2. If all inanimate things are directed towards ends, then those ends must (in some sense) exist. — Aaron R
3. These ends don’t exist in material nature or in the immaterial minds of any finite creature.
4. Therefore, they must exist in an infinite mind. — Aaron R
1. All inanimate things are directed towards ends.
2. If all inanimate things are directed towards ends, then those ends must (in some sense) exist.
3. These ends don’t exist in material nature or in the immaterial minds of any finite creature.
4. Therefore, they must exist in an infinite mind.
5. This infinite mind we call "God". — Aaron R
1. All inanimate things are directed towards ends. — Aaron R
Things act in an orderly way, as if they are ordered towards an end. — Metaphysician Undercover
I think Aquinas would say that if inanimate things did not act towards ends, then the we would observe pure chaos. But we don’t, so things must act towards ends.What is the proof of 1)? — tim wood
I believe that being “directed toward an end” means something like “tends to do some things rather than others with consistent regularity”. The “ends” refer to those “things” or “outcomes” that the inanimate object’s behavior tend toward.What exactly, does it mean to say,"directed towards ends"? — tim wood
I think Aquinas would argue that the ends of inanimate objects don’t exist in material nature because this would require those ends to exist in the future. This was a common criticism of Aristotle’s account of final causality with respect to inanimate objects.3) Who says? — tim wood
What is the other alternative?4) False alternative. — tim wood
I think Aquinas would reply the in the case of firemen heading towards a non-existent fire, the content of their belief in the existence of the fire provides the end toward which their behavior is directed. But I think Aquinas specifically chose to focus his argument on inanimate things because he wanted to avoid the whole question of intentionality.It seems possible to be directed towards an end that does not exist. Firemen heading towards a non-existent fire for example. — Devans99
Yes. Aquinas would not deny that. But I think he would say that in the case of arbitrary physical events involving inanimate objects occurring at remote locations throughout the universe, you (or any other finite being) certainly don’t have their ends in your mind. That claim seems absurd.I have the goal of keeping safe and that goal most definitely exists in my mind. — Devans99
Yes. But again, I think this is why Aquinas was focused specifically on inanimate things. His claim is that their behavior has ends as well, and it seems absurd to say that all of those ends exist in the minds of animals and humans as noted above.Also, he has missed the possibility that ends exist in material minds (of finite creatures). No need for an infinite mind at all... — Devans99
(MU I quoted you to help with my question to Aaron R - I am happy for you to clarify when I am wrong, but I don't think I am asking you anything directly)Things act in an orderly way, as if they are ordered towards an end. — Metaphysician Undercover
All inanimate things are directed — Aaron R
I think Aquinas would say that if inanimate things did not act towards ends, then the we would observe pure chaos. But we don’t, so things must act towards ends. — Aaron R
So Thomas buys into the notion of universal natural law, a proposition that sounds simple, but in fact is not at all simple, as it takes in Greek conceptions of nature and begins to try to solve certain problems that the Greeks could not. And which conception of universal natural law is in fact part of what he meant by "God." God for him being in part a personification of the idea of universal natural law.I think Aquinas would say that if inanimate things did not act towards ends, then the we would observe pure chaos. But we don’t, so things must act towards ends. — Aaron R
I believe that being “directed toward an end” means something like “tends to do some things rather than others with consistent regularity”. The “ends” refer to those “things” or “outcomes” that the inanimate object’s behavior tend toward. — Aaron R
So Thomas invoked God, problems solved. There's nothing wrong with this. The error arises when other people who do not understand the nature and function of presuppositions suppose them to be true and a matter of fact, when no one claims that they are - except those same people making the mistake.I think Aquinas would argue that the ends of inanimate objects don’t exist in material nature because this would require those ends to exist in the future. This was a common criticism of Aristotle’s account of final causality with respect to inanimate objects.
Likewise, they couldn’t exist in human or animal minds because that would require that the outcome of every instance of physical causation within the universe exist in some human or animal mind, which Aquinas thinks is absurd. — Aaron R
False alternative. The other alternative is that they do not exist. And with 5) he is not identifying God, but rather suggesting that an answer to a problem he has in giving an account and having that account make any of the sense he would like it to make, is achieved by invoking an unconceivable concept that he will just call "God."4. Therefore, they must exist in an infinite mind. — Aaron R
False.1. All inanimate things are directed towards ends. — Aaron R
False.2. If all inanimate things are directed towards ends, then those ends must (in some sense) exist.
False.3. These ends don’t exist in material nature or in the immaterial minds of any finite creature.
False.4. Therefore, they must exist in an infinite mind.
This paragraph helped a little (thanks MU), but all I can do is substitute "purpose" or "goal" for "end", and that doesn't seem like the intended meaning? — ZhouBoTong
But I think Aquinas specifically chose to focus his argument on inanimate things because he wanted to avoid the whole question of intentionality. — Aaron R
In the phrase, "the ends justify the means", "ends" would mean results (I think). — ZhouBoTong
You ought to be careful here because the end really is the goal, the intention, and the results are not necessarily consistent with the intention. That's why good intentions sometimes have bad results, especially in the case of mistake. — Metaphysician Undercover
if you suppose that the being of a thing is a kind of action, then who says that action must be toward anything. — tim wood
If we say ends are goals or purposes then I am fairly comfortable saying I have seen zero evidence that "all inanimate objects are directed toward ends" (or even a reason to begin making the assumption). — ZhouBoTong
I think the argument would be something like this. If inanimate things behave in an orderly way (a way describable by laws of physics for example), then they must have been ordered to behave in such a way. — Metaphysician Undercover
If inanimate things have been ordered to behave in a particular way, then they must have been ordered with intent, towards some end. — Metaphysician Undercover
An apple tree would still produce apples in the absence of humans. It does so due to its nature. It is naturally inclined to do so. But, according to Thomas, it is God's providence that is responsible for the nature of finite (or created) things. — Πετροκότσυφας
I don't get it. Why does that "then" follow from the "if"? The same laws of physics that suggest order would also be the cause of that order. — ZhouBoTong
I thought plenty of experiments have been done that show ("show" may be too strong, but certainly "suggest") that order can emerge from chaos (absent intent or interference of any kind - obviously QM might say just observing is interfering). Why does order require intent? — ZhouBoTong
Wouldn't perfect chaos be a type of order? My point being, no reality can be conceived that does not include some type of order. Why would I then assume intention? — ZhouBoTong
I am not sure if you entirely buy Aquinas' argument, but I appreciate your attempt to explain it to me either way — ZhouBoTong
Wouldn't perfect chaos be a type of order? My point being, no reality can be conceived that does not include some type of order. Why would I then assume intention? — ZhouBoTong
End-directedness needs some kind of intelligence, — Πετροκότσυφας
The idea is that if there is order, which we can describe with laws, then there must be a cause of that order. — Metaphysician Undercover
these "ends" or "outcomes" are understood by Aquinas to be the final causes of inanimate objects — Aaron R
Things are directed to certain outcomes, precisely because they're driven by a goal, which is (i.e. the goal) characteristic of intelligence. — Πετροκότσυφας
Things are driven to certain outcomes. That's the significance of intelligence and knowledge here. It has intentions, it can set goals and these goals act as causes. — Πετροκότσυφας
But instead, I just put one line from each of you to highlight what I see as irreconcilable differences. — ZhouBoTong
The way you expressed it makes it seem as if these outcomes just come about. Which, in turn, make it seem as If Thomas believes that order could be a product of chance. But I think that the words that I've put in bold leave little doubt that outcomes don't just come about, they are achieved. — Πετροκότσυφας
And there's the question of, if you suppose that the being of a thing is a kind of action, then who says that action must be toward anything. Why not just action in accord with being? Do you begin to discern the presuppositions of Thomas's argument? — tim wood
What makes you think there is any "tendency"? A rock simply is, unless something comes along and changes it. It itself doesn't tend toward anything; it's not involved with outcomes. — tim wood
The other alternative is that they do not exist. — tim wood
I don't see how these differences are irreconcilable. — Metaphysician Undercover
I didn't say they are. — Πετροκότσυφας
I take him to hold that things act according to their own nature (the internal force), which, in turn, is dictated by God (the external force). — Πετροκότσυφας
1. All inanimate things are directed towards ends.
2. If all inanimate things are directed towards ends, then those ends must (in some sense) exist.
3. These ends don’t exist in material nature or in the immaterial minds of any finite creature.
4. Therefore, they must exist in an infinite mind.
5. This infinite mind we call "God". — Aaron R
Yeah. But, no. Nowhere did I say that a thing's own nature and God are the same thing nor that Aquinas is a pantheist. And, I'm fairly confident that, it is you who thinks that if a thing acts toward an end, as directed by God, then it can't be said that it is acting according to its own nature. Aquinas, as far as I'm concerned, thinks and says that it can. Examples: — Πετροκότσυφας
Aquinas wrote: By their nature they are determined to one result... act according to the mode of their nature. Etc. — Πετροκότσυφας
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