We've been over this. They aren't. Read above. — Snakes Alive
I don't think there is any one way in particular names get established, nor is it relevant to the question. — Snakes Alive
Perhaps if you could restate your argument for why Trump is not logically equivalent to an entity called 'Trump' — Janus
since my contention has been that one of the ways they get established is by description I can't see how it is not relevant to the question. — Janus
The denotation of 'Trump' is Trump.
The denotation of 'the entity called Trump' is whichever entity is called Trump in the relevant world – whether it's Trump or not. — Snakes Alive
The issue is not whether names somehow make use of descriptions to achieve their semantic value, but what their semantic value is, and that it is not descriptive. — Snakes Alive
(for me the 'in this world' is taken for granted, since I believe all reference in possible worlds or counterfactuals must first be established in this world). — Janus
The general denotation of 'Trump' is Trump, and no particular entity has been specified; so 'Trump' is more properly equivalent to 'an entity called 'Trump''. — Janus
Sure, but the point is that the semantic value of names can be expressed, and best understood, in terms of descriptions as I think I have shown above. — Janus
As I showed above, this is not the case. — Snakes Alive
No, this is even worse. The denotation of Trump is Trump (this is an obvious point, which makes it interesting how many confusions people get themselves into). Of course he is called Trump too, in virtue of being the referent of the name. But this doesn't mean that the name means anything to do with being called Trump. It simply refers to the man. — Snakes Alive
Names and descriptions have different modal profiles, due to the lack of rigidity of the latter. The same goes for descriptions about who has which name. — Snakes Alive
More assertions without argument; this is getting boring. Might as well leave it there if you can't come up with any cogent argument that actually addresses what I have written. — Janus
so we end up having to allow silly things like 'if Nixon were a golf ball...' — andrewk
If you had read my post, you would have seen that it was specifically about my experience from reading the book. If you have a different experience, that includes finding a spot where Kripke specifies an accessibility relation, all you need do is point to that spot.Well, if you'd read the book, you'd know this weren't true, and that Kripke does address this question precisely! — Snakes Alive
But, you do agree that in some cases where ambiguity arises about the object of interest, that a definite description can attain the status of a rigid designator? — Wallows
All the referents there: you, Asda, Aldi are established by reference to this world, so I am not clear what point you are trying to make here un. — Janus
Which is the actual world, and which is the counterfactual world?
(A). I go to Asda.
(B). I don't go to Asda.
But all modal logic depends on what is the case in this world
— Janus
It's very very simple. One depends on the other, according to you, but you cannot say whether A depends on B, or B depends on A. — unenlightened
No, it doesn't. Counting as the same individual is stipulated, not discovered. Having a different name in other possible worlds is trivial.If an individual is to count as the same across possible worlds then the individual must have some attributes across those worlds such that it can be counted as that unique individual. — Janus
so the individual is both stipulated and identified by a set of attributes.
And you don’t see your problem here. — Banno
Kripke agrees that the individual must have some shared attributes:Yes it does or your counterfactual talk will be nonsense. I am saying that the individual must be stipulated, not discovered, (I didn't use the latter term, and how could we discover anything counterfactual or merely possible?) to have some attributes the same across possible worlds, otherwise the counterfactual thinking would be incoherent. — Janus
These are necessary properties under Kripke's approach. Where he departs from the DD approach is that he says we don't have to have necessary and sufficient properties in order to pick out the individual in the alternative worlds. The picking out from amongst objects that have the necessary properties is done by stipulation. The stipulation is not by attributes but by mental ostension. We point our mental finger towards the group of objects selecting the necessary conditions, select one and say 'this one is Nixon'.If we can't imagine a possible world in which Nixon doesn't have a certain property, then it's a necessary condition of someone being Nixon. Or a necessary property of Nixon that he [has] that property. For example, supposing Nixon is in fact a human being, it would seem that we cannot think of a possible counterfactual situation in which he was, say, an inanimate object; perhaps it is not even possible for him not to have been a human being. Then it will be a necessary fact about Nixon that in all possible worlds where he exists at all, he is human or anyway he is not an inanimate object. — N&N p46
These are necessary properties under Kripke's approach. Where he departs from the DD approach is that he says we don't have to have necessary and sufficient properties in order to pick out the individual in the alternative worlds. The picking out from amongst objects that have the necessary properties is done by stipulation. The stipulation is not by attributes but by mental ostension. We point our mental finger towards the group of objects selecting the necessary conditions, select one and say 'this one is Nixon'. — andrewk
That's right and it is what I have been saying. — Janus
That must be so otherwise we could not know what individual is being referred to in the first place. — Janus
Now that's just not true. As has been shown multiple times here. We can refer when there is no available description.
And notice again the way you slip from definite description to description per se. Is that a rhetorical device or a failure to recognise the distinction? — Banno
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