What exactly do you mean by the square root of NOT? I thought you were talking about the square root of the word "not", which doesn't make sense to me. Whatever it is, is it to do with logic or physics? If the latter then, again, it's irrelevant to what I'm talking about, which is logic. — Michael
"Are you claiming that idealism is a sentence" is a yes or no question. Try typing less in response to a yes or no question. — Terrapin Station
Okay, so when I talk about idealism, I'm not talking about a sentence. Insofar as you see it as a sentence, we're talking about different things. — Terrapin Station
Since I'm not talking about a sentence, what logically follows from sentences is irrelevant to what I'm talking abuot.
You've answered a couple yes, even though it was like pulling teeth. But it's not as if I have some minimum bar you need to pass and then I'll just ignore if you'll no longer have what I consider a conversation.I've answered a number of your questions. — Michael
The patterns would have been of their own creation, how they interpreted what they saw. So they would have made geometrical figures, patterns, to represent what they experienced (saw). Since the interpretations of what they saw were inaccurate, so were the patterns they created. Why not call these geometrical figures, these patterns, false representations? — Metaphysician Undercover
The point being, that you can make adequate predictions while maintaining false representations. One could claim that a dragon takes the earth in its mouth every evening, and brings it around, through the underground, spitting it out in the morning, and still predict that the sun will rise. You seem to be questioning whether these representations are actually false. I would say that they are false. How then, does the ability to predict come about if the representations are false? — Metaphysician Undercover
"Reliability" is produced by accuracy in the numbering system. This is where you find the value of inductive reasoning, in its relationship to numbering. We can entirely remove the pattern, and rely solely on the numbers. It has always been (infinite number of days), in the past, that the sun rises the next day, so we conclude that it will continue. We need not speculate about patterns to produce this conclusion. — Metaphysician Undercover
I would say that falsification comes about in different ways. First there is falsification with respect to the numbers themselves. Suppose the people found 365 days between when the sun came up at the same place. That's not quite right, so after a number of years, 365 days would be falsified, and they would have to adjust. Secondly, falsification also comes about in respect to the relationship between the geometrical patterns, and the numbers. That there are not precisely 365 days in a year indicates something. It indicates that the year and the day are not parts of the same phenomenon. There is incompatibility, inconsistency between the year and the day, because we cannot make a representation of a year, in which a day remains incomplete. Therefore we must have two distinct geometrical representations, one which represents the day, and one which represents the year. There is a much more evident incompatibility between the month (moon cycle) and the year. — Metaphysician Undercover
Gravity is something whose fundamental nature we do not yet fully understand, we just approximate it's force with mass and distance. And yet, the sheer consistency with which we measure it's force allows us to construct theories and to make reliable predictions about what effect it will have on particular bodies of mass. — VagabondSpectre
I don't need precision beyond "the sun rose every day within memory" in order to (through induction) identify a pattern with which to make the prediction "the sun will rise tomorrow". — VagabondSpectre
I'm saying that it is redundant to use these terms. If reality is everything that exists and nothing else exists except awareness, then you are simply being redundant. In what instances would you use these terms separately and not be talking about the same thing. How could you use these terms in two different sentences and not be meaning the same thing? You need to define "meaning".Reality is everything that exists. Awareness is thoughts and memories and sensations. Exactly as it is for the realist. It's just that whereas the realist would say that both awareness and non-awareness things exist, and so that "reality" refers to awareness and non-awareness things, the idealist would say that only awareness exists, and so that "reality" refers only to awareness.
Again compare with "intelligent species" and humanity. That the former refers only to the latter is not that they mean the same thing or that humanity doesn't exist. — Michael
Well maybe that's because I'm thinking of the word "my" in the way a realist does. You need to define "my" if it means something different to you or I will never understand. — Harry Hindu
Exactly. And you also can't go from "only this mental phenomenon exists" to "other mental phenomenon exists". So, "my" is a term that has no meaning for an idealist. So to use terms like "I" and "my" is meaningless and causes confusion. Only mental phenomena exists. There is no "my".It means what the realist means. I don't understand what's hard to understand. You can't go from "only bodies exist" to "only my body exists" and so you can't go from "only mental phenomena exists" to "only my mental phenomena exists". — Michael
How can any idealist argue for the existence of something that they have never experienced? You have never experienced other minds, only other bodies. You infer the existence of other minds by the behavior of other bodies, just as we infer the existence of atoms through the behavior of matter. What you are saying is that you are sure that something you never experience exists, yet the things you experience don't exist when you don't experience them. You are being contradictory. — Harry Hindu
You're being inconsistent again. I can't converse with someone who refuses to be consistent. If your argument is that something exists when another mind besides mine experiences it goes nowhere because you haven't shown why it is you believe other minds exist where things can exist that you don't experience yet they are still experienced. How do you know that they are being experienced outside of your own when you question the existence of things outside of your experience. If you can't provide a meaningful answer without being contradictory then I won't waste my time here. If you have something to teach then I'm all ears, but so far it's been nothing but contradiction and confusion.Except the claim isn't "the things I experience don't exist when I don't experience them". It's "things don't exist when they're not being experienced". It doesn't matter if I experience them, only that they are experienced.
The only idealism you're even considering is a solipsistic kind. But not all idealisms are solipsistic. — Michael
Unless we need to do accurate calculations for GPS, orbits of planets close to the sun, black holes, gravitational waves, the big bang, and indeed some long range missile targeting. Then we can't just approximate "its force with mass and distance", rather we need to deal with what we know gravity to be. — tom
Yes, that is precisely how we are able to predict with absolute reliability that the next swan we encounter will be white. — tom
I think you might be missing something here. #2 is the conjectured *explanation* of #1. The reason that certain regularities exist is that the sun orbits the earth, and you cannot, via any logical process arrive at #2 via #1.
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Science begins when an explanation of certain phenomena, be they regularities or irregularities, is proposed. Why does the sun orbit the earth? Why do we have seasons? Why can't Demeter and Zeus just get along? — tom
We predict the force of gravity between two objects by looking at their mass and the distance between them. This is physics 101. We don't know what gravity is unfortunately, so rocket scientists have do things my way... With precise approximation... — VagabondSpectre
It's neither absolutely reliable that the next swan you see will be white, nor absolutely reliable that the sun will rise tomorrow. These things can be considered "reliable" (one much more so than the other) but we cannot call them certain. — VagabondSpectre
We haven't done that for 100 years. — tom
I'm not talking about "explanations", I'm talking about empirical observations. I was pointing out that measuring and recording the suns behavior (#1) is how we can gain predictive power over it (through strong induction based on sound observations), not by "explaining" it. — VagabondSpectre
As far as "science begins when explanations are proposed" goes, you have it completely backwards. Science does not "begin" with an explanation. It begins with a lack of an explanation, and then uses evidence and reason, like measurements of when and where the sun rises over the horizon, to try and figure out more and more functional (and presumably accurate) understandings. — VagabondSpectre
Science does not begin with explanations, it ends with them; that's it's final goal or product. Science decidedly begins with that most basic and fundamental activity of data collection. — VagabondSpectre
How do we predict how much force one massive object will exert upon another through gravity?
What is the fundamental mechanism of gravity? — VagabondSpectre
OK, so you have a record of past risings and settings of the sun. I have a record of milkman and postal deliveries to my house. I guess that makes us even?
I predict that there will be a milk delivery on Monday morning and a 66% chance of post. I am scientist! — tom
Are you asking for a science lesson? — tom
The pattern is inherent in the numbers though; in the data; in the observations. — VagabondSpectre
In the most basic argument saying "the sun will rise tomorrow", the observational data is a series of 1's or checked boxes representing each previous consecutive day recording the fact that the sun rose on that day. — VagabondSpectre
We can never be absolutely certain that all the laws of physics wont all suddenly change one day, making science useless, but until then the overwhelming consistency of the empirical phenomenon that scientific theories are developed from represents an extremely strong inductive argument which is why science itself is strong. — VagabondSpectre
No, that's the point I am making, there is no pattern inherent in the numbers. The pattern is a property of how the numbers are applied. So numbers, as objects, ideal objects, don't have inherent patterns. Take "two" for example, it indicates two distinct entities classed together under the same title, "two", but there is no necessary pattern within these two entities. But when "two" is related to "one", and to "three", or other numbers, then we have an ordering, which is a pattern. There is no pattern within the object itself, "two", or "the number", the pattern is created by the application of the number. — Metaphysician Undercover
See here, it is the series of 1's, and the checking, which creates the pattern. — Metaphysician Undercover
But let's not forget my original point, "the sun rose" is not a fact, it is a falsity. The sun did no such thing, the earth is spinning in relation to the sun. The capacity for prediction creates the illusion of objective certainty, but if the premise, "the sun rose" is an inaccurate, imprecise, or in this case false, description, then the conclusion "the sun will rise tomorrow", is equally false or imprecise. — Metaphysician Undercover
The point being, that the predictive power, which science gives us, is only an illusion of objective certainty. If the observed, and predicted event is incorrectly described, then the predictive capacity may hide a profound falsity. The predictive capacity makes one believe that there is an objective truth there, when really there is a profound falsity. All that is required, is for the scientists involved to agree on a description of the event, then the prediction of that described event is supposed to validate the objective certainty of that event. But how is it the case that people agreeing on a description can validate the objective truth of that description? — Metaphysician Undercover
Suppose we see a dark spot on the horizon, you and I, and we agree that it is a big rock. We can predict that every time we walk past this place, we will see a big rock in the distance on our right. We assume to have objective certainty about this big rock, because the dark spot is always over there whenever we walk by. Perhaps this dark spot isn't even a big rock though. The predictive capacity has hidden a deeper misunderstanding, such that there was no objective truth there in the first place. — Metaphysician Undercover
We can know, with a high degree of certainty that some of our descriptions will prove to be inaccurate. This we know from experience. Because of this, we can assume that the "laws of physics" will need to be changed to account for new, better descriptions. Therefore we can have a high degree of certainty that the laws of physics will change. — Metaphysician Undercover
The pattern is that the sun is visible in the sky every day; that's the pattern, not the numbers or symbols we use to represent them. — VagabondSpectre
The sun appearing in the sky every day IS the pattern. The pattern is there whether I check a box, scribble a one to record it, or not. — VagabondSpectre
On an individual level, scientists seek to find "descriptions" (sometimes to describe, sometimes to explain, sometimes to predict) of things which "agree" with observation and experimentation. — VagabondSpectre
I never said what the phenomenon was, you did. All I said was there is a dark spot on the horizon, and with my recorded observations of it's "relative position" over time I have identified a pattern which allows me to predict where this dark spot will appear tomorrow. I don't claim to have knowledge about what the dark spot is; that's your own presumption, I've never said it was a rock. All I claim is to have reliable predictive power over where this dark spot is going to be on the horizon tomorrow. — VagabondSpectre
But by "laws of physics suddenly changed" I meant things like: "What if gravity suddenly reversed the direction of it's force?", "What if the speed of light suddenly slowed?", "What if the nuclear bonds holding atoms together suddenly became stronger or weaker?", "What if empty space suddenly became electrically conductive"?. These are the kinds of things which we hope will never change, because if they did then some or all of what we pragmatically rely on as scientific or even just general fact could suddenly change, and continue changing, forever, rendering some or all of our current models useless and evidently "not objective". — VagabondSpectre
I don't think so, the pattern is in the description, it is described as a pattern. It is dark then it is light, that's how it is described. When it is light, it is called "day". Not by coincidence, the sun is in the sky when it is light. That the sun is "in the sky every day" , is the description. But is the sun really "in the sky", or is the description really inaccurate? The sky is the atmosphere, and the sun is not in the atmosphere. And if the description is inaccurate, then how is the pattern real? The sun is not really in the sky, so this is a false pattern on account of a false description — Metaphysician Undercover
No, I don't think so. The sun appearing in the sky every day is a description. Unless someone makes that description, how is that pattern actually there? — Metaphysician Undercover
You seem to missing the point. Observations are themselves descriptions. Unless the scientists can agree on the terms of description, then the same event will be described differently by different scientists, hence there will be varying observations, which are actually just different descriptions of the very same thing. The point I am making is that when the scientists come to agreement as to how to describe a specific type of event, this does not ensure that the agreed upon description is an objective truth concerning that event. Agreement doesn't produce objective truth. — Metaphysician Undercover
Your observation, "the sun rose yesterday" is a description. You and all your colleagues might agree that these are adequate terms for the observation. But this does not make it true that the sun rose yesterday, just because you and all your colleagues "observed" this. — Metaphysician Undercover
My point is, that if your observations are not proper descriptions of the events which are occurring, if they are just the "agreed upon descriptions", then the current models are already "not objective", they may well be falsities, despite the fact that they may be highly useful in terms of predictability. Therefore predictability doesn't provide any type of objective truth. — Metaphysician Undercover
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