I'd agree with that, but who argues that? — Terrapin Station
No one argues that the absence of harm for nonexistent people is a good thing, either. (I mean, outside of Benatar and some followers--I'm not saying literally no one on the face of the Earth. I mean, to characterize it as some common sentiment is completely unfounded.) — Terrapin Station
So I don't see how that would make prostitution an unordered desire — Terrapin Station
No, a fortiori because I don't buy the notion of unconscious mental content. — Terrapin Station
What concept in our discussion would you say in "unconscious mental content" — Rank Amateur
can you explain to me how prostitution increases love of yourself or of others? — Rank Amateur
I was trying to imagine ways that it might make sense to say that someone is "lying to themselves." — Terrapin Station
There are people who argue that by not having children, are depriving people of pleasure, — schopenhauer1
Anyways, it usually is accepted that we don't want to impose suffering on others. — schopenhauer1
yea - My posit was they really can't. — Rank Amateur
First, love is simply an emotional disposition towards things, right? A very complex and variable emotional disposition (enough so that it's probably not a good idea to tag such a wide range of things with the same term), but it's an emotional disposition nonetheless. So it would just be a matter of having that emotional disposition towards oneself (and others, possibly, including the prostitute) when engaging in prostitution/solicitation. — Terrapin Station
I'm asking who, though. (As in I was hoping you could give some actual examples, because this seems very dubious to me.) — Terrapin Station
Okay, but no one is going to accept that they don't want to impose suffering on a nonexistent person. They'd say that the person has to exist for that to even be a consideration. — Terrapin Station
Oh you know Joe, Bob, Suzy, Liz, Brian, and Barry. — schopenhauer1
So it's not a common enough thing to argue that we could find a record of it anywhere? — Terrapin Station
I think my main problem with the argument is that bad/good ascriptions are not necessarily applicable to suffering or pleasure in themselves. Badness or goodness are separable from hedonic states. They should be defined in reference to some goal or [in the general human sense] with respect to whether something leads one closer to 'well being' or whether it leads them away from that. That makes intuitive sense from the utilitarian position [the good is a goal to which we reach, things are good if they result in the good], even in the case of a hedonic utilitarianism [which I assume is Barren and your position] where what's good is anything that minimizes suffering [your goal]. But that's just one utilitarian theory. Badden's argument would fail if you take anything else as 'the good', which many people do [spinoza's good is attaining freedom by managing passions; maslow's self actualization; societal stability; etc]. And even from the hedonic position, I simply disagree with his contention that there's an assymetry. I actually think many people do think the lack of an ability to experience pleasure [hell, even experiencing at all] is a wrong - it's what motivates my friend to get on my ass about not putting myself out of my comfort zone - because apparently I'm missing out. He [and other friends] feel obligated to push and challenge me, I'm sure you've had friends do the same. They are clearly operating under utilitarian assumption - that I'm not experiencing as much pleasure as I could because I'm limiting myself... a potential human would be limited in just the same way. Would you not say they intuitively feel missing out is a wrong in itself? If so then how is intuition alone enough to justify the asymmetry?His argument takes the negative utilitarian idea extremely seriously. That is to say, harm is what matters, not pleasure. To restate this in a normative structure- potential parents are not obligated to bring someone who experiences joy/pleasure/positive value into the world. However, potential parents are obligated to prevent inevitable harms from occurring. One of his arguments comes from intuition. We don't usually feel pangs of compassionate sadness for the aliens not born to experience pleasure in a far away barren planet. We would most likely feel compassionate sadness, on the other hand, if we learned that aliens in a far away planet were born and were suffering. Suffering seems to matter more than bringing about pleasure in the realm of ethical decision-making. When prevention of all suffering is a guarantee and no actual person loses out on pleasure, this seems a win/win scenario.
This "should" seems a moot point in light of the fact that in the case of whether to procreate someone, that person doesn't need to exist in the first place in order to be lead to "well being". In fact, that is part of the AN's point. There is no need to create someone for an outside agenda that then needs to be followed by the very person which was created for that reason. It's like giving a problem to someone because you like seeing them solve it.hey should be defined in reference to some goal or [in the general human sense] with respect to whether something leads one closer to 'well being' or whether it leads them away from that. — aporiap
[spinoza's good is attaining freedom by managing passions; maslow's self actualization; societal stability; etc]. — aporiap
I actually think many people do think the lack of an ability to experience pleasure [hell, even experiencing at all] is a wrong - it's what motivates my friend to get on my ass about not putting myself out of my comfort zone - because apparently I'm missing out. — aporiap
They are clearly operating under utilitarian assumption - that I'm not experiencing as much pleasure as I could because I'm limiting myself... a potential human would be limited in just the same way. Would you not say they intuitively feel missing out is a wrong in itself? If so then how is intuition alone enough to justify the asymmetry? — aporiap
Ordered desires - taking the God part out, are those desires that stated simply increase love, desiring things that increase love in yourself and in others will not cause suffering. — Rank Amateur
I would propose that the disordered desires above are causing great suffering - to the women, to the people entrapping/enslaving the women and to all the Robert Krafts that pay the woman. — Rank Amateur
I provided the alternatives to demonstrate that negative utilitarianism is itself just one of many theories, and that the antinatalist position depends on it. If bad does not necessarily equal suffering, then you cannot simply make the claim that we are obligated to prevent suffering. What makes us obligated here is the fact that suffering is considered bad. The implicit premise is that (1) we prevent something because it is bad (2) suffering is bad. If suffering is not itself intrinsically bad, there's no obligation.All of these schemas you mentioned not needed if people were not born. These are after-the-fact positions. A non-existent entity doesn't need to manage passions or self-actualize if not born. To be born in order to do these things would be using someone for this agenda, which seems odd to me. Like a journey that is inevitable for someone that didn't in fact have to be forced on that journey.
Firstly, as I've said before, I think you're discounting that negative hedonic utilitarianism [the basis for the whole anti-natalist position] is itself a cultural construct. You'd be committing a naturalistic fallacy if you think just because suffering is uncomfortable it is forthrightly bad, and thus an unborn person is better in that state because it prevents him from suffering.Again, this doesn't make sense in the light that no one inevitably has to exist to experience anything in the first place. This is all after-the-fact of already being procreated and then trying to find cultural values to buy into to make do. First the schema needs to be agreed to be right by the individual, and then it is carried forthwith. Of course various individual personalities and temperaments may find these schemas not for them and switch to other ones. Or, the person simply falls into modern default mode- cobbling together the various cultural environs and values immediately at hand (pragmatic hedonism if you will the modern "default mode" of most).
I can take the 'obligation to prevent suffering' to absurd lengths as well. Why do anything at all, knowing that moving from my comfortable bed now will inevitably lead to discomfort [suffering]? Why walk down 5th avenue or drive a car when you are both putting yourself in a less relaxed state and making yourself at risk for being hurt in an accident or hit by a meteor? Sure they can lead to pleasures, but this isn't necessary and we are nevertheless obligated to proactively prevent suffering whenever possible, so in fact we really shouldn't even leave the house.Also, this projected feeling of "missing out" for the as yet not existing person, can also be taken to absurd lengths. If taken to the logical extreme then we can say the billions and trillions of yet to be born people are missing out. But that is silly. Even more absurd would be that it is people's duty to those billions of non-existent people to keep having more people to reduce those non-existent people's "pain" of not existing and missing out. Obviously that makes no sense.
The implicit premise is that (1) we prevent something because it is bad (2) suffering is bad. If suffering is not itself intrinsically bad, there's no obligation. — aporiap
Firstly, as I've said before, I think you're discounting that negative hedonic utilitarianism [the basis for the whole anti-natalist position] is itself a cultural construct. You'd be committing a naturalistic fallacy if you think just because suffering is uncomfortable it is forthrightly bad, and thus an unborn person is better in that state because it prevents him from suffering. — aporiap
Secondly my point there was countering the intuition based argument for the asymmetry of suffering/pleasure. It seems the only basis is that we have an intuition that preventing suffering is an obligation while promoting pleasure is not, but I am stating here that there are people with intuitions that promoting pleasure is something that you should promote and that they feel a kind of compassion or sympathy for people who aren't in that state. — aporiap
thanks Jake no shock I would disagree with most, if not all of that. But none of my disagreements have any kind of a real philosophic basis — Rank Amateur
(sorry for the foray into God) — Rank Amateur
the one point I would make to you is the nature of ordered or disordered. It is not centered on the item or the action, it is centered on the motivation, on the why, — Rank Amateur
But if you told me that the prostitute in his/her true self did not find it disordered, and if the john in his/her true self did not find it disordered, and if any other party to the act did not find it truly disordered - than I would say it is not disordered. i just can't see how that is possible. — Rank Amateur
Would you say the same thing about a licensed massage therapist and his or her client? — Jake
The problem I have with utilitarian ethical formulas is that it assumes human conflict and violence is a function of having the wrong intent. I beleive that even if we could imagine a future where everyone followed the proper ethical intention to the letter, such as avoiding suffering, it would make no significant dent in the amount of conflict in the world
That's because social strife and abuse is not about intent but the gap between ways of sense- making. Our failure to act 'ethically' is the result of our struggles in construing the other's worldview from their perspective. No amount of prorer intent or focus on suffering will solve this problem. Only progress at subsuming another's scheme of understanding as a variant of our own will free us from the need to blame t he other for their 'bad intent', , the current example being the alleged failure to prioritize suffering,(which just perpetuates the problem).. — Joshs
Headlines now: Medical doctor treats tape worm infection using experimental Buddhist surgery. Worms still there, attachment to body gone. — fdrake
Benatar does a good job separating ethical decisions related to starting a life vs. continuing a life. He sees these two decision matrix as requiring different weights for good and bad. For something that does not exist yet, no one is actually deprived. This is an important point. No actual person is around to miss out on anything. It is only in the parents' head. However, if born, an actual person will be born to suffer. — schopenhauer1
Sorry if this is a tangent, but it will be quick. Also, my question is not sarcastic or snarky, nor intending to be derogatory. Just the one glaring question that always seems to jump out at me when I read about anti-natalism. Why don't anti-natalists promote suicide? The paragraph above explains why they don't promote murder, but gives no reason why all these "suffering" people don't just end the suffering they so adamantly seek to save potential others from. If there is no reason to be born in the first place, why exist just to suffer? — ZhouBoTong
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