The skeptical challenge remains the same in both scenarios. — Moliere

So the skeptic claims that we can't know about the external world because it's possible to doubt it?

That's a really high standard for knowledge. There are rare psychological cases were someone comes to believe their family has been replaced by imposters. And how can you be certain that doppelgangers didn't replace the people you know while you were asleep last night?

On the skeptic's standard for knowledge, I can't know the people I claim to know.

So the skeptic claims that we can't know about the external world because it's possible to doubt it? — Marchesk

More or less. Obviously there's more than one way to put the skeptical challenge -- and there are more types of skepticism than radical skepticism of the sort associated with Descartes -- but that's the gist of the argument

That's a really high standard for knowledge. — Marchesk

I think that's the best way of going about addressing the skeptic, personally. The fault lies in what counts as knowledge, and secondarily how the skeptic divides between how we evaluate internal vs. external worlds.

But even adopting the (rather commonplace, if often criticized) distinction between internal and external, if we examine what counts as knowledge and rework our thoughts on what counts as knowledge, then we undermine the skeptic.

Usually, in the process, though, we also have a weaker form of knowledge. (not that I have a problem with that, but it's a worthwhile realization I came to while thinking through the skeptical problem)

If it wasn't part of the established tradition of philosophy, it would be given the credit it's worth: nothing. No one seriously entertains the idea, the entire premise of this and like ideas are if this is believed; how do we 'access' truth? If this is possible, what can be justified?

'The skeptic' is a bogeyman in philosophy discussions, nothing more.

Sure. The radical skeptic at least. It's more or less a thought experiment. It seems to me that you believe that undermines the thought experiment, though. I don't know why you'd think that. I don't think the thought experiment lies on the authority of tradition. I think it actually makes headway because it plays on common intuitions.



Also, I'm not sure no one entertains the idea. Descartes entertained such doubts, at least, even if it was justified as methodical rather than actual.

The skeptic' is a bogeyman in philosophy discussions, nothing more. — fdrake

Well, there is Nick Bostrom's simulation argument. Sounds like he and quite a few others took it somewhat seriously.

You had Elon Musk asking physicists to find a way out of the simulation! Maybe they told him to shoot a Tesla into space. That would break the simulation for sure.

Allowing the skeptic their innocent imaginings is already giving them enough rope to hang you. We do have knowledge; so the skeptic is wrong in any case. It's probably true that what makes demon-like scenarios so enduring is that they play on the intuition that doubt is set against knowledge. They also invite their reader to imagine knowledge devoid of the contexts it arises in, so it's not surprising knowledge seems unattainable in this light: the deck is stacked.

But it's also true that dealing with the skeptic is something every student taking an introductory epistemology module, or someone with an interest in philosophy reading an introductory text, will be acquainted with. At least Cartesian skepticism. Without that context, it's madness to believe it; and deferred madness - to the hypothetical everyman 'the skeptic'- to give it much weight.

In a parallel universe where Cartesian skepticism was never developed, someone who turns up here writing: "I have a proof that knowledge is impossible, what if there is a demon tricking all our intuitions and knowledge and all we know is the demon's machinations? How can we truly know anything now? The only answer is God.' would have their thread scoured from the forum almost as quickly as an objectivist Holocaust denier.

Well, there is Nick Bostrom's simulation argument. Sounds like he and quite a few others took it somewhat seriously.

Nick Bostrom's simulation argument isn't seeking to undermine all claims to knowledge, though. We have to know stuff about the universe and be able to assess probabilities of events for it to get going. Something 'the skeptic' could easily disallow.

In a parallel universe where Cartesian skepticism was never developed, someone who turns up here writing: "I have a proof that knowledge is impossible, what if there is a demon tricking all our intuitions and knowledge and all we know is the demon's machinations? How can we truly know anything now? The only answer is God.' would have their thread scoured from the forum almost as quickly as an objectivist Holocaust denier. — fdrake

I'd say that the same would happen in the universe we actually inhabit.

If memory serves, actually, that did happen with several supposed radical skeptics on this forum :D. (or perhaps the last iteration?)

Allowing the skeptic their innocent imaginings is already giving them enough rope to hang you. We do have knowledge; so the skeptic is wrong in any case. — fdrake

That the skeptic is wrong isn't the interesting part of the thought experiment, I'd say. Aren't many philosophers wrong, after all? But they can still be of philosophical interest to read. Here what's interesting is why the radical skeptic is wrong -- where is the error? -- and also, supposing these conditions of skepticism, is there some way to persuade the skeptic?

It's probably true that what makes demon-like scenarios so enduring is that they play on the intuition that doubt is set against knowledge. They also invite their reader to imagine knowledge devoid of the contexts it arises in, so it's not surprising knowledge seems unattainable in this light: the deck is stacked.

I don't disagree with this. As I said to Marchsk, I think that looking at the meaning of knowledge is what's fruitful. And the fact that the skeptical scenario plays off of intuitions is also what's fruitful -- because those commonly held intuitions are fallible and often mistaken.

But it's also true that dealing with the skeptic is something every student taking an introductory epistemology module, or someone with an interest in philosophy reading an introductory text, will be acquainted with. At least Cartesian skepticism. Without that context, it's madness to believe it; and deferred madness - to the hypothetical everyman 'the skeptic'- to give it much weigh

Do you think Descartes was mad?

I don't think entertaining doubt, even of the radical sort, is madness -- whether it be a Great Philosopher, or someone before Descartes who had similar thoughts.

You may not find skeptical doubts persuasive, but that doesn't seem enough to make a charge of madness against said doubt. Especially as Descartes lays out his arguments -- obviously there was no tradition of Descartes prior to Descartes, but madness isn't what I'd say is where his thinking comes from.

I'd say that the same would happen in the universe we actually inhabit.

If memory serves, actually, that did happen with several supposed radical skeptics on this forum :D. (or perhaps the last iteration?)

I remember it happening too. Is why I brought it up.

That the skeptic is wrong isn't the interesting part of the thought experiment, I'd say. Aren't many philosophers wrong, after all? But they can still be of philosophical interest to read. Here what's interesting is why the radical skeptic is wrong -- where is the error? -- and also, supposing these conditions of skepticism, is there some way to persuade the skeptic?

The most interesting part of the thought experiment is that it's ok for 'the skeptic' to do but not for anyone real. Why on earth would we need to persuade the skeptic away from their infantile delusions and performative contradictions? The deck is stacked in their favour, they will destroy all knowledge (hypothetically) if you let them.

The skeptic isn't a real person, no one acts as if knowledge is impossible, no one thinks that way either. The skeptic is a philosophical construct aligned with the mere possibilities of erroneous justification, and the mere possibilities of error in every belief. We should stop giving into this alternate personality every student of philosophy can adopt, salivating in response to improbable, unjustifiable fear of error which implicates all of reality in a personal conspiracy against them.

I don't disagree with this. As I said to Marchsk, I think that looking at the meaning of knowledge is what's fruitful. And the fact that the skeptical scenario plays off of intuitions is also what's fruitful -- because those commonly held intuitions are fallible and often mistaken.

Attempting to find necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge outside of the contexts knowledge arises in is a pointless exercise. If the examination of intuitions is the goal and sole reason to entertain 'the skeptic', why not look at how people come to knowledge in the real world? Believing in the utility of skeptic thought experiments actually has real consequences for epistemology: for one, the skeptic (and the JTB enterprise it is coupled with) are entirely concerned with propositional knowledge. Secondly, they don't allow any incorporation of learning skills or learning facts to resultant knowledge-how and knowledge-that. And for three-the skeptical hypothesis is indifferent to how beliefs and competences form networks that allow people to act skilfully in the real world.

Far from analysing how people actually obtain knowledge; the corner of philosophical discourse devoted to the skeptic isn't even examining the conditions of possibility for knowledge - it's far too constrained for that. Dealing solely with propositions, hypothetical justifications and the mere possibility of error in belief.

It is even an impoverished form of skepticism, the pyrrhonists at least espoused skepticism for a practical reason, and prescribe ataraxia as an appropriate response to the real lack of 'ultimate justifications'. What is the character of someone who really believes in Cartesian skepticism? They are paralytically obsessed with the impossibility of knowledge while constantly embodying its use.

Do you think Descartes was mad?

I don't think entertaining doubt, even of the radical sort, is madness -- whether it be a Great Philosopher, or someone before Descartes who had similar thoughts

It isn't madness if you're currently doing philosophy, it's absolutely madness if you allow skeptical hypotheticals to effect you in any other way. Cartesian skepticism only makes sense on the background of propositional knowledge and obsession with sufficient justification's adequacy for truth.

You may not find skeptical doubts persuasive, but that doesn't seem enough to make a charge of madness against said doubt. Especially as Descartes lays out his arguments -- obviously there was no tradition of Descartes prior to Descartes, but madness isn't what I'd say is where his thinking comes from.

Of course he wasn't mad, he quickly dismissed his skeptical hypothesis.

Why on earth would we need to persuade the skeptic away from their infantile delusions and performative contradictions? The deck is stacked in their favour, they will destroy all knowledge (hypothetically) if you let them. — fdrake

Sure it is. Which is why it's an interesting puzzle to ponder. I wouldn't say need is the basis for wondering about persuasion. I would say we don't need to do philosophy, even, for that matter. Rather than necessity I think the motivation is one of curiosity.

The skeptic isn't a real person, no one acts as if knowledge is impossible, no one thinks that way either. The skeptic is a philosophical construct aligned with the mere possibilities of erroneous justification, and the mere possibilities of error in every belief. We should stop giving into this alternate personality every student of philosophy can adopt, salivating in response to improbable, unjustifiable fear of error which implicates all of reality in a personal conspiracy against them. — fdrake

I don't feel like I'm giving into anything. I feel like I have responses to the skeptical scenario. As I read you, at least, it seems that you do as well. But there aren't any factual -- at least, empirical -- grounds for refuting the skeptical scenario, based on exactly what that scenario entails; that the world as we experience it appears identical, yet is actually different. (Another distinction which one could attack the skeptical scenario on)

Attempting to find necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge outside of the contexts knowledge arises in is a pointless exercise. If the examination of intuitions is the goal and sole reason to entertain 'the skeptic', why not look at how people come to knowledge in the real world? — fdrake

I don't think that the skeptical scenario is goal-bound. Philosophy isn't exactly goal-bounded, either. Being able to think through why you disagree with the skeptic is fruitful, though, in that it is a good exercise.

Also, oftentimes when we approach a question by looking at examples -- as often as I really do use this method -- the examples are overdetermined by our intuitions. So having thought puzzles to ply at those intuitions are useful to philosophical exercise.

Believing in the utility of skeptic thought experiments actually has real consequences for epistemology: for one, the skeptic (and the JTB enterprise it is coupled with) are entirely concerned with propositional knowledge. Secondly, they don't allow any incorporation of learning skills or learning facts to resultant knowledge-how and knowledge-that. And for three-the skeptical hypothesis is indifferent to how beliefs and competences form networks that allow people to act skilfully in the real world.

Far from analysing how people actually obtain knowledge; the corner of philosophical discourse devoted to the skeptic isn't even examining the conditions of possibility for knowledge - it's far too constrained for that. Dealing solely with propositions, hypothetical justifications and the mere possibility of error in belief. — fdrake

I don't disagree that the skeptical scenario has real consequences for one's epistemology. But I don't think dismissal is the exact right response, either. While we have no need to address the skeptic, while we can investigate knowledge otherwise I would also say that one is not devoted to JTB forms of knowledge just by way of responding to the skeptical scenario. Like, at all.

I mean, while I think examining what we believe knowledge to consist of is the best response to the skeptic, that doesn't mean we have to believe that knowledge is purely propositional. Why would it?

I don't think the skeptical scenario is foundational to epistemology -- which is maybe what you're against -- but I also don't see a reason to be dismissive of it. It seems to me that formulating a reasonable response, of whatever sort, is the proper philosophical route.

It is even an impoverished form of skepticism, the pyrrhonists at least espoused skepticism for a practical reason, and prescribe ataraxia as an appropriate response to the real lack of 'ultimate justifications'. What is the character of someone who really believes in Cartesian skepticism? They are paralytically obsessed with the impossibility of knowledge while constantly embodying its use. — fdrake

Well, if they actually follow Descartes then whatever character follows from dualism I suppose :D . Surely the only people who espouse the Cartesian scenario as something which "destroys" knowledge are students of philosophy, and worth engaging for pedagogical purposes only. While that may be the case, I don't think it makes sense to just dismiss the scenario. There are reasonable responses to it.

I suppose what I would say is a reasonable response to Descartes (for surely not everyone who reads Descartes also then goes "all the way" while forgetting the solution) for a student would be to ponder it, not to claim that we have no knowledge. To wonder how, not to adopt the method as actual and forget the solution. Or, as I think most do, passing over isn't all bad. But it does strike me as being a-philosophical.

I do like the Pyrrhonists.



Some other things about skepticism, though: Often times, when someone expresses skepticism on particular things, or on some categories, incredulity is the gut reaction you face. So, say, with God. Or moral facts. Or propositions. In some way I look at the skeptical scenario as a way of thinking through any skeptical problem, at its "limit".

@StreetlightX (for shared interest in Laruelle)

I don't disagree that the skeptical scenario has real consequences for one's epistemology. But I don't think dismissal is the exact right response, either. While we have no need to address the skeptic, while we can investigate knowledge otherwise I would also say that one is not devoted to JTB forms of knowledge just by way of responding to the skeptical scenario. Like, at all.

Holding or studying JTB is neither necessary nor sufficient for responding to skepticism, the point I'm making is that skeptical scenarios are close conceptually to accounts of propositional knowledge, especially necessary/sufficient conditions for it. Propositions are the target of justifications, justifications are undermined through skeptical scenarios (can say the same about Gettier cases). You can vary what counts as an adequate justification, and in doing so attack the skeptic: eg. fallibilist justification sweeps the rug from under their feet, foundationalist justification under the guise of hinge propositions attempts to do the same; but it's still the same highly constrained and a-historical account of knowledge that makes sense as something for the skeptic to attack. Can radical doubts be formulated in the same way against, say, knowing how to ride a bike? Specifically, sufficient conditions for knowing how to ride a bike are competences - which don't always have propositional equivalents.

Conceptual/contextual baggage of radical skeptical inquiry destroys the context in which knowledge arises, taking it to a bizarre intellectual limit in which paranoid delusions become respectable avenues of thought, lived life is condensed into a logical network of linked propositions; engaged with merely through assent and disbelief, and anything within the bounds of possibility masquerades as justified belief.

Surely the only people who espouse the Cartesian scenario as something which "destroys" knowledge are students of philosophy, and worth engaging for pedagogical purposes only. While that may be the case, I don't think it makes sense to just dismiss the scenario. There are reasonable responses to it.

Then what's the point in pretending to be the skeptic? Do we really carry a copy of a rebuttal for every skeptical scenario to allow knowledge to take place?

To wonder how, not to adopt the method as actual and forget the solution. Or, as I think most do, passing over isn't all bad. But it does strike me as being a-philosophical.

Maybe it's a non-philosophical approach to skepticism. The skeptic and propositional knowledge are inseparably joined through the unilateral need for philosophically rigorous dismissal of the skeptic; the philosopher is pretending to be the skeptic through interlocution and the distinction between them dissolves in the process; only to be re-contextualised as an imagined enemy. The enemy only makes sense in the context of the theatre of skeptical arguments.

Seeing it as a philosopher's dramatisation of an imagined struggle - when reason reconciles itself with paranoid delusion - takes the sting out of it, no?

Holding or studying JTB is neither necessary nor sufficient for responding to skepticism, the point I'm making is that skeptical scenarios are close conceptually to accounts of propositional knowledge, especially necessary/sufficient conditions for it. Propositions are the target of justifications, justifications are undermined through skeptical scenarios (can say the same about Gettier cases). You can vary what counts as an adequate justification, and in doing so attack the skeptic: eg. fallibilist justification sweeps the rug from under their feet, foundationalist justification under the guise of hinge propositions attempts to do the same; but it's still the same highly constrained and a-historical account of knowledge that makes sense as something for the skeptic to attack. Can radical doubts be formulated in the same way against, say, knowing how to ride a bike? Specifically, sufficient conditions for knowing how to ride a bike are competences - which don't always have propositional equivalents — fdrake

It's a good question. I think it may depend upon whether or not you'd consider riding a bike in the vat is the same as riding a bike outside of the vat. I wouldn't change the scenario (especially since I consider the radical scenario pretty much the same, rationally, just with different dressings). I just wonder if we could count these as competences or not.

Conceptual/contextual baggage of radical skeptical inquiry destroys the context in which knowledge arises, taking it to a bizarre intellectual limit in which paranoid delusions become respectable avenues of thought, lived life is condensed into a logical network of linked propositions; engaged with merely through assent and disbelief, and anything within the bounds of possibility masquerades as justified belief. — fdrake

Wouldn't any a priori investigation do the same?

Also, doesn't any investigation bring along conceptual or contextual baggage? There are, after all, only so many words to use. And philosophy has a long history.

Then what's the point in pretending to be the skeptic? Do we really carry a copy of a rebuttal for every skeptical scenario to allow knowledge to take place? — fdrake

Well, I don't think there is a point. And of course you don't carry a copy of a rebuttal for every skeptical scenario just to allow knowledge to take place. Simply by changing the definition of knowledge you're already talking about something elsewise from the skeptic.

I think many, if not all, philosophical puzzles are like this. There is no point to them -- they are fully and completely useless. But engaging in them is a good exercise of the intellect, and formulating responses are the same. And often what is useful is what comes out of such inquiries -- but the inquiries aren't bounded by the terms of use or purpose.

To give other examples, what is the point of of formulating the question of the meaning of being such that it becomes meaningful again? What is the point to formulating a general theory of justice? What's the point of understanding knowledge historically, as opposed to a-historically?

I think points, purposes, reasons, and so forth are found after the fact. Which is why philosophy is, paradoxically, uselessly useful. (at least, philosophy of this sort)


But as for points that I see -- it's a good exercise in a priori reasoning. It pries at commonly held intuitions by working off of them and coming to absurd conclusions. It's relatively straightforward and easy to communicate. It generates novel solutions to the problem of skepticism which are interesting unto themselves. In a way it is a propaedeutic to philosophy -- else you might have people claiming they are certain of this that or the other when they are only provisionally so. It also serves as a class example for all sorts of skeptical problems, and working through it rationally helps one to let go of the gut reaction to balk at what is, on its face, unreasonable.

Maybe it's a non-philosophical approach to skepticism. The skeptic and propositional knowledge are inseparably joined through the unilateral need for philosophically rigorous dismissal of the skeptic; the philosopher is pretending to be the skeptic through interlocution and the distinction between them dissolves in the process; only to be re-contextualised as an imagined enemy. The enemy only makes sense in the context of the theatre of skeptical arguments.

Seeing it as a philosopher's dramatisation of an imagined struggle - when reason reconciles itself with paranoid delusion - takes the sting out of it, no? — fdrake

Heh. I can see it doing so for some people. I suppose it would have to sting in the first place, though. :D I don't feel that sting as much precisely because I'm not a skeptic, and have formulated thoughts and responses to the scenario that were sufficient for myself.

And, on a rational level at least -- though belief in skeptical actualities probably doesn't take place at a rational level, that I'll grant -- it seems to me that whether the skeptical scenario is presented as a drama or no that the puzzle remains the same.

It's a good question. I think it may depend upon whether or not you'd consider riding a bike in the vat is the same as riding a bike outside of the vat. I wouldn't change the scenario (especially since I consider the radical scenario pretty much the same, rationally, just with different dressings). I just wonder if we could count these as competences or not. — Moliere

It's funny that you're using 'you' and 'I' there to refer to precisely the same person; yourself viewed as the modifier of skeptical scenarios (the skeptic); which implicates yourself as the impersonal arbiter of philosophical sense; and then yourself viewed as a practician of philosophy with specific opinions on skepticism and its relation to its opposites.

That's the bizarre conceptual (decisional) form of radical philosophical skepticism in motion. The disavowal of the skeptic takes a positive form in terms of the impersonalisation of their (your) claims, which retroactively constitutes the philosophical manoeuvres the skeptic will make and has already made. A negative form accompanies in terms of the presupposed repudiation of their (the skeptic's) claims which, it is posited, has already happened - as logically required for further engagement with the role (and its problems). The skeptic is a philosophising person disavowing their own methods of interlocution and the consequences their borderline schizophrenic beliefs should have on themselves.

More later.

By "you" I meant you. As in, the person I'm having the conversation with.

It only makes sense if 'you' is an every-person. Why would whether Cartesian skepticism works the same for know-how as know-that turn on my analysis of it? It doesn't. In case it isn't clear, I don't mean that you personally are borderline schizophrenic, I mean that the way 'the skeptic' functions in discourse gives off that vibe for the reasons I stated.

Wouldn't any a priori investigation do the same?

Also, doesn't any investigation bring along conceptual or contextual baggage? There are, after all, only so many words to use. And philosophy has a long history.

Every analysis has contextual baggage, what matters for the analysis in the long run is whether that baggage is enlightening or occlusive for its subject matter. Constraining knowledge to knowledge that through the lens of radical skepticism sheds no light on what knowledge is for humans. If philosophy is the process of conceptual window-cleaning, this is spraying de-icer on the walls.

The levelling of lived life to a network of propositions, entailments and mere possibilities which operates in every radical skeptical hypothesis is so destructive to actually learning about the function of knowledge (what it does, how it works, why it can come to be) that learning, know-how, any 'externalities' such as biology, pedagogy and psychology of knowledge are deemed irrelevant. All that matters is the fact that X and our belief that X and that never the twain shall meet.

The skeptic can never be answered sufficiently because purely by assuming their role for the purposes of discourse - presumably learning about knowledge - any strategy of undermining them can be dismissed without reason - the mere logical possibility of incorrectness. We may as well lay everything humans have found out about anything, including the rest of philosophy, down at the skeptic's wrathful altar and hope not to meet their eyes. Even though their eyes are always, really, our own.

I think many, if not all, philosophical puzzles are like this. There is no point to them -- they are fully and completely useless. But engaging in them is a good exercise of the intellect, and formulating responses are the same. And often what is useful is what comes out of such inquiries -- but the inquiries aren't bounded by the terms of use or purpose.

Then it's odd to give sufficient enough power to a skeptical hypothesis as to sophisticatedly entertain paranoid delusional fantasies to the tune of literally the whole of reality being out to get you. The only things you get out of skeptical inquiries are the philosophical equivalent of getting off on a technicality in court or the destruction of all knowledge.

Of course, attempting to treat the skeptic as a threat is something the discursive role of 'the skeptic' doesn't allow, it is to be ironically entertained then disavowed when venturing out of its native philosophical context. In ecological terms, radical skepticism is a sink bog - carcasses of dead ideas, no entry without real danger, no escape on its terms.

To give other examples, what is the point of of formulating the question of the meaning of being such that it becomes meaningful again? What is the point to formulating a general theory of justice? What's the point of understanding knowledge historically, as opposed to a-historically?

I think you're misreading me as a quietist, this isn't my intention. I'm interested in 'the skeptic' as a discursive role here. Hence all the references to the character of the skeptic and describing how the transformation between 'normal philosopher' and 'skeptic' is inherent in 'the skeptic' (and hence radical skepticism) as a philosophical construct. Still doing philosophy here.

Heh. I can see it doing so for some people. I suppose it would have to sting in the first place, though. :D I don't feel that sting as much precisely because I'm not a skeptic, and have formulated thoughts and responses to the scenario that were sufficient for myself.

It seems you agree that the only escape is to ironically disavow the judgemental whispers of our angry God.

Does it matter?

If all we have to go on are the manifestations of what we sense and the conclusions we draw from them then this is our reality. It is our reality regardless of whether it is directly lived or simulated somehow. I think the only real question is why it appears as it does. We see the sun rise we learn the earth moves and similarly for everything we know about the world. I think the suggestion that there is a hidden reality somehow behind what we experience, is similar to positing BIV.

Sorry for the delay. I had to have me a think after your last reply. i'm going to try and focus on in this reply to where I think our prime disagreement is -- the philosophical point (or lack thereof) of the skeptical scenario.

I think you're misreading me as a quietist, this isn't my intention. I'm interested in 'the skeptic' as a discursive role here. Hence all the references to the character of the skeptic and describing how the transformation between 'normal philosopher' and 'skeptic' is inherent in 'the skeptic' (and hence radical skepticism) as a philosophical construct. Still doing philosophy here. — fdrake

Cool. I think that helps me to understand more of where you're coming from.

It seems you agree that the only escape is to ironically disavow the judgemental whispers of our angry God. — fdrake

I don't really view responses to the skeptical scenario as one of escape. If the skeptic is wrong then there is nothing to escape from, after all. There are only a handful of inconsistent beliefs based on intuitions of interiority and exteriority, certainty and doubt, reality and appearance, and knowledge and opinion. I tried to line these all up in the same way to show how these four intuitions are structured along a similar axis -- interiority, certainty, reality, and knowledge on one side with exteriority, doubt, appearance, and opinion on the other. There may be others but these are the four intuitions that come to mind at the moment that the skeptical scenario plays off of. We know ourselves with more certainty than the external world. We have a "more imediate" connection to our interiority while we are distanced from and judge exteriority. I, at least, am real -- for I am a thinking thing, and in the moment of thinking "I am" I cannot doubt such a proposition.

In addition, we desire certainty. So the possibility of error plays off of this desire for certainty, stability, and control.

In some ways I view all of these intuitions as traps of thought which apply elsewhere. So I view the skeptical scenario not just as a play -- though I think your characterization has merit for understanding the discursive function of the skeptic, for sure -- but as a tool which takes commonly held intuitions and brings them to conclusions so absurd that they are not acceptable. (for most, at least) It's more a method of bringing someone to a reflexive position towards their own intuitions -- though, granted, it seems that we have seen examples of it doing the complete opposite, where someone doubles down on those intuitions and "bites the bullet" -- but I don't think that's the usual route, just the one you see because it's far more expressive and ridiculous.

It seems to me that by changing our intuitions and questioning our initial beliefs about knowledge that the skeptical scenario is avoided before it gets off the ground. But if we have such intuitions about knowledge, etc., then the skeptical scenario's philosophical point is that it puts those very intuitions into question.

It seems to me that by changing our intuitions and questioning our initial beliefs about knowledge that the skeptical scenario is avoided before it gets off the ground. But if we have such intuitions about knowledge, etc., then the skeptical scenario's philosophical point is that it puts those very intuitions into question.

So you view the skeptic as a kind of philosophical barometer for bullshit? If a position allows radical skeptical arguments to be applied to it - or are a result of that position - you think 'this is bullshit' and move on?

Not exactly... I don't think of it as a test for bullshit, or what can be discarded. Please forgive my lack of clarity and allow me to try again.

This actually ties into ancient skepticism, in a way. Ancient skeptics would use arguments in a medical capacity -- the goal was to help a student attain the appropriate attitude towards various philosophical theories, one where you neither assent nor deny their truth.

In that sense of an argument being judged for its medical usage -- or perhaps hygienic or pedagogical? Since I don't think the radical scenario is one that's needed for a cure, like the ancient skeptics, but does help one achieve a certain appropriate attitude -- I'd say that the skeptical scenario is a sort of hurdle which, once overcome, has a person thinking more clearly. The set of intuitions I listed are common enough, and often incorrect, that it makes sense to help guide someone interested in a philosophical view of things to be able to suspend said intuitions. Or, at the very least where that's not possible, be aware of them as unexamined beliefs held.

The majority of people who read Descartes do not end up "biting the bullet". Now they may just pass over it as a non-problem, which isn't exactly my goal either, but they at least don't fall all the way down the rabbits hole. I suppose there is an empirical element to this -- what are the common reactions to the radical skeptic scenario? How do people actually respond?

But ideally, from my view, overcoming the hurdle allows one to put to rest erroneous beliefs and unexamined intuitions which commonly structure our thought regardless -- and hence would rear its ugly head in examining other philosophical problems.

EDIT: Also, I think it a worthwhile part of any philosophical education to teach the skill of questioning and suspending your own priors. The skeptical scenario, being ridiculous and unacceptable, is a sort of hammer which, I hope at least, helps one recognize that ability to examine your own beliefs.

I don't know if skeptical hypotheses as a treatment for pernicious intuitions actually pans out. The thread title is literally "BIV was meant undermine realism' by attacking semantic externalism. I find it more likely that skeptical hypotheses are co-morbid with faulty intuitions. Externalism being the thesis that internal linguistic stuff is related to external linguistic stuff, internalism being the thesis that this is false in some way.

If it's true that semantic externalism allows its believers to wrestle themselves out of the vat, or the vat undermines semantic externalism, it still implicates the kind of treatment as compatible with the disease - they meet as contraries in the same context of presuppositions.

Yeah, I admit that I'm uncertain about the actual reactions to the skeptical scenario. I'll say that it's an ideal solution, at least. One which, at least as I read you, seems to be where we are in agreement.

And there is definitely something to what you're saying -- that solutions are (often) co-morbid with pernicious intuitions. I tried to read the paper that the OP was referencing, but I couldn't find one that talked explicitly about anti-realism -- only the argument about how a BiV could not refer to itself within the BiV due to semantic externalism. But there's that dichotomy again -- internal/external -- which, being a solution, certainly lends support to what you're saying here.

Hrm hrm hrm. Not sure if I have much else to say. But thanks for sticking with the conversation. It's been interesting (not to cut things off -- by all means feel free to continue. I just wanted to give a faster reply, and I think I've run out of thoughts)

Had the same feeling, think we've covered everything interesting. :)

Thought you might find this interesting:

"Well, one day in 1917 I was standing on the deck of my ship looking back at the wake—it was all white because of the bubbles—and I began wondering idly how many bubbles there were back there. Millions, obviously. I’d learned at school that in order to make a sphere, which is what a bubble is, you employ pi, and I’d also learned that pi is an irrational number. To how many places, I wondered, did frustrated nature factor pi? And I reached the decision right at that moment that nature didn’t use pi. I said to myself, ‘I think nature has a different system, and it must be some sort of arithmetical-geometrical coördinate system, because nature has all kinds of models." Buckminster-Fuller.

I don't think nature uses Pi either, except as part of our constructions. There's something in Pi being part of a bridge between our constructions and nature.

Edit: it's a long article, I've skim-read and it seemed quite good.