This is a bit tough and I have to go a bit beyond what's just there to make sense of this one, but here's what I make of it: the metaphysician insists that she is using an expression in just the same way that it is used in an 'ordinary' circumstance (or what Witty refers to as a 'special circumstance'): "I’m using it with the meaning you’re familiar with."
And Witty's response is something like: you can't just say this. If meaning is use in a language-game, the language-game needs to be in place if that 'same' meaning is to be preserved - and it's not at all clear that, in the metaphysician's use, that language-game (or any language-game) is in place.
This is why Witty is critical of the idea that the meaning of terms is retained in "every kind of use": but Witty's whole point is that there is no 'every kind of use': use is always 'language-game relative' - use in this or that language-game, not "every kind of use". — StreetlightX
The inseparability of meaning from use must work both ways, so when I use 'supernatural' in this game, the aura of the Roman gods is somehow invoked, whether I intend it or not. — unenlightened
All that said, Wittgenstein wrote remarks on several occasions that indicated his recognition of a theological sense in which mathematicians like Georg Cantor thought of the infinite cardinal numbers as representing platonistic "completed " infinities; namely in Wittgenstein's acknowledgement of the "giddy feelings" that accompany thinking about set-theory from the platonistic perspective, and and have psychologically motivated it's development. Wittgenstein, while clearly recognising this theological motivation and use of mathematics, forewarned that it led to the unnecessary development of confusing and over-complicated formalisms of logic that were misleading when it came to the practical application of logic and mathematics. — sime
§117 — StreetlightX
And yet words do have a aura that is the ghost of all the uses in all the games of the ancestors ... The inseparability of meaning from use must work both ways, so when I use 'supernatural' in this game, the aura of the Roman gods is somehow invoked, whether I intend it or not. — unenlightened
My account will be hard to follow: because it says something new but still has egg-shells from the old view sticking to it. (Culture and Value, 14)
The sense in which philosophy of logic speaks of sentences and words is no different from that in which we speak of them in ordinary life when we say, for example, “What is written here is a Chinese sentence”, or “No, that only looks like writing; it’s actually just ornamental”, and so on.
We’re talking about the spatial and temporal phenomenon of language, not about some non-spatial, atemporal non-entity. [Only it is possible to be interested in a phenomenon in a variety of ways]. But we talk about it as we do about the pieces in chess when we are stating the rules for their moves, not describing their physical properties.
The question “What is a word really?” is analogous to “What is a piece in chess?” — PI 108 (boxed section)
When the philosopher says “This is here”, I think he is referring to Moore's claim "here is one hand". Moore's point is that it exists, it is real. But when not doing philosophy does such a statement make sense? It would make no sense for me to walk up to someone and say "here is one hand, and here is another". The example in §117 is some object. Now it might make sense to say “This is here” if we are looking for the object, but in this case the object is right in front of him. In this case, "here" does not mean in this place, as if a hand could be misplaced, but intends something metaphysical - I know irrefutably that it exists. But that is not how the word 'here' is ordinarily used, except perhaps if we are looking for something whose existence is in question; but not as confirmation of existence in general. — Fooloso4
69...We do not know the boundaries
because none have been drawn. To repeat, we can draw a boundary—
for a special purpose. Does it take that to make the concept usable?
Not at alll (Except for that special purpose.)
The context is given, someone says "this is here" as he points to an object. — Metaphysician Undercover
132. We want to establish an order in our knowledge of the use of language: an order with a particular end in view; one out of many possible orders; not the order."
Exactly, it could be used in absolutely any circumstances — Metaphysician Undercover
..."this is here", creates something specific (special) — Metaphysician Undercover
In what circumstances does it make sense? If we are looking for the object and find it: "This (the car key) is here. Or if mapping the location of objects in the room. Or giving an inventory of the things in the room. There is nothing "special" about these circumstances. They are all quite ordinary, but they are not the same circumstances in which one claims "This is here" and means something metaphysical. — Fooloso4
I don't think he meant that one would actually say "This is here" but rather the particular object is here: — Fooloso4
I don't think he meant that one would actually say "This is here" but rather the particular object is here:
— Fooloso4
I disagree. Firstly, I find no reason to question Wittgenstein's example. — Luke
and/or they could also be seemingly sensible expressions which don't make very much sense upon closer scrutiny. — Luke
I don't see how it could be both "used in absolutely any circumstances" (general) but also "something specific" (particular). By "special circumstances" Wittgenstein does not mean just any context. It is not made into a context or some set of "special circumstances" simply by adding that he also points at the object. — Luke
But he says the sentence does make sense in the circumstances in which it is actually used. — Fooloso4
If those circumstances are "special" in the sense of extraordinary — Fooloso4
The sentence: "This is here" does have an everyday use. "This is here (pointing to the table) and this is here (pointing to the chair) but where are the dishes?" — Fooloso4
And yet words do have a aura that is the ghost of all the uses in all the games of the ancestors. — unenlightened
I've always disliked calling language-games 'contexts' — StreetlightX
On what occasion would you point at an object and say "This is here"? — Luke
A language-game determines not 'just' the meaning of a word, but also, the kind of word any particular word is: the role it plays in that game. — StreetlightX
You understand this expression, don’t you?
Well then - I’m using it with the meaning you’re familiar with.
As if the meaning were an aura the word brings along with it and retains in every kind of use.
348. Just as the words "I am here" have a meaning only in certain contexts, and not when I say them to someone who is sitting in front of me and sees me clearly, - and not because they are superfluous, but because their meaning is not determined by the situation, yet stands in need of such determination. — On Certainty
“Yes, that is a sentence. An English sentence. And what is it supposed to be doing?” — On Certainty 352
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