michael: granted that in order to know whether something is true, you need a means of verification.

but for it to be true, you don't.

Understanding "sugar is sweet" does not entail understanding that putting sugar in your mouth would be the method to verify the claim.

Thinking/believing that sugar is sweet doesn't require metacognition. Understanding verification methods is a meta-cognitive endeavor.

Two year olds can understand and think/believe the claim is true by virtue of stating it. They have no metacognition.

michael: granted that in order to know whether something is true, you need a means of verification.

but for it to be true, you don't. — The Great Whatever

What I'm saying is that to understand what it means for a statement to be true one must understand what would count as verifying that claim. If someone doesn't understand what would count as verifying the claim that sugar is sweet then they don't understand what it means for sugar to be sweet.

So, if I were to show someone water falling from the clouds and they don't recognise that this verifies the claim that it is raining then they don't understand what "it is raining" means.

Dummett's claim is that realism requires that some meaningful statements have unknown truth conditions – and by this I don't just mean that they have truth conditions that aren't known to obtain but that we don't even know what such truth conditions would be.

does there have to be a method of verification that it's raining, for it to be raining?

does there have to be a method of verification that it's raining, for it to be raining? — The Great Whatever

There has to be a known method for the claim "it is raining" to mean something.

does there have to be a method of verification that it's raining, for it to be raining?

Your question is misleading, hence why I provided a more appropriate answer. Given that we have a method of verifying the claim that it is raining, "it is raining" means something to us, and it continues to mean something to us even if we suppose some hypothetical people that don't have a method of verification.

What the realist needs to do is provide an example of a meaningful statement that has unknown truth conditions.

Your question is misleading — Michael

how is it misleading?

how is it misleading? — The Great Whatever

Because we have a method of verifying the claim "it is raining", and so the claim "it is raining" means something to us. Your question improperly injects our perspective into a hypothetical situation which is supposed to not be our perspective (one in which there isn't a method to verify the claim). It's like supposing a God's eye view to explain what things look like when they're not being looked at.

What matters is whether or not a meaningful statement can have unknown truth conditions.

i'm not asking about statements right now, nor anything abt. perspectives. i'm asking the following question:

does there need to be a method for verifying that it's raining, for it to be raining?

And I've explained why your question is misleading.

A better question would be to ask if some hypothetical people can in their language have a statement that means "it is raining" without understanding that water falling from the clouds would verify their statement. The answer, according to Dummett, is "no". Any meaningful statement in their language must have truth conditions that they would recognize as its truth conditions.

let's try a different tack.

let's talk abt. what it takes for it to be raining. here's my position: for it to be raining, water has to be falling from the sky (or something to that effect). there don't have to be any languages, or any verification procedures, for it to be raining.

in fact, i claim it rained lots of times on this planet long before there were any such things.

does that sound right?

Yes, it sounds right. The above claims have recognisable truth conditions, and we have both rational and empirical grounds that warrant their assertion.

I don't see how this helps you. It's entirely consistent with my position.

The relevant issue is the issue I raised in my previous comment (albeit edited in, so you may have missed it).

yes, all methodology is granted by fiat. philosophy fails to have a methodology, probably because it has no subject matter. — The Great Whatever

This seems entirely self-refuting even of your positions. You blame your opponents for just repeating themselves and saying no, but if what you say here is true, then you're doing just the same!

ok, so for it to be raining, water has to be falling form the sky, nothing else. whether or not it's raining doesn't depend on whether there are any languages or verification procedures.

now let's bring truth into it. here's my claim: for it to be true that it's raining is just for it to be raining. that is, in any situation in which it's raining, it's true that it's raining, and in any situation in which it's true that it's raining, it's raining. these are just the very same thing.

does that sound right?

philosophy roughly deals with those subjects of inquiry that take no special expertise. that is, philosophy deals with those problems you can solve just by talking about them, without any real need for specialized knowledge.

better?

here's my position: for it to be raining, water has to be falling from the sky (or something to that effect). there don't have to be any languages, or any verification procedures, for it to be raining. — The Great Whatever

There need to be languages in order for "it to be raining" to have meaning - the same meaning that you still want it to have without any languages.

"So in the end when one is doing philosophy one gets to the point where one would like just to emit an inarticulate sound.—But such a sound is an expression only as it occurs in a particular language-game, which should now be described." (Philosophical Investigations §261)

philosophy roughly deals with those subjects of inquiry that take no special expertise. that is, philosophy deals with those problems you can solve just by talking about them, without any real need for specialized knowledge. — The Great Whatever

How else could you solve the problems of philosophy except by talking about them though? I'd go as far as saying that philosophy doesn't have problems as such. Philosophy is about everything and nothing by its very nature. Philosophy is really about arranging everything into a coherent whole, not new discoveries.

i never asked about the sentence 'it is raining' and its meaning, did i? re-read the post; i just asked about what it is for it to be raining. for that to happen, water just has to fall from the sky.

Right, that's what "raining" means.

not at all. for example, philosophy is not about the valency of elements, or the valency of verbs. that's what chemistry and linguistics are about.

the question has nothing to do with the word 'raining' and what it means. it has to do with what it takes for it to be raining. that's a meteorological phenomenon, not a linguistic one. so your rejoinder about the meaning of a word is simply irrelevant. no words need even exist, for it to be raining. water just has to fall from the sky.

not at all. for example, philosophy is not about the valency of elements, or the valency of verbs. that's what chemistry and linguistics are about. — The Great Whatever

But philosophy is responsible for taking the results of chemistry and linguistics and forming a coherent puzzle out of them no? It is responsible for telling us how things "hang together" in the most general sense of the term.

ok, so for it to be raining, water has to be falling form the sky, nothing else. whether or not it's raining doesn't depend on whether there are any languages or verification procedures.

now let's bring truth into it. here's my claim: for it to be true that it's raining is just for it to be raining. that is, in any situation in which it's raining, it's true that it's raining, and in any situation in which it's true that it's raining, it's raining. these are just the very same thing.

does that sound right? — The Great Whatever

Given that you've said that "it is true that it is raining" and "it is raining" mean the same thing, obviously this sounds right. It's a tautology. But tautologies like this don't address the issue. The issue, again, is whether or not a meaningful statement can have unknown truth conditions. Or, to avoid the use of the word "truth" and to bring up my earlier question, whether or not a people can have a statement that means "it is raining" but not understand that water falling from the clouds warrants such an assertion.

i've never seen a philosopher do that in an interesting way, so probably not. in general philosophy contributes little to nothing to human knowledge. it confuses people, and then it can be used against itself to unwind that confusion. michael is experiencing such a confusion now, though whether he unwinds it is still to be seen.

OK, so, let's put the pieces together.

what does it take for it to be raining? for water to fall from the sky.

what does it take for it to be true that it's raining? just for it to be raining.

so, what does it take for it to be true that it's raining? just for water to fall from the sky.

viola. nothing about languages or verification procedures – and notice you admit that water can fall from the sky even though there are neither of these things around.

i've never seen a philosopher do that in an interesting way, so probably not. in general philosophy contributes little to nothing to human knowledge. — The Great Whatever

What about Schopenhauer? I remember you found WWR to be quite interesting, at least at some point. But yes, philosophy cannot, by its very nature, contribute anything to human knowledge. Philosophy is that which plays with knowledge, not that which creates it. Philosophy only arranges knowledge.

Philosophy is a meta-cognitive art form more than a science which aims to clarify that "big picture" of the whole of reality.

it confuses people, and then it can be used against itself to unwind that confusion. michael is experiencing such a confusion now, though whether he unwinds it is still to be seen. — The Great Whatever

How very Humean of you.

what does it take for it to be raining? for water to fall from the sky.

what does it take for it to be true that it's raining? just for it to be raining.

so, what does it take for it to be true that it's raining? just for water to fall from the sky. — The Great Whatever

Given that "it is raining" and "it is true that it is raining" and "water is falling from the sky" all mean the same thing, you're just asserting the truism that it's raining if it's raining. But this doesn't address the fact that for your assertion to mean something we must understand the rational and/or empirical grounds that justify such an assertion. Its truth conditions do not transcend recognition. That's Dummett's point.

Given that "it is raining" and "it is true that it is raining" and "water is falling from the sky" all mean the same thing, you're just asserting the truism that it's raining if it's raining. — Michael

yep. so what's the matter? do you dissent to anything i've said? notice that i introduced truth with no reference to verification. so if what i say is trivial, you can't be right. you must haver made a mistake somewhere.