"Ducks lay eggs" is true if and only if ducks lay eggs. Some ducks do not. — creativesoul

Here again you just expose the limitations of a nominalist metaphysics. Predicate logic is optimised for reasoning about particulars. Universal predication becomes just an exercise in set theory - a nominalistic claim of congruence. So your weapon of choice simply lacks the firepower to make any impression here. It's a classic case of bringing a knife to a gunfight. ;)

If you check out his Posterior Analytics, Aristotle was trying to steer a middle course between Platonic realism and Atomistic nominalism. So his genus~species distinction is an attempt to understand the ontological issue in terms of hierarchies of constraint. A universal speaks to a disposition - a tendency, function or purpose. And thus is is not contradicted - in its generality - by exceptions ... so long as the exceptions are accidental and don't count as essential.

Universals can thus be seen as allied with the top-down constraining causality of telos and form. A generality, like a genus, is defined as some kind of telic intent. A way of being that is organised by a reason. Then a species is some particular form that expresses that intent. A species is a general desire made specific flesh.

So if we are going to say something truthful-feeling like "ducks lay eggs because birds lay eggs, and ducks are birds", then we would have to look towards the reason why birds would even lay eggs. Birds would be a genus - a real distinction in nature - because there was some essential natural purpose that "a bird" expresses. And then a duck would be a bird as a particular form that in turn expresses that purpose in terms of some more specific design.

Then "this duck right here" would be the individuated being which is the form of a duck made locally and materially definite - complete with all the accidents of matter which can be deemed not to matter as they don't really affect the globally real purpose.

So behind every individuated duck, we have a hierarchy of increasingly general, but absolutely real, constraints. And the constraints themselves have a directional organisation - one that points always from general telos towards specific form.

By definition, telos tolerates material exceptions of every possible kind - except any differences that would make a difference in terms of that purpose. So a constraints-based view of "universal predication" says not only that what is not prevented, could be the case. It says if an exception could happen, it must happen. Exceptions are a prediction, given that the very idea of the essential is dichotomous to that of the accidental. You couldn't have the one in any definite sense without having also its "other".

So your attempts to keep forcing regular nominalistic logic onto a discussion of the problems of nominalism is quite amusing. Your dogmatism is a symptom of the intellectual disease in question.

Here is where I think you're major problem is. The very point of a definition is that it's general. A definition doesn't have to allow for all of the variations that might be observed in particular individuals. — Wayfarer

If we are looking to define humans in terms of what's necessary, required, and/or essential to being a human...

Being A is essential to being B.
Not all B's are A.

:-}

Being A is essential to being B.
Not all B's are A. — creativesoul

Being a bird is essential to being a duck, but not all ducks are birds? Sounds legit.

If we are looking to define humans in terms of what's necessary, required, and/or essential to being a human... — creativesoul

Agree, there are many more elements that could be required to define what 'being a human' means. Definitions are sometimes difficult, especially when it comes to matters such as this. But, as far as it goes, a 'rational animal' does say something important, I think. Especially in a culture which will readily agree with 'animal' and dispute 'rational'.

Being A is essential to being B.
Not all B's are A.
— creativesoul

Being a bird is essential to being a duck, but not all ducks are birds? Sounds legit. — apokrisis

Sarcasm doesn't write well does it? Looks like we agree that Aristotle's notion is lacking.

Agree, there are many more elements that could be required to define what 'being a human' means. Definitions are sometimes difficult, especially when it comes to matters such as this. But, as far as it goes, a 'rational animal' does say something important, I think. Especially in a culture which will readily agree with 'animal' and dispute 'rational'. — Wayfarer

Well definitions are notoriously difficult for all sorts of reasons. I'm not arguing against definitions per se. I'm arguing against what looks like a modern-day apologetic for Aristotle's shortcomings. I would certainly grant that most folk use the phrase "ducks lay eggs" despite knowing that only female ducks do. In normal parlance, this is of no concern. However, when we're assessing someone like Aristotle's work it matters. Aristotle was making the strong claim that being rational is what separated humans from animals, and that all humans are rational, and that being rational was somehow 'innate' in being a human, simply by virtue of being human.

If we are claiming that something is essential to being a human, then that something - whatever it is - must be part of every human. Being universal is being universally extant after removing the individual particulars. An essential property/quality of being a human would need to satisfy this criterion. No amount of ad hoc can negate this. Being universal is being a common denominator of a group of particulars.

On my view, just being called by the same name doesn't qualify either(pace Witt's 'game'). However, Witt does shed some light on things by showing us that there are times when the only thing a group of things has in common is that we call them by the same name. There are no relevant common denominators in their elemental composition.

...as far as it goes, a 'rational animal' does say something important, I think. Especially in a culture which will readily agree with 'animal' and dispute 'rational'. — Wayfarer

Indeed. This is at the heart of the matter as far as I'm concerned. What counts as being rational. This is one of those things that we do prior to becoming aware of it, and after as well. The difficulty, it seems, is properly accounting for the differences between the former and the latter in terms of 'kind'.

On my view, being rational consists of thought and belief. As earlier with the fire example, and pace Kant, the attribution/recognition of causality doesn't require language but does count as being rational. However, following the rules of 'correct' inference counts as being rational as well. So, Gettier's hypothetical Smith was a rational being as well. Clearly, if we are to make good sense of this, we'll need to take care in our analysis regarding what these kinds of thinking require. That's what existential contingency is about on my view. It is akin, I suppose, to necessary and sufficient conditions.

Drawing and maintaining the crucial distinction between thought and belief, and thinking about thought and belief is imperative. That's where language, particularly written language, comes into play, for thinking about thought and belief is existentially contingent upon written language. Reasoning that is existentially contingent upon(that involves) metacognition is existentially contingent upon written language.

Birds would be a genus - a real distinction in nature - because there was some essential natural purpose that "a bird" expresses. And then a duck would be a bird as a particular form that in turn expresses that purpose in terms of some more specific design. — apokrisis

This kind of talk is totally foreign to me. Bird is a genus, because there is "some essential natural purpose" which "a bird" expresses. No matter how much I reflect on this phrase, "essential natural purpose", I draw a complete blank as to what you could possibly mean by that.

I draw a complete blank as to what you could possibly mean by that. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well obviously God has his reason for at every instant forming the idea of all the individual avians in the world in his Almighty mind and so giving shape to their existence. But he does move in mysterious ways I hear.

Yep. Either that or your syllogism failed to capture the sense of Wayfarer’s position. The latter I believe.

So, to re-state it, I don't agree with you that reason is dependent on language. The two are obviously closely interlinked, but I'm inclined to give rationality precedence over language, because the ability to abstract and to symbolise, which is required for intentional speech acts, seems to me to be intellectual rather than simply linguistic. — Wayfarer

I wonder if you saw what I've said about this matter. Reason comes in different 'kinds'. Some kinds of reason are most certainly dependent upon written language. Others are most certainly not.

So, I do not think that we are at odds as much as it may seem.

There's no reason to believe that he meant anything in that generic sense.... — creativesoul

Actually the puzzle is why you would think he didn't. Generic sentences are a feature of all natural languages, not just modern English. If instead, as you claim, Aristotle intended an "all" quantification over particulars (re rationality) then the far deeper puzzle would be why he would make such an elementary logic mistake or be curiously unaware of the cognitive differences between infants and adults. [*]

This paper "Truth-Conditions of Generic Sentences: Two Contrasting Views" doesn't mention Aristotle, but it contrasts nominalism and realism with respect to generics and I think gets to the core of that disagreement. Also note the reference to non-accidental generalization below:

Finally, to re-emphasize a point made by Goodman (1955) and more recently by Dahl (1975) (among a host of others), the truth of generics depends on a notion of non-accidental generalization for their truth. The world contains in its extension all manner of possible patterns and convergences, many of which we judge to be purely accidental, but others of which we take to be principled. Only the principled patterns are taken to support true generics. (author's emphasis) — Greg N. Carlson

Saying that "ducks lay eggs" is true because some ducks lay eggs would be equivalent to saying "humans are superstars" is true because some humans are — creativesoul

They are not equivalent. That is the point. "Ducks lay eggs" is true not because some ducks lay eggs, but because there is an essential connection between ducks as a species and egg-laying and only an accidental connection between humans as a species and being a superstar.

That is the nature, so to speak, of generic sentences. You can't straightjacket the wrong logical form onto those sentences (in this case, an "all" quantifier over particulars), you need to investigate and understand the logical form that is already there. This was the kind of situation that motivated the linguistic turn in the early 20th Century where philosophical problems were seen to arise from misunderstanding the logic of language.

--

[*] "Vizzini: I can't compete with you physically, and you're no match for my brains.
Man in Black: You're that smart?
Vizzini: Let me put it this way. Have you ever heard of Plato, Aristotle, Socrates?
Man in Black: Yes.
Vizzini: Morons."

There's no reason to believe that he meant anything in that generic sense....
— creativesoul

Actually the puzzle is why you would think he didn't. Generic sentences are a feature of all natural languages, not just modern English. If instead, as you claim, Aristotle intended an "all" quantification over particulars (re rationality) then the far deeper puzzle would be why he would make such an elementary logic mistake or be curiously unaware of the cognitive differences between infants and adults. [*] — Andrew M

What's more puzzling; attributing meaning that is possible, or attributing meaning that is not? The notion of "generic" is 17th century. Aristotle lived two thousand years prior.

Aristotle didn't make an elementary logic mistake, per se. His reporting(his logic) follows from his (mis)conception regarding what counts as rational. He posited that being rational was something that was essential and innate to being human, and that only humans were rational creatures. He was wrong on both counts. His mistake was working from an utterly inadequate notion regarding what counts as being rational. What you and others are doing is nothing more and nothing less than an apologetic.

Here's the underlying issue...

Being rational is existentially contingent upon thought and belief. Not all thought and belief is existentially contingent upon language use. Some rationality is existentially contingent upon language use. Some rationality is not.

..."Ducks lay eggs" is true not because some ducks lay eggs, but because there is an essential connection between ducks as a species and egg-laying and only an accidental connection between humans as a species and being a superstar.

That is the nature, so to speak, of generic sentences. You can't straightjacket the wrong logical form onto those sentences (in this case, an "all" quantifier over particulars), you need to investigate and understand the logical form that is already there. This was the kind of situation that motivated the linguistic turn in the early 20th Century where philosophical problems were seen to arise from misunderstanding the logic of language. — Andrew M

I find it rather interesting that an entire school of thought and belief has arisen as a means to sophisticate what is nothing more than unsophisticated language use.

"Ducks lay eggs" is not true. That's plain and simple.

It is called "true" as a result of our leniency towards such ambiguity. Most folk know that only female ducks lay eggs and that not all female ducks do.

I find it rather interesting that an entire school of thought and belief has arisen as a means to sophisticate what is nothing more than unsophisticated language use.

"Ducks lay eggs" is not true. That's plain and simple. — creativesoul

And so you have some notion of truth that can’t make a useful distinction between the essential and the accidental.

If a female duck can’t lay eggs, that is some kind of accident. But it is still a duck because essentially - barring the accident - it would have laid eggs. As well as having all the other duck-defining feratures that count as essential. (In the end, this might boil down to a genetic disposition of course.)

And then a male duck, if regarded as part of the class of male things, would only lay eggs by some kind of accident.

It is a basic logical principle. That which is not constrained is free. That which is not essential is still possible by accident. Indeed, that which is not prevented has to happen to some degree if it is a possibility.

So you are working with a notion of reality that doesn’t pick up this essential vs accidental, or constraints vs degrees of freedom, distinction. That leads to an impoverished logical model of reality. You can’t in fact speak its truth because you can’t handle all its facts.

And so you have some notion of truth that can’t make a useful distinction between the essential and the accidental. — apokrisis

There's a marked difference between not being able to draw and maintain a dichotomy and rejecting it based upon grounds of inadequacy...

Try again.

There's a marked difference between not being able to draw and maintain a dichotomy and rejecting it based upon grounds of inadequacy... — creativesoul

And your argument is...

[creative, as per usual, will fail to fill in the blank space where his argumentation was meant to go ;) ]

It's been made heretofore. Go look.

Where? If so, why not cut and paste it here?

Click on my avatar. Click on "comments" icon. Scroll down looking for comments with this thread title. Read for yourself. Much of the discourse between Wayfarer/Andrew M and myself covers it and it's all fairly recent. All my comments in this thread would be a good place to look... I would think.

Hey! As a friendly note and totally off the subject...

There's a bookstore named Green Apple in San Francisco near Golden Gate Park that has what looked to be a 'set' of 6 or 7 'encyclopedia sized' works of Charles Sanders Peirce in a locked cabinet of 'rare' philosophy books. I immediately thought of you! I opted, of course, for Searle, Davidson, and Witt's...

As a general note regarding your approach Apo...

I find that your approach presupposes agency where none is warranted. Drop the notions of intent and purpose, then see what happens to what's left of it...

I find that your approach presupposes agency where none is warranted. Drop the notions of intent and purpose, then see what happens to what's left of it... — creativesoul

Why would I arbitrarily exclude final cause from nature?

Click on my avatar. Click on "comments" icon. Scroll down looking for comments with this thread title. Read for yourself. Much of the discourse between Wayfarer/Andrew M and myself covers it and it's all fairly recent. All my comments in this thread would be a good place to look... I would think. — creativesoul

I think you give yourself way too much credit for clarity of writing. I didn't understand your comment so I wouldn't even know what other comments might count as the argument that supports it.

So I argued that a notion of the general vs particular doesn't make sense unless it understood how it is connected to the distinction between the essential (or necessary) and the accidental (or chance).

Generality is the essence that a collection of individuals would have in common. Their particularity would then be the accidents that are the differences that don't make an (essential) difference to that.

I illustrated this logical principle in reference to your male duck and non-laying duck examples.

If you can't make a counter-argument here, then I can only take the view you can't in fact muster one.

I find that your approach presupposes agency where none is warranted. Drop the notions of intent and purpose, then see what happens to what's left of it...
— creativesoul

Why would I arbitrarily exclude final cause from nature? — apokrisis

Your approach presupposes agency where none is warranted. Ockham's razor applies. If dropping the notions of intent and purpose requires excluding final cause, then the exclusion is not arbitrary, but rather it is necessary.

Either you are a true believer in cognito or you do not realize that a well-educated theist shares your presuppositions...

I think you give yourself way too much credit for clarity of writing. — apokrisis

I am asked where my 'argument' is.

I give the location.

An astute reader can peruse the thread for themselves as a means to read my comments here. After doing so, s/he would walk away with a better understanding of my arguments about universals, and particularly about Aristotle's notion of "man", including but not limited to, how his claims of man being rational have been invoked herein as a means to broaden the discourse about universals. My arguments are throughout the thread and they are context specific.

If you, apo cannot figure some of this out for yourself... I cannot help you.

Generality is the essence that a collection of individuals would have in common. Their particularity would then be the accidents that are the differences that don't make an (essential) difference to that. — apokrisis

Generality is the essence that a collection of individuals would have in common... if they did.

They don't.

The usual rambling bullshit instead of any direct answer.

Are you claiming that ducks do not have anything in common with each other that they do not have with other kinds of birds? Or that they do not have anything in common with other kinds of birds that they do not have with mammals, reptiles or insects.

↪creativesoul The usual rambling bullshit instead of any direct answer. — apokrisis

The usual sign of having no argument...

Ad homs aren't acceptable at this juncture.