I don't understand. Are you unhappy with how things are being handled thus far? If so let me know what would you like for me to change in the manner we're going about things here. Others might have different opinions, but since we're not sticking to any particular companion or interpretation of the Tractatus then by default this is the only method to go about answering lingering questions about what W meant by this or that proposition.

For the matter, MetaphysicsNow is in charge of how were approaching the reading group.

Are you unhappy with how things are being handled thus far? — Posty McPostface

No. I am not unhappy.

Certain posts lead me to mistakenly believe the collective reading has begun and someone forgot to tell me or I did not notice.

I am excited about the prospect of the group and am therefore anxious.

As long as you don't forget me when it comes to launch time, you may disregard my childlike impatience.

:smile:

Yes. It has begun.

so my biggest fears have in fact been realized. Is there a separate thread? What am I expected to have already read? Is there a reading schedule? What edition is being used? Is there one post that contains all of this information? Now I am unhappy.

is there a proposed schedule for their timely completion? Please advise. — Arne

All will be revealed in due time. — Posty McPostface

you can never get me that information too soon. I have started Tractatus a couple of times and just could not get into it. Reading it in a structured way with others could make the difference. At least that is my hope. — Arne

And now I am saddened.

This is the thread.

We're still working on 1 - 2.063. Haven't even gotten to pictures yet. Haven't even nailed down what the terms in the first sections mean. Jump right in! We've basically just started.

I have started Tractatus a couple of times and just could not get into it. Reading it in a structured way with others could make the difference. At least that is my hope. — Arne

I am in exactly this boat, fwiw.

This is the thread. — Srap Tasmaner

is there an agreed upon text?

No. I only have Ogden & Ramsey. We've been using German where necessary for clarity.

Don't be and feel free to chime in whenever you want. I don't think there's any detriment if you bring up questions we already tried to cover. In fact we would have already gone through the interpretation phase so win win for you. :smile:

I think it would be a good idea that upon agreeing on completion of each segment that we pause and summarize what has been covered to address any lingering doubt or uncertainty about what has been covered, also allowing other members to post what they might have missed or just joined the reading group.

Thoughts?

I
Yes

Has there been any progress?

What do you mean?

My gauge of progress is what has been learned over and above what was initially known about some proposition or the general gist of an overarching theme. So, that's how I think we should approach these summaries.

I'm just going to pause and wait until @mcdoodle makes an appearance. I'm still waiting for his input on the first segment that we are covering.

((I had hoped to get this up earlier, but better late than never.))

2.021 Objects form ((bilden)) the substance of the world. Therefore they cannot be compound.
2.0211 If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition ((Satz)) had sense ((Sinn)) would depend on whether another proposition is true.
2.0212 It would then be impossible to form a picture of the world (true or false).

My last post took predication as an analogy and followed the process in one direction, and reached a less than satisfying conclusion. Mainly I think LW is reasoning backward. For my analogy, that would be a claim something like this: If there were not a unit of predication, then we could not form classes in the first place. That's certainly quicker.

Here the chain of reasoning seems to run like this:
(1) It is possible to form a picture of the world (true or false);
(2) Therefore whether a proposition has sense does not depend on whether another proposition is true.
(3) Therefore the world has substance.

There's not much we can do about (1) as a premise. We're about to get to the picture theory, so we'll have more meat on these bones soon. At the moment, we're in no position to evaluate (1).

(2) we might also not be in a position to judge -- having been told nothing about propositions and their sense yet. I would like to think I can makes sense of it, but -- infuriatingly -- the remark right before this, which seems to set it up, uses a completely different set of terms:

2.0201 Every statement ((Aussage)) about complexes ((Komplexe)) can be analysed into a statement about their constituent parts, and into those propositions which completely describe the complexes.

If this were not so we might just say this: the sense of a proposition is the states of affairs (or atomic facts) it describes, actual or not; the truth of a proposition is the obtaining of such a state of affairs. Naturally we want to keep those separate somehow. Why, specifically, should the sense of a proposition not depend on the truth of another? Because truth simply has no place here. If states of affairs are independent, they can obtain or not, without regard to whether other states of affairs obtain or not. We are essentially defining a "state of affairs" as the smallest unit of difference between one (possible) world and another. Such a difference belongs to logical space. If some state of affairs does obtain, it is part of reality, the actual world; there is in logical space another world, exactly like the actual world except that this state of affairs does not obtain.

We're not done, but I want to stop here to note the interpretative problem: 2.0201 is not about propositions but statements. It's also not about states of affairs, but about complexes. "Complexes"? And this is the commentary on 2.02: "Objects are simple." I think we're still on roughly the right track, but there are some intermediate steps, and I think it's what we need to get from (2) to (3).

To get from (2) to (3), we're going to jump ahead a little:

2.024 Substance is what exists independently of what is the case.
2.025 It is form and content.
2.0251 Space, time and colour (colouredness) are forms of objects.
2.026 Only if there are objects can there be a fixed form of the world.

(Starting to feel like I'm going to end up quoting the whole book.)

We should by now be able to recognize what 2.024 is about. There's the vast logical space of possibilities, some of which obtain here in reality. There is something that can be the way it is or another way. That something is substance, what abides whether it is this way or that, what it is that is either this way or that. (More in a minute.)

Now let's go back to the sense of propositions. Because the sense of a proposition "has to do with" (I don't really know how to put this) the (possible) states of affairs it describes, as distinct its truth or falsehood, which "has to do with" whether those states of affairs are factual -- because of this, the sense of a proposition is about substance. And since substance is independent of factuality, there is no place here, in the determining of sense, for the truth or falsehood of any proposition.

2.022 It is clear that however different from the real one an imagined world may be, it must have something -- a form -- in common with the real world.
2.023 This fixed form consists of the objects.

Reasoning backward again, we might say this: a proposition that describes a different world from ours, or describes our world different in some way, perhaps different only in respect of a single fact, is clearly still about something, even though that something is not actual. I think W goes even further: what such propositions are about is exactly the same thing that propositions about the actual world are about.

Continuing to work backwards in this way, I think it's not crazy to view substance, objects, as in some sense theoretical posits. They are simply that thing that propositions are about -- I suppose really we should say what propositions are ultimately about, since it takes analysis to get there.

*

I really only meant to address independence, but I've dragged in substance too. The last little bit about independence was @MetaphysicsNow's question from before:

2.04 The totality of existent atomic facts is the world.
2.05 The totality of existent atomic facts also determines which atomic facts do not exist.

vs.

2.061 Atomic facts are independent of one another.
2.062 From the existence or non-existence of an atomic fact we cannot infer the existence or non-existence of another.

I think the way to take 2.04-2.05 there is that if you're not on the existent list, you're on the non-existent list, and it's one or the other. There is no dependence between atomic facts, or between existent atomic facts.

Again, I think we can get this independence reasoning backward.

1.2 The world divides into facts.

That is to say, we can define a way of logically partitioning the world into units that are independent, the smallest unit of difference between one way the world might be, or is, and another.

*

Stopping here. To do:

• talk about form, the forms of objects;
• fix whatever I've gotten wrong;
• fill in whatever I skipped.

Then I guess we'd be ready to move on to the picture theory and see how things start to fit together.

[...] the truth of a proposition is the obtaining of such a state of affairs. — Srap Tasmaner

I think this needs to be expanded a little more, although I agree with it.

[...] a proposition that describes a different world from ours, or describes our world different in some way, perhaps different only in respect of a single fact, is clearly still about something, even though that something is not actual. — Srap Tasmaner

Yeah, so again, how does it obtain in reality, not the world.

Also, this might help:

“I want you to realize that when I speak of a fact I do not mean a particular
existing thing, such as Socrates or the rain or the sun. Socrates himself does not
render any statement true or false. What I call a fact is the sort of thing that
is expressed by a whole sentence, not by a single name like ‘Socrates.’ . . .We
express a fact, for example, when we say that a certain thing has a certain
property, or that it has a certain relation to another thing; but the thing which
has the property or the relation is not what I call a ‘fact.”’ (‘Logical atomism’,
41, Russell)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logical_atomism#Wittgenstein's_principles

I think this needs to be expanded a little more, although I agree with it. — Posty McPostface

Expanded how? At this point anyway, I'm guessing, because we don't have anything yet on propositions or truth.

how does it obtain in reality, not the world. — Posty McPostface

Do you mean here, how one and not the other, or how does obtaining work?

If you mean the difference between reality and the world -- I can go back to the text, but it's just going to be a question of how he's chosen to use these words. Just a technical question, important for interpretation maybe, but I don't think anything else is riding on it. I don't think he ever quite lands on something that jumps out as a "possible world" -- if he had that might help. Maybe he's deliberately avoiding that, but I'm not sure why.

If it's the latter, that would seem to be a pretty deep mystery.

Also, this might help: — Posty McPostface

Did I write something that conflicts with this quote? (And where's that quote from?)

Expanded how? At this point anyway, I'm guessing, because we don't have anything yet on propositions or truth. — Srap Tasmaner

Yeah, I feel that it inevitably leads us to address Logical Atomism and how Wittgenstein's views differed from Russell.

Did I write something that conflicts with this quote? (And where's that quote from?) — Srap Tasmaner

You can find more info here:

https://users.drew.edu/jlenz/br-logical-atomism1.html

Do a Ctl+f to find the quoted text in that page, which is elaborated on.

Do you mean here, how one and not the other, or how does obtaining work? — Srap Tasmaner

I mean to say the latter. I feel that the difference between Sachlage and Sachverhalte is crucial here. I might be wrong. As for my opinion, I think atomic facts are what constitute the world, and reality is constituted/construed by states of affairs, speaking as an observer of the world.

the quoted text — Posty McPostface

Ah, so that's Russell. I feel like reading that would only confuse matters. Does that seem crazy? I mean, it's hard enough to get a handle on what W is saying. Maybe more historical context would help, but there's also that danger of substituting a view that's easier to grasp for W's. Do you see what I mean?

Let me put it this way: if we need, say, Russell to understand Wittgenstein, then okay. If Wittgenstein cannot be understood on his own, then bring on the comparisons. But I'm not particularly interested in an historical approach just to be historical -- I don't care if Russell thought A, but W thought B.
.

I mean to say the latter. I feel that the difference between Sachlage and Sachverhalte is crucial here. I might be wrong. — Posty McPostface

Obtaining per se -- I can't even imagine having anything to say about that.

As for the Sachverhalt/Sachverlage thing -- I don't see this splitting as one's actual and the other's possible. There's some distinction in the text but I don't see it as that, so I don't want to assign the terms those meanings.

On the other hand, we can make such a distinction. If the words W uses obscure that distinction, then so much the worse for his chosen terminology -- unless there's an argument in the text, explicit or implicit, that we ought not be distinguishing this way.

So if the point were that one's actual and the other's not -- that's not much help is it?

As for my opinion, I think atomic facts are what constitute the world, and reality is constituted by states of affairs, speaking as an observer of the world. — Posty McPostface

I also don't see anything in the text about the way the world is versus the way we observe it. Maybe that'll come out later, but I'm not reading ahead.

Btw, do you mean this is in fact your view, or it's your understanding of LW?

Ah, so that's Russell. I feel like reading that would only confuse matters. Does that seem crazy? I mean, it's hard enough to get a handle on what W is saying. Maybe more historical context would help, but there's also that danger of substituting a view that's easier to grasp for W's. Do you see what I mean? — Srap Tasmaner

I get what you're saying; but, I suppose if we want to talk about these propositions, then some understanding of logical atomism is necessary. And, given that Russell so heavily influenced the early Wittgenstein, then it's only pertinent that we bring up how their views differed from each other.

Obtaining per se -- I can't even imagine having anything to say about that. — Srap Tasmaner

Same.

As for the Sachverhalt/Sachverlage thing -- I don't see this splitting as one's actual and the other's possible. There's some distinction in the text but I don't see it as that, so I don't want to assign the terms those meanings. — Srap Tasmaner

Why not? If Wittgenstein wanted to avoid the ambiguity he could have just stuck to one term instead of convolution the whole thing with both terms. I doubt Wittgenstein would have done this unintentionally had there been some reason.

So if the point were that one's actual and the other's not -- that's not much help is it? — Srap Tasmaner

I'm not quite sure yet. It might become more apparent as we progress though the work. Too early to say at the moment.

I also don't see anything in the text about the way the world is versus the way we observe it. Maybe that'll come out later, but I'm not reading ahead. — Srap Tasmaner

Yeah, I might be jumping ahead.

Btw, do you mean this is in fact your view, or it's your understanding of LW? — Srap Tasmaner

To answer your question with another question; Are facts observer independent or dependent?

some understanding of logical atomism is necessary — Posty McPostface

If by "logical atomism" you specifically mean Russell's views around this period, see below.

I thought there were a lot of people who took TLP itself to be one of the definitive statements of something called "logical atomism" though, so reading it ought to do the trick. Then again, this is just labeling, and I don't care. We're reading TLP and that's enough for me.

given that Russell so heavily influenced the early Wittgenstein — Posty McPostface

I'm no scholar, so I can't speak to that. I think there's plenty of textual evidence that Frege greatly influenced Wittgenstein, early and late, and Frege I know a bit about. That's a dodgy way of saying I'm slightly skeptical of "Russell's influence on Wittgenstein" being a thing.

If Wittgenstein wanted to avoid the ambiguity he could have just stuck to one term instead of convolution the whole thing with both terms. I doubt Wittgenstein would have done this unintentionally — Posty McPostface

I think there is a distinction suggested -- I just don't think it's actual vs. possible.

As for terminology in general -- this is frustrating, as I've noted. The way he rings the changes on world, reality, fact, etc., I'm not quite sure what he's up to. Is every noun he uses used in some specific technical sense? (I forget whether I posted the thought that it can be hard to tell whether you're reading a thesis, an actual claim, or a contextual definition sometimes -- if I didn't, I have now.) I don't know. I have never believed, for instance, that he was using the phrase "forms of life" as a technical term, but the commentariat have made it one. I don't know where to draw the line. I guess we have to draw it as we go.

Are facts observer independent? — Posty McPostface

Yes. In the Tractatus and in reality.

I think there is a distinction suggested -- I just don't think it's actual vs. possible. — Srap Tasmaner

See:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/190055

It jumps ahead a little but illustrates my trifle...

Are facts observer independent?
— Posty McPostface

Yes. In the Tractatus and in reality — Srap Tasmaner

I'm under the impression that the world is the totality of facts and reality is the totality of those facts and states of affairs.

I'm gonna leave this open to debate with others if they contest that way of framing the issue.

ok

and states of affairs. — Posty McPostface

is the difference between "states of affairs" and "atomic facts" reconcilable?

It is my understanding that they are not synonymous?

It is also my understanding we are using the Ogden translation?

1.13
The facts in logical space are the world.

What is logical space?

and if the facts in logical are the world, then there can be no other space within the world that is not subsumed by logical space?