is the view that there are no karmic consequences of actions. Of course this is difficult to fathom, but that is the canonical view. It is elaborated in the Madhyamaka, ‘middle way’ teaching of Nāgārjuna but it is there in essence from the earliest teachings.

Furthermore, the Buddhist teaching on rebirth does not say that you — understood as a persisting personal subject, ego, or bearer of identity — will be reborn. That is precisely what the doctrine of non-self (anattā) rules out from the start. If there were a “you” in that sense, rebirth would amount to reincarnation - a single self which is born again and again, and which Buddhism explicitly rejects. That is the ‘eternalist’ view. But the idea that actions in this life have no consequence beyond physical death is the opposite mistake, the ‘nihilist’ view. (An implication being that modern thought is basically nihilist in orientation.)

What continues is the causal process that underlies and gives rise to living beings. There is continuity without strict identity. And that stands to reason, because all of us are both the same as, and different to, the person we were in the past. Self is a dynamic stream of consciousness, ‘cittasantana’ but without an unchanging kernel or eternal existent.

The aggregates arise, function, and cease. If ignorance and craving persist, the causal conditions for further arising persist. This is why the Buddha consistently avoids answering questions like “Is it the same person who is reborn?” or “Is it a different one?” Or for that matter “who experiences Nirvāṇa?”Such questions are posed on the basis of a false conception of the nature of self, which is why they are left unanswered.

Were the Inquisition and the Crusades an abuse of power, or a mere use of power? What if the popes in the past did what they did because they were "further along than you"?
— baker

Sorry, but I don't understand your point here. Are you claiming that if a behaviour that is blatantly in contradiction with a religion's 'code of conduct' is done by a large number of those who hold a authority position in that religion it is evidence that the religion in question is false (or it is at least a reason to be skeptical of it)? — boundless

I can't retrace how you arrived at this ...

I'm plainly asking what I'm asking.

You can see a lot of this in various religious and esp. "spiritual" traditions where it's sometimes called "crazy wisdom" and where actions, if done by an ordinary person, are deemed inappropriate, but when done by a "spiritually advanced person", are deemed appropriate and "above the understanding of ordinary people". So, for example, if a sadhu gets drunk or high, that's exalted and spiritual somehow, but if an ordinary person gets drunk or high, it's just ordinary intoxication which is frowned upon.

Then in Mahayana, with the Secondary Bodhisattva vows, they've even found a way to excuse killing, raping, and pillaging, all in the name of "compassion" and "spiritual advancement".

Then there is the issue of "skillful means". Again, doing things that are ordinarily considered immoral or wrong, but when done for some "higher purpose" and/or by a "spiritually advanced person", considered perfectly right.

So in the light of this, I'm wondering whether the Crusades and the Holy Inquisition (with the stake burnings and all that) were actually examples of such "spiritual advancement" that we ordinary folks simply cannot even begin to comprehend.

The religious dogma has been ripe in this discussion. — unimportant

Lol.
It would help the discussion if you'd stop shooting from the hip like that.

This is my view too but the majority voice in this thread has been the usual pushback I expected from 'devouts' that any attempt to question the teachings or go outside the box will be met with failure, and maybe derision. — unimportant

For someone so critical of "dogma", you know remarkably little of it.

I guess they will say neither of us are enlightened so we have no place to try and change the tried and true method of the prophets. I have had the same arguments from most things I have learned in life, which have nothing to do with Buddhism. Most often ridiculed for 'going against the grain' and outside of the box but I have found it easy to separate the wheat from the chaff of what is good information vs. bad and irrational stuff in other areas and the proof is in the pudding when I achieve my goals in whatever thing I set out, so I don't see this as being any different.

For someone who is supposedly interested in "enlightenment", you sure spend an awful lot of time _not_ pursuing it.

Yes, I think I’m getting the feeling for it now. My first thought is a reference to a transfiguration of the aspect of the self which is constituted of/in the aggregate. Also if there is a reference to ultimate meaning (paramattha), the self and not-self may lose their distinction, while in a sense remain, reconciled. — Punshhh

It's hard to know what that text meant for 'paramattha'. In the developed abhidharmic/abhidhammic thought, 'paramattha sacca' was the 'ultimate truth' as opposed to the 'conventional truth', i.e. 'how reality truly is' vs 'what is provisionally true but ultimately illusory'. I know that various scholars have suggested that this distinction wasn't made at the time of the earliest commentary but of course traditionalist Theravadins I would say that think there is a continuity between 'early' and 'later' commentaries.

Anyways, the developed Theravadin tradition suggested that there are 'ultimately real dhammas' ('cognizable objects'): 81 types of conditioned (both mental and 'material') and only 1 unconditioned dhamma (i.e. Nibbana). All these 'objects' are irriducible, have no components. Indeed, all 'composite objects', like tables, chairs, trees and so on were seen as ultimately illusory, but conventionally/provosionally real. This was also the case for the 'selves'. Other 'abhidharmic' systems developed their lists of conditioned and unconditioned dhammas but the idea was essentially the same (the Sautrantika denied the 'reality' of unconditioned dhammas, including Nibbana, and believed that they are just absence of conditioned dhammas).
So, indeed, in these systems the 'self' was simply a wrong (albeit useful) idea. No ultimate reconciliation.

Interestingly, in the Madhyamaka thought, if I understand it correctly, this 'ultimate/provisional' distinction collapses in the sense that there are no 'ultimate dhammas'. All 'dhammas' are provisional and, therefore, not more real than the 'selves'. So, in a sense, here you find a 'reconciliation': at the end of the day, while the 'abhidharmic views' were reductionistic ('ultimate irreducible objects' are real, 'composites' aren't), Madhyamaka doesn't posit an 'ultimate' set of 'real dhammas'.

Not sure if this helps (also, don't trust what I'm saying too much).

Whom is experiencing the exalted state? — Punshhh

For most Buddhist traditions is regarded as wrong-posited. Consider this excerpt:

“Venerable sir, who feels?”

“Not a valid question,” the Blessed One replied. “I do not say, ‘One feels.’ If I should say, ‘One feels,’ in that case this would be a valid question: ‘Venerable sir, who feels?’ But I do not speak thus. Since I do not speak thus, if one should ask me, ‘Venerable sir, with what as condition does feeling come to be?’ this would be a valid question. To this the valid answer is: ‘With contact as condition, feeling comes to be; with feeling as condition, craving.’” — SN 12.12, Ven Bodhi translation

Indeed, ultimately, both the 'enligthened' and 'unenlightened' experience is self-less. It would be interesting to see how the ancient 'personalist' (Pudgalavada) Buddhist school, which posited a sort of 'indeterminate self', would read that passage but unfortunately, their literature is lost (and the same goes for many other ancient Buddhist schools).

I know this might sound like a simplistic question, but there is a deeper issue in it. Or rather if there is total annihilation, such that all is left is a state of non-existence, whom, is, present, in it? Who, or what remains? — Punshhh

I believe that the 'commentarial Theravada' would answer, 'the Nibbana element' remains. Given that it isn't understood as anything material or mental, I have no idea of what would mean. But no, based on the quotes I found it isn't simply 'non-existence' or an 'absence'.
I think that the Madhyamaka instead would answer you that even asking this question is premised on wrong presuppositions about reality.

Note that even the Sautrantika wouldn't say that 'Nibbana without remainder' is annihilation because they would tell you that since there is no self, there is nothing to annihilate. But, yeah, their view of 'Nibbana without remainder' is well 'non-existence' IIRC (I think that some scholars questioned that this was true for all Sautrantikas but I can't recall their arguments).

I’m not expecting an answer to it, particularly. Just expressing the question that immediately occurred to me on learning the Buddhist conception of nirvana. — Punshhh

Me too. I gradually found the 'abhidharmic' (the Sautrantika included) views less and less convincing over time. However, interestingly, I would say that the Madhyamaka perhaps would be right if there is no metaphysical Absolute that 'grounds' the reality of the conditioned - if there is no 'Absolute', then neither the conditioned nor the unconditioned are ultimately real.

Then there is the issue of "skillful means". Again, doing things that are ordinarily considered immoral or wrong, but when done for some "higher purpose" and/or by a "spiritually advanced person", considered perfectly right.

So in the light of this, I'm wondering whether the Crusades and the Holy Inquisition (with the stake burnings and all that) were actually examples of such "spiritual advancement" that we ordinary folks simply cannot even begin to comprehend. — baker

I see. Sorry for the misinterpretation. However, this presupposes a very strong 'discontinuity' between the 'perfected state' and the 'imperfect state' that is IMO indeed a problem.

For instance, if a 'perfectly good person' can make clearly bad acts from an 'imperfect' perspective, then arguably 'good' loses its meaning. In many ancient philosophies and traditions, the 'perfected realization of virtue' is the ultimate realization of something that is 'already present' in those are still in an imperfect state and everytime that vritue is exercised, it is a manifestation of such a 'potential to perfection'.

All of this to say that if 'love of your neighbour' for 'ordinary folks' means that one should care for the other, treat him or her with respect and so on, it is reasonable to expect that if one is 'perfect in virtue' then he or she would treat the 'neighbour' in an analogous way but better than the 'ordinary folks'.

If, however, one accepts that there is strong discontinuity between the 'perfected' and the 'imperfect' states, then yeah I can see how one might end up justifying what is unjutifiable, calling 'an expression of goodness' what would generally regarded as the opposite and so on. The problem with these kinds of views is that the language they use can't be trusted.

I’m interested in the same thing. I don’t think it’s correct for you to suggest that because I disagree, I’m interested in a wrong aspect of this discussion, or in some ‘objective’ and erroneous analysis. We’re just having a conversation, and what I said would apply to both an insider and an outsider. I simply resisted the idea you put forward that my argument would not be understood by an insider. But let's move on since this is a minor part of the overall discussion. — Tom Storm

Not understood by, but relevant to. Things that are relevant to outsiders might not be the same as the things relevant to insiders, and vice versa.

I think that to you, as to an outsider, it makes perfect sense to think relatively highly of doubters. But to an insider, it doesn't.

And many times, for insiders, the reasons are entirely practical. From an insider's perspective, a doubter (who attends a religious venue along with the insiders and tries to participate in their community) is simply "high maintenance", more work than they are worth. It's tedious for the insiders to deal with a doubter, to try to accomodate the doubter, to explain things over and over again. I've seen this all too often myself: People just got tired of me, the doubter. Sometimes, quite aggressively tired. Some things I've been told:
"Lead, follow, or get out of the way."
"By now you should have figured out what you want and what to do next."
"If you don't like something, leave."
"I've offered you a finger but you want the whole arm."

The point I made was that it would be okay for a pope to have doubts, and that this would not make him a bad pope.

Perhaps from your perspective as an outsider.

You took us to stake burning for reasons that are still unclear to me. You introduced the notion of an abuse of power, but to my knowledge the discussion was not about this.

You introduced the concept of "abuse of power". I'm saying it still needs to be established whether the Crusades etc. were an abuse of power, or actually proper use of power. (See also my reply to Boundless above, about "skillful means".)

As for stake burnings: The RCC still considers itself entitled to rule over all the people on this planet, just like it did five hundred years ago. How it goes about ruling or attempting to rule the planet is changing with the times, but its belief that it has the right to rule over everyone has not. If circumstances change sufficiently, we could be faced with more crusades and inquisitions -- and stake burnings. (Notice how when popes apologized for things done by the RCC in the past, they apologized for the methods, but not for the motivations.)

It was about whether a follower of a religion, or a pope, can have doubts about their faith and still be a productive member of that faith. I say yes. You seem to say no. I have heard no good reason why.

When you formulate it that way --
If a nominally religious person has doubts about their religion, then the motivation for their actions will be problematic, even if their actions externally match the expectations for said religion. Because of their doubts, their actions cannot be properly motivated in accordance with the religion. Eventually, this lack of proper motivatedness shows up somewhere, usually in the form of inconsistently performing the expected actions. Due to this inconsistency, they cannot be a productive member of that faith.

The more common form of punishment is to slowly push the doubting person out of the group, without this ever being made explicit and instead made to look like the person's own choice and fault.
— baker

Yes, this happens especially in fundamentalist groups. But so what?

So what? A lot of time and resources get wasted, a lot of grief is caused, for many of the involved. Some even commit suicide.

This could have been prevented, simply by people being more straightforward about things, and sooner, both the insiders as well as the doubter.

Humans often shun people they disagree with or do not understand. This seems to occur when there is dogma and a kind of certainty that brooks no diversity.

See my point earlier about doubters being more work than they are worth.

It would be nice, wouldn’t it, to expect religious followers or theists more specifically to behave in superior ways to the rest of the community, but they don’t. It seems we can’t expect people in a religion to behave differently from people in a family, a sporting club, or a corporate management group. Does this tell us that religions are just ordinary beliefs in fancy dress, or does it say we strive imperfectly to reach God?

Actually, my basic thesis is that a religion is supposed to be practiced exactly the way the people who claim to be its members practice it. I'm now in my "Take things at face value" phase. I'm done helping religious/spiritual people look for excuses and keeping up pretenses. I'm done with "Oh, but they didn't mean it" and "They are just imperfect followers of God." No. They've had more than enough time to get their act together.

This may well be the case if the religion is misogynist, classist, and elitist. In such cases, it seems we have a religion where more followers need to doubt those doctrines and work to reform beliefs.

But why should they reform themselves??
Their religion is what it is; anyone who doesn't like it should stay away from it.

It's not clear whence this desire to reform a religion.

This brings me to a thought I have often had regarding Buddhist conceptions of nirvana. If the self etc is annihilated in the realisation of nirvana. Whom is experiencing the exalted state?
I know this might sound like a simplistic question, but there is a deeper issue in it. Or rather if there is total annihilation, such that all is left is a state of non-existence, whom, is, present, in it? Who, or what remains? — Punshhh

It's not about annihilation, that would be wrong view.

I find Thanissaro Bhikkhu's approach here the easiest to understand: not-self(ing) is a strategy. We already use it anyway every day when we disidentify with things we don't want or don't like. He explains it that the Buddhist practice takes this strategy further, though.

He writes and talks about this a lot, see here, for example.

Ever heard of Parkinson’s Law? — praxis

Lol.

A similar view is sometimes held by some Buddhists who believe that belief in rebirth makes people lazy and complacent, thinking, "If I don't make it this time around, there's always the next, so I can just relax".
But this takes a dim view of human nature, assuming that unless people are pushed by external constraints and rewards, they are lazy and unmotivated. And while this is certanly true for some people, it's not true for everyone.

But back to Parkinson's Law and Buddhist practice: Buddhist practice rests on the premise that there first must be causes and conditions in place before any next rung on the scale of progress can be reached. Without the right causes and conditions, progress can't be made. Causes and conditions, however, take time, for some people a little time, for others, more, depending on how much work one was able to do up to that point in a previous life (!).

Buddhist practice rests on the premise that there first must be causes and conditions in place before any next rung on the scale of progress can be reached. — baker

It claims cyclical existence without beginning. A circular ladder doesn’t progress, it goes round and round without beginning or ending.

And yet, you find different interpretations of it. The third type of dukkha is most often interpreted as a form of suffering/unsatisfactoriness/ill-being that permeates all conditioned states. I believe that one of the late-canonical commentarial books in the Pali Canon clearly say that even arhats and Buddhas experience dukkha while alive in the forms of physical pain and this third 'mysterious' type. — boundless

So, according to the passage quoted, the first kind of suffering is due to pain―no problem interpreting that―suffering can even be defined as pain. The second kind of suffering is said to be due to "formations",and I said I would interpret "formations" as negative mental tendencies. If we are at all self-aware and aware of others, I think we know that negative (suffering inducing) mental tendencies or thought complexes come in many forms. The third type of suffering is due to "change"―which is also easy to understand. We are creatures of habit (some more than others obviously) and we desire security (again some more than others). The more we desire security and predictability the more change will cause us to suffer. Change might cause either mental or physical suffering or both.

So, I would say there are really only two kinds of suffering―physical and mental (in the latter category of which I would include emotional and existential suffering). That said, perhaps it could be argued that if human life in general has somehow gone off the rails spiritually, then existential suffering (angst) would not be merely due to personal mental (conceptual and emotional) complexes.

That's my take on it.

PS. After writing this response I read your next post which quotes Gautama as saying much the same as I have said above.

Yes, that's a possible way to interpret the three forms of suffering and, indeed, this seems to have been the interpretation that is taken up by the Mahayana: perfect insight itself extinguishes (Nirvana literally mean extinguishment) suffering at the very moment it occurs.

The Theravadin commentary I quoted however says that the true end of suffering happens when all conditioned phenomena cease. So, perfect insight itself doesn't extinguish suffering the moment it occurs but it leads to the eventual end of arising conditioned phenomena.

IMO you can find support of both views in the suttas.

Edit: "The Theravadin commentary I quoted however says that the true end of suffering happens when all conditioned phenomena cease" - of course not literally all the conditioned phenomena. I meant all conditioned phenomena of the series relative to an individual. Of course, Theravadins do not claim that when one arhat 'reaches' Nirvana without remainder, conditioned phenomena stop for everyone

Right, I think it is true that for any biological lifeform physical suffering is inevitable. I read the prescription of non-attachment as recommending an acceptance as total as possible of this ineliminable condition of life.

ok, so you seem closer to 'Theravadin' reading.

BTW, you find both views espoused by supporters of both traditions. So perhaps calling Theravadin and Mahayanist is incorrect.

The idea of ending suffering for all beings seems to be in both traditions and also seems impossible to me. Buddhist cosmology posits a beginning-less creation―if the (illusory?) world has existed forever, and suffering is still universal then how could progress in that goal ever be imagined to be plausible?

In the Mahayana, there is an aspiration to liberate all sentient beings without, however, the guarantee that it will happen.

In the Theravada, there is the idea that while Buddhas and arhats stop helping when they reach Nirvana without reminder, but also the idea that cyclically the Dharma will be rediscovered and taught and there will be more occasions of liberation.

Interestingly, there is a sutta in the Pali Canon in which the Buddha is asked on how many will be liberated and the Buddha replied that one shouldn't ask about that, basically. He just put the question aside.

So, imo generally in both traditions you'll find the idea to act for the benefit of all (within one's limit) but there is no guarantee that such an 'universalist' ending will come to fruition. Perhaps you cam say that the Mahayana is more hopeful but even there you generally find emphasized of how rare is reaching liberation.

BTW, last post for today, here in my timezone is quite late!

Cheers, yes the idea of liberating all beings is aspirational. And given how few (if any?) do ever seem to be liberated, and the acknowledgement within the traditions of its rarity...
That said, acting for the benefit of all rather than the self would seem to be liberating for the self (or from the self).

Personally I like to think of death as being liberation for all―either in eternity or oblivion―the idea of rebirth makes little sense to me. It seems to be, if anything, to be motivated by attachment to the self.

Personally I like to think of death as being liberation for all―either in eternity or oblivion―the idea of rebirth makes little sense to me. It seems to be, if anything, to be motivated by attachment to the self. — Janus

Ditto.

the idea of liberating all beings is aspirational — Janus

Indeed. Can it be demonstrated that a single person has achieved this end? How would we even do that? How do we even know it is a plausible possibility?

Indeed. Can it be demonstrated that a single person has achieved this end? How would we even do that? How do we even know it is a plausible possibility? — Tom Storm

I agree. I think the idea of the enlightened one is just a case of the usual human myth-making. In any case no one but the actual enlightened would know, and is it even credible that any human being could not be mistaken in thinking they were enlightened?