I agree. I would probably prefer to say that moral feelings are informed (in the sense of 'in-formed' and hence shaped) by culture than by language in the strict linguistic sense of the term. So, informed by spoken and written expressions of culture, as well as by visual, musical, bodily (dance, clothing or sexual expressions for example) and architectural expressions of culture. Moral feelings may be "deeply personal" in some cultures, and not so much in others I would say.

It's a complex, and that's why I have objected to the assertions of others that it is merely a matter of personal preference, or entirely subjective.

Moral feelings and moral beliefs need further parsing. Not all are informed by language use. — creativesoul

I would disagree and say that when it comes to language users all moral feelings are informed by culture (language in the broadest sense I outlined above). I don't think it is entirely appropriate to speak of moral feelings in relation to pre-linguistic or non-linguistic beings. And how much less so to speak of moral thoughts or beliefs.

All moral things share a common core of different elements. Moral feelings are those about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour. Moral thought... the same. Moral belief... the same. Moral discourse... the same.

What counts as "moral" on your view?

Moral feeling and thought are concerned with behavior towards others.

So one does not have moral thought, belief, or feelings until they are able to think in those terms? Nah, that can't be what you mean.

Certainly one can concern themselves with behaviour toward others without being able to say that. One could realize that what they've done harms another without being concerned about it in the sense of moral concern that arises from complex language use.

...

So one does not have moral thought, belief, or feelings until they are able to think in those terms? — creativesoul

I didn't suggest that.

Are all morals about behaviour towards others? — creativesoul

They are about behaviors that others would be affected by if they were aware of the behavior. I qualified the statement with other's awareness, because people commonly feel guilty about things they have done that no one knows about, if they think that others would find the behavior reprehensible.

Are you saying that one cannot have thought/belief that is concerned with behaviour towards others until and/or unless s/he has begun language acquisition?

All moral feelings(feelings about behaviour towards others) are informed by culture?

The Fox and the Grapes...

A moral lesson?

Not by your standard of "moral"...

And yet, it is.

I qualified the statement with other's awareness, because people commonly feel guilty about things they have done that no one knows about, if they think that others would find the behavior reprehensible. — Janus

This is a good chance to point out that the deeper the feeling of conviction over a moral thought/belief, the more personal it seems to become. It is reasonable to assume, at certain level, that the individual makes ethical judgments due to the obligation of personal duty, as opposed to any obligatory social norms.

Yes, one cannot have thoughts or beliefs, period, until one has acquired the requisite level of linguistic competency.

Pre-linguistic beings can probably (we don't really know) do something that we might characterize as thinking or believing, but it would certainly not amount to holding thoughts or beliefs. This is really about nuances of definition and what we might think are the most usefult and different ways to define terms like "having thoughts", "thinking", and so on. The salient point is that thinking and believing and feeling are no longer the same for a language competent being (and I mean language in the broadest sense as I outlined above).

No idea what you are getting at here.

one cannot have thoughts or beliefs, period, until one has acquired the requisite level of linguistic competency... — Janus

Linguistic competency is not existentially dependent upon human thought/belief.

That is the consequence of what you're putting forth. Reductio Ad Absurdum is grounds for outright rejection.

Having and/or holding thoughts differs from forming them. I'm loose with language in that regard.

I thought that the conversation was getting to the point where we were drawing a distinction between the different complexity levels that moral thought/belief can arrive at. Ethical ones were being described as the more complex conscious ones replete with thinking about one's own adopted moral basis.

One cannot think about trees unless one has language?

:worry:

Moral feelings are those about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour. Moral thought... the same. Moral belief... the same. Moral discourse... the same. — creativesoul

I would argue that the categories of morality each pertain to distinct aspects. If nothing else, moral thought/belief is predominantly developed within the constraints of reason; whereas moral feeling disregards reason (in a sense) and is arrived at by an irrational commitment to the good.

Moral discourse... — creativesoul

"I'm right, you're wrong."

Linguistic competency is not existentially dependent upon human thought/belief. — creativesoul

I didn't say it was.

One cannot think about trees unless one has language. And yet we learn to call those things "trees" by drawing a correlation between the utterance and the tree. — creativesoul

One can (presumably) visualize a tree without being a competent language user. If we can see them we can visualize (recall the seeing of) them, and we can also get the naming intention behind repeatedly making a sound and pointing to a tree. I don't see what point your are trying to make.

I thought that the conversation was getting to the point where we were drawing a distinction between the different complexity levels that moral thought/belief can arrive at. Ethical ones were being described as the more complex conscious ones replete with thinking about one's own adopted moral basis. — creativesoul

I concur.

Having and/or holding thoughts differs from forming them. I'm loose with language in that regard. — creativesoul

Well, I think the clarity and depth of your thought would benefit from tightening up your language.

,

This is a good chance to point out that the deeper the feeling of conviction over a moral thought/belief, the more personal it seems to become. It is reasonable to assume, at certain level, that the individual makes ethical judgments due to the obligation of personal duty, as opposed to any obligatory social norms. — Merkwurdichliebe

I agree, because all the important social norms are matters of life and death which the individual can easily get if they are capable of being concerned about their own well-being and safety

and are also able to empathize. Once a certain level of ethical sophistication is reached the contextual logic of ethics and morality is internalized, and the individual becomes properly socialized as opposed to being more or less sociopathic.

Linguistic competency is not existentially dependent upon human thought/belief.
— creativesoul

I didn't say it was. — Janus

That is the consequence of what you're putting forth. — creativesoul

Once a certain level of ethical sophistication is reached the contextual logic of ethics and morality is internalized, and the individual becomes properly socialized as opposed to being more or less sociopathic. — Janus

The internalization of social norms, I would attribute to inculcation/indoctrination. This is where the youngster learns the basic game of ethics, so to speak. But it is the most superficial level of ethical existence.

The deeper one is submerged into ethical existence, the less relevent social norms become. The deeper the ethical existence, the greater the potential for sociopathy.

How do you arrive at that conclusion? Conversing with you would be less tedious if, instead of merely asserting things, you presented the argument with the initial assertion. It would save having to ask.

The internalization of social norms, I would attribute to inculcation/indoctrination. This is where the youngster learn the basic game of ethics, so to speak. But it is the most superficial level of ethical existence.

The deeper one is submerged into ethical existence, the less relevent social norms become. The deeper the ethical existence, the more potential for sociopathy. — Merkwurdichliebe

I agree with your first paragraph, but not with the second. I think sociopathy is on account of distorted or absent moral feeling; the inability to empathize sufficiently or at all. I don't believe sophisticated defenses of ethical positions such as that it is OK to murder, rape, and so on are possible in those who actually care enough about others to qualify as socialized individuals. Which is not to say that you cannot act as though you are properly socialized, i.e. care about others even if you are not and do not, but I would not count that as a "deep ethical existence". I think the latter is simply impossible without the requisite accompanying feelings.

I'll get back to where we were momentarily...

I agree with your first paragraph, but not with the second. I think sociopathy is on account of distorted or absent moral feeling; the inability to empathize sufficiently or at all. I don't believe sophisticated defenses of ethical positions such as that it is OK to murder, rape, and so on are possible in those who actually care enough about others to qualify as socialized individuals. Which is not to say that you cannot act as though you are properly socialized, i.e. care about others even if you are not and do not. — Janus

I understand where you are coming from, and I don't want to digress too much but... You are speaking about very ordinary conditions. The more subjective ethical judgement becomes, the more complicated it gets.

Consider when the socio-ethical obligation permits sociopathic behavior, such as going to war (to essentially murder for the state). How do we account for that? Especially after we factor in the conscientious dissenter, who makes the more sociopathic choice to rebel against the system, not for himself or for another, but by the sheer strength of his commitment to an ethical principle.

We're talking about the source/origen of morals. The discourse has moved to talk about morals in terms of moral thought/belief and what counts as that. The criterion can account for all morals. Your criterion for what counts as being moral(in kind) cannot be substituted in many instances of the use of "moral" when it's referring to kinds. Therefore, it's inadequate in explanatory power. The criterion being used exhausts the one you've put forth and effectively passes the test of salva veritate that your proposed criterion fails.

So, the point here is that you're using an inherently inadequate criterion for what counts as being "moral". There's another as well.

...one cannot have thoughts or beliefs, period, until one has acquired the requisite level of linguistic competency... — Janus

This is to say that there is no thought/belief at all(period) unless the candidate forming, having, and/or holding thought/belief is competent with language. That is to say that all thought/belief is existentially dependent upon competent language use. It only follows that there is no thought/belief formation prior arriving at the level of one's mastery of language that you deem competent. That would be to admit that there were no thought/belief necessary for simple language use such as first learning the names of things. It only follows that the very first case of competent language use preceded the very first case of thought/belief formation. The very first case of one speaking in clear meaningful common language preceded one's very first thought.

That is impossible.

That's just a quick and dirty run down regarding the consequences of what you're putting forth as criterion for what counts as "moral" and what counts as "thought" or "belief". It's all unacceptable.

Some moral feelings and beliefs, perhaps the ones that you're vaguely referencing, are existentially dependent upon competent language use. We've already begun to discuss these kinds. However, they are not the first kinds. Thus, they're relevant to an overall understanding of moral thought/belief. They are not an example of the first ones. I asked you about the feelings, because that is where we are in terms of the evolution of thought/belief into morals.

That's a great summary of how we have justified the premise from which we have been building. And I think we've made some decent progress.

Yes. It seems so.

If I could buy you a drink, I would.

How about I just have drink and consider it equal. :wink: