A sincere speaking saying "It is raining" implies that said speaker believes it is raining -- but they are talking about the rain, and not their belief.
— Moliere
Indeed. Unless they're talking about the statement itself. — creativesoul
When a sincere speaker says "It's raining outside", unless they're mistaken, it ought be raining outside. If they're mistaken, it ought not be.
When a sincere speaker says "I promise to plant you a rose garden on Sunday", unless they're mistaken, there ought be a rose garden planted on Sunday. If they're mistaken, there ought not.
When a sincere speaker says "There's a beer in the fridge", unless they're mistaken, there ought be a beer in the fridge. If they're mistaken, there ought not.
When a sincere speaker says "The cat is on the mat", unless they're mistaken, there ought be a cat on the mat. If they're mistaken, there ought not.
We all know that this is true. That's how language, talking about the world and/or ourselves, works. — creativesoul
it does not represent the nature of the action itself (which is itself right or wrong). — Andrew M
However, Banno's mistake is failing to realise that our standard in moral judgement stems from us! We're not making a comparison with anything external to ourselves. Banno is unconsciously making a comparison with his own standard of judgement, but erroneously thinks that he's appealing to objective morality. Not only is the notion of objective morality unsubstantiated, it would serve no purpose which isn't already met by our own standard of judgement. Banno simply judges kicking puppies to be immoral, as do I, with or without the chimaera of objective morality. Nothing else is required. The notion of objective morality is about as useful as a bottomless bucket. — S
You can't just go by other people's views. — Terrapin Station
In our case, the world would not be a better place — creativesoul
Hence, moral judgements are much the same as other judgements; they do not form a special "subjective" class. — Banno
My moral inclinations would certainly prohibit me from kicking a puppy, but if the occassion warrants, which is impossible to foresee, then cute or not.....we’d have to see. — Mww
....is correct from the point of view of whomsoever should hold congruent judgement. This does nothing to explain or justify the morality of those in opposition to it, whose categorical imperative obviously differs from which they necessarily judge themselves as not wrong — Mww
It doesn’t miss the point; it is the point. Mine anyway.
To say that the same behavior is both moral/immoral, and have instances wherein such behavior I’d objectified, is the perfect reason for even having moral philosophy in the first place. — Mww
This does nothing to explain or justify the morality of those in opposition to it, whose categorical imperative obviously differs from which they necessarily judge themselves as not wrong — Mww
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