f an inanimate thing is determined by God to act toward God's end, then there is no freedom of choice, and the thing is not acting according to its own end, it is acting toward God's end. — Metaphysician Undercover

For Aquinas, it is both. Aquinas understands final cause as the "cause of causes". This means that formal cause cannot operate independently of final cause and, in fact, final cause is the cause of formal causation. Things act towards ends by their nature and, yet, it is because of those ends that things have the natures that they have.

Aaron, do you know a place in the corpus where Aquinas explicitly argues:
1. against backwards causality
2. that the final cause/end must "exist in some way" before the agent begins its operation?

I have seen these positions in commentators on Aquinas, and in your own posts, but so far I have not found Aquinas himself arguing them explicitly.

Tx

A thing has a form, and the form is proper to the thing itself, as the thing which it is, a particular thing with a particular form. This form includes all accidents. Then there is the thing's "nature", which is formal. Generally when we speak of a thing's "nature", we refer to its essence, which is the form without the accidentals. It is how we, as human minds, apprehend the thing, the form without all the accidentals.

With respect to final cause now. Does the final cause interact with the inanimate thing through the form as essence, or though the form as particular? For example, the human mind only knows things through their essences, it does not know the particular forms complete with all the accidentals. So when the human being acts by final cause, it acts on the particular forms through the means of essences, and this gives the possibility of mistakes. In the case of God, would the final cause act directly on the form of the particular, God apprehending the complete form, accidentals included. If so, then from God's perspective is there even such a thing as the thing's "nature"? Each thing being its own unique particular in the mind of God, what role would the essence play in God's mind?

I believe that Aquinas would say that final cause interacts with the inanimate thing through the form as essence. In other words, essences within the mind of God act as the final causes of all things. Insofar as a particular thing has a substantial form, this is possible only because there is a corresponding universal essence existing eternally within the mind of God.

No, I don't know of anywhere that Aquinas argues these points explicitly.

To call the some other way" "god" is purely gratuitous — Frank Apisa

I do not agree. Assuming, of course, that Aquinas has successfully argued his point, then there must exist an infinite mind that acts as the final cause of all that exists. In saying "this we call God", he's simply acknowledging what was widely considered to be an attribute of God within his milieu.

To call the some other way" "god" is purely gratuitous — Frank Apisa


I do not agree. Assuming, of course, that Aquinas has successfully argued his point, then there must exist an infinite mind that acts as the final cause of all that exists. In saying "this we call God", he's simply acknowledging what was widely considered to be an attribute of God within his milieu. — Aaron R

Okay...for his day and age...it was the kind of "conclusion" that would be drawn...which was the reason he proposed it.

Today, though, is not "back then."

Today, saying there are mysteries...and then gratuitously suggesting those mysteries demand a "creator" "prime mover" "reason for ends"...is inappropriate.

This is NOT to say there is no prime mover or creator.

I have no idea if there is or if there is not.

But the supposed necessity for any of those things...or the assertion of their existence...

...is gratuitous.

Today, saying there are mysteries...and then gratuitously suggesting those mysteries demand a "creator" "prime mover" "reason for ends"...is inappropriate. — Frank Apisa

Except that is not what Aquinas is doing. He has a metaphysics, and he's deducing a conclusion from it. There's no doubt that he's looking for ways to rationally justify his faith. But that's a different thing to what you are describing.

We agree that Aquinas was looking to rationally justify (rationalize) his "faith." That was inherent in what I was suggesting with my remarks.

Essentially he is starting with where he wants to end...that a GOD has to exist...and then shoehorning various ways to get to that point.

His "proofs" all end up in a variation of... "This everyone calls GOD."

If he were being real, all his situations would resolve to..."This may be because a GOD exists, but it also may be that one doesn't. We really do not know."

I don't think we are that far apart, Aaron, but insofar as we are apart, the difference may be irreconcilable. I feel I am closer to the truth on this, but it certainly is possible you are.

So, according to you, (most) non-human animals, plants and artifacts can't be said to have ends. — Πετροκότσυφας

No, I think that other living things choose their own ends as well, the difference being that human beings use reason in making these choices, while other living things do not. It is inanimate things which do not have their own ends.

We can't say that the leaf's ends are photosynthesis and transpiration, a bird's singing is to attract mates or that a house's end is to shelter, — Πετροκότσυφας

I think that the tree does make choices in growing its branches in this way instead of that way, toward the light for example, and the bird makes choices about when to sing. So there must be ends involved in these actions, the reasons why these creatures choose to do what they do, and not something else.

Also, human ends can't be traced back to God. Is that right? — Πετροκότσυφας

That's right, and this is why we have free choice, and why we can make mistakes and do what is wrong. There is a separation between God and the free willing beings. But as I described already, I also think that there is necessarily a separation between inanimate things and God. God gives inanimate things direction, making the things behave in a general way, but He is not there within the particular things, making each particular thing act in its own particular way, He directs things in a more general way, as Aaron describes here:

I believe that Aquinas would say that final cause interacts with the inanimate thing through the form as essence. In other words, essences within the mind of God act as the final causes of all things. Insofar as a particular thing has a substantial form, this is possible only because there is a corresponding universal essence existing eternally within the mind of God. — Aaron R

Let me see if I understand what you are saying. If God interacts through essences, then God would interact with inanimate things in a general or universal way. So God might say "all things of this type [of this essence] will act in this way, and all the particulars of that type would act in that way because God makes them act that way. But what gives a thing its uniqueness, its particular substantial form? It cannot be that there is a corresponding universal essence, because that would be a universal, and we are talking about a thing's particularity. If God only directs things toward His ends through essences, universals, then is it possible that particular things have accidental properties which God is unaware of?

We are only talking about the mode of final causality here. I was not saying that God's knowledge is restricted to knowledge of universal essences, I was simply saying that it is through God's knowledge of universal essences that he acts as the final cause of all things.

If humans use reason to make choices, what do other animals or artifacts use to make theirs? — Πετροκότσυφας

That's a good question, but I don't know the secrets of the soul, so I can't help you with what other animal use to make choices. And, in the case of artifacts, if they are inanimate, as I said, they do not make choices, they do not have ends within themselves. These inanimate things are directed toward ends by the choices of living things, so they are artificial.

We are only talking about the mode of final causality here. I was not saying that God's knowledge is restricted to knowledge of universal essences, I was simply saying that it is through God's knowledge of universal essences that he acts as the final cause of all things. — Aaron R

The issue is important though. We are talking about the final cause of all inanimate things, this means each particular thing in itself. What we observe empirically, is that each type of thing has a way of acting which is specific to that type. However, individual things have a uniqueness which is peculiar to the thing itself. If God acts as final cause of each thing, through the universal essences, then He makes each thing the type of thing that it is. He gives each thing a way of acting which is specific to a type. How then is it possible that things acquire their peculiarities, their uniqueness? Do things achieve uniqueness from some process other than by God's Will? If so, then how can we say that God directs all things toward their ends? Do you see the gap between God directs things through universal essences, and each thing has a uniqueness peculiar to itself? A thing's peculiarity, uniqueness, allows that it has an end other than the one God gives it.

I believe that Aquinas would say that individual things achieve their uniqueness through efficient causation, which also finds it's ultimate grounding in the act of God.