But you don't want to say that to know a word refers to gold, you have to know what gold is?

that sounds plausible.

I should have posed a narrower question: what would it mean, in the context of antirealism, to say that gold really was found in the hills? Realism, as I understand it, would say that it means that gold was found in those hills and that the fact that it was found is not dependent upon anyone believing, thinking and/or saying that it was found.

I think the next simple, common sense step is to say that a population using the word "gold" to refer to gold is a convention, but there being such a thing as gold is not.

And then maybe we're ready to get back to melting points and such ...

yes. and gold melting at a certain pt. is also not a matter of convention; hence what's expressed by a sentence claiming that gold can't ever melt isn't true or false as a matter of convention / use either. it expresses a purported truth, which is so or isn't depending on the behavior of gold and not on the language. it is a matter of convention that the language uses those words to express that purported truth. this convention, you can call a matter of 'use.' but it's just not relevant whether anyone knows, or can know, whether what's expressed by the words is true.

gold melting at a certain pt. is also not a matter of convention; — The Great Whatever

Yes.

hence what's expressed by a sentence claiming that gold can't ever melt isn't true or false as a matter of convention / use either. — The Great Whatever

But here I'd like to slow down. Did you say "what's expressed by a sentence" rather than just "a sentence" for a reason? Is it the sentence that's true or false, or is it what's expressed by the sentence? If it's the latter, what sort of thing is that?

But here I'd like to slow down. Did you say "what's expressed by a sentence" rather than just "a sentence" for a reason? Is it the sentence that's true or false, or is it what's expressed by the sentence? If it's the latter, what sort of thing is that? — Srap Tasmaner

i take it that what's expressed by a sentence is distinct from the sentence qua linguistic object, since different sentences, both in the same language or in different languages, can express roughly the same thing.

it doesn't matter what you want to call it - to avoid theoretical commitments, just make it whatever you refer to when you use propositional anaphora like 'that,' when you say 'john thinks gold can't melt, and mary thinks that too.' you can call it a thought, proposition, whatever, it's just the thing one thinks or says in saying the sentence. even more colloquially, it's what people refer to when they say 'are you thinking what i'm thinking?' or 'i said what you said.'

in the context of antirealism, to say that gold really was found in the hills? — Janus

That "gold really was found in the hills" has a verification-immanent truth condition, because the meaning of the phrase "gold really was found in the hills" is to be explained by looking at the practical ability to use such a phrase; a practical ability that is to be understood according to the empirical situations that would warrant its assertion.

Your account of realism seems to take a step back and not explain the issue at all. What does it mean for gold to really have been found in the hills? What do we understand the truth conditions to be? Obviously simply re-asserting the claim that gold was really found in the hills is no answer at all, and it is this kind of non-answer that Dummett takes issue with and tries to examine. A Tarskian answer such as "X" is true if X isn't a sufficient account.

I'm good with pretty much all of this, or something close to it. But this is the hard part.

Allowing truth to attach to sentence tokens allows a cleaner treatment of indexicals -- I think -- but then you have to make truth dependent on a language+interpretation as well as on how the world is, which I take it you're not inclined to do.

I am persuaded that the sort of equivalence you describe in your first paragraph means there must be some way of dealing with the theoretical entity issue you allude to in the second. Also hard, though.

I have been tempted to see if I can have my cake and eat it too by having equivalence classes of sentences as truth-bearers, but I have no idea if that can be made to work. Yet.

ADDED: Ignore the indexicals comment. You don't have issues with indexicals or ambiguity or ellipsis, etc., if truth-bearers just aren't linguistic at all.

Allowing truth to attach to sentence tokens allows a cleaner treatment of indexicals -- I think -- but then you have to make truth dependent on a language+interpretation as well as on how the world is, which I take it you're not inclined to do. — Srap Tasmaner

truth can attach to sentence tokens, by having what those sentence tokens express be true.

but then you have to make truth dependent on a language+interpretation as well as on how the world is, which I take it you're not inclined to do. — Srap Tasmaner

whether someone says something true is of course dependent on the language, because what someone says is a matter of linguistic convention. but whether this latter thing is so is not (unless of course it deals with matters of linguistic convention).

i don't think there's any problem of truth bearers. if you like you can say propositions are t/f, and sentences, assertions, etc. derivatively of this in the obvious way. but then propositions are completely theoretically trivial: for the prop p to be true is just for p. there's nothing to a 'proposition' other than that, and the notion is eliminable.

Obviously simply re-asserting the claim that gold was really found in the hills is no answer at all, — Michael

why is that not an answer? it's the right answer, surely - we might say other things about what it means for gold to be found, having to do with what exactly gold is, what a hill is, what finding is, etc. we might be able to do this, or we might not - what does it matter? if you want to know more abt. what gold is, ask a matallurgist, prospector, or chemist. if you want to know more about what a hill is, ask a geologist or a surveyor or a storyteller. what makes it true that gold was found in the hills? that gold was found in the hills. nothing less, and nothing more. the anti-realist acct. makes it both less and more, and so gets it wrong on both fronts.

the insistence that the conditions under which smth's true must be 'verification-immanent' is simply added for no reason. truth has nothing to do with verification.

whether someone says something true is of course dependent on the language, because what someone says is a matter of linguistic convention. but whether this latter thing is so is not — The Great Whatever

Okay, yes. Of course.

(Been at work for 11 hours now and should probably quit trying to do philosophy at the same time.)

the insistence that the conditions under which smth's true must be 'verification-immanent' is simply added for no reason. truth has nothing to do with verification. — The Great Whatever

I think this is the problem. It's not the case that the realist and the anti-realist agree on what it means to be true and just disagree on what it takes for something to be true, but that they disagree on what it means to be true.

Dummett's account seems to be that the statement "'it is raining' is true" just means "there are rational and/or empirical grounds to justify the assertion 'it is raining'". And, of course, that there are rational and or/empirical grounds to justify an assertion has everything to do with verification. The realist, on the other hand, argues something like the statement "'it is raining' is true" meaning "'it is raining' corresponds to some relevant recognition-transcendent state-of-affairs". But Dummett's argument is that Wittgenstein's account of meaning entails the former and is incompatible with the latter.

but that they disagree on what it means to be true. — Michael

for p to be true is just for p.

'it's true that it's raining' means the same as 'it's raining.'

that's it.

this:

"'it is raining' is true" just means "there are rational and/or empirical grounds to justify the assertion 'it is raining'" — Michael

is wrong. '"it is raining" is true' does not mean anything more or less than 'it is raining.'

now, what does it take for it to be raining? well, water has to be falling from the sky, or something like that. does that have to do with 'rational and/or empirical grounds to justify an assertion?' no, it has to do with water falling from the sky.

given what the words, mean, can 'it is raining' be true if it's not raining? no. can it be raining, and 'it is raining' not be true? no. so we have a biconditional equivalence. but then, for 'it is raining' to be true (given what the words mean) just is for it to be raining. but now notice what you're claiming: that whether it's raning has to do with reasons, empirical grounds, justification of assertions, etc. no. it has to do with whether water falls from the sky.

hope that clears it up.

The realist, on the other hand, argues something like the statement "'it is raining' is true" meaning "'it is raining' corresponds to some relevant recognition-transcendent state-of-affairs" — Michael

whether it's raining is a recognition-transcendent state of affairs (it doesn't matter whether you know/think/can figure out whether it's raining – all that matters is that water's falling from the sky). but for it to be true that it's raining, it just has to be raining, and vice-versa. hence, even on this construal of realism, the realist is right (tho i would avoid the baggage of using any of this terminology).

notice also the anti-reliast is wrong: the anti-realist is now committed to saying that whether it's raining depends on there being a linguistic community with such-and-such conventions, empirical faculties, etc. whatever. nope. it rains whether or not there is any language at all.

'"it is raining" is true' does not mean anything more or less than 'it is raining.' — The Great Whatever

This is very strange coming from you. You've long argued against this Tarskian approach (e.g. here).

But then even if we take this approach, how am I to understand what you mean when you use the phrase "it's raining" (or "water is falling from the clouds")? According to Dummett (as per Wittgenstein), the meaning of the sentence isn't to be understood by appealing to some recognition-transcendent state-of-affairs that the statement corresponds to, but by looking to its practical use. On what occasions do we find ourselves justified to utter it? On what occasions do we find ourselves justified to reject it? The meaning of the phrase is to be understood according to the conditions that warrant its use. Verifiability is tied into the notion of meaning, and so also tied into the notion of truth.

You wrote:

That "gold really was found in the hills" has a verification-immanent truth condition, because the meaning of the phrase "gold really was found in the hills" is to be explained by looking at the practical ability to use such a phrase; a practical ability that is to be understood according to the empirical situations that would warrant its assertion.

That can't be right.

What precedes "because" doesn't follow from what comes after. It should.

It doesn't follow from the fact that one knows when asserting "gold really was found in the hills" is warranted that the claim itself is either verifiable or true. What you've called a verification-immanent truth condition admits both unverifiable and false claims.

It doesn't follow from the fact that one knows when asserting "gold really was found in the hills" is warranted that the claim itself is either verifiable or true. — creativesoul

It's verifiable in the sense that we understood what it would take to verify (or falsify) the claim. Dummett's point is that if we can't even make sense of how to determine if the claim is true then we can't understand what it means for the claim to be true, and as per Fichte if we can't understand what it means for the claim to be true then we can't understand what the claim means.

this is why philosophy is a joke - it's so lacking in method that 'nuh uh' is always a viable professional option. — The Great Whatever

Not meaning to derail the thread, but briefly, do you think it's impossible for philosophy to acquire any kind of method? And if it isn't why don't we establish method in philosophy?

Understanding what it takes to be verifiable is about us. Being verifiable is about the claim. It makes no sense whatsoever to create a criterion for "verifiably immanent truth conditions" if those conditions can be satisfied by unverifiable false claims.

That needs to be acknowledged.

According to Dummett (as per Wittgenstein), the meaning of the sentence isn't to be understood by appealing to some recognition-transcendent state-of-affairs that the statement corresponds to, but by looking to its practical use. — Michael

if u look to its practical use, you'll find it's correctly used when it's raining. this has to do with water falling form the sky, not epistemic conditions and verification and justification & blah blah blah

Verifiability is tied into the notion of meaning, and so also tied into the notion of truth. — Michael

nope. respond to the above.

for it to be true that it's raining is just doe it to be raining.

so according to u, for it to be raining, there have to be assertion conditions & justification & empirical conditions & verifiability & blah blah blah. nope. water just has to be falling from the sky.

in fact u seem to be committed to saying that for anything to be true, these inguistic conditions have to be set up, which is the same as to say for anything to be so, they have to be, i.e. a hard linguistic idealism. acc. to u, can't rain w/o a linguistic community - absurd

This is very strange coming from you. You've long argued against this Tarskian approach (e.g. here). — Michael

it works when u add the qualifier, as i did, 'given the meaning of the words.' i won't go into why the biconditionals u used to propose were wrong b/c i have learned form experience that it's pointless to try.

Not meaning to derail the thread, but briefly, do you think it's impossible for philosophy to acquire any kind of method? And if it isn't why don't we establish method in philosophy? — Agustino

yes, all methodology is granted by fiat. philosophy fails to have a methodology, probably because it has no subject matter.

to understand what it takes for the claim to be true and to know how to verify it are distinct. i underdtand 'it's raining''s truth conditions whne i know it's true iff it's raining. doesn't mean anything about my ability to recognize whether it's raining. how we use the words is that they're used to say something true when it's raining. this has nothing to do with verification - indeed when we say it's raining, we don't mean 'i can verify it's raining,' we just mean that it's raining. we may not be justified in asserting something w/o evidence or ability to verify, but that has no bearing on whether it's raining or not.

in fact u seem to be committed to saying that for anything to be true, these inguistic conditions have to be set up — The Great Whatever

Well, yes, because truth is predicated of statements. Only statements are the sort of things that can be true, correct?

so according to u, for it to be raining, there have to be assertion conditions & justification & empirical conditions & verifiability & blah blah blah. nope. water just has to be falling from the sky. — The Great Whatever

And how am I to understand what you mean when you say that water just has to be falling from the sky? Any claim you make about the conditions for truth must be understood, and as per Wittgenstein the only way I can understand the claims you make is by understanding the rational and/or empirical occasions that warrant the use of those words. Else you might as well just be speaking to me in Japanese.

How exactly do you expect someone to learn a language if they can't recognise when they should or shouldn't make a particular claim? Language-acquisition would be impossible if recognition-transcendent conditions were part of a word's meaning.

Understanding what it takes to be verifiable is about us. Being verifiable is about the claim. It makes no sense whatsoever to create a criterion for "verifiably immanent truth conditions" if those conditions can be satisfied by unverifiable false claims.

That needs to be acknowledged. — creativesoul

I don't understand what needs to be acknowledged.

As an example of what I mean, you wouldn't know what "sugar is sweet" means if you didn't know that putting some sugar in your mouth would be the method to verify the claim.

Well, yes, because truth is predicated of statements. Only statements are the sort of things that can be true, correct? — Michael

no, for example, if i say 'it's true that it's raining,' i'm not saying anything about a statement. it can be true that it;s raining even if there are no statements and no one to make them - it just has to be raining. truth is predicated of propositions, which are the sorts of things clauses like: '...that p' denote.

And how am I to understand what you mean when you say that water just has to be falling from the sky? — Michael

what part don't you understand? do you not know what water is? what falling is? what the sky is? shall i explain them to you?

Any claim you make about the conditions for truth must be understood, and as per Wittgenstein the only way I can understand the claims you make is by understanding the rational and/or empirical occasions that warrant the use of those words. — Michael

yes and the occasions that make the use of 'it's raining' true are when it's raining. that's how the words are used, per their truth conditions. we might recognize it's raining by all sorts of means, or be wrong, or even never be able to figure it out. there may even be conditions on assertion and warrant that require we have at least some evidence for what we say, or we commit an epistemic faux pas of some sort. but that has no bearing on whether ot not it's true that it's raining, which is just for it to be raining. it's raining or not raining regardless of what evidence we may or may not have, and regardless of whether we can have any.

How exactly do you expect someone to learn a language if they can't recognise when they should or shouldn't make a particular claim? Language-acquisition would be impossible if recognition-transcendent conditions were part of a word's meaning. — Michael

wrong - whether it's raining doesn't depend on anyone recognizing that it does. yet we can still figure out how to use words like 'rain' by recognizing cases where it rains. that doesn't mean that it raining requires us to be able to recognize that it is. capiche?

What does it mean for gold to really have been found in the hills? What do we understand the truth conditions to be? Obviously simply re-asserting the claim that gold was really found in the hills is no answer at all, and it is this kind of non-answer that Dummett takes issue with and tries to examine. A Tarskian answer such as "X" is true if X isn't a sufficient account. — Michael

OK, you say to assert that gold having been found in those hills is the truth condition for "gold was found in those hills" is "no answer at all" or not a "sufficient account". Why do you say it is it not a sufficient account, that is, what more do you expect? Or, what would be an alternative truth condition for "gold was found in those hills"; one that we might count as a 'real answer'?

It makes no sense whatsoever to create a criterion for "verifiably immanent truth conditions" if those conditions can be satisfied by unverifiable false claim.

...it would be impossible to know what "sugar is sweet" means if you didn't understand that putting some sugar in your mouth would be the method to verify the claim.

Nonsense.

One can draw mental correlations between the physiological sensory effects/affects of sugar and the statement "sugar is sweet" without any awareness of verification methods.

One can draw mental correlations between the physiological sensory effects/affects of sugar and the statement "sugar is sweet" without any awareness of verification methods. — creativesoul

How does one get to the physiological sensory effects of sugar? And which physiological effects? The ones that happen when I hold some in my hand?