I’m just trying to understand your distinction between behavior towards others and behavior not towards others, as it relates to morals.
If you don’t want to cooperate that’s fine. It’s entirely your choice. — praxis
The distinction is between considering behaviour towards another and considering one's own thought, belief, and/or behaviour in a specific context that is not considering behaviour towards another. — creativesoul
The distinction is between considering behaviour towards another and considering one's own thought, belief, and/or behaviour in a specific context that is not considering behaviour towards another.
— creativesoul
I think the point you are missing here is that in moral thought we are considering what kind of person we want to be, and that makes no sense in the absence of the other. — Janus
I'm actually beginning to wonder why that seems to be something so troublesome to agree on for some here. — creativesoul
Rather, I'm arguing about the content of what counts as moral thought - in kind. Moral thought does not have to be about, and/or in the context of considering behaviour towards another. Some is. Not all. — creativesoul
I would say most is concerned with considering behavior towards others, and even if it is not a consideration of behavior specifically directed towards another, it will always be a consideration of the implications for others of whatever behavior is in question and/ or of how others would see me if they knew that I had behaved that way and so on. — Janus
I would say that moral principles always come from others and are always and only pertinent to relationship with an other or others. Perhaps there are exceptions, but I can't think of any. — Janus
Even in the case of, for example, a moral proscription against masturbation; it is generally considered wrong because, or insofar as, it is thought to make you unfit for sexual relationship with another. If it were condemned because it was thought to cause blindness, then it would be considered to be morally wrong because you would become a burden on your friends and family and society in general (you might then be on welfare for example). — Janus
I had another friend who used to say "Women are alright, but you can't beat the real thing!" — Janus
To what extent must one consider an other in order for her/him to be thinking ethically about the other.
— creativesoul
That is something that we can now make a distinction about, but only because the variables have been existentialized, right?
Ethical thought/belief it would seem, pertains to the stages of prelinguistic thought/belief and cultural indoctrination (predominantly the latter). It opens up onto ethical existence for the individual.
In ethical existence, the individual internalizes ethical thought/belief. Somewhere here, in the internalization of ethical thought/belief, is where moral thought/belief should first appear (I can't exactly pin point it yet).
At a the most superficial level, moral thought/belief would be likely to appear identical to the ethical thought/belief from which it was derived. But the deeper one sinks into moral thought/belief (i.e. the more serious his conviction and responsibility become), the more ethical existence becomes a reality for him... the more likely (but not necessarily) his morality will come to differ from the ethical thought/belief from which it is derived.
It seems reasonable to suggest that at a deep enough level of moral thought/belief, it ceases to be a cognitive process, and becomes more akin to feeling and intuition. If this is accepted, then the more that ethical thought/belief is internalized, the more irrational it becomes. — Merkwurdichliebe
perhaps we would be best to clear up these issues first before going on to the rest. — Janus
creativesoul seems to be particularizing the question; do I have another specifically in mind when I am morally deliberating (he says "ethically", but I think it will save confusion to stick to "morally" regardless of the question as to whether the terms are equivalent). If I do not have another specifically in mind when I am morally deliberating, does that not mean that my moral deliberations are not concerned with others? I would say that it does not mean that although of course the distinction as such is useful.
You then say that we can make a distinction (presumably about moral thinking which is specifically about others and moral thinking which is not?) because we have "existentialized" the "variables". So, I am not clear what you mean by this, but that may be because this has been lifted out of the context of the whole conversation — Janus
Next, I don't know what it means that moral thought "pertains to the stages of pre-linguistic thought/ belief", because, firstly I don't accept that there are any clearly formed pre-linguistic thoughts or beliefs, and secondly because, even if there were, they would not be linguistically formed thoughts and beliefs and I can't see how something.like linguistically formed moral thought could pertain to anything pre-linguistic. I can see how linguistically formed thought could evolve out of pre-linguistic mental processes, but how it could ever pertain to them if "pertain" is meant to signify anything like 'justify' or 'be justified by' I am unable to say. — Janus
I don't hold prelinguistic thought/belief to be ethically charged. — Merkwurdichliebe
I'm actually beginning to wonder why that seems to be something so troublesome to agree on for some here.
— creativesoul
I think that I may have figured it out, and in the process identified a basic flaw in the project of attempting to develop a universal criterion for what counts as a moral thing, which is essentially that we may be blind to morals frameworks (and their particular sets of values) that differ from our own. — praxis
...moral dumbfounding occurs at an advanced stage of morality, well beyond the primitive stage of prelinguistic thought/belief. — Merkwurdichliebe
Indeed. Cognitive dissonance requires a pre-existing worldview be questioned by another. Moral dumbfounding is a kind of cognitive dissonance. — creativesoul
Moral dumbfounding can perfectly explain why Socrates drinks the hemlock. — Merkwurdichliebe
Can it? — creativesoul
I was under the impression that one was morally dumbfounded when and if they could not answer certain questions regarding why they believe something or other(strongly), and/or how they've come to such hold such conviction in moral belief. — creativesoul
...moral dumbfounding occurs at an advanced stage of morality, well beyond the primitive stage of prelinguistic thought/belief.
— Merkwurdichliebe
Indeed. Cognitive dissonance requires a pre-existing worldview. Moral dumbfounding is a kind of cognitive dissonance. — creativesoul
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