No, my answer to the question you initially proposed is that implied consent cannot be established in those circumstances. Since you stopped responding to any of the arguments on that point, I had assumed you dropped it. — Echarmion

not sure I stopped responding. Again you denied the concept of implied consent - out of hand.

An interesting angle. The consent seems manufactured though. You cannot implicitly consent to a result you explicitly try to avoid. Having sex entails a non-zero chance of pregnancy, but awareness of a possibility is not sufficient to establish consent, implied or otherwise. To use an absurd example: Walking down a dark street might entail a non-zero chance of being robbed, but I do not implicitly consent to that outcome just by taking the risk. — Echarmion

You give no reason at all why, it is manufactured, that attempts to avoid relieve you of responsibility, or why awareness is not sufficient. You just state they are. It is not just you, but this seems rather normal on here. Without any reasons why or supporting those points, they are just your opinions - which is fine. But it just boils down to - your argument is wrong because I don't believe it.

On the final point on the robber I can back explaining you had the backwards, the child in the innocent actor and the mother is the robber.

to this you cam back

An act of free will does not make you responsible for all possible outcomes of that act. But even if we ignore the details and assume that the mother is responsible for the resulting pregnancy, this does not impact her right to bodily autonomy. In order to overcome bodily autonomy, you need consent.

In that sense, your question is not without merit, or your initial question had merit, because it explicitly based it's argument on consent. In your latest posts, however, you seem to have gotten no closer to actually establish consent, implied or otherwise. — Echarmion

Yet again, one more declaration that an act of free will does not make you responsible - with no support of the idea, acknowledgement of where it does or where it does not - and why the difference.

then granting for the sake of argument you go to declare - once again -

But even if we ignore the details and assume that the mother is responsible for the resulting pregnancy, this does not impact her right to bodily autonomy. In order to overcome bodily autonomy, you need consent.

So my base argument asks does the sex provide some obligation on the use of the mothers body - this above is just a long way to say NO, because i say so. Once again - just one more declarative sentence - without support. Just opinion

However, when it came to the child support question - you seem quite willing to assign the father responsibility for his action. seemingly based on differentiation between financial support and the use of the woman's body as below

Because the obligation is not absolute or all encompassing. There is an obligation to support the child, but that obligation does not extend to your bodily integrity. You have asked why, before, and my answer would be that your body is the only connection to the outside world you, as a consciousness, have, and is therefore central to your freedom. As such, it is strongly protected — Echarmion

I was attempting here to summarize where we are to continue:

So, in some type of summary, To the question I proposed, although you seem to believe in the concept of an implied consent, you point is it does not apply to pre birth, because it seems your view is bodily integrity is a stronger claim. — Rank Amateur

which still seems a rather good summary

to which you come back.

No, my answer to the question you initially proposed is that implied consent cannot be established in those circumstances. Since you stopped responding to any of the arguments on that point, I had assumed you dropped it.

My answer to your other, unrelated, question of why child support is a moral obligation while carrying a child to term is not is what you quoted. — Echarmion

Which still is just saying, yet again, that Rank you are wrong because I say so. And for good measure your example is unrelated because i say so.

I am not trying to be a jerk, but it just turns into twitter if we just share unsupported opinions. You can and should attack my position, and I make that easier by giving you the basis of the belief. So we can logically argue the concepts. See if the concepts apply uniformly across other scenarios or not, and if not why.

just to help a little. David Boonin in his "pro choice" book " In defense of abortion" addresses the issue of Tacit Consent this way.

He grants, that the free act of having sex establishes a responsibility for the existence of the fetus, it does not, however establish a responsibility of the dependence of the fetus on the woman's body. The though experiment is, a doctor saves my life today, 2 years later I develop Parkinson's. I sue the surgeon for support, because if he had not saved my life, I would not have gotten ill.

My problem with this argument is, by granting the parents are responsible for the existence, and since not responsible for the dependence and can deny the use of her body on this rational. We are right back to where we usually get in the abortion discussion. Some action that most people would consider wrong, to a born human, is somehow not wrong in an un-born human.

If you tried to make a case that a mother or father does not need to take care of a 1 month old, because their act of sex does not directly establish the dependence of the baby would seem insane.

So we get back to where we normally end up. The moral rules that apply outside the womb, do not apply inside the womb. Because we are able to convince ourselves, maybe correctly, maybe not, that the fetus is without the moral standing to deserve like protection.

Why - no - ? What is it you want to establish? Do you know what "tacit" means? It seems you want to establish consent. Consent is both a moral and a legal construct. In either case, for there to be consent, there has to be the capacity to consent, and the consent has to be meaningful. Among the things "meaningful" means is that the person consenting, when he consented, had a real choice and could have not consented if he had so wished.

As to the saying, "silence consents," it can, but in itself does not.

Why - no - ? What is it you want to establish? Do you know what "tacit" means? It seems you want to establish consent. Consent is both a moral and a legal construct. In either case, for there to be consent, there has to be the capacity to consent, and the consent has to be meaningful. Among the things "meaningful" means is that the person consenting, when he consented, had a real choice and could have not consented if he had so wished.

As to the saying, "silence consents," it can, but in itself does not. — tim wood

Quick aside, and it may just be me - but i find your prose most confusing. But let me give it a try.

"It seems you want to establish consent. "

Not really, what the proposal is, is that by some action of free will consent is already present - such as, by my act of free will of choosing to live in the US I have given tacit consent to abide by the laws. I haven't signed anything. No one said these are your options.

"Consent is both a moral and a legal construct. "

OK

"In either case, for there to be consent, there has to be the capacity to consent, and the consent has to be meaningful. Among the things "meaningful" means is that the person consenting, when he consented, had a real choice and could have not consented if he had so wished. "

I think you want to hold this to a standard of explicit consent, like signing an ok to do an operation

the point I am making is, there is a non explicit consent given, even without knowing one had, as the result of a willful act.

Tacit consent is a silent consent given by your actions.

and again the argument.
We are responsible for the predicable results of our acts of free will
The existence of a depended being is a predicable result of sex

therefore - the act of sex is an act of tacit consent for the care of the fetus.

and again - we hold to this standard in most cases involved with the child - such as paternity suits. It is the same concept, applied differently in 2 different situations. Which is fine, so it is either because the use of the mothers body is a very different thing than the use of the father's body and effort to make money, which it might be. Or because the of the different nature of the born human, versus the unborn human.

But in either case we once again modify a criteria or principal for the fetus.

not sure I stopped responding. Again you denied the concept of implied consent - out of hand. — Rank Amateur

I did no such thing. Implied consent is a valid concept. I disagreed with your application of the concept.

You give no reason at all why, it is manufactured, that attempts to avoid relieve you of responsibility, or why awareness is not sufficient. You just state they are. It is not just you, but this seems rather normal on here. Without any reasons why or supporting those points, they are just your opinions - which is fine. But it just boils down to - your argument is wrong because I don't believe it. — Rank Amateur

The reasons are right in the bit you quoted, and I have expanded on them several times. I can try again: Implied consent is not imposed consent. The intent must be actually implied by either the interests of the person whose consent you try to establish, or their actions. Corresponding to that, if the declared intent of a person is to avoid a certain scenario, this rules out implied consent. Consent is an intentional act, it's giving permission. You cannot reduce it to merely being aware of a possibility.

This is again all based on the assumption that you use the common, approximately legal definition of consent. If by implied consent you mean something significantly different, I'd ask you to provide an explanation.

Yet again, one more declaration that an act of free will does not make you responsible - with no support of the idea, acknowledgement of where it does or where it does not - and why the difference. — Rank Amateur

The reasoning here is that unpredictable or extremely unlikely outcomes of an act of free will are not actually expressions of that will.

So my base argument asks does the sex provide some obligation on the use of the mothers body - this above is just a long way to say NO, because i say so. Once again - just one more declarative sentence - without support. Just opinion — Rank Amateur

Your argument was explicitly based on the notion of consent. If you want to establish the moral obligation some other way, you need to actually make that argument. I cannot respond to arguments in your head.

However, when it came to the child support question - you seem quite willing to assign the father responsibility for his action. seemingly based on differentiation between financial support and the use of the woman's body as below — Rank Amateur

It's odd that you arrive at this conclusion given that I have explicitly stated that it's not based on responsibility.

Which still is just saying, yet again, that Rank you are wrong because I say so. And for good measure your example is unrelated because i say so.

I am not trying to be a jerk, but it just turns into twitter if we just share unsupported opinions. You can and should attack my position, and I make that easier by giving you the basis of the belief. So we can logically argue the concepts. See if the concepts apply uniformly across other scenarios or not, and if not why. — Rank Amateur

The issue I have with your "style", for lack of a better word, is that it seems to me you don't stick to one specific line of argument. You have alternatively used either responsibility or consent as the basis for your argument, but those are different concepts. I don't see how you can switch from one to the other without changing the entire structure of your argument.

He grants, that the free act of having sex establishes a responsibility for the existence of the fetus, it does not, however establish a responsibility of the dependence of the fetus on the woman's body. The though experiment is, a doctor saves my life today, 2 years later I develop Parkinson's. I sue the surgeon for support, because if he had not saved my life, I would not have gotten ill. — Rank Amateur

This seems close to my position, though I don't think the thought experiment is a great way to illustrate the point.

My problem with this argument is, by granting the parents are responsible for the existence, and since not responsible for the dependence and can deny the use of her body on this rational. We are right back to where we usually get in the abortion discussion. Some action that most people would consider wrong, to a born human, is somehow not wrong in an un-born human. — Rank Amateur

Is it wrong to deny a born human usage of your body? Let's say you cause a car accident by being negligent, which leads to a severe injury of another person. It seems fairly straightforward that you are responsible for the injuries. Are you morally obligated to donate blood to the injured person? donate a kidney? I don't think the answer is always yes regardless of circumstance.

I can try again: Implied consent is not imposed consent. The intent must be actually implied by either the interests of the person whose consent you try to establish, or their actions. Corresponding to that, if the declared intent of a person is to avoid a certain scenario, this rules out implied consent.[/quote

"The intent must be actually implied by either the interests of the person whose consent you try to establish, or their actions." - Ok, the argument is, that the actions of the mother, in this case, having sex where pregnancy is a possible result is " or their actions" What this point does not address is

there is no implied consent by the mother, because ...........

] — Echarmion

Consent is an intentional act, it's giving permission. You cannot reduce it to merely being aware of a possibility. — Echarmion

That is true of explicit consent, But implied consent, as you have already agreed here

Implied consent is a valid concept. — Echarmion

to as a valid concept is by definition not an intentional giving of permission.

This is again all based on the assumption that you use the common, approximately legal definition of consent. If by implied consent you mean something significantly different, I'd ask you to provide an explanation. — Echarmion

well here

Implied consent is a valid concept. — Echarmion

, you accept the concept and 2 lines later you ask me to define it.

but in any case - this should work
Implied consent is consent which is not expressly granted by a person, but rather implicitly granted by a person's actions and the facts and circumstances of a particular situation

The reasoning here is that unpredictable or extremely unlikely outcomes of an act of free will are not actually expressions of that will. — Echarmion

because ...... yet again you need to support the reasons behind statements like that. Give an example of where it would apply. As it stands it is just an opinion -

Your argument was explicitly based on the notion of consent. If you want to establish the moral obligation some other way, you need to actually make that argument. I cannot respond to arguments in your head. — Echarmion

My argument was about implied consent, which you have already agreed is valid. I have defined it, I have shown how it could possibly apply to the use of the mothers body, and gave an example in the case of paternal child support where it is used. Not sure how much better it could be explained.

It's odd that you arrive at this conclusion given that I have explicitly stated that it's not based on responsibility. — Echarmion

but your wrote

Because the parents are the ones most closely associated to the creation of the child. Given that a child has certain material needs in order to develop, who else is supposed to shoulder this burden if not the parents? — Echarmion

The issue I have with your "style", for lack of a better word, is that it seems to me you don't stick to one specific line of argument. You have alternatively used either responsibility or consent as the basis for your argument, but those are different concepts. I don't see how you can switch from one to the other without changing the entire structure of your argument. — Echarmion

yea - i feel the same, what we have here is a failure to communicate. I tried to be clear. Looks like i failed. But I hold to my point, that so much of your objections have been completely unsupported opinions - i am aware you don't see it that way.

This seems close to my position, though I don't think the thought experiment is a great way to illustrate the point. — Echarmion

I was trying to be helpful, and give the best argument against.

Is it wrong to deny a born human usage of your body? Let's say you cause a car accident by being negligent, which leads to a severe injury of another person. It seems fairly straightforward that you are responsible for the injuries. Are you morally obligated to donate blood to the injured person? donate a kidney? I don't think the answer is always yes regardless of circumstance. — Echarmion

I agree.

but in the what would be the right thing to do " give blood" - I vote yes. Give a kidney - I say no.

How about a 9 month blood transfusion - that only you can do, to save the life you put in danger ?

which is why I tried to summarize -

So, in some type of summary, To the question I proposed, although you seem to believe in the concept of an implied consent, you point is it does not apply to pre birth, because it seems your view is bodily integrity is a stronger claim. — Rank Amateur

People are responsible for the predictable consequences of their actions. — Rank Amateur

Sure. So the couple involved in a conception are responsible for the result.

Now, what in that implies that they ought carry through to birth?

I think you want to hold this to a standard of explicit consent, like signing an ok to do an operation — Rank Amateur

Nope,

"In either case, for there to be consent, there has to be the capacity to consent, and the consent has to be meaningful. Among the things "meaningful" means is that the person consenting, when he consented, had a real choice and could have not consented if he had so wished. " — tim wood"

A stone cannot consent. An infant cannot consent. A minor cannot consent (to some things). Of people who can consent, being subject to gravity is not something they consent to. Needing food and water to survive is not something they consent to. Being the brother of your brother is not something you consent to.

We are responsible for the predicable results of our acts of free will
The existence of a depended being is a predicable result of sex
therefore - the act of sex is an act of tacit consent for the care of the fetus. — Rank Amateur

Sheer failure to understand plain English in favor of what you want it to say. Responsibility is arguably so, although subject to qualification. The "therefore" is wishful fantasy - I cannot even call it thinking. I wonder if you are confusing implication and inference. You infer "tacit consent." And you're free to infer whatever you like. What you mean, or should want to mean to make your case, is that the consent is implied, and it is not.

But throughout this thread you have seemed immune to reason What exactly is your purpose? What are you about?

There seems to be some basic misunderstanding between the two of us on what consent *is*. Not on the definition, because I have no issue with the definitions you provided, but on how the definition is applied to practical cases.

I can consent by walking up to someone and saying "please do X".

My consent can be implied if I say "please to Y", and I know that in order to do Y, X needs to be done first.

It can also be implied if I say "please do Y", and either X or Z lead to Y, but X is more in line with my known interests.

In any case, my consent is linked to my intention. Consent is an intentional act, and implied consent needs to conserve that intentionality, either by reference to another intention I do actually have, or by reference to an intention I would presumably have formed, had I been aware of the options.

You might ask why intentionality needs to be conserved. My answer would be that by consenting, you waive rights. Since only you can waive your rights, this waiver needs to be attributable to you as a subject. And the way to do that is via your intentions.

If you disagree with this on a fundamental level, we need to have an entirely different discussion on the fundamentals of self, action, responsibility etc. before we can continue here.

Now, assuming you do not disagree that consent needs to be linked to intention:
If you do not intent to have a child, and do in fact hope or assume that the sex will not lead to pregnancy, then you do not consent, implicitly or otherwise, to the consequences of that pregnancy. To assume you implicitly consented by having sex would ignore your actual intentions and replace them with the opposite.

If, on the other hand, you do intent to get pregnant, or at least accept that result as an acceptable outcome, then you could be said to have implicitly consented to the consequences of that pregnancy.

So there is a case to be made on the basis of implied consent, but only for intentional pregnancies.

The reasoning here is that unpredictable or extremely unlikely outcomes of an act of free will are not actually expressions of that will.
— Echarmion

because ...... yet again you need to support the reasons behind statements like that. Give an example of where it would apply. As it stands it is just an opinion - — Rank Amateur

I did not expect that statement to be controversial. You are familiar with the term "butterfly effect", I assume? I think it's fairly obvious that you cannot be responsible for every possible outcome of your actions. That would turn responsibility into mere causality.

As a matter of practicality, you cannot expect me to give you a full argument from first principles for every single statement I make. It'd take entire books worth of text. I would ask you, instead, to note when you have a fundamental disagreement. We can then try to establish the closest common ground and work from there.

but your wrote... — Rank Amateur

I avoided using the term responsibility in the bits you quoted on purpose, though I cannot fault you for not knowing that. I don't think financial burdens need to be based on responsibility. Society needs to distribute burdens somehow, and sometimes this means that a financial burden ends up with someone who is not strictly responsible for it's creation. I know this is not a full argument. If you are really interested we could discuss it at length as it's own topic.

I agree.

but in the what would be the right thing to do " give blood" - I vote yes. Give a kidney - I say no.

How about a 9 month blood transfusion - that only you can do, to save the life you put in danger ? — Rank Amateur

I think the fact that we feel the need to differentiate between a single blood transfusion, a long term transfusion and donation of a kidney already establishes that responsibility for the pregnancy is not sufficient to completely overcome any interest the mother has in her bodily autonomy.

I think the argument can be made that, regardless of morality, it can never be a legal obligation to provide your body to others. But this is just my opinion at this point, to establish it as an argument we'd have to talk about the difference of morality and legality and that is a thread in it's own right.

In the realm of morality, I think in order to progress at this stage, we'd need to establish just how much responsibility sex entails. I don't think having protected sex is negligent. Unprotected sex, maybe, but it's probably not "running a red light during rush hour" negligent.

thanks , banno. An assumption of the argument is the fetus is a moral actor. Has a right to life. Otherwise the argument is absurd. So, just for the sake of arguing the concept it has to be assumed.

A stone cannot consent. An infant cannot consent. A minor cannot consent (to some things). Of people who can consent, being subject to gravity is not something they consent to. Needing food and water to survive is not something they consent to. Being the brother of your brother is not something you consent to. — tim wood

Can you tie that to the father and mother having no responsibility for the consequence of their act of free will please.

Sheer failure to understand plain English in favor of what you want it to say. Responsibility is arguably so, although subject to qualification. The "therefore" is wishful fantasy - I cannot even call it thinking. I wonder if you are confusing implication and inference. You infer "tacit consent." And you're free to infer whatever you like. What you mean, or should want to mean to make your case, is that the consent is implied, and it is not. — tim wood

Yet again, just a bunch of words that say I disagree, With no support.

Are we or are we not responsible for the predictable outcomes of our acts of free will?
If no, why.

If yes,
Is pregnancy the predictable out come of sex?

Again, assuming only for the sake of this argument that the fetus is a moral actor, Why are the mother and father not responsible?

But throughout this thread you have seemed immune to reason What exactly is your purpose? What are you about? — tim wood

And the Tim wood closing barb that no comment is complete without

In any case, my consent is linked to my intention. Consent is an intentional act, and implied consent needs to conserve that intentionality, either by reference to another intention I do actually have, or by reference to an intention I would presumably have formed, had I been aware of the options. — Echarmion

So, are we relieved of the responsibility of our acts of free will, simply by them not being intended? I didn't want to hit that car as I ran the red light, my intention was only to save a few minutes.

uming you do not disagree that consent needs to be linked to intention:
If you do not intent to have a child, and do in fact hope or assume that the sex will not lead to pregnancy, then you do not consent, implicitly or otherwise, to the consequences of that pregnancy. To assume you implicitly consented by having sex would ignore your actual intentions and replace them with the opposite. — Echarmion

Yet, you have agreed already that the father has to pay child support, after he has said he had no intention of having the child. Can you bridge that for me?

So there is a case to be made on the basis of implied consent, but only for intentional pregnancies. — Echarmion

You realize that is a blatant contradiction in terms

I did not expect that statement to be controversial. You are familiar with the term "butterfly effect", I assume? I think it's fairly obvious that you cannot be responsible for every possible outcome of your actions. That would turn responsibility into mere causality. — Echarmion

So we are responsible for the direct and predictable results of our act of free will because a butterfly flapped it wings in Argentina? Not buying the butterfly defense in this specific set of circumstances. Seems a reach to me. But, thank you for the reasoning behind the statement, it helps.

In the realm of morality, I think in order to progress at this stage, we'd need to establish just how much responsibility sex entails. I don't think having protected sex is negligent. Unprotected sex, maybe, but it's probably not "running a red light during rush hour" negligent. — Echarmion

I would agree, for sure that their is a continuum of responsibility of degree with not having sex at one end, and unprotected sex, during ovulation at the other end.

And in a practical sense, if an effective method of contraception is used effectively, well over 95 or more percent of this issue is moot. And, while effectively trying to limit the possible results of your actions is the right thing to do, I still would argue the mere change in the probability of the result does not relieve you of the responsibility

It can be a dangerous route to go down to base value judgements on ruling out personhood. — S

Isn't personhood the main issue. If we take that out of the discussion then the opponent pro-lifers vanish into thin air. The pro-choicers win without even lifting a finger.

I understand your point though. Personhood is a nebulous concept and probably impossible to apply to the issue. A practical approach would be, like you say, focus on what we know or is knowable and come to a workable resolution to the problem.

Do you think the scientific consensus of allowing abortions for fetuses that aren't viable is alright? Isn't this pragmatic and also moral within the limits of our knowledge?

Are we or are we not responsible for the predictable outcomes of our acts of free will?
If no, why. — Rank Amateur

Is responsibility consent?

assuming only for the sake of this argument that the fetus is a moral actor, — Rank Amateur

You can demonstrate anything if you can assume anything.

Why are the mother and father not responsible? — Rank Amateur

Sure, but what exactly does "responsibility" mean here?

But throughout this thread you have seemed immune to reason What exactly is your purpose? What are you about?
— tim wood
And the Tim wood closing barb that no comment is complete without — Rank Amateur

Sorry, but the question is substantive. Reason in argumentation, here, is what I think the whole point is - because it's a philosophy site. But you're arguments seem anti-reason., as if all that mattered was your conclusion, never mind who it's got to.. Is that the truth of it?

Isn't personhood the main issue. If we take that out of the discussion then the opponent pro-lifers vanish into thin air. The pro-choicers win without even lifting a finger. — TheMadFool

And that non-person status extends to infancy now, apparently.

Is responsibility consent? — tim wood

Is not an answer to the question, is a dodge

assuming only for the sake of this argument that the fetus is a moral actor,
— Rank Amateur
You can demonstrate anything if you can assume anything. — tim wood

I asked at the start that this be assumed for the sake of arguing this concept - because it has to be for the concept to apply. If the child is not a moral actor - the concept is absurd. - Again - if one is not willing, just for sake of exploring this concept, to play along with that - fine.

Sure, but what exactly does "responsibility" mean here? — tim wood

for the existence of the fetus - seemed to follow to me

Sorry, but the question is substantive. Reason in argumentation, here, is what I think the whole point is - because it's a philosophy site. But you're arguments seem anti-reason., as if all that mattered was your conclusion, never mind who it's got to.. Is that the truth of it? — tim wood

really - i have put forth the 2 major - non person hood arguments on the topic. Published, referenced and seriously argued for 30 years. I have given the premises, and the conclusions. And at least to my POV have not had a reasoned objection on this thread.

It appears to me your definition of doing philosophy is agreeing with you.

So, are we relieved of the responsibility of our acts of free will, simply by them not being intended? I didn't want to hit that car as I ran the red light, my intention was only to save a few minutes. — Rank Amateur

No.

Yet, you have agreed already that the father has to pay child support, after he has said he had no intention of having the child. Can you bridge that for me? — Rank Amateur

I already tried, including in the very post you are quoting from. Without further input, I have nothing to add to that.

You realize that is a blatant contradiction in terms — Rank Amateur

I don't realize. I suspect you find the combination of intentional pregnancy and implied consent contradictory? I don't know how many women explicitly state their consent to carry a child to term during sex, but I somehow doubt it's very many.

So we are responsible for the direct and predictable results of our act of free will because a butterfly flapped it wings in Argentina? — Rank Amateur

This is just weird. Is there a "not" missing somewhere?

I would agree, for sure that their is a continuum of responsibility of degree with not having sex at one end, and unprotected sex, during ovulation at the other end.

And in a practical sense, if an effective method of contraception is used effectively, well over 95 or more percent of this issue is moot. And, while effectively trying to limit the possible results of your actions is the right thing to do, I still would argue the mere change in the probability of the result does not relieve you of the responsibility — Rank Amateur

But if there are degrees of responsibility that correspond (possibly among other factors) to the degree of certainty of a risk, it seems to follow that there is a level of risk that corresponds to practically zero responsibility. That is the responsibility is so ephemeral that it cannot support any moral obligation.

I am having trouble attaching a consequence as significant as several months of unwanted pregnancy, and then giving birth, to sex, even unprotected sex. Of course small errors can have life-changing consequences under various circumstances. But these consequences are usually the result of having to alleviate damage done, not to create some desirable state of affairs.

This is just weird. Is there a "not" missing somewhere? — Echarmion

Yes it should be.


So we are NOT responsible for the direct and predictable results of our act of free will because a butterfly flapped it wings in Argentina?

I am having trouble attaching a consequence as significant as several months of unwanted pregnancy, and then giving birth, to sex, even unprotected sex. Of course small errors can have life-changing consequences under various circumstances. But these consequences are usually the result of having to alleviate damage done, not to create some desirable state of affairs. — Echarmion

I understand that is your belief, and that is 100 pct fine. But that is not argument.

I think we have been back and forth enough on this -

these are the types of exchanges with you on this topic - that i find frustrating.

You say

"In any case, my consent is linked to my intention. Consent is an intentional act, and implied consent needs to conserve that intentionality, either by reference to another intention I do actually have, or by reference to an intention I would presumably have formed, had I been aware of the options."
— Echarmion

then I respond

"So, are we relieved of the responsibility of our acts of free will, simply by them not being intended? I didn't want to hit that car as I ran the red light, my intention was only to save a few minutes."

and you just say

No.

it is like "who's on first " ( hope you get the reference )

So we are NOT responsible for the direct and predictable results of our act of free will because a butterfly flapped it wings in Argentina? — Rank Amateur

If the consequences are direct and predictable, then one is responsible. It's when the consequences are neither that there is a problem.

and you just say

No.

it is like "who's on first " ( hope you get the reference ) — Rank Amateur

Well what else am I supposed to answer if I talk about consent and you talk about responsibility? I can see no connection between what I wrote and your interpretation.

I understand that is your belief, and that is 100 pct fine. But that is not argument. — Rank Amateur

Sure, it's not an argument. But I don't claim I can easily resolve the issue. As it stands, I see several problems for the stance that, barring special circumstances, carrying a child to term is a moral obligation.

First, the moral position of the foetus is questionable, particularly in early pregnancy.

Second the notion that the act of having sex entails responsibility for the dependency of the resulting foetus treats sex like a wrongful act towards that foetus. It seems to suppose that the person the foetus will eventually turn into already existed in an abstract form, waiting to be born. And now that you have put this person into the sorry state of dependence on a womb, you must help them out. Needless to say, this is odd.

And third even if the responsibility is established, we need to establish that it's actually significant enough, in the specific case, to warrant the imposition of an unwanted pregnancy.

So yes, I don't have an ironclad argument against a moral obligation against abortion. But on the other hand, I haven't seen an ironclad argument in favor, either. Given that there are significant hurdles such an argument would have to take, I think my position is somewhat reasonable.

Isn't personhood the main issue. — TheMadFool

No, the main issue is the ethics of abortion. I don't connect the two in the way that others are doing.

If we take that out of the discussion then the opponent pro-lifers vanish into thin air. The pro-choicers win without even lifting a finger. — TheMadFool

I don't think so.

I understand your point though. Personhood is a nebulous concept and probably impossible to apply to the issue. A practical approach would be, like you say, focus on what we know or is knowable and come to a workable resolution to the problem.

Do you think the scientific consensus of allowing abortions for fetuses that aren't viable is alright? Isn't this pragmatic and also moral within the limits of our knowledge? — TheMadFool

I don't judge it based on viability. But I do think that abortion is acceptable under the conditions I've mentioned previously. Though it's nothing to celebrate. And, with some exceptions, those who conceived it bear responsibility.

Now, what in that implies that they ought carry through to birth? — Banno

If you're interested in a good test for that, instead of just picking apart his logic, then here it is again:

(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a person shall not be guilty of an offence under the law relating to abortion when a pregnancy is terminated by a registered medical practitioner if two registered medical practitioners are of the opinion, formed in good faith—

(a) that the pregnancy has not exceeded its twenty-fourth week and that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated, of injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman or any existing children of her family; or
(b) that the termination is necessary to prevent grave permanent injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman; or
(c) that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk to the life of the pregnant woman, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated; or
(d) that there is a substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped.

If they fail the test, then they ought to carry through to birth.

So we are NOT responsible for the direct and predictable results of our act of free will because a butterfly flapped it wings in Argentina? — Rank Amateur

If the results are direct and predictable, there is no problem with responsibility. If they are neither - like a butterfly effect - then there is a problem..

and you just say

No. — Rank Amateur

Well, what else am I going to respond if you rephrase my statement to say something entirely different? I was talking about consent. You talked about responsibility. Different words with different meanings.

I understand that is your belief, and that is 100 pct fine. But that is not argument.

I think we have been back and forth enough on this - — Rank Amateur

Sure, it's not an argument. I am not sure on the exact outcome of the question given the premises.

That said, it is my impression that a complete argument in favor of a moral obligation towards carring a child to term faces significant problems.

First, the moral standing of the foetus is questionable, particularly in early pregnancy.

Second, in order to establish a responsibility for the well being of that foetus, we need to somehow connect it's dependence on the mother to an act of her. But the only act that is apparently available is the act of conception, and at that point the person that is supposedly impacted by that act does not exist. That is unless we assume they already existed as some kind of spirit waiting to be incarnated.

And third, even if we ignore these points, as we have done so far, it's still not clear just how much we can demand from the mother based on her responsibility, and it seems we need to examine specific cases.

So while I cannot argue that it's impossible to construct a sound argument, I haven't seen one, either. But perhaps I have not looked enough.

If the results are direct and predictable, there is no problem with responsibility. If they are neither - like a butterfly effect - then there is a problem.. — Echarmion

Is pregnancy as a result of sex the former or the later ?

We know what we are talking about -

I say there is a responsibility
You say no - Butterfly effect
I say really -
You say as above

This is really hard to continue with

First, the moral standing of the foetus is questionable, particularly in early pregnancy. — Echarmion

for like the 4th time, this is an assumption in the concept we are discussing, has to be - if the fetus has no moral standing - there is no need for tacit consent - the woman can do as she sees fit. If we want to discuss the concept this has to be an assumption.

This is really hard to continue with

Second, in order to establish a responsibility for the well being of that foetus, we need to somehow connect it's dependence on the mother to an act of her. — Echarmion

Really - there is the whole have sex thing

But the only act that is apparently available is the act of conception, and at that point the person that is supposedly impacted by that act does not exist. That is unless we assume they already existed as some kind of spirit waiting to be incarnated. — Echarmion

There is zero logic in this. How does conception, and that being come into existence - for now the 5th time for the sake of this argument we have to assume has moral standing, oh yea i remember - sex

And third, even if we ignore these points, as we have done so far, it's still not clear just how much we can demand from the mother based on her responsibility, and it seems we need to examine specific cases. — Echarmion

With this I agree. In this example it is a case of competing rights, and the answer would in many cases be dependent on the individual circumstances. For example life of the mother, serious or permanent damage to the mother, the prospect of a servery handicapped child. etc etc. But none of that matters if the there is no tacit approval. Without it, the mother has absolute autonomy over the use of her body with regard to the fetus.

really - i have put forth the 2 major - non person hood arguments on the topic. Published, referenced and seriously argued for 30 years. — Rank Amateur

EXCEPT THEY WEREN'T ARGUMENTS. Did you not read them? Did you not read where more than once the author made explicitly clear that he was merely assuming his premises? Look: I can assume the moon is made of green cheese, and I can have that as a premise in an argument. But neither assuming it nor using it as a premise makes it true, and if it isn't true the argument is reduced to rhetorical exercise (which I believe the author understood perfectly well, being a professional philosopher). And any conclusion therefrom gets no value from the argument. Indeed, if the conclusion happens to be true, that truth has nothing to do with the argument. But all of this you pay zero attention to. So, what are you selling?

If you have a proposition in mind you wish to present, just present it. If you have some argument in support, then argue your argument. At the moment all that you're doing is insisting on what you should not insist on: that other people with grounds for disagreeing with you give up without cause their argument and agree with you. The best I can do is say that if you want to inhabit a fantasy-land, you're pretty much free to do so.

You're akin to a person who believes in the supernatural, but that insists that the supernatural is natural.

Sure, but what exactly does "responsibility" mean here?
— tim wood
for the existence of the fetus - seemed to follow to me — Rank Amateur

No disagreement. But the question as to any meaning of "responsibility" beyond this is just sharpened. I can easily imagine a judge imposing an obligation of support on an absent father: he might well reference "responsibility." But were we to suppose we understood exactly what he meant by "responsibility," it would be at our peril.

EXCEPT THEY WEREN'T ARGUMENTS. Did you not read them? Did you not read where more than once the author made explicitly clear that he was merely assuming his premises? Look: I can assume the moon is made of green cheese, and I can have that as a premise in an argument. But neither assuming it nor using it as a premise makes it true, and if it isn't true the argument is reduced to rhetorical exercise (which I believe the author understood perfectly well, being a professional philosopher). And any conclusion therefrom gets no value from the argument. Indeed, if the conclusion happens to be true, that truth has nothing to do with the argument. But all of this you pay zero attention to. So, what are you selling? — tim wood

he and they ( one by the way was a pro choice argument) does no such thing, and i have explained your error in on this point a few times.

But just take a dispassionate step back, you are saying the most published, argued, and referenced arguments on the topic for the last 30 years, are the equivalent of

Look: I can assume the moon is made of green cheese, and I can have that as a premise in an argument. — tim wood

does that really make sense to you ? Has the world of serious argument on this topic missed the point you are making for 30 years ? And only you Tim Wood has seen it. Or, is it just possible, the rest of the world has found some reason to continue to discus this argument because it has some merit.

please don't continue to make vague semantic references - if you actually have a point about what you want responsibility to mean in the case we are discussing - than tell me what it is, so we can examine it. Stop dancing, make a clear, concise and supported point please.

Has the world of serious argument on this topic missed the point you are making for 30 years ? And only you Tim Wood has seen it. — Rank Amateur

Don't take my word for it, just go, and read! That is all that it takes. And what you dismiss as my error, is my dismissal of a sophistic exercise as real argument. But you win, if and when you account for the author's mere assumptions,, and how you get from his mere assumptions to substantive conclusions. And that's why I invite you to make your own argument - maybe you won't rely on mere assumption.

please don't continue to make vague semantic references - if you actually have a point about what you want responsibility to mean in the case we are discussing - than tell me what it is, so we can examine it. — Rank Amateur

Certainly. What case would you like me to account for? The hypothetical judge just above, in my opinion, is not making a case for moral or ethical responsibility, or cause. I'm guessing he orders support as the defendant's burden to help defray the cost of an expense he created, as opposed to others paying for it.

If you want responsibility to run with cause, then you shall have to address the complexity of "cause"; it is not a simple word and incorporates a wide variety of meanings.

But for present purpose it's enough for me if you step out from behind the arguments of others and make your own. Do you have any? Or even just a well-crafted question or two?