1,2 & 3. I do not think you have the essential quality of a fact.
A fact is first and foremost a statement of affairs, claimed to be true. It does not stand alone and relies wholly on the story teller.

When I tell someone a fact, am I telling them a statement or telling them a state of affairs? I don't think I'm doing either. I might be uttering a statement about a state of affairs, but it doesn't seem right to equate a fact with either of these things.

So a fact can be a truth-bearer, in which case it's a statement; because it is statements that are able to be true or false. — Banno

Yep. Thats where I started.

The customary definition of a fact is ‘whatever is the case’. — Wayfarer

The point is that nothing else is added by stating that a proposition is a fact. — Akanthinos

so objects are one thing and facts are another (and sentences are a third). — Michael

A fact is a group of words that express an idea that has a positive truth value. — Sir2u

I can understand this. Perhaps if we draw a distinction between sentences and propositions we can say that a fact is a true proposition. — Michael

I might be uttering a statement about a state of affairs, but it doesn't seem right to equate a fact with either of these things. — Michael

A fact is first and foremost a statement of affairs, claimed to be true. It does not stand alone and relies wholly on the story teller. — charleton

So, to what state of affairs do facts, or a fact, correspond to, in order for it to be a proposition? — Posty McPostface

It's a nice example of how simple words that are seconded into philosophy become enormous problems. In its natural home it has various uses, but when philosophers try to pin them down they start to mix them up. — Banno

Facts are states of affairs; events; happenings; the way things are/were; reality. When a statement corresponds to, matches, and/or accurately reports on the fact(s), it's a true statement. It's the correspondence, matching, and/or accurate reporting that makes it true. The lack thereof is what makes them false.

which is to say that it is being true that makes statements true.

Why are fact's things that are valid only in view of the correspondence theory of truth?

↪creativesoul which is to say that it is being true that makes statements true. — Banno

Not quite.

It is to say that correspondence, matching up, and/or correctly reporting on the facts makes statements true.

Being true doesn't make a statement true. Being meaningful doesn't make a statement meaningful.

It's a nice example of how simple words that are seconded into philosophy become enormous problems. In its natural home it has various uses, but when philosophers try to pin them down they start to mix them up. — Banno

I'm not sure what about facts is supposed to be simple. Wouldn't you think from the start that pinning down facts is going to be a contentious issue.

Why are fact's things that are valid only in view of the correspondence theory of truth? — Posty McPostface

I wouldn't say it's only valid in this view, but its probably the view in which the term insert itself the most easily. It's also likely the most common view that is consistent with a naive interpretation of the world.

Correspondence with fact is what makes statements true. In order for a statement to be true, there must be things that have happened or things that are happening, and a meaningful way to take account of those. When all these conditions manifest, we can make a true statement about the facts.

Meaning is irrevocably important to the very ability to make statements about fact, regardless of whether or not the statement is true/false. When accounting for the necessary and sufficient conditions for true/false statements, when accounting for what true statements require, when accounting for what true statements are existentially contingent upon, we mustn't neglect the necessity of meaning.

All meaning is attributed by virtue of making connections(drawing mental correlations) between signs, symbols, and that which is signified and/or symbolized; respectively. This is not necessarily a one to one type of relationship(like math and other rigid designators), but that's another matter altogether. Suffice it to say that where there is no meaning, there can be no statements(at least not in the sense we're concerned with). When there are no statements, there can be no correspondence between them and what they report upon; the facts.

The statement "the cat is on the mat" is meaningful because we have long since connected it to very specific portions of ongoing events(fact). By the time we get to where we can start talking about all of the different senses of the term "fact", we've long since been drawing mental correlations between the statement and the specific bits of reality it's connected to. Making a statement doesn't make it meaningful.

We can make the statement, and be perfectly understood by another who shares meaning(speaks the same language) by virtue of having drawn similar enough correlations between the statement and the bits of reality that the statement reports upon. We can do this even when the statement isn't true. The statement can be made, understood, and false. The statement "the cat is on the mat" has the exact same content, regardless of whether or not it's true/false; regardless of whether or not it corresponds to fact; regardless of whether or not there is a cat on the mat. It means the same thing. That is because the content of statements doesn't include truth, even if it is true, despite the presupposition of truth.

Truth is not a property of statements. Truth is not contained within statements. Truth is a relationship 'between' true statements and fact that is - in part - facilitated by meaning. It is presupposed within all statements by virtue of statements consisting of mental correlations and correlation presupposing the existence of it's own content. We compare statements with what they're reporting upon as a means of checking for truth. That's precisely what verification/falsification methods are seeking; Correspondence to fact.

That's a significantly large part of how "fact" works when used to mean the events we find ourselves immersed within; happenings; states of affairs; the way things are/were.

Silence is deafening.

Using the word “correspondence” Only gives us a name for the posited relationship between word and thing. It does not explain anything.

Using the word “correspondence” Only gives us a name for the posited relationship between word and thing. It does not explain anything. — Banno

Yes, but the world consists of objects, not things.

yes, so correspondence consists in acting within the world. That stuff about truth not being a property of a statement @creativesoul, is muddled.

yes, so correspondence consists in acting within the world. — Banno

And here is the gem I was looking for. Regarding ethics and metaphysics, whereof one cannot speak, thereof one ought to remain silent, as Wittgenstein intended that statement to be understood within that context.

Back to quietism for me.

Is the statement starting with, 'I know ... ' tantamount to stating a fact? It would seem that according to Wittgenstein in 'On Certainty', he says:

-For "I know" seems to describe a state of affairs which guarantees what is known, guarantees it as a fact. One always forgets the expression "I thought I knew." — Wittgenstein, On Certainty, 12.

↪Posty McPostface yes, so correspondence consists in acting within the world. That stuff about truth not being a property of a statement creativesoul, is muddled. — Banno

Where do I lose your confidence?

@Posty McPostface

You and I face each other. You hold up a hand and say "Here is a hand".

What would you make of any incredulity I might offer? That I have bad sight? That I do not understand English?

Correspondence with fact is what makes statements true. — creativesoul

Yes, but the world consists of objects, not things. — Posty McPostface

There's another distinction you have made. How do things differ from objects?

Why? A child can tell what is true from what is false. It takes a philosopher to doubt such things.

Using the word “correspondence” Only gives us a name for the posited relationship between word and thing. It does not explain anything. — Banno

Sometimes what is posited doesn't require our positing it in order for it to exist, as it is, prior to or discovery. Certain relationships are such things. Truth is a relationship 'between' thought, belief, statements thereof and states of affairs; events; happenings; that which was/is the case; that which has happened or is currently happening; reality; fact; the world; the circumstances we find ourselves within; observed interactions; etc.("fact" from henceforth)

Relationships do not have a spatiotemporal location. Do not take the term between as an indication of such(hence the scarequotes above). Correspondence is a relationship. Relationships do not have precise enough a spatiotemporal location to be sensibly called a 'property' of a statement. Statements have quite precise locations. Relationships do not.

Correspondence with fact happens prior to language. As a result of that, and that alone, we can know that correspondence with fact doesn't always require language. Accompany that with our already knowing that empirical knowledge is accrued and we can further know that thought and belief is accrued. I mean, that's what empirical knowledge consists in/of. True belief is formed and put to further use prior to language.

What's not understood Banno?

Truth is a relationship 'between' thought, belief, statements thereof and states of affairs; — creativesoul

No. That would make truth a binary predicate - it isn't.

Why? A child can tell what is true from what is false. It takes a philosopher to doubt such things. — Banno

Using language is second nature to almost every human beings. Within language, the use of terms like 'true' and 'false' is relatively simple, because we rely on well-established parameters to guide us through this usage. But what we do here is, as philosophers, when we question what are 'facts' and how we structure our understanding of them, is locate ourselves somewhat 'outside' of language (even if it is quite literally inescapable). We locate ourselves within 'epistemology' or 'ontology' and try to work out a framework.

But then, I guess anyone is free to deny this distinction, or its possibility, and simply say that we are overcomplicating things. That's an argument from the ages, and I'm sure it's never really convinced any philosopher who was tempted by the ontological or epistemological path.

Correspondence with fact is what makes statements true. — creativesoul

Holding expectation is possible prior to language.

When my cat comes to me expecting treats as a result of hearing the plastic treat bag rustle, she has recognized the sound. She has long since drawn a mental correlation between the sound and the treats. She expects to be given treats. She hears the sound, and she makes her way to me.

When my cat hears the treats hitting the inside of the glass food bowl, her expectation is much stronger. She has formed meaningful thought and belief about the events she's immersed within. She believes she's about to eat treats.

She has drawn correlations between 'objects' of physiological sensory perception and/or herself(her own mental/emotional state). Those correlations are the origen of meaning. Correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content, regardless of subsequent qualification(s). <-----------that is the presupposition of correspondence to fact inherent to all thought and belief formation.

Being a binary predicate is existentially contingent upon language. Correspondence with fact is not.

I'm sure it's never really convinced any philosopher who was tempted by the ontological or epistemological path. — Akanthinos

Except Wittgenstein??

Objects have names, and relations between them give meaning. Things are none of those. According to Wittgenstein as I understand him.

Yes, this is nominalism being professed here.

Except you said "Correspondence with fact is what makes statements true", limiting yourself to language.

Now you want to shift to something like "Correspondence with fact is what makes beliefs true".

And again I must point out that merely naming the posited relationship between beliefs and facts tells us nothing.