As a matter of terminology, descriptions with an indefinite article like 'a' are called indefinite descriptions. Descriptions with a definite article like 'the' are called definite descriptions. — Snakes Alive
But all modal logic depends on what is the case in this world, and since there is only one country called Albania bordering Greece, and in fact only one country called Albania: "A country called Albania that borders Greece" and even "a country called Albania" picks out just one entity and thus should be considered to be a definite description. — Janus
The same thing applies when you say that 'Donald Trump' is a rigid designator (leaving aside for the sake of the argument the objection that the name does not pick out just one entity if more than one person is called Donald Trump); it is only contingently so because the man named Donald Trump was named Donald Trump. — Janus
Read the rest of the post. — Snakes Alive
No. 'Donald Trump' picking out Donald Trump is not contingent on his being named so in another world. — Snakes Alive
I didn't say it was; I said it was contingent upon the man named Donald Trump being so named in this world. — Janus
All reference in counterfactual discourse is established by reference to the actual world; and this goes equally for names as it does definite descriptions. — Janus
I could name my car 'Donald Trump' if I wished to. In the case where multiple entities are named the same, then further qualifications (descriptions) are required to establish which of those entities is being referred to (except in ostensive contexts as I have already acknowledged many times). — Janus
that A is necessarily the same thing as B.
Now A is a pain, and hence necessarily a pain.. — Banno
Yes, I think that, rather than 'all refs in counterfactuals are fixed in this world' it is 'all refs in counterfactuals that are rigid designators across the set of possible worlds under consideration are fixed in this world'.If we say if the South successfully split from the Union, the president of the United States at the end of the 19th century would have governed a smaller territory. Here the definite description does not depend in any way upon who was the president of the United States at which time in the actual world – only in the counterfactual scenario. — Snakes Alive
Fair enough. And thank you. I like a stimulating challenge. Perhaps my last post was a little lazy.if you have to throw up your hands and say that 'they are rigid, except when they aren't,' you don't have a theory. — Snakes Alive
But all modal logic depends on what is the case in this world — Janus
All reference in counterfactual discourse is established by reference to the actual world; — Janus
No, because the referent of the DD was the Republican candidate. If the Dem candidate was named Peter Nixon, or even Richard Milhouse Nixon, that person would not be the referent of the DD.This doesn't work, because in your example, the description is still not rigid. We might imagine a counterfactual scenario where another man named Nixon won the 1968 election, in which case we'd be referring to him using the counterfactual. — Snakes Alive
I think DDs in hypotheticals are covered by the same method as DDs in counterfactuals, and the splitting time for the possible worlds becomes the present, rather than some date prior to a fact that is being countered.But all modal logic depends on what is the case in this world — Janus
the former is false; not all possible worlds are counterfactual. — unenlightened
No, because the referent of the DD was the Republican candidate. If the Dem candidate was named Peter Nixon, or even Richard Milhouse Nixon, that person would not be the referent of the DD. — andrewk
Do you have a ref for that? A problem with N&N is that it's very verbose and lacks clear, concise definitions. Which is one of the reasons it is so open to many different interpretations. A bit like Kant's CPR.Kripke's view is that there's a set of all possible worlds. That set has as its members every way the world could be. Each member is along the lines of saying "It is possible that..."
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