As a consequentialist, I have generally two options to pick within consequentialist ethics - act and rule consequentialism. These are further refined by sub-options. In my case, I am a partial rule consequentialism, or "rule breaking" consequentialism. Rules are put into place as a heuristic for decision making. Those actions that typically result in the best-possible outcome (maximizing happiness, minimizing suffering) on the global scale are made into rules, however, being rules, they are also made to be broken. When a situation presents itself that would make following the rules result in a less-than-optimal outcome, then the rules ought to be broken. They were more akin to suggestions than anything more.

This means that, for example, murdering a person may be an acceptable form of action, such as in self-defense, or in a political assassination. In my view, to see the act itself as immoral (and not the consequences) is to forget why the act was originally seen to be immoral (because of a history of repetitive consequences) and to misplace the focus of ethics, which should be on sentient welfare.

Partial rule consequentialism also tends to reject notions of intention, consent, and instrumentalization as "special" rules of some sort, since doing so would once again forget the bigger picture, the consequences at stake. Instrumentalization, in particular, is what I think to be a disguised way of holding that suffering holds priority over pleasure. So although I reject notions of utility monsters, I can and will still hold that negative utility monsters are perfectly acceptable, which results with the conclusion that the instrumentalization of someone who is not as bad off as the person that this act is meant to help is acceptable, assuming there aren't better options available.

I have a generally 'religious/spiritual' philosophy. (I don't like either word much, but it seems that it is what I have to use.) But my understanding is, very briefly put, that the purpose of life is to awaken, and to serve awakening. To what? one might ask. I think you have to be able to develop a sense of gratitude, and also a sense of wonder at what most people think is ordinary (although that is by no means all there is to it.)

Because (and I think in this I even have science on my side) it is proven, beyond all reasonable doubt, that the circumstances that gave rise to our existence - no matter how bad it might seem - are woven into the fabric of the cosmos. So the sense, common to a lot of existentialism, of having been 'thrown into existence', isn't warranted (although I hasten to add, I could easily understand why many people do feel that way, like the poor unfortunate refugee diaspora.) But we are an expression of the Universe, specifically, the form in which the processes of evolution can become self-aware; because of that we actually have a reason for existence, and it's up to us to work out what that is; I think a good deal of unhappiness is caused by the unwillingness to face up to that fact (for which, see Eric Fromm, Fear of Freedom). And also we have stewardship of 'spaceship earth', which, in my view, is the only vessel we're ever going to have (so we have to overcome our promethean sci-fi fantasies of interstellar travel). This earth is what we have, it is very crowded, it is resource- threatened, and it is rife with conflict, but I don't think we'll get another option.

So the major ethical challenge for me is, well, me. I have all manner of inclinations and dispositions which I know are less than optimal, which seems so simple when I write it out, but so difficult on a day to day basis. So whatever philosophy one has, it has to provide the impetus, and the motivation, to overcome those dispositions, to be grateful, to serve others and to serve awakening. The philosophical lexicon and approach which seems best suited to that is generally Buddhist, but I hasten to add that it's very much a 'working title'. But those are my normative ethical views.

What name would you give that vice? Edit: Perhaps justice is the virtue that is at issue? Hard to see one man owning another as being fair or just. — anonymous66

Ancient slavery was a completely different phenomenon from industrial age slavery which is the idea all of us have in our minds when we think of slavery. The slavery where the slave is brutalised and completely dehumanised is not Ancient slavery, but industrial age slavery. A sleight of hand is committed when the two phenomena are associated together, which is the same sleight of hand committed when Victorian age female oppression is associated with practices dating in Ancient Rome. The two ages are different. Plato, Aristotle, and the other virtue ethicists would find industrial age slavery to be ABHORRENT.

The slavery where the slave is brutalised and completely dehumanised is not Ancient slavery, but industrial age slavery. — Agustino

Not true. Conditions for the slaves in the Roman mines were famously brutal.

I agree, I think the abolition of slavery - not that this is complete - is real progress and a genuine accomplishment of modernity.

Not true. Conditions for the slaves in the Roman mines were famously brutal. — jamalrob

I was talking about slavery as understood by the Ancients - referring mainly to Aristotle and Plato. Yes of course there were cases where slavery was exceptionally brutal - I'm saying though that this wasn't the case for most slaves. During the Industrial Revolution conditions were extremely brutal for most slaves as they were exploited in the name of maximising production; of course even then there were exceptions; some slaves working for noble families on their estates were treated decently, and provided with decent, although not exceptional living conditions, and not demanded inhuman amounts of effort.

Aristotle and Plato, by the way, have never encouraged abuse of people, whether they were slaves or otherwise. Slavery still exists in modern days in a sense alike to the slavery existing for the Ancients in India. Many rich Indians have slaves (they call them servants) - they are bound for a very long term generally to live and work on their estates, and their children are raised and educated on their estates as well. They are provided adequate nutrition and means of living, and are treated with decency. They can leave if they wish, but they're not likely to find employment and means of sustenance with the same ease in other places. I don't agree with such a practice because it highly limits capacity for independence and development, but I can nevertheless notice how much less abusive it is in comparison to industrial age slavery, and how some Ancients, like Plato and Aristotle, could think that such an arrangement was profitable even for the slaves.

I will add though, that if we develop the thinking of both Aristotle and Plato and elucidate and correct their system so that it is internally coherent, then they would indeed be against all forms of slavery or economic servitude.

They are provided adequate nutrition and means of living, and are treated with decency. They can leave if they wish, but they're not likely to find employment and means of sustenance with the same ease in other places. — Agustino

I don't see how you could disagree with the modern Indian practices of "slavery'' in view of the above quote.

Lots of these people working as "slaves'' would have far worse lives if given independence and released out into the general Indian public,where they would immediately be recognized as poor and weak and subsequently preyed upon by other powerful,less decent people than their former employers.

Furthermore,it seems unreasonable to even call this slavery, since this sort of situation where these people are given decent wages and accommodation is radically different from what slavery refers to generally.

I don't see how you could disagree with the modern Indian practices of "slavery'' in view of the above quote.

Lots of these people working as "slaves'' would have far worse lives if given independence and released out into the general Indian public,where they would immediately be recognized as poor and weak and subsequently preyed upon by other powerful,less decent people than their former employers. — hunterkf5732

I don't disagree with it in the sense of I want to abolish it tomorrow. I disagree with it in the sense that I think we should gradually move towards a society in which these people can achieve more independence, probably by ensuring their children have access to good education. I'm not condemning their life to be intolerable, and them needing immediate salvation as a revolutionary would. (and the reason you cite, that they will have a worse life otherwise, is precisely the reason why I am not a revolutionary - I understand the contingencies and limitations of history).

Furthermore,it seems unreasonable to even call this slavery, since this sort of situation where these people are given decent wages and accommodation is radically different from what slavery refers to generally. — hunterkf5732

When Plato and Aristotle used the word, they frequently referred to this type of slavery, hence why I used the word. People like to import modern connotations into the past, and this doesn't work very well. There is no progression in history, different historical periods are radically different and have totally different conceptions of social and economic organisation, and any broad look will just miss these differences which in the end are essential to understand the period and its thinkers.

Title says it all. — darthbarracuda

Virtue is my ethical foundation. Virtue is the one and only thing that can never be lost, nothing can take it away from you (unless of course you give it). Any other thing such as pleasure is impermanent, and a wise man will never stake his happiness on that which is perishable. Put your dough where crows cannot reach my friend...

Because all evil is due to a lack of knowledge, there is only one moral imperative: Do not destroy the means of error correction.

Normativity only makes sense within the context of a set of commands issued by some authority, and so any normative ethics that doesn't defer to some command-issuing authority is nonsensical.

If you yourself judge something to be wrong/undesirable/to-not-be-done, then you don't need some outside force/authority to coerce you.

You can make a judgement, but whether or not that judgement is correct is something else. Of course, you can always argue that you're the moral authority, and so your judgement is self-validating.

Yeh I guess to make sense of morality (for me) somethings got to give. By thinking of it this way I can get past issues of moral motivation, or what an ought it is because if it's you making the judgement those issues don't apply. As in the answer to 'why you ought to to what is morally correct' is just that in saying that it's morally correct you want something specific to happen/not happen
.
There isn't a distinction between what I judge to be morally correct and what I judge I should do.

I'm trying to deal with the same problem that you mentioned. Thinking of morality as a set of restrictions which we learn from somewhere has issues. It's like a command without a commander.

You can still believe that you are judging what is correct for everyone in a specific situation, so it doesn't need to follow that it is only moral because you judge it to be moral.

Normativity only makes sense within the context of a set of commands issued by some authority, and so any normative ethics that doesn't defer to some command-issuing authority is nonsensical. — Michael

Why do you think so? What if the commands are present in nature - in your own nature, and in my own nature, and in everybody's nature? What if our nature is so conditioned that judgement X is always correct for us? Then the authority is our own nature. Some of us will have a better grasp of our nature than others. And some, despite their better knowledge, will refuse to do that which is good by choice of will.

What if the commands are present in nature - in your own nature, and in my own nature, and in everybody's nature? What if our nature is so conditioned that judgement X is always correct for us? Then the authority is our own nature. Some of us will have a better grasp of our nature than others. And some, despite their better knowledge, will refuse to do that which is good by choice of will. — Agustino

Commands are a type of linguistic expression. Nature doesn't talk to us and tell us what to do.

Why do you think so? — Agustino

Because when I try to make sense of the phrase "you ought not X" I find myself interpreting it as either "don't do X" or "doing X is against the rules" – with the latter interpreted as "some relevant authority has issued the command 'don't do X'". There seems no other meaningful interpretation.

Anscombe addresses the common notion of moral obligation that tries to separate itself from the idea of some person telling us what to do, correctly concluding that the notion is vacuous. It's just "a word of mere mesmeric force" (here's to hoping her Modern Moral Philosophy will be our September reading).

Commands are a type of linguistic expression. Nature doesn't talk to us and tell us what to do. — Michael

Are you sure? Not all languages are written languages Michael :)

I didn't mention writing.

I didn't mention writing. — Michael

Or spoken for that matter. Nature speaks to you in a different way - through your conscience, through your desires, etc. If you rationally organise these into a coherent whole then you will arrive at the equivalent of commandments.

Nature speaks to you in a different way - through your conscience, through your desires, etc. If you rationally organise these into a coherent whole then you will arrive at the equivalent of commandments. — Agustino

Sorry, but this is just poetic nonsense. I'm using the term "command" in the literal sense, not in some metaphorical sense.

Unless you're arguing for panpsychism and claiming that nature has a consciousness and is able to telepathically tell us what to do?

Sorry, but this is just poetic nonsense. I'm using the term "command" in the literal sense, not in some metaphorical sense. — Michael

It is a command. Kill and you shall suffer says the command. How will you suffer? Well because by killing someone you will do violence towards your own self in so far as your nature provides you with a desire for community and compassion, and in-so-far as you could have profited and found joy in relationship with the person you have killed. You will be faced by remorse and guilt. This is just like any other human law out there. If you break the law of a state there are punishments. If you break the laws of nature, likewise there are punishments. You may fail to perceive them as punishments, because you fail to perceive how they are a consequence of your actions, but that doesn't change what they are. This is nothing but natural morality - which doesn't it is true, emerge from the empirical, but from the spiritual nature of man - from his inwardness. That's why Wittgenstein thought that ethics is the most important, but ethics is a matter of the transcendent, in for example TLP.

Well, if you have given up on this notion of morality, do you still have any moral inclinations? How do you describe/explain what is going on with that (assuming you do)?
Edited.

I haven't given up on morality. I've simply explained that normative morality only makes sense if it defers to some command-issuing authority.

It is a command. Kill and you shall suffer says the command. How will you suffer? Well because by killing someone you will do violence towards your own self in so far as your nature provides you with a desire for community and compassion, and in-so-far as you could have profited and found joy in relationship with the person you have killed. You will be faced by remorse and guilt. This is just like any other human law out there. If you break the law of a state there are punishments. If you break the laws of nature, likewise there are punishments. You may fail to perceive them as punishments, because you fail to perceive how they are a consequence of your actions, but that doesn't change what they are. — Agustino

This isn't a command. This is a description of (possible) psychological and social consequences. Again, you're just being poetic.

When I say that "normativity only makes sense within the context of a set of commands issued by some authority" I mean it in the literal sense of requiring some person or group of people telling us to do or not do something.

This isn't a command. This is a description of (possible) psychological and social consequences. Again, you're just being poetic.

When I say that "normativity only makes sense within the context of a set of commands issued by some authority" I mean it in the literal sense of requiring some person or group of people telling us to do or not do something. — Michael

Okay your government, a group of people, tell you, through your own understanding of the written law not to steal. You go ahead and steal. There are consequences for it.

Your nature, through your own understanding of your yourself and your place in the world tells you that if you kill, you will suffer natural consequences. You go ahead and kill. You suffer natural consequences.

What's the difference? A command is nothing else than a cause and effect relationship. Do X and suffer Y. Even a state doesn't just tell you don't steal. They tell you don't steal because otherwise Y will happen to you. Then you are free to steal if you want to. Only that Y will happen to you.

Okay your government, a group of people, tell you, through your own understanding of the written law not to steal. You go ahead and steal. There are consequences for it.

Your nature, through your own understanding of your yourself and your place in the world tells you that if you kill, you will suffer natural consequences. You go ahead and kill. You suffer natural consequences.

What's the difference? A command is nothing else than a cause and effect relationship. Do X and suffer Y. Even a state doesn't just tell you don't steal. They tell you don't steal because otherwise Y will happen to you. Then you are free to steal if you want to. Only that Y will happen to you. — Agustino

The difference is in the meaning of "tell". They're not the same. There's a difference between "so-and-so told me not to do this" and "I can tell that something bad will happen if I do this". The former (use of the verb "to tell") is a command, and is required to make sense of a normative claim, whereas the latter isn't.

The difference is in the meaning of "tell". They're not the same. There's a difference between "so-and-so told me not to do this" and "I can tell that something bad will happen if I do this". The former (use of the verb "to tell") is a command, and is required to make sense of a normative claim, whereas the latter isn't. — Michael

Maybe a theoretical difference, but I see no practical one... both tellings play exactly the same role.

Commands are a type of linguistic expression. Nature doesn't talk to us and tell us what to do. — Michael

Humans (mostly) have natural moral instincts just as social animals have natural social instincts that 'tell them what to do'.

It doesn't "tell them what to do" in a sense that's comparable to being issued a command. Like Agustino you're conflating. There's a difference between something like "my body is telling me to eat" and something like "my boss is telling me to write up the report".

Nature does 'talk to you' in non-linguistic ways and instinctive moral commands act in ways like your body telling you what to eat and not in ways like your boss telling you to write up a report; which was precisely my point.