If I combine this:

In short, when a truth occurs, it occurs ontically—and that which ontically is is not subject to the possibility of being wrong, i.e. fallibility. But we can only appraise what ontically is epistemologically, which will always be to some extent fallible. — javra

And this:

When differentiating the ontological from the epistemological, ontically occurring truths (which are absolutely certain and not possible to be wrong) do occur all the time. But our epistemic appraisals of what are and are not ontic truths (the latter, again, do occur) will be fallible to some measure. — javra

Is there a contradiction?

Consider this proposition as if it were itself a truth:

<Ontological truths (which are absolutely certain and not possible to be wrong) do occur all the time.>

Is this "truth" an "ontological truth" or an "epistemological truth"? Because if it is an "epistemological truth," then it is not certain, and if it is an "ontological truth," then your appraisal is not fallible. This is why I'm not sure the way you are dividing up this territory is ultimately coherent. You are speaking as if your knowledge-claims about ontological truths are themselves ontological truths and not epistemological truths, and your theory seems to preclude this.

* The monkey wrench is logical and other putatively analytical truths. [...] There's something odd about asking whether "If A, then not (~A)" is a belief, or how we might justify it. But I'll leave that for others. — J

A prime example of this (and it does regard what can well be considered hinge propositions) are those who take dialetheism to be true. We thereby now have an inconsistency between the principle of noncontradiction being true and dialetheism being true. And this inconsistency as to which in fact conforms, or else corresponds, to the actual states of affairs can only be resolved via optimal justifications. Yes, maybe for now these are lacking, but, short of aggressions of each camp toward the other such that “might makes right”, what other avenue is available to us toward discerning what is true in respect to this aspect of ontology (what might possibly be termed the ontology of valid reasoning or of valid logic … or, maybe more esoterically, of logos)?

Is there a contradiction? — Leontiskos

Not as far as I know.

Consider this proposition as if it were itself a truth:

<Ontological truths (which are absolutely certain and not possible to be wrong) do occur all the time.>

Is this "truth" an "ontological truth" or an "epistemological truth"? Because if it is an "epistemological truth," then it is not certain, and if it is an "ontological truth," then your appraisal is not fallible. This is why I'm not sure the way you are dividing up this territory is ultimately coherent. — Leontiskos

To be clear, I'm not here writing a formal philosophical thesis but a forum post intended to address a specific issue. That mentioned:

The truth of the proposition here quoted would of course of itself be an epistemic truth. One which I so far find thoroughly justifiable: To keep things short, I so far find that there can be no epistemic truth in the absence of an ontically occuring truth it aspires to express. Can you, or anyone else, cogently justify the occurence of an epistemic truth that does not claim to be or else intend to conform to an ontic truth?

If not, then it remains cogently justifiable that ontically occuring truths do occur. Conversely, it then becomes unjustifiable that ontically occurring truths do not occur. (The "all the time" part I'll cut off for now, for it would require a great deal of further justification.)

The truth of the proposition here quoted would of course of itself be an epistemic truth. One which I so far find thoroughly justifiable: To keep things short, I so far find that there can be no epistemic truth in the absence of an ontically occuring truth it aspires to express. Can you, or anyone else, cogently justify the occurence of an epistemic truth that does not claim to be or else intend to conform to an ontic truth?

If not, then it remains cogently justifiable that ontically occuring truths do occur. Conversely, it then becomes unjustifiable that ontically occurring truths do not occur. — javra

That's a fair argument. It is similar to a comment asked me about, and which could perhaps be folded into this thread:

If there is no pole of knowledge then I don't see how one [inference to the best explanation] can be better than another (because no [inference to the best explanation] can better approach that pole). — Leontiskos

You seem to be saying that "epistemic truths" presuppose the existence of "ontological truths"; we all believe ourselves to be uttering "epistemic truths"; therefore we are all presupposing the existence of "ontological truths"; and because of this the belief in "ontological truths" is justified.

I think that's a good account on the "game of pool" approach, but I would prefer an account that provides for knowledge of at least some "ontological truths," rather than mere justified belief. Or in other words, if we take up your idea of fallibilism via Janus' conditional:

So, if we know p could be false, then we don't know that it's true, but we may well believe that it's true. — Janus

Then on the premise that we know that every p (epistemological truth) could be false, we cannot know any p.

has forwarded a theory where all (or almost all - this is contentious) beliefs are inferences to the best explanation, and are thus probabilistic.

On all of these conceptions certain knowledge is impossible, and yet knowledge is traditionally understood to be certain.


(It should again be noted that none of this has anything special to do with JTB. The one who thinks JTB does not understand JTB.)

You seem to be saying that "epistemic truths" presuppose the existence of "ontological truths"; we all believe ourselves to be uttering "epistemic truths"; therefore we are all presupposing the existence of "ontological truths"; and because of this the belief in "ontological truths" is justified.

I think that's a good account on the "game of pool" approach, but I would prefer an account that provides for knowledge of at least some "ontological truths," rather than mere justified belief. — Leontiskos

Here is a different approach to the same conclusion:

Can it be in any way validly justified that no ontologically occurring truths occur? If one believes that this is the case, what does one intend to express by the proposition of “no ontically occurring truths occur” if this proposition is not meant to conform/correspond to the actual states of affairs of the world and, thereby, of itself be an ontic truth? Thereby contradicting the very proposition made. Therefore, there is no justifiable alternative to the proposition that ontic truths occur.

As to providing knowledge of some "ontological truths", this, again, is what our ability to honestly and cogently justify offers us the possibility of. It just that our JTB knowledge will not, by a fallibilist account, be infallible. (Fallibiilty does not equate to being wrong.)

Then on the premise that we know that every p (epistemological truth) could be false, we cannot know any p. — Leontiskos

Remember that the JTB model of knowledge was presented by an Ancient Skeptic. If one presumes knowledge to be infallible, then this quote holds. If one presumes knowledge to be fallible, then it does not.

On all of these conceptions certain knowledge is impossible, and knowledge is traditionally understood to be certain. — Leontiskos

By everything I've so far stated, there then can occur ontically true beliefs which we can justify at will. These then will be instances of ontic knowledge, which is certain. Because we can only hold epistemic appraisals of what is ontically true, though, everything we uphold as knowledge will be epistemic knowledge, rather than ontic knowledge - which, as with epistemic truth, is less than "completely assured, fixed, and invariable."

I'll be back tomorrow.

↪Relativist
has forwarded a theory where all (or almost all - this is contentious) beliefs are inferences to the best explanation, and are thus probabilistic. — Leontiskos

That's correct, but I don't claim that most such inferences are rigorous. It's often just what seems most likely to the person making the judgement at the time he makes it.
Example of non-rigorous IBE: a Presidential candidate* loses the election; based on his belief that he was overwhelmingly more popular than his rival, and he judges that this is best explained as the election being stolen from him by illegal means. (* Any resemblance to any person, living or dead, is purely coincidental.)

More rigor enters into the analysis when one open-mindedly considers additional evidence that was previously unavailable or overlooked, often in the face of being challenged on the initial judgement.

__________________________
Regarding "probablistic" - do not mistake this with orthodox Bayesian epistemology, which depends on the absurd assumption that we can attach a consistent set of epistemic probabilities to every statement we claim to believe. Rather, I embrace Mark Kaplan's* "modest Bayesianism", which makes the modest claim that we can attach a relative confidence level to SOME pairs (or small sets) of statements of belief. If there's a reasonable basis for the ranking.

* source of this theory: Mark Kaplan's article "Decision Theory and Epistemology", in the Oxford Handbook of Epistemology.

That bird looks sad. Is he a cousin of the fly in the fly-bottle? (I also notice that he could leave the cage anytime he wanted to.)

Here is a different approach to the same conclusion:

Can it be in any way validly justified that no ontologically occurring truths occur? If one believes that this is the case, what does one intend to express by the proposition of “no ontically occurring truths occur” if this proposition is not meant to conform/correspond to the actual states of affairs of the world and, thereby, of itself be an ontic truth? Thereby contradicting the very proposition made. Therefore, there is no justifiable alternative to the proposition that ontic truths occur. — javra

That's also an intelligible argument, but I think it's weaker than the other one. This is because it seems to commit the error of applying the LEM to justification, so to speak. It seems to say, "If you don't think one is justified in affirming the existence of 'ontological truths', then you must have some justification for affirming their non-existence." I don't think this works because I think that someone could reject all particular justifications on offer in either direction, even if they do not affirm the truth that there can be no justification in either direction. One example of this approach would be the ancient skepticism that you mentioned, but in a more general sense I think an agnostic stance that does not affirm either of the two "ontological truths" is coherent.

As to providing knowledge of some "ontological truths", this, again, is what our ability to honestly and cogently justify offers us the possibility of. It just that our JTB knowledge will not, by a fallibilist account, be infallible. (Fallibiilty does not equate to being wrong.) — javra

But if "fallibility" means that we cannot be certain, then the same problem arises.

The words "infallible" and "fallible" are often used by "fallibilists" but never by "infallibilists," which makes me think they involve contentious presuppositions. I would say that what is at stake is the certainty of knowledge, not the infallibility of knowledge. Actually the object of in/fallibility is a faculty or power, not a piece of knowledge, which is another reason I don't find those terms helpful. It is understandable that one would use them, but given that no one accounts themselves an "infallibilist" the distinction's usefulness is questionable. More simply, I see no reason why someone who affirms the certainty of some knowledge must be a so-called "infallibilist."

Remember that the JTB model of knowledge was presented by an Ancient Skeptic. If one presumes knowledge to be infallible, then this quote holds. If one presumes knowledge to be fallible, then it does not. — javra

...and since no one presumes knowledge to be infallible, and yet pretty much everyone holds that knowledge is certain, @Janus' conditional must apply more generally than you allow.

By everything I've so far stated, there then can occur ontically true beliefs which we can justify at will. These then will be instances of ontic knowledge, which is certain. Because we can only hold epistemic appraisals of what is ontically true, though, everything we uphold as knowledge will be epistemic knowledge, rather than ontic knowledge - which, as with epistemic truth, is less than "completely assured, fixed, and invariable." — javra

Well you're walking a tightrope with these sentences. For one thing, I would want to ask what it means for "ontic knowledge" to "occur" or be "certain." And why is it "certain" that there are instances of ontic knowledge? Couldn't someone of your persuasion hold that there are no ontically true beliefs, even though every epistemological belief aims at ontic knowledge?

I would take the more traditional approach and agree with a great deal of what you have said, but add that sometimes "epistemological knowledge" and "ontic knowledge" coincide, and can be known to coincide.

I'll be back tomorrow. — javra

Okay, and if I don't manage to post tomorrow then I will be out for a few days.

Regarding "probablistic" - do not mistake this with orthodox Bayesian epistemology, which depends on the absurd assumption that we can attach a consistent set of epistemic probabilities to every statement we claim to believe. Rather, I embrace Mark Kaplan's* "modest Bayesianism", which makes the modest claim that we can attach a relative confidence level to SOME pairs (or small sets) of statements of belief. If there's a reasonable basis for the ranking. — Relativist

Okay good, and therefore let me try to answer one of your questions from a different thread here, in part because I will be out for a few days:

If there is no pole of knowledge then I don't see how one IBE can be better than another (because no IBE can better approach that pole).

Similarly, if we know what ice is then we have a pole and a limit for the coldness of water. If we don't know what ice is, then the coldness of water is purely relative, and there is nothing to measure against. I would argue that knowledge is prior to IBE, and that IBE is parasitic upon knowledge. Thus if you make IBEs the only option, then there is nothing on which an IBE can be parasitic upon or subordinate to, and this undermines IBEs themselves. — Leontiskos

Does your "tentpole" comment refer to the mere fact that knowledge exists, are you suggesting IBEs that aren't based on knowledge are all equivalent, or something else entirely? — Relativist

Not a tentpole, but a pole such as the North Pole. If some things are more North and some things are less North, then something must be most North.

So if knowledge is probabilistic, then it would seem to be asymptotic towards "100% probable." If someone doesn't know what it means to be 100% probable, then they cannot know what it means to be probabilistic at all. And if you admit IBEs or probabilistic knowledge without admitting traditional knowledge, then it looks like you have no pole to orient your IBE.

The phrase itself, "inference to the best explanation," presupposes the idea of an explanation, and an explanation is not merely probabilistic.

The general idea here—which will apply to a large number of the epistemological theories on offer—is that if we abandon the possibility or notion of certain knowledge, then the replacement form of uncertain knowledge will cease to make sense. If all knowledge is uncertain, then no knowledge is uncertain, so to speak. And if there is to be a spectrum of certainties, then one must account for what makes the more certain knowledge more certain and what makes the less certain knowledge less certain, and this accounting will itself reinstate the traditional view of knowledge that one was trying evade in the first place.

An attempt to analyse truth in terms of knowledge using a definition of knowledge in terms of truth will of course be circular.

The problem I think you see is of your own creation. Or so it seems to me.

Finished what I had to do early, so I'll reply now.

That's also an intelligible argument, but I think it's weaker than the other one. This is because it seems to commit the error of applying the LEM to justification, so to speak. — Leontiskos

The issue I posed had nothing to do with the Law of the Excluded Middle but with contradiction and consistency, hence with the LNC. The proposition that “no ontic truths occur” can’t help but contradict itself upon analysis—for it intends to covey that which is actual and thereby specify an ontic truth. If it happens to be (ontically) true, this then directly contradicts what is affirmed. And if it’s not (ontically) true … what viable alternative can there be obtained other than that it is an untrue, and thereby a false or else erroneous, proposition? Else, how can the proposition of “no ontic truths occur” be interpreted to in any way convey a partial truth? The proposition is either completely true or it is not.

The justification provided for the proposition that ontic truths occur then serves to evidence that the stance is held knowledge. The contrarian, if they cannot provide cogent justification, then cannot claim to have knowledge in the form of JTB that no ontic truths occur. This then results in (yet fallible) JTB that they do vs. blind belief which is in no way justifiable that they don’t.

The words "infallible" and "fallible" are often used by "fallibilists" but never by "infallibilists," which makes me think they involve contentious presuppositions. — Leontiskos

As pertains to this and a good portion of the remaining comments in your post:

As you might already know, “certainty” is a very difficult semantic to adequately define. For my part, I’ve so far tried to define it as being “completely assured, fixed, and unvarying”. But since you place so much emphasis on the issue of certainty in respect to knowledge, please define what you yourself mean by the term. For example, the SEP article on certainty specifies a distinction between psychological certainty (as one example, being certain that X due to a gut feeling one cannot consciously justify) and epistemic certainty (i.e., the highest degree of certainty possible). And I presume you are here referring to epistemic certainty. You will find the article further addresses four different possibilities of what epistemic certainty might signify, with infallibility being formally introduced as one of these four possibilities addressed. If you disagree that epistemic certainty equates to infallibility (this being something that I myself disagree with), then, again, please specify what it is you believe certainty in relation to knowledge equates to.

But if "fallibility" means that we cannot be certain, then the same problem arises. — Leontiskos

As I understand it, fallibility (simply: the possibility (but not the plausibility) of being mistaken) does not equate to a lack of certainty, neither to lack of psychological certainty nor to lack of epistemic certainty. For one example, I can find no “higher degree of certainty possible” than applies to, for one example, the proposition that the ontic is, i.e. that being is. In then upholding this affirmation to be epistemic certainty, and because I don’t equate epistemic certainty to infallibility (i.e., the impossibility of being mistaken), I then can yet intellectually acknowledge the possibility (but not the plausibility) of being mistaken in so upholding. And, thereby, of the proposition being technically fallible. But this does not in any way diminish the fact that I hold the occurrence of being to be epistemically certain. No psychological uncertainty whatsoever involved here. Again, this even though I don’t take this epistemic certainty to be infallible, i.e. impossible to be mistaken, and thereby yet deem it fallible.

Well you're walking a tightrope with these sentences. — Leontiskos

I might better address this after you specify what you mean by "certainty". For the time being though, to toot my own horn: perhaps I am, but, if so, I so far find this tightrope walk to be steadfast, secure, and successful: Ontic knowledge obtains, hence occurs, when one can justify a belief which is, in fact, ontically true. A belief which in fact is ontically true is certain in the sense that it conforms or else corresponds to an actuality that is itself ontically (rather than psychologically or epistemically) certain - and, hence, is ontologically assured, fixed, and unvarying given its context, or else limitations, of space and time. For example, if a cat is on a mat at that location and at that time, this will be ontically certain, i.e. completely assured, fixed, and unvarying ontologically. If my pronouncement that "the cat is on the mat at that location and at that time" is ontically true, then my pronounced truth is as completely assured, fixed and unvarying as is the cat being on the mat ontologically. And lastly, no, I cannot conceive of there being no ontically true beliefs. If you can, please elaborate on how that might be possible.

The general idea here—which will apply to a large number of the epistemological theories on offer—is that if we abandon the possibility or notion of certain knowledge, then the replacement form of uncertain knowledge will cease to make sense. — Leontiskos

First of all, I have never claimed knowledge is impossible. I said it is rare. Is this sufficient for uncertain "knowledge"* to make sense, on your terms?

*(if it's uncertain, it's not knowledge - by most definitions)

Secondly, I suggest that TRUTH is a well defined concept, and the ideal that we strive for is: TRUE BELIEFS. Just this one aspect of "knowledge" is needed to make sense of what we're doing.

Turning to the other qualifying factors for knowledge...

Justification is relevant, but only because it relates to the means by which we pursue truth. Some justifications are better than others; the best are the ones that achieve certainty (=confidence we have found truth).

The existence of Gettier problems would seem to suggest that 100% certainty should almost never be claimed (there's nearly always some remote possibility that a strongly justified belief is false). However- IMO, remote possibilities doesn't and shouldn't shake our complete confidence in a strongly justified belief.

This segues into my view of epistemic "probabilities". I don't think the term should be used, because our attitudes toward statements aren't developed in any remotely mathematical way. As I said in my prior post, we can often rank one justification stronger than another, but that doesn't warrant assigning fine-grained numbers. Now back to Gettiers...

If fine-grained "probabilities" can't be assigned to beliefs, remote possibilities should not be a factor in judging confidence because they would reflect only fine-grained difference. This removes Gettier problems from real-world epistemic considerations.

So...if the Gettier issue is included in the definition of knowledge, then it renders true knowledge a rarely obtainable objective. But this should have no bearing on the rational pursuit of truth.

I'm good with all that. Just wanted to make the case that almost anything we claim to be true requires some (potential) justification. — J

I agree that when it comes to claims of knowledge, justification is required. On the other hand I know many things with certainty that require no justification simply because they are directly known―in these cases justification just doesn't enter the picture.

the truth of things which are true by definition and logical self-evidence is simply obvious, and just needs to be pointed out to be established in conscious understanding.
— Janus
It is obvious to us. But we have learnt how to do reasoning as part of learning language and interacting with people. — Ludwig V

Right of course, but I think it is also the case that some things that are self-evident are already so before their self-evidence becomes reflectively conscious. In other words I think there are basic logics inherent in perception itself that forms the primordial basis for reasoning, and can be seen in the kind of basic reasoning revealed in animal behavior.

So, if we know p could be false, then we don't know that it's true, but we may well believe that it's true.
— Janus

Then on the premise that we know that every p (epistemological truth) could be false, we cannot know any p. — Leontiskos

Strictly, allowing for radical skepticism (Brain-in-vat, might-be-a-dream, Evil Demon) I think that is true, and we should not speak of knowledge (except in the know-how sense) but, more modestly, of belief―so not 'knowing that' but 'believing that'.

But I also think that is too strong and that we do know some things with certainty, because I don't think skepticism based on the bare logic possibility of error should be taken seriously.

If there were only one proposition, then how could there be an entailment? Gettier's argument depends on the entailment, and entailments involve at least two propositions. "The man who will get the job" does not refer to either Smith or Jones. It is a descriptor. What this means is that, contrary to your view, Smith is not uttering a tautology when he says, "Jones is the man who will get the job." Such an utterance is not the same as, "Jones is Jones," even for Smith. — Leontiskos

I think we are still talking past each other. I take your point that there is an entailment involved and that this must involve two propositions. I also take your point that "Jones is the man who will get the job" and "Jones is Jones" are not equivalent, even though A=A.

Let me try again:-

.. suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the fol1owing conjunctive proposition:
(d) Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket. .....
Proposition (d) entails: (e) The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.
Let us suppose that Smith sees the entailment from (d) to (e), and accepts (e) on the grounds of (d), for which he has strong evidence. In this case, Smith is clearly justified in believing that (e) is true. — Analysis. vol. 23 (1966)

I think we agree that (d) and (e) are two distinct propositions, and (d) implies (e).

But imagine, further, that unknown to Smith, he himself, not Jones, will get the job. And, also, unknown to Smith, he himself has ten coins in his pocket. Proposition (e) is then true, though proposition (d), from which Smith inferred (e), is false. — Analysis. vol. 23 (1966)

That's right, because (e) also follows from (s) "Smith is the man who will get the job, and Smith has ten coins in his pocket." Now we know that if Jones gets the job, (e) will be true, and if Smith gets the job, (e) will be true. So it also follows that (e) is true, because whoever gets the job will have ten coins in his pocket.
But Smith only knows that if Jones gets the job, the man who gets the job will have ten coins in his pocket. So Smith is justified in believing (e) if "the man who gets the job" refers to Jones. He is not justified in believing (e) if (e) refers to Smith. So he is not justified in believing (e) if it refers to "whoever gets the job".

Your theory amounts to the idea that when Smith says, "The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket," he is saying something false. But when someone else says the exact same sentence, such as the hiring agent who knows that Smith has ten coins in his pocket, he is saying something true. — Leontiskos

No, I would not say exactly that. I do say that, given what S believes, when he asserts that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket, he is asserting something that he does not know to be true. But when the hiring agent says the same sentence, that needs to be interpreted in the light of their knowledge and beliefs, and the hiring agent does know that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. Are we to say that Smith's belief is false? It depends whose point of view you regard as the appropriate context.

The "exact same" sentence may have different meanings if it is used (asserted) in different contexts. Suppose that A is 20 years old, and B is 40 years old. If A says "I am twenty years old", A is saying something true. If B says "I am twenty years old", B is saying something false.
I say that "I am twenty years old" said by A is a distinct statement from "I am twenty years old" said by B. A statement is a sentence as it is used in a specific context. Whether it is the same proposition or not, I do not opine, because, IMO, the concept of a proposition is not sufficiently clearly defined.
But if you are thinking of a proposition as something like the meaning of a sentence, I think you will still have trouble saying that "I am twenty years old" expresses the same proposition in both contexts, because it is true in one context and false in another. But you might say that "I am twenty years old" said by A means "A is twenty years old" and similarly for B. In that case, you still get two distinct meanings for the sentence and therefore two distinct propositions.

"The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket" has different references in different contexts. In the context of Smith's beliefs, it refers to Jones. In the context of our knowledge, it refers to Smith. There is a third context, and so a third meaning for this sentence, and that is the context before anyone knows who will get the job. As it happens, in that context, we know (but Smith does not) that whoever gets the job will have ten coins in his pocket.

So I think a material conclusion can differ from a formal conclusion, for example when both say the same thing and yet the "therefore" of the first is merely valid whereas the "therefore" of the second is sound. — Leontiskos

Could you please explain to me the difference between a material conclusion and a formal conclusions? I'm not familiar with it. I may have forgotten what it is.

I would go farther and say that you can see that their argument is correct. It's not so much a matter of trusting them. — Leontiskos

I would accept that. But I do have a reservation about the data. Unless I can make my own observations (or experiments), I have to trust the report of them. In order to pass on knowledge, we have to be able to assume a common context to at least some extent.

As one banal example, why must something which by all accounts appears to all everywhere to be a vase on a table in fact necessarily be a vase on a table—such that it being a vase is true—rather than, say, being an extraterrestrial alien which is camouflaged as a vase, or else an advanced hologram — javra

It depends what you mean by "necessarily". I suspect that you have in mind logical necessity, and that is not possible, because "there is a vase on the table" is contingent. In one way, I'll accept that we can imagine that the vase on my table is an alien or a hologram. But there is not a shred of evidence for either possibility, so there is no rational basis for an actual doubt. It is and empty possibility. In fact, when I try to imagine it, I cannot imagine how that possibility might have come about, except by a further fantasy which has little or no connection with reality. Contrast the possibility that the vase on the table is actually a listening device with a camera, planted by an evil agency to entrap me. But then, I can rule that out, so it is in a different class.

But I also think that is too strong and that we do know some things with certainty, because I don't think skepticism based on the bare logic possibility of error should be taken seriously. — Janus

Quite right too. (I sometimes wonder what distinguishes Descartes' evil demon from a paranoid fantasy.)

I agree that when it comes to claims of knowledge, justification is required. On the other hand I know many things with certainty that require no justification simply because they are directly known―in these cases justification just doesn't enter the picture. — Janus

And this resembles the "A or ~A" case, where it's difficult to see it in terms of justifications. Still, I think the conclusion we ought to draw from this is that we're not quite sure what a justification is. What sorts of reasons may play a part in justification? (We noted earlier that a "good justification" is very unclear, in many cases.) If you ask me for my justification in believing "I am having thought X right now" and I reply, "I am directly observing this occurrence as we speak," have I offered a justification? Perhaps so; that's one way of understanding what reasons count as justification, though I'd probably also need to say something about the previous reliability of my direct observations. Or we might conclude that "directly observing" and "having" are two ways of saying the same thing, so no actual reason has been offered. Then, if "I am having thought X" needs a justification, we'd have to look elsewhere.

The problem I think you see is of your own creation. Or so it seems to me. — Banno

You may well be right. But I haven't yet satisfied myself one way or the other. Your input, as always, is appreciated.

I agree that when it comes to claims of knowledge, justification is required. On the other hand I know many things with certainty that require no justification simply because they are directly known―in these cases justification just doesn't enter the picture.
— Janus

And this resembles the "A or ~A" case, where it's difficult to see it in terms of justifications. Still, I think the conclusion we ought to draw from this is that we're not quite sure what a justification is. What sorts of reasons may play a part in justification? (We noted earlier that a "good justification" is very unclear, in many cases.) If you ask me for my justification in believing "I am having thought X right now" and I reply, "I am directly observing this occurrence as we speak," have I offered a justification? Perhaps so; that's one way of understanding what reasons count as justification, though I'd probably also need to say something about the previous reliability of my direct observations. Or we might conclude that "directly observing" and "having" are two ways of saying the same thing, so no actual reason has been offered. Then, if "I am having thought X" needs a justification, we'd have to look elsewhere. — J

In his final piece of writing, On Certainty, Wittgenstein describes how G.E. Moore asserts something quite close to what Janus claims, that we can know things with certainty that require no justification simply because they are directly known―in these cases justification just doesn't enter the picture. Moore uses as an example holding up one’s hand and stating ‘here is my hand’. He believes one can be certain of this without a need for justification. But Wittgenstein disagrees with Moore’s depiction of this form of certainty as a kind of empirical knowledge. He asserts instead that it is a matter of our enmeshment in a “form of life”, a hinge on the basis of which to organize facts rather than the ascertainment of those empirical facts by themselves.

But Wittgenstein disagrees with Moore’s depiction of this form of certainty as a kind of empirical knowledge. — Joshs

Yes, that's a good link to Moore and Witt. In this context, I'm not so concerned to ask whether there is such a thing as direct knowledge -- or rather, I take it as given that there is. The problem is to explain what we mean by that, and what can count as a justification for our confidence in it. Witt, as I understand him, is raising a doubt not about the "knowledge" part, but about whether it is empirical. That's also what I was moving toward, in saying "If 'I am having thought X' needs a justification, we'd have to look elsewhere." Hinges and forms of life are good candidates.

In one way, I'll accept that we can imagine that the vase on my table is an alien or a hologram. But there is not a shred of evidence for either possibility, so there is no rational basis for an actual doubt. — Ludwig V

Yes, and, again, that was the entire point of the example given. One can intellectually acknowledge the possibility (not the plausibility) of being mistaken in a maintained proposition without in any way finding any rational, coherent, or else sane means of doubting anything about the proposition maintained. As I was saying to @Leontiskos in my last post, the epistemological stance of fallibility does not equate to uncertainty, of which doubt is a variant of. Same will then apply to BIV hypotheses, the hypothesis of solipsism, and so forth: "I can't prove that there's no possibility of being wrong in upholding that we are not BIVs but, all the same, I can find no rational basis whatsoever to in any way doubt that we are not."

I agree that when it comes to claims of knowledge, justification is required. On the other hand I know many things with certainty that require no justification simply because they are directly known―in these cases justification just doesn't enter the picture. — Janus

And this resembles the "A or ~A" case, where it's difficult to see it in terms of justifications. Still, I think the conclusion we ought to draw from this is that we're not quite sure what a justification is. What sorts of reasons may play a part in justification? (We noted earlier that a "good justification" is very unclear, in many cases.) If you ask me for my justification in believing "I am having thought X right now" and I reply, "I am directly observing this occurrence as we speak," have I offered a justification? — J

At least the last example overlaps knowledge by acquaintance, which is not contingent on justification, with knowledge by description, which is.

We shall say that we have acquaintance with anything of which we are directly aware, without the intermediary of any process of inference or any knowledge of truths. (Russell 1912: 78)

I say that I am acquainted with an object when I have a direct cognitive relation to that object, i.e., when I am directly aware of the object itself. When I speak of a cognitive relation here, I do not mean the sort of relation which constitutes judgment, but the sort which constitutes presentation. In fact, I think the relation of subject and object which I call acquaintance is simply the converse of the relation of object and subject which constitutes presentation. That is, to say that S has acquaintance with O is essentially the same thing as to say that O is presented to S. (Russell 1910/11: 108) — https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-acquaindescrip/#Dis

Say an intoxicated person is seeing a pink elephant. The person’s knowing that they are seeing a pink elephant is knowledge by acquaintance; it is non-inferential and so not contingent on justifications; this knowledge thereby does not equate to or else require JTB. Knowledge that the pink elephant seen is either real or not, on the other hand, will require some form of inference and, so, will be contingent on justification; thereby equating to the JTB sense of knowledge.

Thermometers never commit epistemic errors; they can only mislead those who uncritically rely upon them. Likewise, the same can be said of a 'believer's' utterances.

The dilemma is either

A. a belief merely refers to the coexistence of a believer's mental state and an external truth-maker, where the external truth-maker is decided by the linguistic community rather than the believer. In which case the intentionality associated with the believer's mental state is irrelevant with respect to the belief that the community ascribes to the believer as a matter of linguistic convention rather than of neurological fact.

or

B. Beliefs refer to the actual physical causes of the believer's mental-state - in which case the believer's intentionality is relevant - so much so, that it is epistemically impossible for the believer to have false beliefs. (Trivialism).

So you either have to sacrifice belief intentionality or you have to accept trivialism. There is no "inbetween" alternative IMO. Either way, the naive conception of beliefs as binary truth-apt intentional states is untenable and ought to be eliminated from discourse.

Yes, and, again, that was the entire point of the example given. — javra

I'm afraid I didn't realize that. Fair enough.

The person’s knowing that they are seeing a pink elephant is knowledge by acquaintance; it is non-inferential and so not contingent on justifications; — javra

Does that mean that you are thinking of seeing the pink elephant as introspection and so immune from mistake? I can't help feeling that applying the description "pink elephant" to whatever I am seeing is not immune from mistake.

In which case the intentionality associated with the believer's mental state is irrelevant with respect to the belief that the community ascribes to the believer — sime

I don't quite understand this. Our community ascribes false beliefs to people all the time and that's why they are called "intentional"

Beliefs refer to the actual physical causes of the believer's mental-state - in which case the believer's intentionality is relevant - so much so, that it is epistemically impossible for the believer to have false beliefs. — sime

I don't understand this either - apart from the first part. If beliefs did refer to the actual physical causes of the believer's mental state, we could never ascribe them to each other, since we mostly have no idea what they are.

The person’s knowing that they are seeing a pink elephant is knowledge by acquaintance; it is non-inferential and so not contingent on justifications; — javra

Does that mean that you are thinking of seeing the pink elephant as introspection and so immune from mistake? I can't help feeling that applying the description "pink elephant" to whatever I am seeing is not immune from mistake. — Ludwig V

If the pink elephant happens to be a hallucination or mirage*, then hallucinations and mirages are not introspections (aka, self-examinations of one’s own being, thoughts, etc.) … but imaginings (such as can occur in daydreams) seen with the mind’s eye that a) are not willfully produced at a conscious level and b) which the person does not, at least momentarily, realize are merely imaginings seen with the minds eye. Do you disagree with this?

If you agree, then what is seen with the mind’s eye remains known-by-acquaintance as that which one so sees (here, again, with the mind’s eye): here, then, the person sees a pink elephant and knows this (thereby knowing it isn’t a pink snake or else a green elephant, etc., which is being seen). And this is so known-by-acquaintance without any inferences involved - it is brute data of experience with presents itself to the person (in contrast, most introspection that I know of is inferential in some capacity or another).

Introspection is not immune from mistakes, because it is most always inferential. That one experiences what one presently experiences is, on the other hand, a brute given. One would need to delve deep into hypotheticals (e.g., the possibility that there in fact is no "I" and hence no perceiver) to grant room for possible mistakes in the affirmation of, "I am currently seeing X" when one is in fact so currently seeing (be it with the mind's eye as is the case with imaginings or else with one's physiological eyes).

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* Otherwise, the intoxicated person could conceivably have seen a real elephant covered in pink powder, such as occurs at times in India during certain celebrations, in which case it would not have been a hallucination or mirage but an externally existing elephant which was physiologically seen.

hallucinations and mirages are not introspections (aka, self-examinations of one’s own being, thoughts, etc.) … but imaginings (such as can occur in daydreams) seen with the mind’s eye — javra

That sounds right -- but it also means that we can't say the drunk saw a pink elephant. Seeing with the mind's eye is a metaphorical extension of what it means to see something.

I can't help feeling that applying the description "pink elephant" to whatever I am seeing is not immune from mistake. — Ludwig V

I'd say the mistake is in the use of "see".

But in any case, this is about choice of terminology. We could say to the drunk, "No, you didn't," and mean either "You saw nothing" or "What you saw wasn't a pink elephant." Neither one is obviously correct, apart from pedantry. But we're all three dividing up the conceptual territory the same way. (And I think @sime is getting at this too, with their A and B analyses of beliefs.)

That sounds right -- but it also means that we can't say the drunk saw a pink elephant. Seeing with the mind's eye is a metaphorical extension of what it means to see something. — J

Although “the mind’s eye” is indeed metaphorical, that doesn’t seem right to me. As one very common example, visual experiences that occur during REM periods of sleep are all seen with the mind’s eye. So then people can’t say, “I saw X in a dream last night”? Yet this is common practice. Or else, someone instructing another to visualize such and such and then asking the person, "what do you see?" (this too obviously being visualizations experienced via the metaphorical mind’s eye).

Yes, it's just terminology, as I said. I certainly don't feel strongly about it. We can use an ambiguous term like "see" any way we want to stipulate, as long as everyone knows what that is!

...where the external truth-maker is decided by the linguistic community rather than the believer. — sime

For a large class of sentences, the truth of the sentence is decided by how things are, not by how the community thinks they are.

Again,

An attempt to analyse truth in terms of knowledge using a definition of knowledge in terms of truth will of course be circular. — Banno

I'd suggest that here truth is foundational, and knowledge derivative.

From "We know that A" we can conclude that A is true, but only because that is how "We know that..." works; this is a bit of grammar only.

A. a belief merely refers to the coexistence of a believer's mental state and an external truth-maker, — sime

Did you mean correspondence? I don't see what coexistence does there.

No belief is an island. Any particular belief implies a web of associated propositional attitudes, much of which is worldview, the present generation's heritage. Being wrong involves miscalculation, misinformation, misconception. What's wrong with that account?

Or we might conclude that "directly observing" and "having" are two ways of saying the same thing, so no actual reason has been offered. Then, if "I am having thought X" needs a justification, we'd have to look elsewhere. — J

If I am conscious of entertaining some thought or other, then I cannot be wrong about that awareness. So, I can say that I know I am thinking X, when I am aware that I am thinking X. I cannot justify that I have that knowledge to you, if you believe me you take it on faith.

He asserts instead that it is a matter of our enmeshment in a “form of life”, a hinge on the basis of which to organize facts rather than the ascertainment of those empirical facts by themselves. — Joshs

We can only organize facts, or even generate the concept of a fact because we have symbolic language. On the other hand we and the other animals observe many things without necessarily self-consciously or reflectively conceptualizing those observations, and of course it is only we (as far as we know)m that can verbalize facts as statements.

But in any case, this is about choice of terminology. We could say to the drunk, "No, you didn't," and mean either "You saw nothing" or "What you saw wasn't a pink elephant." Neither one is obviously correct, apart from pedantry. — J

This is spot on. But I don't think it is just pedantry.

I'd say the mistake is in the use of "see". — J

I don't think there is any mistake at all. You are presenting a tediously familiar philosophical "problem" but in a way that makes us to look at the problem in a different way. The conceptual resources in your presentation do not allow a satisfying description of the situation. As you say, two contradictory answers seem both to be true. If you say the drunk saw nothing, you are not taking into account what they say and what they do - they do in fact behave as if they saw a pink elephant. If you say, what the drunk saw was not a pink elephant, you invite the question what they did see, and there is no answer, apart from nothing.

But we're all three dividing up the conceptual territory the same way. — J

I take it that the three of us are 1) someone who says the drunk saw nothing, and 2) someone who says what the drunk saw was not an elephant and 3) the drunk who says that they saw a pink elephant? ln which case, you are quite right. But your description is excluding the "straightforward" answer that the drunk is hallucinating a pink elephant.
So we can see that the concept of a hallucination resolves the problem - it squares the circle of three answers, none of which is satisfactory. I'm irresistibly tempted to say that it was (in some sense) designed to do just that.
In a sense, of course, it just kicks the can down the road, because the puzzle about what a hallucination actually is remains. Many philosophers have "resolved" it by distorting our concept of experiences, appearances, images or inventing a yet more puzzling concept like "sense-data" to explain the phenomena. But that is not a solution. It just kicks a much bigger can down the road. Common sense doesn't do that, but moves towards an explanation why all this is happening. So we needn't go down the philosophical road, but simply say that Macbeth's weird behaviour is the result of his guilty conscience or possibly a vision sent by God.