If I combine this:

In short, when a truth occurs, it occurs ontically—and that which ontically is is not subject to the possibility of being wrong, i.e. fallibility. But we can only appraise what ontically is epistemologically, which will always be to some extent fallible. — javra

And this:

When differentiating the ontological from the epistemological, ontically occurring truths (which are absolutely certain and not possible to be wrong) do occur all the time. But our epistemic appraisals of what are and are not ontic truths (the latter, again, do occur) will be fallible to some measure. — javra

Is there a contradiction?

Consider this proposition as if it were itself a truth:

<Ontological truths (which are absolutely certain and not possible to be wrong) do occur all the time.>

Is this "truth" an "ontological truth" or an "epistemological truth"? Because if it is an "epistemological truth," then it is not certain, and if it is an "ontological truth," then your appraisal is not fallible. This is why I'm not sure the way you are dividing up this territory is ultimately coherent. You are speaking as if your knowledge-claims about ontological truths are themselves ontological truths and not epistemological truths, and your theory seems to preclude this.

* The monkey wrench is logical and other putatively analytical truths. [...] There's something odd about asking whether "If A, then not (~A)" is a belief, or how we might justify it. But I'll leave that for others. — J

A prime example of this (and it does regard what can well be considered hinge propositions) are those who take dialetheism to be true. We thereby now have an inconsistency between the principle of noncontradiction being true and dialetheism being true. And this inconsistency as to which in fact conforms, or else corresponds, to the actual states of affairs can only be resolved via optimal justifications. Yes, maybe for now these are lacking, but, short of aggressions of each camp toward the other such that “might makes right”, what other avenue is available to us toward discerning what is true in respect to this aspect of ontology (what might possibly be termed the ontology of valid reasoning or of valid logic … or, maybe more esoterically, of logos)?

Is there a contradiction? — Leontiskos

Not as far as I know.

Consider this proposition as if it were itself a truth:

<Ontological truths (which are absolutely certain and not possible to be wrong) do occur all the time.>

Is this "truth" an "ontological truth" or an "epistemological truth"? Because if it is an "epistemological truth," then it is not certain, and if it is an "ontological truth," then your appraisal is not fallible. This is why I'm not sure the way you are dividing up this territory is ultimately coherent. — Leontiskos

To be clear, I'm not here writing a formal philosophical thesis but a forum post intended to address a specific issue. That mentioned:

The truth of the proposition here quoted would of course of itself be an epistemic truth. One which I so far find thoroughly justifiable: To keep things short, I so far find that there can be no epistemic truth in the absence of an ontically occuring truth it aspires to express. Can you, or anyone else, cogently justify the occurence of an epistemic truth that does not claim to be or else intend to conform to an ontic truth?

If not, then it remains cogently justifiable that ontically occuring truths do occur. Conversely, it then becomes unjustifiable that ontically occurring truths do not occur. (The "all the time" part I'll cut off for now, for it would require a great deal of further justification.)

The truth of the proposition here quoted would of course of itself be an epistemic truth. One which I so far find thoroughly justifiable: To keep things short, I so far find that there can be no epistemic truth in the absence of an ontically occuring truth it aspires to express. Can you, or anyone else, cogently justify the occurence of an epistemic truth that does not claim to be or else intend to conform to an ontic truth?

If not, then it remains cogently justifiable that ontically occuring truths do occur. Conversely, it then becomes unjustifiable that ontically occurring truths do not occur. — javra

That's a fair argument. It is similar to a comment asked me about, and which could perhaps be folded into this thread:

If there is no pole of knowledge then I don't see how one [inference to the best explanation] can be better than another (because no [inference to the best explanation] can better approach that pole). — Leontiskos

You seem to be saying that "epistemic truths" presuppose the existence of "ontological truths"; we all believe ourselves to be uttering "epistemic truths"; therefore we are all presupposing the existence of "ontological truths"; and because of this the belief in "ontological truths" is justified.

I think that's a good account on the "game of pool" approach, but I would prefer an account that provides for knowledge of at least some "ontological truths," rather than mere justified belief. Or in other words, if we take up your idea of fallibilism via Janus' conditional:

So, if we know p could be false, then we don't know that it's true, but we may well believe that it's true. — Janus

Then on the premise that we know that every p (epistemological truth) could be false, we cannot know any p.

has forwarded a theory where all (or almost all - this is contentious) beliefs are inferences to the best explanation, and are thus probabilistic.

On all of these conceptions certain knowledge is impossible, and yet knowledge is traditionally understood to be certain.


(It should again be noted that none of this has anything special to do with JTB. The one who thinks JTB does not understand JTB.)

You seem to be saying that "epistemic truths" presuppose the existence of "ontological truths"; we all believe ourselves to be uttering "epistemic truths"; therefore we are all presupposing the existence of "ontological truths"; and because of this the belief in "ontological truths" is justified.

I think that's a good account on the "game of pool" approach, but I would prefer an account that provides for knowledge of at least some "ontological truths," rather than mere justified belief. — Leontiskos

Here is a different approach to the same conclusion:

Can it be in any way validly justified that no ontologically occurring truths occur? If one believes that this is the case, what does one intend to express by the proposition of “no ontically occurring truths occur” if this proposition is not meant to conform/correspond to the actual states of affairs of the world and, thereby, of itself be an ontic truth? Thereby contradicting the very proposition made. Therefore, there is no justifiable alternative to the proposition that ontic truths occur.

As to providing knowledge of some "ontological truths", this, again, is what our ability to honestly and cogently justify offers us the possibility of. It just that our JTB knowledge will not, by a fallibilist account, be infallible. (Fallibiilty does not equate to being wrong.)

Then on the premise that we know that every p (epistemological truth) could be false, we cannot know any p. — Leontiskos

Remember that the JTB model of knowledge was presented by an Ancient Skeptic. If one presumes knowledge to be infallible, then this quote holds. If one presumes knowledge to be fallible, then it does not.

On all of these conceptions certain knowledge is impossible, and knowledge is traditionally understood to be certain. — Leontiskos

By everything I've so far stated, there then can occur ontically true beliefs which we can justify at will. These then will be instances of ontic knowledge, which is certain. Because we can only hold epistemic appraisals of what is ontically true, though, everything we uphold as knowledge will be epistemic knowledge, rather than ontic knowledge - which, as with epistemic truth, is less than "completely assured, fixed, and invariable."

I'll be back tomorrow.

↪Relativist
has forwarded a theory where all (or almost all - this is contentious) beliefs are inferences to the best explanation, and are thus probabilistic. — Leontiskos

That's correct, but I don't claim that most such inferences are rigorous. It's often just what seems most likely to the person making the judgement at the time he makes it.
Example of non-rigorous IBE: a Presidential candidate* loses the election; based on his belief that he was overwhelmingly more popular than his rival, and he judges that this is best explained as the election being stolen from him by illegal means. (* Any resemblance to any person, living or dead, is purely coincidental.)

More rigor enters into the analysis when one open-mindedly considers additional evidence that was previously unavailable or overlooked, often in the face of being challenged on the initial judgement.

__________________________
Regarding "probablistic" - do not mistake this with orthodox Bayesian epistemology, which depends on the absurd assumption that we can attach a consistent set of epistemic probabilities to every statement we claim to believe. Rather, I embrace Mark Kaplan's* "modest Bayesianism", which makes the modest claim that we can attach a relative confidence level to SOME pairs (or small sets) of statements of belief. If there's a reasonable basis for the ranking.

* source of this theory: Mark Kaplan's article "Decision Theory and Epistemology", in the Oxford Handbook of Epistemology.