This is a bit tough and I have to go a bit beyond what's just there to make sense of this one, but here's what I make of it: the metaphysician insists that she is using an expression in just the same way that it is used in an 'ordinary' circumstance (or what Witty refers to as a 'special circumstance'): "I’m using it with the meaning you’re familiar with."

And Witty's response is something like: you can't just say this. If meaning is use in a language-game, the language-game needs to be in place if that 'same' meaning is to be preserved - and it's not at all clear that, in the metaphysician's use, that language-game (or any language-game) is in place.

This is why Witty is critical of the idea that the meaning of terms is retained in "every kind of use": but Witty's whole point is that there is no 'every kind of use': use is always 'language-game relative' - use in this or that language-game, not "every kind of use". — StreetlightX

"Language-game" is a substitute for "context" here. "Context" has two very distinct connotations, each of which are very important to meaning. The first is the position of a word in relation to other words in an act of use. The second is the special circumstances which constitute the environment of the act of use. "Language-game" as StreetlightX uses it here, acts as a substitute for both of these, "meaning is use in a language-game". So "language-game" provides us with a third sense of "context". "Context" does not refer here to a static position, or state of things in relationship to each other, it refers directly to the act, as a move with context, within a game.

The first sense of context (the positional relations of words) may be subsumed as part of the language game, a move within the game. The move is to put words in relations to each other. But as StreetlightX points out, the metaphysician's game is unfamiliar, perhaps as a sort of personally created, private game, though the metaphysician insists that the game ought to be familiar to you. When the game is unfamiliar to you, meaning cannot be determined by the first sense of context (positional relations of words), so we are left with context in the second sense, "special circumstances" as the only means to determine the meaning.

The inseparability of meaning from use must work both ways, so when I use 'supernatural' in this game, the aura of the Roman gods is somehow invoked, whether I intend it or not. — unenlightened

That is because it is the game we are familiar with. But if a philosopher used "supernatural" in a context (relation to other words) in which the invoking of Roman gods was out of place, and therefore the use of that word seemed like nonsense, then we'd complain that the philosopher was using the word in a nonsense way, because we couldn't understand that context. Then to understand what the philosopher was talking about, we'd have to turn to the "special circumstances" of that use. What exactly is it, according to the context of that particular act of use, in its special circumstances, that the philosopher is referring to?

All that said, Wittgenstein wrote remarks on several occasions that indicated his recognition of a theological sense in which mathematicians like Georg Cantor thought of the infinite cardinal numbers as representing platonistic "completed " infinities; namely in Wittgenstein's acknowledgement of the "giddy feelings" that accompany thinking about set-theory from the platonistic perspective, and and have psychologically motivated it's development. Wittgenstein, while clearly recognising this theological motivation and use of mathematics, forewarned that it led to the unnecessary development of confusing and over-complicated formalisms of logic that were misleading when it came to the practical application of logic and mathematics. — sime

So those mathematicians like Cantor, think that they have attained God's perspective, and this is the source of the giddy feelings?

§117 — StreetlightX

When the philosopher says “This is here”, I think he is referring to Moore's claim "here is one hand". Moore's point is that it exists, it is real. But when not doing philosophy does such a statement make sense? It would make no sense for me to walk up to someone and say "here is one hand, and here is another". The example in §117 is some object. Now it might make sense to say “This is here” if we are looking for the object, but in this case the object is right in front of him. In this case, "here" does not mean in this place, as if a hand could be misplaced, but intends something metaphysical - I know irrefutably that it exists. But that is not how the word 'here' is ordinarily used, except perhaps if we are looking for something whose existence is in question; but not as confirmation of existence in general.

And yet words do have a aura that is the ghost of all the uses in all the games of the ancestors ... The inseparability of meaning from use must work both ways, so when I use 'supernatural' in this game, the aura of the Roman gods is somehow invoked, whether I intend it or not. — unenlightened

I agree.

Wittgenstein said:

My account will be hard to follow: because it says something new but still has egg-shells from the old view sticking to it. (Culture and Value, 14)

Husserl points to the sedimentation of meaning. Words accrue meaning over time. We see this clearly with the term 'soul'. Whole mythologies became part of its meaning.

A relevant quote relating to issues around §116:

The sense in which philosophy of logic speaks of sentences and words is no different from that in which we speak of them in ordinary life when we say, for example, “What is written here is a Chinese sentence”, or “No, that only looks like writing; it’s actually just ornamental”, and so on.
We’re talking about the spatial and temporal phenomenon of language, not about some non-spatial, atemporal non-entity. [Only it is possible to be interested in a phenomenon in a variety of ways]. But we talk about it as we do about the pieces in chess when we are stating the rules for their moves, not describing their physical properties.
The question “What is a word really?” is analogous to “What is a piece in chess?” — PI 108 (boxed section)

When the philosopher says “This is here”, I think he is referring to Moore's claim "here is one hand". Moore's point is that it exists, it is real. But when not doing philosophy does such a statement make sense? It would make no sense for me to walk up to someone and say "here is one hand, and here is another". The example in §117 is some object. Now it might make sense to say “This is here” if we are looking for the object, but in this case the object is right in front of him. In this case, "here" does not mean in this place, as if a hand could be misplaced, but intends something metaphysical - I know irrefutably that it exists. But that is not how the word 'here' is ordinarily used, except perhaps if we are looking for something whose existence is in question; but not as confirmation of existence in general. — Fooloso4

In the example, "this is here" means nothing more than "this object is in this place", exactly as it sounds. Notice a pointing motion is indicated. The problem is that "this is here" is only meaningful if the special circumstances (the context of the act of use) are considered. When the special circumstances are considered (the pointing to an object), it refers to a particular object in a particular place. Without consideration of the special circumstances it could refer to any object in any place, and therefore looses its meaning. The phrase makes no sense outside the context of the special circumstances.

There's a sort of paradox indicated because the phrase is extremely useful (able to be used to refer to any object at any place), but it really has no meaning (makes no sense), other than what is given to it by the special circumstances of the particular instance of use. That's a peculiar aspect of language, the more useful phrases are the ones which are allowed to derive their meaning from the special circumstances of their use. This relates back to when he described the concept of "game" as unbounded. Being unbounded makes the word "game" very useful (may be used in many different cases), but we may create a boundary for a special purpose.

69...We do not know the boundaries
because none have been drawn. To repeat, we can draw a boundary—
for a special purpose. Does it take that to make the concept usable?
Not at alll (Except for that special purpose.)

"This is here" - "You understand this expression, don’t you? Well then - I’m using it with the meaning you’re familiar with."

But when would we use this expression? A context could probably be provided/imagined, but I can't think of one easily. "This is here" is an unusual expression, which is why (I think) Wittgenstein considers that its actual use would require "special circumstances".

The context is given, someone says "this is here" as he points to an object. There's a sort of paradox involved because one might point to any object and utter that phrase, and it would make sense. Yet without context the phrase makes no sense . So it is not required that the circumstances are "special", because the phrase is applicable in all circumstances. However, it is only meaningful in the sense that it indicates special circumstances. You might say that the phrase (in the context) creates special circumstances.

The context is given, someone says "this is here" as he points to an object. — Metaphysician Undercover

If that were the case, then why does Wittgenstein state: "he should ask himself in what special circumstances this sentence is actually used"?

Exactly, it could be used in absolutely any circumstances, therefore the circumstances in which it is usable are not "special" at all. But if it were used, as it is in the example, the use of it would make those circumstances very special.

Compare this to how he presents the form of a proposition at 114, "this is how things are". The one, "this is how things are" is a generalization, it creates something general. The other "this is here", creates something specific (special). Wittgenstein is directing us away from the use of language for creating something general (what philosophers do), toward its use for creating something specific (special). That's what ordinary language use does, creates something special, it specifies. Ordinary language use is very specific to the circumstances, we refer to particular things in particular locations, and that's where language's usefulness is based. Talking about specific things in specific places is ordinary use, and that's the foundation of language.

The philosophical type of language use, generalizations ("this is how things are", or "essences"), is a special type of language use, created for special purposes. As we'll see in 120-135 this dissolves the generalized idea that philosophy is done for 'a purpose', rendering it as philosophy is done for a variety of different special purposes. That's because all forms of language use are based in specification, as the foundation of language, mentioned above. Now what is specified is the particular purpose.

132. We want to establish an order in our knowledge of the use of language: an order with a particular end in view; one out of many possible orders; not the order."

Since "someone" is pointing to an object in front of him "this" refers to whatever it is that he or she is pointing to.

The term translated as "special" is Besondere. It can also be translated as particular. In some cases it makes sense to say "This is here". It is not being used in the same way however, when "This is here" is meant to point something metaphysical (§116). In this case "here" means exists or is real, which is not what the word means when used in those circumstances where it does make sense.

In what circumstances does it make sense? If we are looking for the object and find it: "This (the car key) is here. Or if mapping the location of objects in the room. Or giving an inventory of the things in the room. There is nothing "special" about these circumstances. They are all quite ordinary, but they are not the same circumstances in which one claims "This is here" and means something metaphysical.

Exactly, it could be used in absolutely any circumstances — Metaphysician Undercover

..."this is here", creates something specific (special) — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't see how it could be both "used in absolutely any circumstances" (general) but also "something specific" (particular). By "special circumstances" Wittgenstein does not mean just any context. It is not made into a context or some set of "special circumstances" simply by adding that he also points at the object.

In what circumstances does it make sense? If we are looking for the object and find it: "This (the car key) is here. Or if mapping the location of objects in the room. Or giving an inventory of the things in the room. There is nothing "special" about these circumstances. They are all quite ordinary, but they are not the same circumstances in which one claims "This is here" and means something metaphysical. — Fooloso4

I don't disagree with this, but "This is here" still sounds unnatural to me in your examples.

I don't think he meant that one would actually say "This is here" but rather the particular object is here: "The key is here".

"This is here" might be used in response to the question: "What happened to the things on the table?". In that case someone might say "This is here and this is here" while pointing to the items. Or, when doing an inventory to check if anything is missing: "This is here and this is here, but where is 'x'?"

This (post) is here.

Well thanks for pointing that out un, I hadn't noticed. :roll:

It seems a fucking weird thing to say, to me. The circumstance that makes it seem slightly less than totally redundant would be making a comparison between the parts diagram and pack contents of an Ikea bookcase, such that 'this' and 'here' are different 'realms'. "This (points at paper) is here (points at object)". Or conversely, pointing at the spire in a picture of Notre Dame, "this is not here", pointing at the remains of the cathedral.

I don't think he meant that one would actually say "This is here" but rather the particular object is here: — Fooloso4

I disagree. Firstly, I find no reason to question Wittgenstein's example. Secondly, I think it may be another case similar to "Here is a hand" or "I know there is a sick man lying here" (OC10), which could be metaphysical uses, as you say, and/or they could also be seemingly sensible expressions which don't make very much sense upon closer scrutiny. (ETA: unless we can find a suitable context, or "special circumstances", for them.)

I don't think he meant that one would actually say "This is here" but rather the particular object is here:
— Fooloso4

I disagree. Firstly, I find no reason to question Wittgenstein's example. — Luke

I think you are right with regard to what "someone" actually said. What I was getting at is that "this" means the object that is pointed to. I don't think he was drawing our attention to the use of "this" but of "here".

and/or they could also be seemingly sensible expressions which don't make very much sense upon closer scrutiny. — Luke

But he says the sentence does make sense in the circumstances in which it is actually used. If those circumstances are "special" in the sense of extraordinary then the use of the sentence in any circumstance other than that exceptional one would not make sense. But I take this to be an example of bringing words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use. The sentence: "This is here" does have an everyday use. "This is here (pointing to the table) and this is here (pointing to the chair) but where are the dishes?"

I don't see how it could be both "used in absolutely any circumstances" (general) but also "something specific" (particular). By "special circumstances" Wittgenstein does not mean just any context. It is not made into a context or some set of "special circumstances" simply by adding that he also points at the object. — Luke

Think of this. Someone could point to absolutely any object, at any particular place whatsoever, and say "this is here". Therefore, the sentence in itself, is very general in its usability. However, if or when, someone actually points to an object and uses the sentence, its meaning is very specific in its use, to indicate that special object in that special place.

So, the circumstances are not unique, or special at all, as they are in themselves, because it could be absolutely any circumstances. That is, until the sentence is applied, and this transforms the circumstances into something special. The sentence, in the context of the pointing, specifies this object in this place, creating special circumstances from circumstances which were not special at all. It is this act of individuating an object, "this here", which the law of identity is based. Following this the object may be named.

It seems a fucking weird thing to say, to me. — unenlightened

Yes, eloquently put. :grin:

But he says the sentence does make sense in the circumstances in which it is actually used. — Fooloso4

Yes, but he also prompts the reader to question what are those "special circumstances". As I said in my initial post on §117, we probably could provide/imagine such circumstances, but I haven't found it easy to do so.

If those circumstances are "special" in the sense of extraordinary — Fooloso4

No, I take "special" to mean particular, like you stated earlier.

The sentence: "This is here" does have an everyday use. "This is here (pointing to the table) and this is here (pointing to the chair) but where are the dishes?" — Fooloso4

Maybe that works, but the sentence has been changed from "This is here" to "This is here but where is X?"

The point made by Wittgenstein was that if the sentence "This is here" makes sense to you, then you ought to question the special circumstances where it is actually used.

It appears like the sentence does not make sense to Luke, nor does it make sense to unenlightened, so these two move to deny that the sentence is ever actually used. The sentence does make sense to myself, and Fooloso4, so we move to question the special circumstances in which it is actually used, i.e. at 117 in the Philosophical Investigations.

When philosophers publish philosophical musings, like Wittgenstein has, they are full of things which make sense to some, but do not make sense to others. As he says, it depends on whether or not the words are being used in a way that you are familiar with. I am familiar with this type of philosophical statement, so "This is here" makes sense to me. But when I see algebra it does not make sense to me, because I am not familiar with it.

On what occasion would you point at an object and say "This is here"?

One example I've just thought of could be saying (to someone) "This is here" while pointing at a map, where "this" refers to a location on the map and "here" refers to your current location. It is therefore similar to unenlightened's example of two different "realms".

And yet words do have a aura that is the ghost of all the uses in all the games of the ancestors. — unenlightened

I think that within a particular context (where the meaning is unambiguous), it is as though the other possible meanings of a word disappear. Obviously, one can intentionally use a word in an ambiguous manner (e.g. double entendre). However, perhaps some might suggest that there is no such thing as an unambiguous meaning.

I don't think the second bit of §117 can be properly discussed without referring to the discussion of ostension that took place earlier in the book. After all, "this is here" is about as an exemplary case of ostension as there could ever be. And in that connection, let it be remembered that Witty's major point was that any sensible act of ostension required a certain knowledge already in place before ostension would be able to get off the ground in the first place: a knowledge of what kind of thing was being pointed out (color? shape? outline?).

Insofar as this 'prior knowledge' amounts to knowledge of the language-game in which a particular ostensive act figures in to, when someone says: "You understand this expression, don’t you? Well then - I’m using it with the meaning you’re familiar with." - one can read this as an effort to appropriate or rather expropriate a language-game without the form-of-life which gives it meaning, or makes it 'work'. An attempt to take the language-game out of its lived context and claim it in the abstract: but to do this is just to deprive a language-game - and thus a word - of the very thing which makes it operative.

Also, a quick note on something I was thinking about in the car today:

I've always disliked calling language-games 'contexts', and on reflection I think I know why: the idea of a language-game captures something that the word 'context' seems to miss, which is a distinction among types or kinds of words. A language-game determines not 'just' the meaning of a word, but also, the kind of word any particular word is: the role it plays in that game.

'Contexts', to me anyway, seem to make words differ only be degree - ("in this context, this means that; in another context, something else"). Contexts are more general than language-games; they don't discriminate as much. It doesn't capture, in the same way, the typification at work when 'language-games' are employed. I suspect that it may be considerations of this kind that led Witty to invent the slightly clunkly neologism of the 'language-game', rather than resort to the already-available word 'context' to get his point across.

I've always disliked calling language-games 'contexts' — StreetlightX

Sorry, it was probably me that brought that in as something of a fudge between 'language game' and 'form of life'. I wonder if you might say a word about that distinction?

On what occasion would you point at an object and say "This is here"? — Luke

This would be done on the occasion of making a philosophical demonstration, as Fooloso4 points out, it's similar to when Moore says "here is one hand". Notice that Wittgenstein is trying to "bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use". He is doing this by showing that a philosophical use (such as the demonstration of "this is here") is no different from any instance of ordinary use, each one being a particular instance, of "special circumstances". Each instance of use, whether philosophical, mathematical, scientific, mundane, or whatever, may be classed in the same category, as a particular instance of special circumstances. So the instance of philosophical use is no different in the sense of aiming for "the ideal", it is just another instance of use, and like any other, it has a particular purpose specific to itself.

A language-game determines not 'just' the meaning of a word, but also, the kind of word any particular word is: the role it plays in that game. — StreetlightX

Notice the two distinct senses of "context". I think that the second sense accounts for the kind of word by relating to the particular circumstances of use. Both senses of "context" are important to meaning, but you're right, neither can account for a word playing a role. So "language-game" encompasses and supersedes both senses of "context".

Where I think "language-game" really excels is in the fact that it refers to activity (movements within a game). We therefore attribute meaning to human actions, rather than assuming that meaning is associated with static, defined relations, like "context" does. The difference is significant because classically the act is understood as the means to the end, while the end is a static object (what is intended), but meaning was always associated with the end (what was meant, intended). One might say that classically the act only had meaning by being related to an end. "Language-game" gives us the principles whereby we can associate meaning directly with the act itself, rather than the end, so that meaning is inherent within the act, being derived from the game, not the end.

If "philosophical use...is no different from any instance of ordinary use", as you claim, then what does it mean to "bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use" - and why do you state that "Wittgenstein is trying" to do this? If all uses of language are already ordinary or everyday uses, then what is there to bring back? What is a metaphysical use, then?

In answer to the question:

You understand this expression, don’t you?

I would say I do. But this is where we are led astray.

Well then - I’m using it with the meaning you’re familiar with.

But this may not be the way it is being used. Just because it made sense when used in some other situation does not mean it makes sense under these circumstances. It is not:

As if the meaning were an aura the word brings along with it and retains in every kind of use.

Under the circumstances in the example given - pointing to something and saying "this is here" is pointless. Of course the object is there, otherwise one could not point to it.

348. Just as the words "I am here" have a meaning only in certain contexts, and not when I say them to someone who is sitting in front of me and sees me clearly, - and not because they are superfluous, but because their meaning is not determined by the situation, yet stands in need of such determination. — On Certainty

To point to an object and say "this is here" is superfluous, but that is not the problem. The problem is that the meaning is not determined by the situation. It is the situation that renders the statement meaningless. The sentence is in need of a determination. As he asks elsewhere:

“Yes, that is a sentence. An English sentence. And what is it supposed to be doing?” — On Certainty 352

What is the sentence: "This is here" supposed to be doing? It cannot be used to inform us that the object is here. We may know what the statement means is some other situation, but here it is idle. Yet, it is here that the philosopher leaves behind everyday use and asserts metaphysical meaning.

It just occurred to me that I was trying to come up with an example of pointing to something, saying "this is here", and having it make sense. But that is not what Wittgenstein is asking us to do. The circumstances in which the sentence is used and makes sense is not one in which one points to an object in front of him while saying it. It is not a matter of adding context to the example in order to make sense of it. It is rather, that there may be circumstances in which one says "this is here" and it makes sense but saying it while pointing to something in front of him is not one of those circumstances.