Exercised rationality is how we come to recognize it. But the definition describes the kind of animal a human is, and is not negated by the developmental stage any particular human is at or whether their capabilities are currently being exercised. — Andrew M

The definition of man as being rational is not negated if man is not rational?

As a similar case, consider the uncontroversial claim that humans are bipeds. Yet initial human embryos don't have two legs and neither does an adult that has had their legs amputated.

For the same reasons, being a featherless biped is insufficient for being a human.

For the same reasons, being a featherless biped is insufficient for being a human. — creativesoul

Would you also say the claim that "humans are bipeds" is false?

Creative, if you have an argument, just bring it. Don’t pretend to expertise you can’t deliver.

Remember inertia? The first derivative of motion? The big deal is that "rest" isn't actually not going anywhere. It is simply a relative lack of motion. — apokrisis

This I take as a mistake, to define rest as a relative lack of motion, because it doesn't provide a real descriptive limit to motion. Now the concept of "inertia" for you is derived from motion, but as I explained already, "inertia" for me is derived from an observed temporal continuity of existence, a lack of change. You have no approach to this concept of lack of change from which the concept of inertia was really derived, because you define inertia as a derivative of motion. But your definition is mistaken, because the basic assumption involved with "inertia" is that things will stay the same, unless forced to change, and this assumption is then applied to motion. It is not derived from motion.

So in the actual physics of action, your presumptions about "rest" being anything else than an asymptotic limit on action is archaic metaphysics. — apokrisis

This betrays your closed minded, physicalist attitude. You are claiming that any assumption of the reality of anything other than what is demonstrated by "the actual physics of action" is "archaic metaphysics".

The issue which you are not paying attention to, is that any description of "the actual physics of action" which we may produce, is necessarily derived from fundamental, foundational assumptions, which act as real limitations to those descriptions. The descriptions produced are "derived" from the fundamental assumptions, they are not derived from the "actual actions". That's the way logic, and the human mind works, our descriptions are limited by the words we know and the ideas we associate with them.. We, as human beings, have no capacity to go beyond these fundamental assumptions in our descriptions, and so they provide the real limitations on our descriptions. The things being described provide no real limitations to our descriptions, as is evident from the fact that we can make false descriptions.

So, you mistakenly assume that the concept of inertia is derived from actual motion, when it is really derived from an assumption of rest, the foundational assumption that things will continue to exist in an unchanged way, as time passes. Now you have no approach toward understanding this foundational assumption, because you have excluded it from your conceptual structure by associating inertia with motion. And you support this conceptual structure with your foundational assumption that anything outside of this conceptual structure is "archaic metaphysics", which ought to be ignored.

Would you also say the claim that "humans are bipeds" is false? — Andrew M

Yup. Some are. Some are not. That's the issue I see. Not enough precision in the claims...

Notably, with regard to Aristotle, an impoverished notion of being rational.

Now the concept of "inertia" for you is derived from motion, but as I explained already, "inertia" for me is derived from an observed temporal continuity of existence, a lack of change. — Metaphysician Undercover

Inertia is a positive quality - a resistance to change. So rest is the potential for a reaction to an action. Push a rock to get it to roll and it pushes right back.

But even if you just want to make the dichotomy the difference between passive and active, or static and changing, or inert and vigorous, it’s still about a dichotomy that defines some particular categorical spectrum of possibility in every case.

So, you mistakenly assume that the concept of inertia is derived from actual motion, when it is really derived from an assumption of rest, the foundational assumption that things will continue to exist in an unchanged way, as time passes. Now you have no approach toward understanding this foundational assumption, because you have excluded it from your conceptual structure by associating inertia with motion. And you support this conceptual structure with your foundational assumption that anything outside of this conceptual structure is "archaic metaphysics", which ought to be ignored. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are simply whinging about the fact that Aristotelian physics proved wrong and got corrected by Newtonian mechanics.

The idea that things could be at rest had to be extended to include inertial motion.

But even archaic physics was based on metaphysical dichotomies. The opposed motions of gravity and levity being a prime example.

Inertia is a positive quality - a resistance to change. So rest is the potential for a reaction to an action. Push a rock to get it to roll and it pushes right back. — apokrisis

Ok, so "passivity" does not refer to something which matter is prior to being acted on, it refers to how matter will react when being acted on. See, you are defining everything in relation to action, saying what passivity would be like if it were active. It would be reactive. You give yourself no means for describing what passivity is during that time when it is what it is, passive, i.e. not being acted upon, and not reacting. So passivity is the potential for action. What do you think it means to be capable of reacting?

But even archaic physics was based on metaphysical dichotomies. — apokrisis

The point is, that you have the wrong idea of what a dichotomy is. A dichotomy is a division, a separation. You instead, unite the two defining terms of the dichotomy by claiming that what these two terms refer to are the two extremes of the same thing. So a dichotomy is not a division to you, it is the means by which two terms which would normally exclude each other in reference, are united in the same category. That is because your monist faith will not allow you to conceive of real ontological separation.

Ok, so "passivity" does not refer to something which matter is prior to being acted on, it refers to how matter will react when being acted on. See, you are defining everything in relation to action, saying what passivity would be like if it were active. It would be reactive. You give yourself no means for describing what passivity is during that time when it is what it is, passive, i.e. not being acted upon, and not reacting. So passivity is the potential for action. What do you think it means to be capable of reacting? — Metaphysician Undercover

You are distressed because your ontology likes to presume a world of passive and stable existence. But the evidence from nature itself is contrary. As Peircean semiosis recognises, existence arises as the regulation of fundamental uncertainty or spontaneity. The basis of existence is instability. Then formal cause - the emergence of constraints or habits of regulation - is what stabilises being so that it appears to become eventually a realm of classical passivity.

So you get your desired passivity. But only at the end of time. And even then, it is only a relative passivity. There is still going to be a quantum scale thermal jitter at the Heat Death of the universe.

Thus in my ontology, passivity is an emergent quality. It is always relative to the more fundamental state of agitation that is a quantum Cosmos.

Then when it comes to the action~reaction dichotomy that accounts for motion in a (Galilean) relative fashion, inertia is also an emergent property. It treats constant velocity or constant angular momentum as the fundamental symmetries of spacetime. Ground zero is a mass moving freely at a steady rate - all impressed forces being equilibrated or in balance. And thus now it is being disturbed from an inertial state of motion which defines "an action" - either an acceleration, or dichotomously, a deceleration.

And mass is a measure of how fast the rate of an object's inertial motion can be changed. Its "resistance" to change is a measure of its "massiveness". The relation is a reciprocal one. Massiveness is like a quantity of elasticity which introduces a temporal delay. You have to push for longer to get the same amount of change in velocity.

Passivity is really a capacity for inactivity. And a massive object at relative rest has the greatest capacity for inaction. After all, at rest it has the least measurable mass as well as the least measurable velocity.

The point is, that you have the wrong idea of what a dichotomy is. A dichotomy is a division, a separation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Look it up. A dichotomy is a relation that is mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive.

There is the division that is the mutual exclusion - and even that is a connection in being mutual. And there is that same togetherness in thatjointly they exhaust all other possibilities.

One or other alone does nothing. Only when each properly opposes its other, in a perfect binary fit that excludes all others, can it properly be considered a dichotomy. It's Dialectics 101.

That is because your monist faith will not allow you to conceive of real ontological separation. — Metaphysician Undercover

My faith, such as it is, would have to be triadic. You may have heard me mention that once or twice.

Would you also say the claim that "humans are bipeds" is false?
— Andrew M

Yup. Some are. Some are not. That's the issue I see. Not enough precision in the claims... — creativesoul

Precision isn't the issue. The issue is about what interpretive rule to apply to statements like the above which are termed generics (SEP). Some interesting points from these slides:

• Much of our commonsense knowledge of the world is expressed by generic sentences
• One of the notable features of generic sentences is that they are "exception tolerating"
• It is this feature that piques the interest of many logically-oriented linguists and philosophers

I think the interpretive rule here is that the truth or falsity of "humans are bipeds" isn't dependent on whether there are defective or incomplete instances of the type, but instead on whether there is a non-accidental (or essential) connection between humankind and the property of being bipedal.

You are distressed because your ontology likes to presume a world of passive and stable existence. — apokrisis

No, I don't presume that. I understand that some things change and some things do not. I do not presume that world the consists exclusively of either one of these. I accept dualism as the only coherent understanding of reality.

So you get your desired passivity. But only at the end of time. — apokrisis

It is evident that some things remain the same, and we do not have to wait until the end of time to observe this.

Look it up. A dichotomy is a relation that is mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. — apokrisis

Yes, so it appears like you do not know what "mutually exclusive" means. How are rest and motion mutually exclusive when you define rest as a minimal degree of motion? .

Yes, so it appears like you do not know what "mutually exclusive" means. How are rest and motion mutually exclusive when you define rest as a minimal degree of motion? . — Metaphysician Undercover

Hmm. Will you ever master this tricky notion of reciprocal limits I wonder?

Rest would be minimal motion, and motion would be minimal rest.

It is evident that some things remain the same, and we do not have to wait until the end of time to observe this. — Metaphysician Undercover

Given that the Universe is now scrapping along at less than 3 degrees above absolute zero, you are observing Being towards the end of time.

I accept dualism as the only coherent understanding of reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

Oh well, with dualism at least you are halfway there. :)

Will you ever master this tricky notion of reciprocal limits I wonder? — apokrisis

We were discussing dichotomies, not reciprocal limits. And your attempt to turn dichotomies into reciprocal limits is misguided. .

Rest would be minimal motion, and motion would be minimal rest. — apokrisis

Right, so rest and motion are clearly not mutually exclusive when defined in this way. Therefore this is not a dichotomy as per the definition of dichotomy which you provided.

We were discussing dichotomies, not reciprocal limits. And your attempt to turn dichotomies into reciprocal limits is misguided. . — Metaphysician Undercover

Dichotomies are reciprocal limits on possibility regardless of whatever you might pretend to be discussing.

Right, so rest and motion are clearly not mutually exclusive when defined in this way. — Metaphysician Undercover

They are mutually excluding.

So I’m taking an active dynamical or process view of ontology, while you want to believe in some theistic eternality where existence is some god-given brute fact. Where you think in terms of nouns, I am thinking in terms of verbs.

[

Dichotomies are reciprocal limits on possibility regardless of whatever you might pretend to be discussing. — apokrisis

You're not making sense. You defined dichotomy as "a relation that is mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive". Then you described "reciprocal limits" in a way in which they clearly were not mutually exclusive. Rest is said to be minimal motion, and motion is said to be minimal rest. So it is very clear that your statement "dichotomies are reciprocal limits" is contradictory. Reciprocal limits are not mutually exclusive, but dichotomies are.

Furthermore, as I argued earlier, your reciprocal limits are not jointly exhaustive, because they do not allow for the real limits.

Then you described "reciprocal limits" in a way in which they clearly were not mutually exclusive. — Metaphysician Undercover

What could be more minimal than zero?

What could be more minimal than zero? — apokrisis

You weren't talking about zero, you were talking about asymptotic limits.

Exactly. Nothing is more minimal than zero. So zero is the asymptotic limit on somethingness.

The logic of dichotomies is apophatic. We are talking about reality - definite somethingness. The limit on reality is then where things stop being real. And if limits didn’t come in matched pairs, there would be nothing in-between to be real either.

Your approach demands that limits are what exist. And singularly. That’s obviously crazy.

Too bad the limits on what you can say couldn't stop you at the point where you stopped making sense. You know, if the limits aren't real and existent, then they are completely arbitrary with no real constraint; like what you've just said, completely arbitrary with no constraint in relation to reality.

So if there is a point where reality comes to an end, you want to say that it doesn’t in fact come to an end there? The end ain’t real?

Sounds legit.

Until we have an adequate way of distinguishing between what is real, and what is not, I don't see any point in worrying about where reality comes to end. You could proceed far beyond the limits of reality without even noticing the difference. As you've demonstrated.

Precision isn't the issue. The issue is about what interpretive rule to apply to statements like the above which are termed generics (SEP). Some interesting points from these slides:

Much of our commonsense knowledge of the world is expressed by generic sentences
One of the notable features of generic sentences is that they are "exception tolerating"
It is this feature that piques the interest of many logically-oriented linguists and philosophers

I think the interpretive rule here is that the truth or falsity of "humans are bipeds" isn't dependent on whether there are defective or incomplete instances of the type, but instead on whether there is a non-accidental (or essential) connection between humankind and the property of being bipedal. — Andrew M

Knowledge cannot be false. Belief can be false. You're conflating knowledge with belief.

The truth or falsity of "humans are bipeds" is wholly and completely determined by whether or not humans are bipeds. Not all humans are.

As this pertains to the thread...

Aristotle emphasized that humans were the only rational beings. Being rational, according to Aristotle, included all different sorts of reasoning. Some of those are very complex metacognitive endeavors. Infants are not capable. Infants are humans. Not all humans are capable of being rational in all of the different ways that humans are rational.

Potential leads to a reductio, special pleading, or piles of being rational...

As mentioned before... the problem here is most certainly one of imprecision/inadequacy. The commonsense belief you speak of is false as is Aristotle's definition statement of "man". The falsity of both are the result of following from (mis)conceptions.

A very young child can learn that touching fire hurts. It does so by virtue of attributing causality. It draws a correlation between it's own actions and the pain that follows. The child forms true thought and belief about touching fire, despite it's inability to tell us about it. It's refusal to touch fire again shows that such non-linguistic belief formation can leave quite an impression.

In that way that child is rational.

If Aristotle held that that and that alone constituted being rational, then there would be no issue with Aristotle's notion and the facts reported upon above. However, Aristotle's notion of rational must be determined solely by virtue of all the different ways he claimed that 'men' are rational. Some of those ways are existentially contingent upon language. Some are not(per the fire example above). Not all of the ways that humans are rational is exclusive to being human.

Other beings can recognize/attribute causality in the same way as the child in the above example. That is particularly the case when another being is in the same set of circumstances.

...the truth or falsity of "humans are bipeds" isn't dependent on whether there are defective or incomplete instances of the type, but instead on whether there is a non-accidental (or essential) connection between humankind and the property of being bipedal. — Andrew M

The truth or falsity of 'A is B' isn't dependent upon this A or that A being B... No. No. No.

Rather... those A's.

Those are the ones that help make "Some A's are B" true and "A's are B's" false.

The truth or falsity of "humans are bipeds" is wholly and completely determined by whether or not humans are bipeds. Not all humans are. — creativesoul

There’s your problem. You actually write as if you understand the meaning, or the basis, of rationality, as if you have a theory which accounts for it, which I don’’t think you’ve at all demonstrated.

Gratuitous assertions won't do Jeep. Explain for me. Always ready to learn something new...

Well, because the whole point of the definition of what something essentially is, can accomodate difference - the fact that some individuals might indeed not be bipeds. They might be legless, or paraplegic, or whatever. But that is surely, according to Aristotelean logic, accidental - and that is even ironic, here, because people usually are legless or paraplegic due to an accident, even if that is not the exact meaning of ‘accident’ in Aristotle. So essentiallly I’m agreeing with AndrewM’s assessment.

But the deeper point, of the sense in which reason is dependent on //language//, is also incorrect, I believe. I think you’re super-imposing evolutionary naturalism over the top of Aristotelian logic. In fact it denotes the inability to argue Aristotelan logic on its own terms.

//I had mis-typed the above as 'logic' due to entering text via an iPhone//

If it is the case that not all A's are B, then 'A's are B' is false.

I've granted Aristotle's terms Jeep. I've subsequently argued for why his conceptions are wrong. You would be correct in saying that I work from a few premisses that work within a methodological naturalism framework. That's irrelevant to what's being argued.

If one who believes that "men are rational beings" is true later admits that not all men are, then s/he is forced to deal with learning that their own belief is self-contradictory, incoherent, and just plain false.

If "all men are rational beings" is true, then "not all men are rational beings" is not(and vice-versa). They are mutually exclusive. They are negations of one another. "Men are rational" is true if, and only if, it is the case that all men are rational.

...the deeper point, of the sense in which reason is dependent on logic, is also incorrect, I belileve. — Wayfarer

Not exactly following this. Let me be clear here. Not all reason is existentially contingent upon logic. I do not privilege logic over and above thought and belief. All reason consists of thought and belief. Some is existentially contingent upon logic.

Thought and belief are accrued.

The same holds for reason being existentially contingent upon language. All reason consists of thought and belief. Some thought and belief is existentially contingent upon language. Some reason is existentially contingent upon language.

Knowledge cannot be false. Belief can be false. — creativesoul

True, but not relevant here.

The truth or falsity of "humans are bipeds" is wholly and completely determined by whether or not humans are bipeds. Not all humans are. — creativesoul

On an ordinary interpretation, the sentence "humans are bipeds" evaluates as true. [*]

The problem is that you're misinterpreting that sentence as the universal "for every human, that human is a biped". Since that evaluates as false, your interpretation fails to match the logical form of the ordinary interpretation. In other words, you mean something different to what ordinary language users mean.

So I suggest looking at the SEP article on generic sentences. Per the quantificational theory, the logical form is "for every human, it is normal for that human to be a biped". Per the kind theory, the logical form is "humankind is characterized as being bipedal".

Both of these interpretations evaluate the sentence as true here, which matches the ordinary interpretation. I suggest trying to understand Aristotle's definition in this generic sense.

--

[*] For example, "Humans, birds and (occasionally) apes walk bipedally." from the first google hit on "humans bipedal" (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1571302/)

Knowledge cannot be false. Belief can be false.
— creativesoul

True, but not relevant here. — Andrew M

You're calling false belief 'commonsense knowledge'. It is most certainly relevant for me to point it out.

The truth or falsity of "humans are bipeds" is wholly and completely determined by whether or not humans are bipeds. Not all humans are.
— creativesoul

On an ordinary interpretation, the sentence "humans are bipeds" evaluates as true. [*]

The problem is that you're misinterpreting that sentence as the universal "for every human, that human is a biped". Since that evaluates as false, your interpretation fails to match the logical form of the ordinary interpretation. In other words, you mean something different to what ordinary language users mean.

Not my problem if others do not say what they mean. There's a bit of irony here. I am addressing what Aristotle said. You and others are addressing what he did not say and charging me with misinterpreting...

I suggest trying to understand Aristotle's definition in this generic sense...

There's no reason to believe that he meant anything in that generic sense....

We have every reason to believe otherwise. He stressed that humans are the only rational beings and that that was what made them what they are, different than other animals.

Aristotle fails on two fronts. We are not rational by virtue of just being human. Other creatures are rational, albeit to a much lesser 'degree'. These failings are both consequences of an ill-conceived notion of being rational at work in his work.

With regard to the bit about generics...

We are forced to attribute meaning to generics that does not follow from what was actually stated. "Ducks lay eggs" is true if and only if ducks lay eggs. Some ducks do not. Saying that "ducks lay eggs" is true because some ducks lay eggs would be equivalent to saying "humans are superstars" is true because some humans are. If we all know that only female ducks lay eggs, then we also know that not all ducks lay eggs. If we know all this and state that "ducks lay eggs" is true, then we've called something true despite knowing that it is not.

There is a difference between calling 'X' true and 'X' being so.

"Ducks lay eggs" is not true as a result of some ducks laying eggs and our saying that that is what is/was meant. Rather it is false as a result of some ducks laying eggs. "Some ducks lay eggs" is true as a result of some ducks laying eggs.

Not exactly following this. Let me be clear here. Not all reason is existentially contingent upon logic. I do not privilege logic over and above thought and belief. All reason consists of thought and belief. Some is existentially contingent upon logic. — creativesoul

I did edit that phrase of mine you quoted, because it was nonsensical - I had meant to take issue with your statement that 'reason is dependent on language', but I was inputting on my iPhone and mangled it.

So, to re-state it, I don't agree with you that reason is dependent on language. The two are obviously closely interlinked, but I'm inclined to give rationality precedence over language, because the ability to abstract and to symbolise, which is required for intentional speech acts, seems to me to be intellectual rather than simply linguistic. And one can have rational insights which can be expressed in language - as evidenced by the fact that science has often required the invention of new symbolic codes, to convey rational insights which there weren't the means to express in the current lexicon (i.e. the expressions associated with quantum physics or computer science).

If one who believes that "men are rational beings" is true later admits that not all men are, then s/he is forced to deal with learning that their own belief is self-contradictory, incoherent, and just plain false. — creativesoul

Here is where I think you're major problem is. The very point of a definition is that it's general. A definition doesn't have to allow for all of the variations that might be observed in particular individuals. But by stating that humans are 'rational animals', Aristotle is distinguishing between humans and other animals with reference to a capacity humans clearly have, that animals don't, namely, rationality. But it's obvious that not all persons are rational. And it's also obvious that no person is only rational. But this doesn't invalidate the definition. Indeed if your notion of 'definition' held, then it wouldn't be possible to define anything, because definitions, or at least most definitions, are general in their very nature.

And that ability to generalise and abstract is essential to rationality. Which gets us back to universals - because it is only by virtue of universals that we can make abstract and general statements at all.