Except you said "Correspondence with fact is what makes statements true", limiting yourself to language. — Banno
No. That would make truth a binary predicate - it isn't. — Banno
And again I must point out that merely naming the posited relationship between beliefs and facts tells us nothing. — Banno
Sometimes what is posited doesn't require our positing it in order for it to exist, as it is, prior to or discovery. Certain relationships are such things. Truth is a relationship 'between' thought, belief, statements thereof and states of affairs; events; happenings; that which was/is the case; that which has happened or is currently happening; reality; fact; the world; the circumstances we find ourselves within; observed interactions; etc.("fact" from henceforth)
Relationships do not have a spatiotemporal location. Do not take the term between as an indication of such(hence the scarequotes above). Correspondence is a relationship. Relationships do not have precise enough a spatiotemporal location to be sensibly called a 'property' of a statement. Statements have quite precise locations. Relationships do not.
Correspondence with fact happens prior to language. As a result of that, and that alone, we can know that correspondence with fact doesn't always require language. Accompany that with our already knowing that empirical knowledge is accrued and we can further know that thought and belief is accrued. I mean, that's what empirical knowledge consists in/of. True belief is formed and put to further use prior to language.
What not understood Banno? — creativesoul
And you think this is objects and things. Ah. — Banno
Do you agree that logical simples were rejected in PI? — Banno
I have yet to find a passage in the Investigations that even addresses logical simples. — Posty McPostface
Except Wittgenstein?? — Banno
Does it matter which we say, so long as we avoid misunderstandings in any particular case? — Wittgenstein, PI, 48.
49. But what does it mean to say that we cannot define (that is,
describe) these elements, but only name them? This might mean, for
instance, that when in a limiting case a complex consists of only one"'
square, its description is simply the name of the coloured square.
Here we might say—though this easily leads to all kinds of philosophical
superstition—that a sign "R" or "B", etc. may be sometimes
a word and sometimes a proposition. But whether it 'is a word or a
proposition' depends on the situation in which it is uttered or written.
For instance, if A has to describe complexes of coloured squares to B
and he uses the word "R" alone, we shall be able to say that the word
is a description—a proposition. But if he is memoming the words
and their meanings, or if he is teaching someone else the use of the
words and uttering them in the course of ostensive teaching, we shall
not say that they are propositions. In this situation the word "R",
for instance, is not a description; it names an element——but it would be
queer to make that a reason for saying that an element can only be
named! For naming and describing do not stand on the same
level: naming is a preparation for description. Naming is so far not a
move in the language-game—any more than putting a piece in its place
on the board is a move in chess. We may say: nothing has so far been
done, when a thing has been named. It has not even got a name except
in the language-game. This was what Frege meant too, when he said
that a word had meaning only as part of a sentence. — Wittgenstein, PI, 49.
2.0121 OGD [→GER | →P/M]
It would, so to speak, appear as an accident, when to a thing that could exist alone on its own account, subsequently a state of affairs could be made to fit.
If things can occur in atomic facts, this possibility must already lie in them.
(A logical entity cannot be merely possible. Logic treats of every possibility, and all possibilities are its facts.)
Just as we cannot think of spatial objects at all apart from space, or temporal objects apart from time, so we cannot think of any object apart from the possibility of its connexion with other things.
If I can think of an object in the context of an atomic fact, I cannot think of it apart from the possibility of this context. — Wittgestein, TLP, 2.0121
no — Posty McPostface
The discussion of sections 44–66 focuses on the problems of logical analysis and logical atomism. Wittgenstein criticizes not only Frege and Russell, but also Wittgenstein's own early work in the Tractatus. A driving impetus of early analytic philosophy was the notion that logical analysis could uncover the underlying structure of language and reality. Analysis relies on the assumption that language and reality can be broken down into smaller and simpler parts, and that there must be a bedrock of utterly simple objects that can be named but not defined or described (since that would suggest they were analyzable). Russell famously remarked that the only true proper names are "this" and "that," because they cannot be further analyzed or broken up.
The closest you will get is the T-sentence, and that sets out an equivalence. — Banno
Single place predicate: "the cat is black". Represented by f(a)
Double place predicate: "The cat is on the mat", setting out a relation of "...is on..." between cat and mat. Represented f(ab).
We say:
"The cat is black" is true.
This has the form of a single-place predicate. — Banno
Tell me more. — Banno
Pissing competitions. Meh. — Banno
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