I don't know what you are driving at with "subjectivity over objectivity".

But that's not why we're here, now is it? Certainly not why you are, I'd wager. :smile: — Outlander

I don't know why I'm here.

There is no denial of moral agency in the Buddhist teaching. This is made completely clear in the Attakārī Sutta: — Wayfarer

I wasn't denying that Buddhism accepts moral agency and moral responsibility. I was questioning how the latter concept can be consistent with a denial of unchanging (either temporary or eternal) identity. If there is such unchanging identity I can't see how one can attribute accountability. TBH, all the arguments that I have encountered from Buddhists have failed to persuade me. I have found them as more like attempts to rationalize the denial of an unchanging self by trying to explain moral responsibility in terms of mere continuity. For instance, if I do a 'bad action' I leave a damage in the successive instances of my mind-streams which might ripen in a future lifetime. However, if I at the same time hold that "it is incorrect to say that it will be me that suffer from these consequences because there is no fixed identity" I would be correct to say that if there is no unchanging self, it would be not 'just' for the 'future being' to experience the results of 'my' actions.

The Pudgalavada posited an indeterminate self to explain these issues. However, I think that my other argument also applies to them.
If there are no essences that constraint the ways in which a sentient being might exist, why are there regularities at all? If there are no essences, why does an acorn give rise to an oak tree rather than an apple tree? In other words: if anatman is interpreted as denying essences or even essences with determinate defining characteristics, why do we observe regularities?

@Janus and @Punshhh, in Buddhism animals are subject to karma and their intentional actions can have good or bad fruits like human's. So, while I can agree that 'moral responsibility' is a too loaded term for animals, Buddhism accepts that they can do things that are relevant for karma.

But what is "spiritual growth"? — baker

This is an extremely interesting question. I think that it is something like 'maturity'. The aim of education IMO should be the perfecting of character, i.e. the establishment of virtue and the avoidance of vice. It seems that most ancient cultures (in both the East and West) accepted this kind of idea but, of course, disagreed about what 'perfect character' would be and how we should reach such goal. However, I believe that there are similarities between some important ethical teacings of the said traditions and also how in the descriptions of how the 'perfected' are said to behave and so on.
At the same time, I also share your perplexity about the efficacy of the 'traditional teachings' when we observe the behaviours of supposedly trained practicioners or even revered figures. This perhaps means that the 'visible' demarcations between 'official' traditions (both within the same religions and between different religions) do not reflect the exclusivist readings of the teachings contained in those traditions. At the same time, it seems that all religious traditions contain seemingly explicit statements that the 'goal' is to be found only if one follows the 'right' path and if one adheres to the 'right' tradition.

"Selflessness" (in a practical sense, not the Buddhist doctrine of 'anatman') and "non-attachment" for instance are said to be a sign of 'spiritual maturity' in many traditions. This to me suggest that one becomes more 'spiritually mature' if one becomes less concerned with, say, one's social status, possessions etc.

At the same time, I don't claim to have a 'proof' that 'spiritual growth' is indeed real. However, I see enough evidence of it being real even if the evidence itself is ambiguous.

And they are, for thousands of rebirths-- just not forever and not absolutely. — baker

If there is no unchanging identity, how can one be held accountable? Mere continuity isn't enough (see the above reply I made to @Wayfarer for this point and the point I made about essences).

Because such is the nature of experience. — baker

OK. I know that. I stil however have to see a fully convincing explanation of this.

Even ordinary worldy psychology doesn't grant people such uniqueness.
We are unique for various legal and taxation purposes, but otherwise, systemization, categorization, depersonalization are the norm. — baker

I can see that but indeed we are 'unique', right? Individual differences are undeniable even among animals, let alone humans. This does suggest that there is 'something' that distinguishes individuals.

And to be honest, if there isn't anything essential to individuals, how differentiations in separate 'mind-streams' is even possible?

I'm not a Buddhist either.
I don't specifically take any issue with any of the teachings, but on the whole, from my dealings with Buddhists and with religious/spiritual people in general, I can't escape the impression that religious/spiritual teachings somehow aren't supposed to be taken all that seriously. — baker

I do respect Buddhism and find it fascinating - both Theravada and Mahayana. However, I have intellectual and practical doubts and concerns that keep me outside.
Regarding the last sentence, I see it more as evidence that people hardly take some teachings seriously rather than they shouldn't be taken seriously even if those people belong to a tradition and perhaps are even 'intellectualy' convinced that these teachings should be taken seriously. In other words, cognitive dissonance seems to be very widespread.

in Buddhism animals are subject to karma and their intentional actions can have good or bad fruits like human's.

Yes, when they develop agency. Lightening doesn’t have agency, although it was depicted as an act of God, a Divine agency.This is because it appeared to have great power and urgency. But that power is only the emergence of energies in a forum of interacting energies and particles. Animals and plant’s do have agency because they act as an entity, an agent. Although that agency is largely defined by the group (species) in how it adapts to the environment and the responses and karmic actions of the individual entity is largely dictated by instinct, or biologically programmed behaviour.

Yes, when they develop agency. — Punshhh

Right. I can even attribute them some kinds of rudimental responsibility/accountability but not to the type of enough mature human beings.

Animals and plant’s do have agency because they act as an entity, an agent. — Punshhh

I can see what you mean.

For reasons that I don't know, Buddhism doesn't attribute the status of sentient beings to living beings different from animals, humans (and other realms). Plants for them aren't sentient beings. To be honest, I don't think I can agree with that. It seems to me that a rudimental sentience is present even in plants and perhaps even in fungi and single-celled organisms.

Although that agency is largely defined by the group (species) in how it adapts to the environment and the responses and karmic actions of the individual entity is largely dictated by instinct, or biologically programmed behaviour. — Punshhh

:up: Interestingly, spiritual traditions link virtue to 'freedom' and vice to 'enslavement'. Vice makes humans 'brutish', animal-like because it corrupts rationality. So a 'brutish' behaviour is normal for animals but a corruption (and a result of a corruption) for humans. That's the reason why, in my opinion, 'moral responsibility' or 'accountability' in their proper sense is too loaded for animals. At the same time, however, animals IMO have the ability to choose among options and perhaps even have something that 'approximates' rationality.

So, true freedom in this view isn't merely an ability to choose among options but rather an ability to choose in a truly free, i.e. rational way. 'Spiritual growth', then, might be seen as a way to become 'more free' (I'm reminded of some passages of John's Gospels "the truth will set you free" (Jn 8:32) and "everyone who sins is a slave to sin" (Jn 8:34) as well as a passage in a Buddhist discourse that states: "Just as the great ocean has one taste, the taste of salt, so also this Dhamma and Discipline has one taste, the taste of liberation." (Udana 5.5)).

I agree that humans being reborn as animals, even insects, makes little sense even within the doctrine of karma. — Janus

In fact, that's where the idea comes from to begin with, and this is where it does make sense.

Buddhism altogether lacks any metaphysical force insofar as it lacks any capacity to explain the world we experience in common.

According to traditional Buddhism, the Buddha taught only one thing: suffering and the end of suffering. That's all. Whatever worldly (or supernatural) benefits one might obtain through practicing the Path are incidental to the Path, not integral to it. Traditional Buddhism isn't interested in explaining "the world we experience in common", that has never been its scope, even though especially later, some have tried to make it part of its scope.

According to traditional Buddhism, you're either interested in making an end to suffering, or you aren't. And if you aren't, then what are you doing around someone who clearly states that suffering and the end of suffering is all he teaches?

Just to clarify, you're claiming that, judging from what I've posted so far in this topic, I'm thinking in terms of reincarnation, not rebirth. I asked how you arrived at that conclusion from what I've written in this topic so far and your answer is that you "distinguish between rebirth and reincarnation." — praxis

Earlier, you said that "we" keep getting reborn. I asked you who is "we", and you won't tell me. You also won't define what you believe is the self and what a living being.

Do I have to ask you three times ...

Up until the point of reminding one's self there's always more to know — Outlander

If people would only study primary religious texts as a primary source, many problems they proclaim to have with said religion would go away. Instead they tend to rely on hearsay, or tertiary sources at best, and then, quite predictably, there is confusion and frustration and ill will and dismissal ...

Granted, unlike the Bible or the Kuran, the Pali Canon hasn't been around in readily available translation for that long. But it is now, and there is no reason not to reference to it.

I wasn't denying that Buddhism accepts moral agency and moral responsibility. I was questioning how the latter concept can be consistent with a denial of unchanging (either temporary or eternal) identity. — boundless

Denial of self, denial of atman, denial, denial, denial. Where do you get this? What is your source for learning about Buddhism?

In the Pali suttas, the Buddha never says "there is no self", even when asked directly, he is silent (as has already been quoted in this thread). But he goes to great lengths to list what is _not fit_ to be regarded as the self.
Have you thought about this concept of something not being fit to be regarded as the self?

If there is such unchanging identity I can't see how one can attribute accountability. TBH, all the arguments that I have encountered from Buddhists have failed to persuade me. I have found them as more like attempts to rationalize the denial of an unchanging self by trying to explain moral responsibility in terms of mere continuity. For instance, if I do a 'bad action' I leave a damage in the successive instances of my mind-streams which might ripen in a future lifetime. However, if I at the same time hold that "it is incorrect to say that it will be me that suffer from these consequences because there is no fixed identity" I would be correct to say that if there is no unchanging self, it would be not 'just' for the 'future being' to experience the results of 'my' actions.

Kamma is what makes you.

The Pudgalavada posited an indeterminate self to explain these issues. However, I think that my other argument also applies to them.
If there are no essences that constraint the ways in which a sentient being might exist, why are there regularities at all? If there are no essences, why does an acorn give rise to an oak tree rather than an apple tree? In other words: if anatman is interpreted as denying essences or even essences with determinate defining characteristics, why do we observe regularities?

It looks like you're trying to fit Buddhism into the metaphysical categories you're already familiar with.

If there is no unchanging identity, how can one be held accountable? — boundless

Held accountable by whom? A Jehovah-like judge god? A galactic court of law? Whom?


If you're asking how come there is a legal system, complete with the punishment system, in traditionally Buddhist countries, then that's another question.

OK. I know that. I stil however have to see a fully convincing explanation of this.

If you're waiting to be convinced, then you're possibly in for a very long wait.

I can see that but indeed we are 'unique', right? Individual differences are undeniable even among animals, let alone humans. This does suggest that there is 'something' that distinguishes individuals.

Of course. But are those things fit to be regarded as your self? Is, say, the amount of melanin in your skin somehow definitive of who you are?

And to be honest, if there isn't anything essential to individuals, how differentiations in separate 'mind-streams' is even possible?

In about the same way as you can make differently shaped biscuits out of the same dough.

I do respect Buddhism and find it fascinating - both Theravada and Mahayana. However, I have intellectual and practical doubts and concerns that keep me outside.
Regarding the last sentence, I see it more as evidence that people hardly take some teachings seriously rather than they shouldn't be taken seriously even if those people belong to a tradition and perhaps are even 'intellectualy' convinced that these teachings should be taken seriously. In other words, cognitive dissonance seems to be very widespread.

Once I've seen Buddhist Trumpistas, it made me doubt how well I understood Buddhism. I mean, I know Buddhists who understand Pali, who can quote the suttas and all kinds of Buddhist texts far better than I, and yet they are Trumpistas. Things like that make me think there is something about the big picture of Buddhism that I don't understand, even though I'm quite confident that I have a measure of understanding of the teachings from the Pali Canon.

If enlightenment is somehow a part of our nature, then this means that it's inevitable that we will somehow become enlightened and that no effort is required of us in this direction
— baker

Just wanted to comment on this. I think this is wrong. Consider for instance the potency of an infant to grow up in an adult or the potency of a person to learn a skill or a subject. You can say that such a potency is intrinsic to the infant but can't be actualized without the agent efforts and also the aid of others. Likewise for the second example. — boundless

Sure. But the true-nature theory would have us believe that we don't have to make any big, life-changing decisions, that it's somehow enough if we just "follow our hearts", and that if we "do our best", this will somehow suffice and we are sure to become enlightened.

However, if 'potency for enlightnment' isn't an essential property of a being, then arguably 'enlightnment' would be like transforming a rabbit to a volcano, i.e. doing a transformation that completely lacks any intelligible continuity.

Again, sure. But the true-nature theory is overstating the case. Namely, that if you have the potential to become enlightened, it's somehow guaranteed that you'll become enlightened.

Traditional Buddhism is in this somewhat similar to Roman Catholicism; in RC, the person cannot be sure until the end whether they are in fact saved or not; in contrast, there are Protestant churches where a person is considered saved from the moment they are baptized. In RC, you're regarded as having the potential for salvation, but you won't know until the end, there are no guarantees; in some Protestantisms, you're sure of your salvation from the onset.

The issue at hand is this personal conviction of one's salvation or enlightenment. The true-nature theory and the Protestantisms are keeping one confident and thus comparably lazy, in comparison to traditional Buddhism and Roman Catholicism, where one is always on one's toes until the end.

I would say that a similar thing IMO happens with moral responsibility. It doesn't seem possible to me to consistently believe that 'provisionally' you remain tbe same person and hence responsible for past actioms and also believe that ultimately this is illusory.

To give a mundane example: Suppose you killed someone when you were 20 years old. Somehow, the police didn't catch you then; you escaped, moved to a different town, changed your name. Now you're 80 years old, and the police come knocking on your door.
Are you the same person at the age of 80 as you were when you were 20? Only provisionally.

Denial of self, denial of atman, denial, denial, denial. Where do you get this? What is your source for learning about Buddhism? — baker

If we restrict ourselves only to the Theravada, what about the very long first chapter of the Kathavatthu, a commentarial text included in the Pali Canon (TBH, I haven't read the whole thing but it is a lengthy denial of the existence of the 'person')?
The fifth century Visuddhimagga also has this impressively reductionist view about this topic and quotes an equally reductionist earlier commentary (now lost):

Therefore, just as a marionette is void, soulless and without curiosity, and
while it walks and stands merely through the combination of strings and wood,
yet it seems as if it had curiosity and interestedness, so too, this mentality-materiality
is void, soulless and without curiosity, and while it walks and stands
merely through the combination of the two together, yet it seems as if it had
curiosity and interestedness. This is how it should be regarded. Hence the
Ancients said:

"The mental and material are really here,
But here there is no human being to be found,
For it is void and merely fashioned like a doll—
Just suffering piled up like grass and sticks."

(Visuddhimagga, Part 3, ch.28, 31; bold mine)

(As a side note, this is different from modern reductionism that deny the reality of consciousness. Here it is denying the existence of the self. But still, when I read it I was surprised on how reductionist Buddhist texts can be)

And what about this passage from an early sutta: "Bhikkhus, since a self and what belongs to a self are not apprehended as true and established" (from MN 22)? Isn't this after all a denial of atman?

Of course, you can go on with a Pudgalavada view or perhaps bikkhu Thanissaro's practical view of anatta but telling that Buddhism hasn't usually deny the existence of the self is weird.

Kamma is what makes you. — baker

If so, then, when kamma ceases, I am annihilated. Provisionally, this is might true for Buddhists. But ultimately, most would deny it.

It looks like you're trying to fit Buddhism into the metaphysical categories you're already familiar with. — baker

I disagree. I can't exclude it but to be honest Buddhist themselves seem to have debated in similar terms.

Held accountable by whom? A Jehovah-like judge god? A galactic court of law? Whom? — baker

I'm not necessarily positing it in legalistic terms. But any kind of moral theory seems to posit persistent (either temporal or everlasting) agents.

Of course. But are those things fit to be regarded as your self? Is, say, the amount of melanin in your skin somehow definitive of who you are? — baker

Perhaps not. However, TBH, I think that Buddhist critiques of the self assume that their opponents accept a static self of some sorts. What about thinking the self as a river, i.e. something that stays the same precisely because in some respects it is always changing in some ways?

In about the same way as you can make differently shaped biscuits out of the same dough. — baker

I see, but then one might ask why there is a multiplicity in the first place. This is not an objection to what you have said here and it tells more about me than anything else. But one is left wondering about how differentiation originated in the first place.

Things like that make me think there is something about the big picture of Buddhism that I don't understand, even though I'm quite confident that I have a measure of understanding of the teachings from the Pali Canon. — baker

Same goes for me and not only about Buddhism but also about other religions. I am impressed on how certain people are so familiar with their religious texts and hold views in other topics that seem to me in open contradiction with what the texts say.

Sure. But the true-nature theory would have us believe that we don't have to make any big, life-changing decisions, that it's somehow enough if we just "follow our hearts", and that if we "do our best", this will somehow suffice and we are sure to become enlightened. — baker

Well, yes, perhaps this is a danger for the 'true-nature' views. But what about the opposite view? If I believe that the 'final' state is something 'alien' to my own nature, how can I not conclude that the 'final state' entails a replacement of 'me' with 'something else'? To me this other view would completely render spiritual life meaningless because, at the end of the day, the 'realized' would be a different 'entity' from me.

Regarding what you say about Protestants and Roman Catholics, it is arguably the reverse. I believe that even someone like Thomas Aquinas would say that the 'visio beatifica' is the ultimate fulfillment of human nature, whereas many protestants would retort and say that there is a greater discontinuity between our fallen nature and the state of the blessed, in a way to imply a sort of complete and discontinuous transformations. But to be honest, I think that you can't make such a kind of general statement for both traditions (in the same way that one can't say that, for instance, all Theravadins nowadays agree on how to interpret Nibbana, anatta etc).

Are you the same person at the age of 80 as you were when you were 20? Only provisionally. — baker

I personally think I am truly the same person. If not, holding the 80 years old me accountable wouldn't make sense.

If we restrict ourselves only to the Theravada, what about the very long first chapter of the Kathavatthu, a commentarial text included in the Pali Canon (TBH, I haven't read the whole thing but it is a lengthy denial of the existence of the 'person')? — boundless

And where is there denial?
It says that the controverted point is "That the “person” is known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact."
It's about how a person can be known and whether it can be known as a real and ultimate fact. And even the puggalavadin says it can't.
That's not denial of person or soul, that's saying it cannot be known as a real and ultimate fact. This is neither pedantry nor avoidance, although some claim it is. It just says what it says, and one shouldn't make unwarranted inferences.

Perhaps one of the crucial points in Eastern philosophy in general is its use of the ex negativo approach: defining something by what it is not, or otherwise using negation. (Hence also all the terms beginning with a(n)- (such as ahimsa, alobha, adosa, amoha), which often make for strange sounding translations into English and other Western languages.)

The fifth century Visuddhimagga also has this impressively reductionist view about this topic and quotes an equally reductionist earlier commentary (now lost):

Therefore, just as a marionette is void, soulless and without curiosity, and
while it walks and stands merely through the combination of strings and wood,
yet it seems as if it had curiosity and interestedness, so too, this mentality-materiality
is void, soulless and without curiosity, and while it walks and stands
merely through the combination of the two together, yet it seems as if it had
curiosity and interestedness. This is how it should be regarded. Hence the
Ancients said:

"The mental and material are really here,
But here there is no human being to be found,
For it is void and merely fashioned like a doll—
Just suffering piled up like grass and sticks."
(Visuddhimagga, Part 3, ch.28, 31; bold mine)

(As a side note, this is different from modern reductionism that deny the reality of consciousness. Here it is denying the existence of the self. But still, when I read it I was surprised on how reductionist Buddhist texts can be)

Mahayana texts can be even more reductionist, to say nothing of the reductionism of pop Buddhism.

And what about this passage from an early sutta: "Bhikkhus, since a self and what belongs to a self are not apprehended as true and established" (from MN 22)? Isn't this after all a denial of atman?

No, it's says just that: that a self and what belongs to a self are not apprehended as true and established. Which I agree with. For the life of me, I can't apprehend as true and established a self and what belongs to a self. What I see is the body of a person, I'm aware there is a concept that this is a person, I'm aware that there is a popular consensus that this is a person. But can those things properly be regarded as the self? I don't see how.

Who am I? What am I? Whatever I can think of as answers to these questions, I can't think of anything that I would find satisfying. Whatever answer I can think of, or whatever answer some other people want to impose on me, is something that I feel miserable about, a disappointment. I imagine that "my true self" would be something I feel happy and confident about, and not a source of misery. And if it's a source of misery, why insist on it??

A contextual point here is that traditional Buddhism (as per the suttas), is only really appealing to those who have become considerably fed up with life as it is usually lived. It's not clear that one will stick around Buddhism for long if one is only curious about it. One has to have some sense of samvega for traditional Buddhism to be appealing. (It's actually very strange that Buddhism grew into a religion at all.)

Of course, you can go on with a Pudgalavada view or perhaps bikkhu Thanissaro's practical view of anatta but telling that Buddhism hasn't usually deny the existence of the self is weird.

No, it's just accurate, as far as the Pali Canon goes. And of course, in practice, Buddhists of all varieties often claim "there is no self", but they can't provide a canonical scriptural reference for that claim if their life depended on it. It's an ongoing dispute in Buddhist circles, too.

Kamma is what makes you.
— baker

If so, then, when kamma ceases, I am annihilated.

In roundabout, yes.

Provisionally, this is might true for Buddhists. But ultimately, most would deny it.

Who would deny it? Most people in general, or most Buddhists?

It looks like you're trying to fit Buddhism into the metaphysical categories you're already familiar with.
— baker

I disagree. I can't exclude it but to be honest Buddhist themselves seem to have debated in similar terms.

We could look into those in detail ... but time is of the essence.

Held accountable by whom? A Jehovah-like judge god? A galactic court of law? Whom?
— baker

I'm not necessarily positing it in legalistic terms. But any kind of moral theory seems to posit persistent (either temporal or everlasting) agents.

So does the theory of kamma.

Perhaps not. However, TBH, I think that Buddhist critiques of the self assume that their opponents accept a static self of some sorts.

Well, because that's just what they often do, the same as 80-year old you below.

What about thinking the self as a river, i.e. something that stays the same precisely because in some respects it is always changing in some ways?

Like the ship of Theseus analogy?
This is actually in line with the Buddhist notion of self as a process, an activity, changing throughout rebirths, but somehow staying the same.

I see, but then one might ask why there is a multiplicity in the first place. This is not an objection to what you have said here and it tells more about me than anything else. But one is left wondering about how differentiation originated in the first place.

A pithy saying says that differentiation is an illusion, and that for things to exist separately, it is only necessary to name them.

Sure. But the true-nature theory would have us believe that we don't have to make any big, life-changing decisions, that it's somehow enough if we just "follow our hearts", and that if we "do our best", this will somehow suffice and we are sure to become enlightened.
— baker

Well, yes, perhaps this is a danger for the 'true-nature' views. But what about the opposite view? If I believe that the 'final' state is something 'alien' to my own nature, how can I not conclude that the 'final state' entails a replacement of 'me' with 'something else'? To me this other view would completely render spiritual life meaningless because, at the end of the day, the 'realized' would be a different 'entity' from me.

This is still assuming a "true nature" throughout it all. How can you not conclude that the 'final state' entails a replacement of 'you' with 'something else'? Because you believe that you have your own nature. It's how any belief about "true nature" hinders you in one way or another, by making you complacent or despondent. It doesn't really matter what in particular one believes that one's "true nature" is; as long as one believes on "has a true nature", this will be hindersome in some way.

Regarding what you say about Protestants and Roman Catholics, it is arguably the reverse. I believe that even someone like Thomas Aquinas would say that the 'visio beatifica' is the ultimate fulfillment of human nature, whereas many protestants would retort and say that there is a greater discontinuity between our fallen nature and the state of the blessed, in a way to imply a sort of complete and discontinuous transformations. But to be honest, I think that you can't make such a kind of general statement for both traditions (in the same way that one can't say that, for instance, all Theravadins nowadays agree on how to interpret Nibbana, anatta etc).

Like I said, the issue at hand is the personal conviction of one's salvation or enlightenment. If one believes that one's salvation or enlightenment is guaranteed, one will not be motivated to practice toward salvation or enlightenment. (Upthread, we were discussing motivation for practice.)

I personally think I am truly the same person. If not, holding the 80 years old me accountable wouldn't make sense.

In a legal, worldly way, of course it makes sense. But beyond that? Should we take worldly standards as the ultimate standards? Why?
If "who I really I am" is what worldly standards claim that I am, then that puts me into a hopeless situation. Now why would I freely resign myself to that??

The "immaterial" components persist.
Well Buddhists do a very good job of not mentioning this. Is this one of the things they don’t give an answer to? — Punshhh

I can't answer for them.

Also is this how a person’s Karmic record is linked to their next incarnation?

Yes.

I’m no Buddhist scholar, but it seems to me from what I’ve heard and read over the years that Buddhism does include pretty much all the cosmogony of Hinduism, but behaves as though it doesn’t exist. Is silent on the issue and assumes a spiritual, or divine ground, while sometimes denying there is one, or refusing to discuss it.

Because divinity, in Buddhism, is nothing particularly special or worth aspiring to (even the devas are not enlightened). As for "assuming a divine ground" -- are you thereby refering to creation by Brahma?

In a nutshell the self is an embodied, individuated expression of divinity.

Mhm.

I'm not talking about an external spiritual teacher, but a development within one’s self. Remember Buddha nature, there is an inviolable bit of one’s self. That is the teacher, or intuition*.A school in the external world and a life in the world are necessary and for most a mentor is required. It is a dance, a journey, with many roots in the path to trip up on.

This doesn't sound promising.

Traditional Buddhism isn't interested in explaining "the world we experience in common", that has never been its scope, even though especially later, some have tried to make it part of its scope. — baker

I agree that Buddhism offers only a soteriology and not any coherent, consistent or explanatory metaphysics, and the idea that it does offer the latter is all I've been arguing against.

And where is there denial? — baker

The denial is apparent when you consider that the text clearly asserts that the aggregates, sense bases etc and Nirvana are 'known' whereas the 'self' isn't. Just to make an example from the Kathavatthu:

At dissolution of each aggregate.
If then the “person” doth disintegrate,
Lo! by the Buddha shunned, the Nihilistic creed.
At dissolution of each aggregate.
If then the “soul” doth not disintegrate.
Eternal, like Nibbāna, were the soul indeed.

If the Theravadins (or rather, their 'ancestors') believed that a third option was possible, it was good time to make it clear but they didn't. Either the self is knowable and can be described as permanent or impermanent or it is unknowable precisely because it doesn't exist (except as an illusion). And I don't believe it is a chance that the very first chapter of the book is devoted on this topic. They clearly believed that this topic was particularly important to have it in the very first chapter of a quite ancient text that is devoted to 'controverted points' among Buddhist schools. If your point is that provisionally the self can be said to exist then OK. I mean I never disputed that this is true for all Buddhists. However, provisional/conventional truth is generally regarded as ultimately illusory.
BTW, here is another excerpt from the later commentarial text Visuddhimagga:

So in many hundred suttas it is only mentality-materiality that is illustrated,
not a being, not a person. Therefore, just as when the component parts such as
axles, wheels, frame poles, etc., are arranged in a certain way, there comes to be
the mere term of common usage “chariot,” yet in the ultimate sense when each
part is examined there is no chariot—and just as when the component parts of
a house such as wattles, etc., are placed so that they enclose a space in a certain
way, there comes to be the mere term of common usage “house,” yet in the ultimate
sense there is no house—and just as when the fingers, thumb, etc., are placed in
a certain way, there comes to be the mere term of common usage [594] “fist,”—
with body and strings, “lute”; with elephants, horses, etc., “army”; with
surrounding walls, houses, states, etc., “city”—just as when trunk, branches,
foliage, etc., are placed in a certain way, there comes to be the mere term of
common usage “tree,” yet in the ultimate sense, when each component is
examined, there is no tree—so too, when there are the five aggregates [as objects]
of clinging, there comes to be the mere term of common usage “a being,” “a
person,” yet in the ultimate sense, when each component is examined, there is
no being as a basis for the assumption “I am” or “I”; in the ultimate sense there
is only mentality-materiality. The vision of one who sees in this way is called
correct vision.

(same chapter quoted in the previous post of mine, par. 28)

It is evident to me that this is saying that the 'self' is illusory because it is a composite entity and all the composite entities are illusory. Only what is irriducible is regarded as ultimately real. I can't see how this is saying anything different.

Mahayana texts can be even more reductionist, to say nothing of the reductionism of pop Buddhism. — baker

Yes, but I wasn't arguing from the Mahayana simply for time reasons. Yes, reductionism is also prevalent in the Mahayana. However, in Madhyamaka you'll get to the view that 'reductionism' is used to show that the 'self' (and other composites) is illusory but at the same time this branch of Mahayana doesn't posit a set of 'ultimate dhammas'. So, in some sense, Madhyamaka isn't reductionist because there aren't dhammas that are 'more real' than the composites.

No, it's says just that: that a self and what belongs to a self are not apprehended as true and established. Which I agree with. For the life of me, I can't apprehend as true and established a self and what belongs to a self. What I see is the body of a person, I'm aware there is a concept that this is a person, I'm aware that there is a popular consensus that this is a person. But can those things properly be regarded as the self? I don't see how. — baker

I agree with you that the suttas are less 'clear' on how to interpret anatman than the commentarial texts and a pragmatic view that you seem to endorse is perhaps compatible with them. And yes, I agree with all you're saying that the point of the teaching of anatman/anatta is to dis-identify with what normally we identify without however identifying with something else. This is compatible with a 'pragmatic view' of anatman, a denial of it and perhaps even the Pudgalavada's indeterminate self view. I believe that it is not a chance that even Buddhists disagree on how to interpret the suttas. They aren't clear as one would think them to be. However, the explicit denial of the self is a time honoured interpretation, not just a bad 'Western reading' that introduces extraneous metaphysical categories.

So does the theory of kamma. — baker

That's my point. Kamma simply breaks down if you don't assume persisting agents. So one can have reasonable doubts about the consistency of Buddhism. Rather than 'rebirth', the thing that is IMO at odds with anatta is kamma itself. If one takes kamma very seriously then and also accepts that Nibbana is the end of kamma, one automatically thinks of Nibbana in annihilationist terms. This is a bit of a problem because annihilationism is one of the extremes to be avoided. So, how can one truly arrive to a state that supposedly is freed from thinking in 'personal' terms if one takes kamma seriously?

Who would deny it? Most people in general, or most Buddhists? — baker

I meant most Buddhists.

This is actually in line with the Buddhist notion of self as a process, an activity, changing throughout rebirths, but somehow staying the same. — baker

I disagree because in order to have a persisting identity something must remain the same. However, this doesn't imply that an object of experience that remains the same.
Think of a river. It remains a river only if its material contents change but, at the same time, some of its properties remain the same (like the starting and the ending points, the number of its affluents, and other physical properties).

A pithy saying says that differentiation is an illusion, and that for things to exist separately, it is only necessary to name them. — baker

This is very good for a monistic view where all differentiations collapses in one real entity (like Advaita Vedanta) or even a Madhyamaka view where all differentiations ultimately are negated without however an 'ultimate entity' that remains. I'm not sure that this can be accepted by a 'traditional' Theravadin that follows the 'Abhidhammic' tradition.

This is still assuming a "true nature" throughout it all. How can you not conclude that the 'final state' entails a replacement of 'you' with 'something else'? Because you believe that you have your own nature. — baker

Yes, I see three options:
1) there is a 'true nature' that is real and spiritual practice aims at perfecting it
2) there is a 'true nature' that is real and spiritual practice aims at replacing it with something else
3) there is no 'true nature' and the aim of the spiritual practice aims at recognizing it

Alternative (2) would imply an annihilation, so I'm not sure how it can be motivating unless one wants to annihilate oneself. (3) seems to be closer to the Buddhist view. However, I believe that conceptually has its problems (how to explain regularities, responsibility/karma) and so on. (1) has the big advantage that sees spiritual life as a sort of 'perfecting' oneself even it that means to 'die to oneself' in some sense.
To be honest, I see (1) as the most motivating here because it explicitly says that there is a continuity between 'me' and the 'final state'. I still can't see why you think that it automatically leads to 'laziness'. I mean, you can still have to make much effort to reach the 'final state' even if it is somehow the fulfillment of the 'true nature'.

(1) also has the advantage to make more sense of daily life. I can refer to 'myself', 'me', 'you', 'he', 'she' etc without also believing that in some sense these terms are incorrect. If I help someone I'm not just 'reducing' an 'impersonal' suffering but I'm truly helping someone who is perhaps like me in some important sense. One should remember that asserting (3) also implies (3) for all others.

I honestly see in Buddhists texts a lot of tensions between (1) - which seems to be implied by Buddhist ethical teachings both at the individual and the communal level - and (3) which is more doctrinal. However, if (3) is accepted, (1) is false.

Edited for clarity