Under your definition of "proposition" though, a proposition must have a special type of understanding, a shared understanding. But this is impossible because understanding is not the type of thing which a person shares with another. — Metaphysician Undercover

The problem is that the definition doesn't reflect the real use of the word, so the "presuppositions", or in this case "propositions", which are described are articles of fiction, they are not the presuppositions or propositions which are talked about in normal discourse. — Metaphysician Undercover

Could you hope to find a better example of blatant self-contradiction than is exemplified in these two statements?

so, circularity.

No, it's not a vicious circularity in the sense of going around and around in a circle. It might be understood to be a virtuous circularity in the sense of being contained within a hermeneutic circle, though.

It seems obvious that human inquiry is contained within, in the sense of always beginning from within, the circle of present understanding and knowledge; and we don't ever get out of that circle, rather we expand it to contain ever more.

Why, should I bother further when you never even attempt to answer questions that challenge your position? Are you afraid you will fail?

As everyday conversation demonstrates, we do share such understandings. — Banno

How does conversation show that we share an understanding? Talking about the same things is a far cry from sharing an understanding.

So you think it's OK to believe things without having any rational justification for doing so? If that's true, then why bother trying to practice philosophy at all? — Janus

I don't see how believing things without justification is incompatible with practising philosophy. Perhaps I practise philosophy in an attempt to understand why I believe things without justification.

And again you seem to have failed to notice (just like MU) that I did not say that every truth requires a justification, but that everything we count as being true requires justification. Can you not understand that distinction? — Janus

You haven't answered my criticism. How can you count that being justified is equivalent to being counted as being true, unless you believe that being justified and being true are one and the same thing? If you do not believe that being true and being justified are one and the same thing, then being justified counts as being justified, and nothing more. But being justified cannot be equivalent to being counted as being true if being justified and being true are counted as two distinct things..

Could you hope to find a better example of blatant self-contradiction than is exemplified in these two statements? — Janus

I suppose I'm not so good at finding "blatant self-contradiction" as you are. Perhaps you could help me by showing me where to look.

How does conversation show that we share an understanding? Talking about the same things is a far cry from sharing an understanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

Here again, you think meaning is in one person's head, I think it is something we build together. I'm right.

Your reply, above, is the sort of thing that leads me nonplussed, and not to reply to many of your posts.

it's not a vicious circularity — Janus

Sure, but coherentism is circular.

I did not say that every truth requires a justification, but that everything we count as being true requires justification. — Janus

And what we count as being true... is the stuff we believe, isn't it? Which is what I am saying.

SO now we agree?

Here again, you think meaning is in one person's head, I think it is something we build together. I'm right. — Banno

We're not talking about meaning, we're talking about the understanding of, and interpretation of meaning. To understand, and to interpret are things which happen within each of our minds. That's evident.

Again, you're practising this act which I've noticed is prevalent in modern metaphysics. You are changing what we are talking about, redefining to suit your purpose. If meaning is what we are talking about, you might be right. But we are not talking about meaning, we are talking about the understanding of meaning, so you're not right. I'd wish you good luck on trying to change reality to suit your metaphysical principles, but that's really bad metaphysics, and I'd prefer that you would just quit, and start adapting your principles instead..

The question is whether something can be true without this verification process which establishes that it is true. — Metaphysician Undercover

Doesn't this beg the question against your position? I can suppose verification would show something hasn't been proven false, so in that light it would make an assumption of truth rational, but aside from particles verifying only brings light to truth, but it can't create it.

In a physical reality I measure something but the measurement doesn't change the thing measured.

↪Cheshire Apparently there is:
The action of speaking or acting in accordance with the truth. — Banno

that's got to be some type of record. Well played sir.

Janus seems to confuse justified with true, and Banno argues that a proposition can be true without any act of verification which would justify the proposition. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not really reading Janus quite the same way. If we count 1000 things as true, we'll probably discover some amount were actually not true at a point later in time, so allowing for this inevitable seems worth while to me. To be counted as true allows for errors, to simply be true ignores the reservation.

We're not talking about meaning, we're talking about the understanding of, and interpretation of meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover

What is meaning. then?

I sugest it is the understanding of, and interpretation of - the use of - our utterances.

Again, meaning is not in the head of an individual.

Sure, but coherentism is circular. — Banno

True, it is circular in the virtuous sense, as I described, but my position is not coherentism, or rather, not just coherentism. I say that what we are justified in believing is what is consistent with overall experience and human judgement, but that overall human judgement is constrained by what is given in experience.

What is given, in its fundamental sense, is not socially constructed, but real independently of any and all opinions about it, but it does not consist of, but rather gives rise to, teacups, and chairs and keys in the cupboard as well as atoms, molecules, quarks and everything else. In other words we are constrained by the given, but anything we say about it is not what it is. It is not any-thing.

And what we count as being true... is the stuff we believe, isn't it? Which is what I am saying.

SO now we agree? — Banno

Yes, I agree with that. Where we may not agree is on the question of whether there is truth beyond what we count as being true, including all that we will come to count as being true. I can't see how we could coherently say there could be, unless God is posited.

Of course, this still allows that what we presently count as being true may not be, because we may later come to count it as false. That is true which will always be counted as true, no matter how much it is subjected to criticism and investigation.

What is meaning. then?

I sugest it is the understanding of, and interpretation of - the use of - our utterances.

Again, meaning is not in the head of an individual. — Banno

You're only contradicting yourself. You say that meaning is the understanding and interpretation of utterances. But clearly this is what goes on in the heads of individuals. Then you say that meaning is not in the head of an individual.

I suggest that we define meaning differently. Isn't meaning what is inherent within things like utterances, statements, and propositions? These things are a representation of what was meant by the author, so we say that they have meaning. I think meaning is what was meant.

Do you acknowledge a difference between saying something, and therefore meaning to say what was said, and interpreting or understanding what was said? What was meant must be interpreted, and the interpretation is not necessarily a correct, or even an adequate understanding of what was said, therefore understanding and interpretation is something other than meaning.

Now, do you see a difference between "meaning" and "value"? Can you apprehend interpretation as a form of valuation, or even evaluation? It's a matter of judging importance. We all view things through a veil of personal values, and this determines what is important to us. So when we interpret we must fit the words into our own structure, or hierarchy, of values or else we cannot understand what was said. We only remember what has importance. What you call "shared meaning" is more like a shared value structure by which we may have compatible interpretations of meaning.

I can suppose verification would show something hasn't been proven false, so in that light it would make an assumption of truth rational, but aside from particles verifying only brings light to truth, but it can't create it. — Cheshire

I don't think so. To show that something has not been proven false does not verify that thing, it only verifies that the thing has not been proven false. So it is not at all rational to assume as true, the thing which hasn't been proven false.

As for "verifying only brings light to truth, but it can't create it", that assertion hasn't yet been justified. Do you think of truth as correspondence? How could one thing correspond with another without some sort of judgement? And how could there be a judgement without some form of verification?

I'm not really reading Janus quite the same way. If we count 1000 things as true, we'll probably discover some amount were actually not true at a point later in time, so allowing for this inevitable seems worth while to me. To be counted as true allows for errors, to simply be true ignores the reservation. — Cheshire

It appears to me, that when you and Janus say such and such "counts as true", what you are really saying is that such and such is justified. So you're not talking about what it means to be true at all. If you want to talk about what it means to be true, then we must move on from this talk about being "counted as true", because this is just another way of saying "justified", and that's not truth at all.

Where we may not agree is on the question of whether there is truth beyond what we count as being true, including all that we will come to count as being true. — Janus

Tis takes us back to the OP.

lol...too true.

With that being said, the problem is that it is true....The foundational axioms of metaphysics are continually processing and changing. It is this progress, however that acts as the boundary from which metaphysics is formed as one axiom projects to another and then another, which the new axioms inevitably cyclicaling back to the old while expanding into further.

This directional nature of the axioms of metaphysics effectively form the nature of metaphysics as a process of being qua being, with "qua" as "which way" or "as" observing inherent seperative or connective qualities associated with direction.

This progressive amd self referential nature of metaphysics, if not all philosophy/religion/science for that matter, necessitates an inherent limit with the foundation of metaphysics as directed movement where this directive movment acts as the limit through which metaphysics exists.

This nature of metaphysics as limit through limit, axiomized in its inherent form and function, necessitates metaphysics as the study of limits itself.

Fluid theory (Reproduction/Feed/Reasoning) decanted selfmultidimentionalover...
The simultaneity polydynamics of the movement (Reproduction/Feed/Reasoning) generates pseudo-autonomy as material property, of the autogenous phenomenon; existing.(...)
Simultaneous as my unidimensional variability...
unidimensional variability = live-beings