We've been over this. They aren't. Read above. — Snakes Alive

I've read it and I can't see an argument for it that I believe I haven't refuted. Perhaps if you could restate your argument for why Trump is not logically equivalent to an entity called 'Trump' or 'Trump' is not logically equivalent to 'an entity called 'Trump'' we might get somewhere on this point.

I don't think there is any one way in particular names get established, nor is it relevant to the question. — Snakes Alive

I wasn't saying there is any one way, but was outlining the imaginable ways, in which names get established and since my contention has been that one of the ways they get established is by description I can't see how it is not relevant to the question.

Perhaps if you could restate your argument for why Trump is not logically equivalent to an entity called 'Trump' — Janus

The denotation of 'Trump' is Trump.

The denotation of 'the entity called Trump' is whichever entity is called Trump in the relevant world – whether it's Trump or not.

since my contention has been that one of the ways they get established is by description I can't see how it is not relevant to the question. — Janus

The issue is not whether names somehow make use of descriptions to achieve their semantic value, but what their semantic value is, and that it is not descriptive.

The denotation of 'Trump' is Trump.

The denotation of 'the entity called Trump' is whichever entity is called Trump in the relevant world – whether it's Trump or not. — Snakes Alive

OK, I think I see where the confusion lies now: I think the precise formulation should be 'the entity called Trump in this world' (for me the 'in this world' is taken for granted, since I believe all reference in possible worlds or counterfactuals must first be established in this world).

As I see it, in general the denotation of 'the entity called 'Trump'' is the entity called 'Trump'', and it is implicit that there is only one such entity.

The general denotation of 'Trump' is Trump, and no particular entity has been specified; so 'Trump' is more properly equivalent to 'an entity called 'Trump''.

The issue is not whether names somehow make use of descriptions to achieve their semantic value, but what their semantic value is, and that it is not descriptive. — Snakes Alive

Sure, but the point is that the semantic value of names can be expressed, and best understood, in terms of descriptions as I think I have shown above.

(for me the 'in this world' is taken for granted, since I believe all reference in possible worlds or counterfactuals must first be established in this world). — Janus

As I showed above, this is not the case.

The general denotation of 'Trump' is Trump, and no particular entity has been specified; so 'Trump' is more properly equivalent to 'an entity called 'Trump''. — Janus

No, this is even worse. The denotation of Trump is Trump (this is an obvious point, which makes it interesting how many confusions people get themselves into). Of course he is called Trump too, in virtue of being the referent of the name. But this doesn't mean that the name means anything to do with being called Trump. It simply refers to the man.

Sure, but the point is that the semantic value of names can be expressed, and best understood, in terms of descriptions as I think I have shown above. — Janus

No, which is the whole point of Lecture I. Names and descriptions have different modal profiles, due to the lack of rigidity of the latter. The same goes for descriptions about who has which name.

I doubt even you could give a concise summary of you position. No, Janus. Not interested. Read the book.

As I showed above, this is not the case. — Snakes Alive

You have not shown that as far as i can see. Please provide a concise argument or quote exactly where you think you've shown it.

No, this is even worse. The denotation of Trump is Trump (this is an obvious point, which makes it interesting how many confusions people get themselves into). Of course he is called Trump too, in virtue of being the referent of the name. But this doesn't mean that the name means anything to do with being called Trump. It simply refers to the man. — Snakes Alive

LOL, who's confused now? The denotation of Trump is not Trump; the denotation of 'Trump' is Trump. Of course the name means means something to do with being called Trump; that the name 'Trump' refers to Trump just is that the entity the name refers to is called 'Trump'. I don't even know what point
you are trying to make in the above passage; it doesn't seem to address anything i have said.

Names and descriptions have different modal profiles, due to the lack of rigidity of the latter. The same goes for descriptions about who has which name. — Snakes Alive

More assertions without argument; this is getting boring. Might as well leave it there if you can't come up with any cogent argument that actually addresses what I have written.



Of course this response is no surprise, either. Just more posturing. Let me know when you become interested in doing some actual philosophy. Honestly the level of your discussion is appalling; you should be ashamed of yourself!

I think part of the confusion that emanates from N&N is that, so far as I have been able to see, Kripke fails to specify an accessibility relation for the set of possible worlds that are under consideration. Without such a relation, there is no limit to the possible worlds that can be considered, so we end up having to allow silly things like 'if Nixon were a golf ball...'

Specifying an accessibility relation is an indispensable part of any exercise in modal logic, so Kripke's failure to do this is hard to fathom. Talk of possible worlds without a specified accessibility relation is doomed to make no sense.

The accessibility relation I use to make sense of counterfactuals and hypotheticals is that all the worls, including this one, must be identical up to a 'splitting time' T2. That provides a clear, objective means of determining reference and rigidity.

I'd like to consider alternative accessibility relations. Perhaps Kripke does choose one somewhere, and I missed it. If so, I'd be grateful if somebody that has spotted it could point it out. @Wallows did you spot an accessibility relation in the text?

More assertions without argument; this is getting boring. Might as well leave it there if you can't come up with any cogent argument that actually addresses what I have written. — Janus

Read. the. fucking. book. The arguments are given in Lecture I + II.

so we end up having to allow silly things like 'if Nixon were a golf ball...' — andrewk

Well, if you'd read the book, you'd know this weren't true, and that Kripke does address this question precisely! Not only that, but these issues, and the part of the book they come from, have been discussed in this very thread! Funny how that works.

Seriously, if you chuckleheads don't start showing some evidence that you have read the book we're supposed to be talking about, I'm just going to stop posting. I know you must think you're so intelligent that you don't need to read anything before criticizing it, but I assure you that is not the case.

Read.

The sheer illiteracy in this thread is actually starting to piss me off, so I think I'm going to duck out.

Honestly the level of your discussion is appalling; you should be ashamed of yourself! — Janus

Yeah, I agree. You win.

Now can we get on with it?

Naming and Necessity Lecture Three

A new thread for those interested in things other than definite descriptions.

I'd value your contribution at Naming and Necessity Lecture Three

Well, if you'd read the book, you'd know this weren't true, and that Kripke does address this question precisely! — Snakes Alive

If you had read my post, you would have seen that it was specifically about my experience from reading the book. If you have a different experience, that includes finding a spot where Kripke specifies an accessibility relation, all you need do is point to that spot.

The fact that you chose to hurl insults instead suggests that you have not found such a spot.

The same applies to your claim that it has been discussed in this 52-page long thread.

But, you do agree that in some cases where ambiguity arises about the object of interest, that a definite description can attain the status of a rigid designator? — Wallows

Slowly and with care.

Can a definite description be a rigid designator?

Now a rigid designator refers to the very same individual in all the possible worlds in which it exist.

So your question is the same as "can a definite description refer to the very same thing in every possible world in which that thing exists?"

But remember that if something is true in all possible worlds, it is true necessarily.

So "Can a definite description be a rigid designator?" is the same as asking "Can a definite description be necessarily true of its referent?".

Agreed?

All the referents there: you, Asda, Aldi are established by reference to this world, so I am not clear what point you are trying to make here un. — Janus

Which is the actual world, and which is the counterfactual world?
(A). I go to Asda.
(B). I don't go to Asda.

But all modal logic depends on what is the case in this world
— Janus

It's very very simple. One depends on the other, according to you, but you cannot say whether A depends on B, or B depends on A.

Which is the actual world, and which is the counterfactual world?
(A). I go to Asda.
(B). I don't go to Asda.

But all modal logic depends on what is the case in this world
— Janus

It's very very simple. One depends on the other, according to you, but you cannot say whether A depends on B, or B depends on A. — unenlightened

I would not say that A depends on B or the obverse, but that both A and B depend upon there being an actual world such that there is an Asda to go to and an entity---yourself---able to go or not to go to it..

Finally you lay your argument out clearly!
If an individual is to count as the same across possible worlds then the individual must have some attributes across those worlds such that it can be counted as that unique individual. If those attributes can be described, even in principle, then there must be descriptions that rigidly designate.

The other point is that the entity we call X may not be called X in other possible worlds so us referring to the entity as X is valid or coherent only insofar as the entity is called X in this world. This is the same as counting a definite description which is valid in this world as rigidly designating the entity across possible worlds even if that description is not valid in those worlds. These are just different ways of specifying which entity we wish to talk about in counterfactual or possible scenarios.

If an individual is to count as the same across possible worlds then the individual must have some attributes across those worlds such that it can be counted as that unique individual. — Janus

No, it doesn't. Counting as the same individual is stipulated, not discovered. Having a different name in other possible worlds is trivial.

Read the book.

Yes it does or your counterfactual talk will be nonsense. I am saying that the individual must be stipulated, not discovered, (I didn't use the latter term, and how could we discover anything counterfactual or merely possible?) to have some attributes the same across possible worlds, otherwise the counterfactual thinking would be incoherent. Nixon being a golf ball is an example.

You keep telling me to read the book. I have read it years ago. I am not interested enough to read it again. I am here responding to what others write, since this is a philosophy forum. Read what I write and respond relevantly to that or don't read it and don't respond at all. I couldn't care less, but I am tired of your pompous bullshit!

so the individual is both stipulated and identified by a set of attributes.

And you don’t see your problem here.

Read the book.

so the individual is both stipulated and identified by a set of attributes.

And you don’t see your problem here. — Banno

The individual is identified by some set of stipulated attributes. If you think there is a problem with that then why behave like a pompous smartarse by merely insinuating that there is a problem ? Why not just act in good faith and explain what the problem is?

Here's an example: if I say 'What if Trump had had black hair?' how would you know who I am referring to?

Yes it does or your counterfactual talk will be nonsense. I am saying that the individual must be stipulated, not discovered, (I didn't use the latter term, and how could we discover anything counterfactual or merely possible?) to have some attributes the same across possible worlds, otherwise the counterfactual thinking would be incoherent. — Janus

Kripke agrees that the individual must have some shared attributes:

If we can't imagine a possible world in which Nixon doesn't have a certain property, then it's a necessary condition of someone being Nixon. Or a necessary property of Nixon that he [has] that property. For example, supposing Nixon is in fact a human being, it would seem that we cannot think of a possible counterfactual situation in which he was, say, an inanimate object; perhaps it is not even possible for him not to have been a human being. Then it will be a necessary fact about Nixon that in all possible worlds where he exists at all, he is human or anyway he is not an inanimate object. — N&N p46

These are necessary properties under Kripke's approach. Where he departs from the DD approach is that he says we don't have to have necessary and sufficient properties in order to pick out the individual in the alternative worlds. The picking out from amongst objects that have the necessary properties is done by stipulation. The stipulation is not by attributes but by mental ostension. We point our mental finger towards the group of objects selecting the necessary conditions, select one and say 'this one is Nixon'.

When I first read this a while back I didn't spend much time on it. I thought it just didn't sound like a helpful way to think about things, and moved on. But given the length of this thread and the passion displayed herein, I'm trying to be charitable. It still sounds to me like an odd way to proceed, but I will reflect on it and see if it starts to appear any more appealing.

The individual is identified by some set of stipulated atributes.

Atributes that may not be true of that individual in some possible world.

The quoted passage from Kripke is interesting, as it I think it shows that (at least on some counts) I have not been disagreeing with him at all, but only with his exegetes in this thread.

These are necessary properties under Kripke's approach. Where he departs from the DD approach is that he says we don't have to have necessary and sufficient properties in order to pick out the individual in the alternative worlds. The picking out from amongst objects that have the necessary properties is done by stipulation. The stipulation is not by attributes but by mental ostension. We point our mental finger towards the group of objects selecting the necessary conditions, select one and say 'this one is Nixon'. — andrewk

This just seems odd to me, though. I would say that we must be able to stipulate sufficient properties to establish an identity across worlds.I am not too sure about thinking in terms of necessary properties. as an example if someone said "what if Nixon had been a golf ball?' I would ask instead 'what properties could a golf ball possibly have sufficient to establish that it was Nixon?'.



That's right and it is in accordance with what I have been saying. The individual is identified by attributes which are given as descriptions. Those attributes are the ones we recognize in the actual world. That must be so otherwise we could not know what individual is being referred to in the first place. A mere name is not enough, because many individuals could have the same name.

So let's consider how Kripke might treat "Could Nixon have been a golfball?"

First, that's a question about Nixon. That's stipulated; and fixed in all possible worlds in which Nixon exists, by the fact that "Nixon" is a rigid designator.

Second, Nixon is human. What this means is that if we talk about a situation in which the thing we call Nixon is not human, we will not be talking about Nixon. SO if for instance we posit that Nixon was an automata, then we are not talking about a world in which the person we call Nixon is an automata, but a world in which Nixon* does not exist, and rather there is some other individual, with certain attributes that are the same as Nixon, but who is decidedly not Nixon because it is a robot.

The conclusion: since Nixon is necessarily human, and since golfballs are necessarily not human, Nixon could not be a golf ball.

There is no possible world in which Nixon is a golf ball.

And "There is no possible world in which Nixon is a golf ball" is a statement about Nixon.

*(perhaps - he might still be there, but flipping burgers in Mexico under another name...)

That's right and it is what I have been saying. — Janus

And without a hint of irony.

That must be so otherwise we could not know what individual is being referred to in the first place. — Janus

Now that's just not true. As has been shown multiple times here. We can refer when there is no available description.

And notice again the way you slip from definite description to description per se. Is that a rhetorical device or a failure to recognise the distinction?

I have not been disagreeing with him at all, — Janus

You are not reading the book, so you have no idea what he is saying - as is clear form your posts.

Read the book.

The question is not really about Nixon at all. It is really a general question: 'Could human beings have been golfballs?'
So there is at least one description that must obtain in any possible world "Nixon is human". If that is a necessary property then it seems that there must be at least one necessary property. But the other question would be 'what attributes are sufficient to establish that Nixon is being coherently referred to?'. There may be a set of such attributes, and any of them may be sufficient, but none of them necessary, to establish that Nixon is being coherently referred to.

Now that's just not true. As has been shown multiple times here. We can refer when there is no available description.

And notice again the way you slip from definite description to description per se. Is that a rhetorical device or a failure to recognise the distinction? — Banno

I have said from the start that in my view descriptions are more or less definite. A description is adequately definite if it allows anyone with the relevant knowledge to pick out just one entity. It is absurd to criticize me for not adhering to your definition of definite description when that is the very thing I am arguing against.

I am trying to propose an alternative understanding of description and definite description. I am not saying that that understanding is complete or infallible, I am open to critiques of it, but not to rejections of it merely on the basis that it doesn't accord with your preconceived notions of what a definite description is.

You never even attempt to answer the salient questions. You can't refer when there is no available description. Again, if I say to you "What if Trump had black hair?' how do you know who I am referring to? I say you don't and you must be given some description that tells you who i am referring to. If you disagree then tell me how else (apart from my pointing to the entity or some image of the entity) you would know.