It is also my understanding we are using the Ogden translation? — Arne
is the difference between "states of affairs" and "atomic facts" reconcilable? — Arne
and if the facts in logical are the world, then there can be no other space within the world that is not subsumed by logical space? — Arne
What is logical space? — Arne
is the difference between "states of affairs" and "atomic facts" reconcilable? — Arne
It jumps ahead a little but illustrates my trifle... — Posty McPostface
(1) It is possible to form a picture of the world (true or false);
(2) Therefore whether a proposition has sense does not depend on whether another proposition is true.
(3) Therefore the world has substance. — Srap Tasmaner
That is to say, we can define a way of logically partitioning the world into units that are independent, the smallest unit of difference between one way the world might be, or is, and another. — Srap Tasmaner
2.0211 If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition ((Satz)) had sense ((Sinn)) would depend on whether another proposition is true.
2.0212 It would then be impossible to form a picture of the world (true or false).
Wittgenstein does talk about möglich Sachlage — Posty McPostface
2.013 Jedes Ding ist, gleichsam, in einem Raume möglicher Sachverhalte. Diesen Raum kann ich mir leer denken, nicht aber das Ding ohne den Raum.
2.013 Every thing is, as it were, in a space of possible atomic facts. I can think of this space as empty, but not of the thing without the space.
2.013 Jedes Ding ist, gleichsam, in einem Raume möglicher Sachverhalte. Diesen Raum kann ich mir leer denken, nicht aber das Ding ohne den Raum.
2.013 Every thing is, as it were, in a space of possible atomic facts. I can think of this space as empty, but not of the thing without the space.
Why don't we just table this until we finally move on to the picture theory. — Srap Tasmaner
someone else — Posty McPostface
I'm going to refer to "gleichsam" analogically as "manner and form" here (jumping ahead a little): Yes, but it's one and the same to talk about atomic facts and states of affairs in some manner or form. I mean, we are limited by what we can think of to be true, and if we can't think illogically, then we're somewhat limited in our ability to talk about what is being said in manner and form. Or at least borrowing from Wittgenstein, a picture cannot depict its own form.If it is combined with other objects in a definite way, we have an atomic fact, and it is surely appropriate to call the object a "part" of this atomic fact. But what about all the possible atomic facts which it could be a part of, the possibility of being a part of which is prejudged in the object? Would you say it is a "part" of those? That seems wrong. So 2.013 has that little "gleichsam" in it. — Srap Tasmaner
So there's a distinction near the one you're talking about: an object isn't part of something that's only possible; that appellation we'd reserve for being so combined in something actual. — Srap Tasmaner
Where does that leave states of affairs? I read "state of affairs" as a way of looking at atomic facts, possible or actual, in which we still only consider the objects so combined as objects, rather than as parts. — Srap Tasmaner
Here's what really puzzles me about treating atomic facts themselves as always only actual and never possible: what about facts? — Srap Tasmaner
But, if you recall, Russell had a kind of convincing argument for the existence of
negative facts: suppose that we have a list of atomic facts f1 . . . fn. Now consider
some true sentence ‘not-S.’ Is the truth of ‘not-S’ determined by f1 . . . fn? It seems
not. For f1 . . . fn are atomic facts, and there is nothing to prevent a series of atomic
facts from being consistent both with the truth of S, the falsity of S, or even S lacking
a truth-value. Hence, Russell concluded, true negations of atomic propositions must
correspond to negative facts. How can Wittgenstein avoid this argument?
I think that his ideas about objects provide him a way out. Recall that, for Wittgenstein,
objects are not only what underlie change over time, but also what underlie
necessity and possibility: all possible changes to the world are just a matter of the
recombination of simple objects. As he puts it,
2.0124 If all objects are given, then at the same time all possible states of
affairs are also given.
If there are a fixed number of objects, then a list of all the states of affairs (i.e.,
atomic facts) will not be consistent with both the truth and falsity of a sentence S.
A worry about this view: the intuition that all objects exist only contingently.
Wittgenstein often discusses the world or reality. How are these two notions related?
(This question is made especially difficult by the fact that Wittgenstein seems to
say contradictory things in §§2.04, 2.06, 2.063.)I think that the basic idea can be
stated as follows: the world consists of all the existing states of affairs, whereas reality
consists of the world plus all possible but non-actual states of affairs. Wittgenstein’s
claim is then that the world determines reality: once we know everything about what
states of affairs exist, we know everything about what states of affairs could exist
as well. (Indeed, as Fogelin points out, this follows from the claims that the world
consists of states of affairs, that all objects must be in some state of affairs, and the
passage from §2.0124 cited above.) — Jeff Speaks
I tend to think, that what obtains is the actuality of a state of affairs although both can exist in possibilities, made apparent by atomic facts. — Posty McPostface
2.11 Das Bild stellt die Sachlage im logischen Raume, das Bestehen und Nichtbestehen von Sachverhalten vor.
2.11 The picture presents the facts in logical space, the existence and non-existence of atomic facts. ((O&R))
2.11 A picture presents a situation in logical space, the existence and non-existence of states of affairs. ((P&M))
2.031 In the atomic fact the objects are combined in a definite way.
2.032 The way in which objects hang together in the atomic fact is the structure of the atomic fact.
2.033 The form is the possibility of the structure.
2.14 The picture consists in the fact that its elements are combined with one another in a definite way.
2.141 The picture is a fact.
2.15 That the elements of the picture are combined with one another in a definite way, represents that the things are so combined with one another.
This connexion of the elements of the picture is called its structure, and the possibility of this structure is called the form of representation of the picture.
2.151 The form of representation is the possibility that the things are combined with one another as are the elements of the picture.
2.173 The picture represents its object from without (its standpoint is its form of representation), therefore the picture represents its object rightly or falsely
2.031 Im Sachverhalt verhalten sich die Gegenstände in bestimmter Art und Weise zueinander.
2.032 Die Art und Weise, wie die Gegenstände im Sachverhalt zusammenhängen,ist die Struktur des Sachverhaltes.
2.033 Die Form ist die Möglichkeit der Struktur.
2.14 Das Bild besteht darin, dass sich seine Elemente in bestimmter Art und Weise zu einander verhalten.
2.141 Das Bild ist eine Tatsache.
2.15 Dass sich die Elemente des Bildes in bestimmter Art und Weise zu einander verhalten stellt vor, dass sich die Sachen so zu einander verhalten.
Dieser Zusammenhang der Elemente des Bildes heisse seine Struktur und ihre Möglichkeit seine Form der Abbildung.
2.151 Die Form der Abbildung ist die Möglichkeit, dass sich die Dinge so zu einander verhalten, wie die Elemente des Bildes
I really think we need to go back — Srap Tasmaner
I'm pretty much in agreement with everything you've said — Posty McPostface
a picture is clearly a Sachverhalt — Srap Tasmaner
What 2.11 says is simply that the picture shows you what the situation is in logical space, how things stand -- and how things stand is which atomic facts obtain and which don't. — Srap Tasmaner
Try this link:
http://www.kfs.org/jonathan/witt/ten.html — Posty McPostface
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