But is it just a difference in matters? Why do scientific facts obtain so well? You can say that it is similar to how a carpenter creates a masterpiece furniture, but is that the same? A man-made object created by someone, or a social convention, can be arbitrarily changed, and is contingent, varied. Any decision on it would be the freedom of the carpenter, or the architect. Perhaps the language of the woordworker is real in that community, but they are contingent conventions. This is not so with the science language game. There are constraints that nature is imposing, making the findings a necessity. It is nature forcing our hand. It moves away from contingency and hits on necessity. Wittgenstein's "forms of life" and "use" may not fit this scenario of science. You, in a really superficial way, can make an argument that humans are interested in pursuing scientific ideas, so in that sense is "for us", but the evidence gets more refined over time, more precise, more accurate, and leads to powerful results. — schopenhauer1

I don't see how you can say "use" does not fit scientific language games. The reality of the world is inherent within "use", as what is used. So "for us" implies two things, the "for" implies purpose, usefulness, and therefore the reality of use, and the "us" implies a communion of people. These are the two underlying features of language games, the communion of people, and the purposes of those people making use of the reality of the world.

The "real" universe is simply taken for granted, as is often the case in philosophy, but it's a reality of use. Perhaps even the Kantian position that we have no access toward understanding the noumenal world is also taken for granted. What is available to us for study and description, is the way that we use the world. And this is most evident in language. But language is complex, because not only is it comprised of the reality of people using the world, it is also comprised of the reality of the communion of people. These are distinct "realities" understood by distinct principles, and it would be extremely difficult to analyze language in such a way as to separate the manifestations of each, within language. They are well intertwined.

Where are language games played - out in the world, or on one's mind? Is the internet posts and the forum out in the world or in your mind?
— Harry Hindu

Both :D. — schopenhauer1

Then youre saying that language games have an ontology themselves, no? An ontology of being in the mind and being on an internet forum.

Why do scientific facts obtain so well? You can say that it is similar to how a carpenter creates a masterpiece furniture, but is that the same? A man-made object created by someone, or a social convention, can be arbitrarily changed, and is contingent, varied. Any decision on it would be the freedom of the carpenter, or the architect. Perhaps the language of the woordworker is real in that community, but they are contingent conventions. This is not so with the science language game. There are constraints that nature is imposing, making the findings a necessity. It is nature forcing our hand. It moves away from contingency and hits on necessity. — schopenhauer1

Of course the default is that the mathematically-informed science is just an interpretation. But the interpretation corresponds with a greater predictive ability and technology which gives it a different characteristic far beyond other language-games and their heuristics, even accounting for other heuristics getting refined over time with accumulated knowledge. — schopenhauer1

The thing is that we could have the same predictive ability and technology with very different language-games. It is a matter of convention whether we consider that there is such a thing as atoms and subatomic particles or not, we could explain observations differently. Rather than saying "we observe such result because electrons were deflected by the magnetic field", we could say "we observe such result when we heat a metal surface in a vacuum tube and there is a magnet nearby".

We could frame the science language-game in a very different way, but in that language there would still be a name for the Sun, and ways to describe how the Sun moves in the sky, or how the sky and the horizon move while the Sun stays still, or how to find where the Sun is, there are conventions in the science language-game in the same way that there are in that of the carpenter.

To create his masterpiece furniture the carpenter would be implicitly applying his theories of how his tools work and how wood behaves in various situations, he just wouldn't call them theories because he would have internalized all that from his experience, each of his past experience with wood being experiments he carried out, from which he inferred generalities and expectations and predictions. Which is what scientists do, they carry out experiments, they infer generalities, expectations, predictions, and they share their results with one another.

The difficult question is how much of what we see is a convention? There are plenty of so-called optical illusions, where we see different things depending on our state of mind. Plenty of examples of so-called shared delusions, where something seen by an individual becomes seen by a few other people, while others don't see it and interpret it as a delusion. But then if that "delusion" spread to everyone it would become reality, and then how do we know we're not living in a shared "delusion", how do we know how much of nature is man-made, how much it is not nature imposing constraints on us but ourselves imposing constraints on ourselves?

Everytime 'language-game' is equated with (just/mere/only a) convention, a small kitten dies. This thread is a feline mass grave, and all of you are kitten murderers, in particular the OP.

As I said already, either there is a "how things are for us" which is prior to language and necessary for the existence of language, or "how things are for us" is something which emerges from language. Which position do you think Wittgenstein supports? — Metaphysician Undercover

In On Certainty Wittgenstein quotes Goethe:

In the beginning was the deed.

We are social animals. The group and its activities comes first.

Do you think PI 242 also speaks to this?

Everytime 'language-game' is equated with (just/mere/only a) convention, a small kitten dies. This thread is a feline mass grave, and all of you are kitten murderers, in particular the OP. — StreetlightX

Why can't "merely" be used? It is in relation to ideas about realism, so would be appropriate in the context of scientific realism presenting some sort of ontology versus other language games. Essentially, it is about whether science indicates something that we are interpreting, different than what other language-games/forms of life are doing. My last post I said:

But I still think that is fundamentally different than how the observable evidence and technological gains fostered by modern science dictates certain understanding of reality. Both are related, and share family resemblences, but are not the same. One is a constraint on epistemology itself, our ability to go beyond our own language-games. The other is a constraint on how we can interact and conceive of the universe itself. The latter is a constraint that perhaps indicates something about the universe, outside human interpretations of it. Of course the default is that the mathematically-informed science is just an interpretation. But the interpretation corresponds with a greater predictive ability and technology which gives it a different characteristic far beyond other language-games and their heuristics, even accounting for other heuristics getting refined over time with accumulated knowledge. — schopenhauer1

But again, your style gets in the way of your content. This whole making snarky remarks from the corner, isn't helpful to the conversation. If you have something actually interesting to say other than snarky remarks, say it. I am open to dialogue. But I know your style, I can predict another snarky dismissive response, so unless you want to surprise me, don't even bother.

Why can't "merely" be used? — schopenhauer1

Because it tries to insinuate a stupid distinction between 'language-games' and 'scientific realism' that is senseless and inattentive to what language-games are. Substandard ideas deserve substandard replies.

Because it tries to insinuate a stupid distinction between 'language-games' and 'scientific realism' that is senseless and inattentive to what language-games are. Shitty ideas deservse shitty replies. — StreetlightX

Ah yes, so all is language-games, don't try to debate it. Read Philosophical Investigations only. End of conversation. Sounds about as authoritarian as you can get, if you ask me. Also, limits any inquiry and methodology beyond Wittgensteins. You assume his approach limits all other talk, which is also shitty. You have trapped the fly again.

Not even 'all is lanaguage-games' makes sense; nor language-games 'limiting' anything. No one, least of all Witty, would say either. The grammar here is senseless.

Not even 'all is lanaguage-games' makes sense; nor language-games 'limiting' anything. The grammar here is senseless. — StreetlightX

Wait, am I talking to a Wittgenstein bott? Holy shit, whoever programmed these responses, great trolling.

Well it generally helps to have a basic mastery of the grammar, at a bare minimum, of what it is you're trying to critique. And it's hard to tell if it's tragic or cute that an appeal to actually read the text you're critiquing is somehow seen as asking too much. As if your laziness is the issue of others.

Perhaps the language of the woordworker is real in that community, but they are contingent conventions. This is not so with the science language game. There are constraints that nature is imposing, making the findings a necessity. — schopenhauer1

First there are constraints on the woodworker. The properties of the wood, the tools, the adhesives, the fasteners. There is also the woodworker's language that deals with these things and the working with the materials. It is a fact that pine is a soft wood and oak a hardwood. It is a fact that some woods are more prone to cupping and warping then others. It is a fact that some woods are more resistant to rot and insects than others. The terms used are conventions, but they are based on the activity of working with wood. The techniques are conventions but not independent of the tools that have been developed over time and what works and does not work.

Second, the findings of science are not a necessity. Science has a history. It has developed differently in different times and different places. The discoveries are not independent of the paradigms or the particular concerns of the investigators or the ability to fund their research.

Wittgenstein's "forms of life" and "use" may not fit this scenario of science. — schopenhauer1

The philosophy and sociology of science say otherwise. It has its own activities which are not independent of but different from other human activities.

But I still think that is fundamentally different than how the observable evidence and technological gains fostered by modern science dictates certain understanding of reality. — schopenhauer1

I think the same is true throughout human history. Many cultures have stories of a golden age that has been lost. This is tied to technological advances - agriculture was perhaps the most disruptive, tying people to a patch of land, but tool making and weapons is another.

Well it generally helps to have a basic mastery of the grammar, at a bare minimum, of what it is you're trying to critique. And it's hard to tell if it's tragic or cute that an appeal to actually read the text you're critiquing is somehow seen as asking too much. As if your laziness is the issue of others. — StreetlightX

So, by telling me to read the literature and not telling me, even just a small summary of what principle YOU think I am violating when discussing Wittgenstein, also shows your laziness. At least when I make a critique, I try to explain it. You can at least provide that. Otherwise, I can always claim the same and you could only defend yourself by further withdrawing into snarkiness, which would then keep proving my point. So we would always be at a standstill unless you explain your critiques leaving little room for me to misinterpret them.

You are not being clever by waiting for others to "hit" whatever point you want them to get, just obtuse. And the style shows more about ego than anything else.

↪Fooloso4 Do you think PI 242 also speaks to this? — Luke

Yes. Here is 242:

242. It is not only agreement in definitions, but also (odd as it may sound) agreement in judgements that is required for communication by means of language. This seems to abolish logic, but does not do so. - It is one thing to describe methods of measurement, and another to obtain and state results of measurement. But what we call “measuring” is in part determined by a certain constancy in results of measurement.

I will say a bit more about 242, but first:

240. Disputes do not break out (among mathematicians, say) over the question of whether or not a rule has been followed. People don’t come to blows over it, for example. This belongs to the scaffolding from which our language operates (for example, yields descriptions).

Wittgenstein used the term "scaffolding" in the Tractatus to refer to what underlies both language and the facts of the world. (See the earlier quote about the harmony between thought and reality). The scaffolding, however, is no longer regarded as logical and is no longer thought of as underlying reality. Hence the complaint in 242 about abolishing logic.

241. “So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?” - What is true or false is what human beings say; and it is in their language that human beings agree. This is agreement not in opinions, but rather in form of life.

It is our agreed upon, that is, shared or common, form of life that is the scaffolding. Our agreed upon definitions and judgments are part of our form of life. It is not simply that we share the same opinions, but that both our agreement and disagreement regarding opinions rests on our form of life. And this means, in part, not only that we agree on the definition of a meter but that there is a certain constancy of results when we measure. When the woodworker measures the length of a board it is not first one meter then two or three. It is not human agreement that determines that the length of the board does not change, but we agree when we say that it is true that it does not change.

First there are constraints on the woodworker. The properties of the wood, the tools, the adhesives, the fasteners. There is also the woodworker's language that deals with these things and the working with the materials. It is a fact that pine is a soft wood and oak a hardwood. It is a fact that some woods are more prone to cupping and warping then others. It is a fact that some woods are more resistant to rot and insects than others. The terms used are conventions, but they are based on the activity of working with wood. The techniques are conventions but not independent of the tools that have been developed over time and what works and does not work. — Fooloso4

But what are these facts compared to science? By simply saying it is a different human inquiry, so requires different language games, is misleading. The practical applications of use, the recreational applications of use, and simply the social applications of use, seem different in kind and not degree.

The philosophy and sociology of science say otherwise. It has its own activities which are not independent of but different from other human activities. — Fooloso4

This a good formulation of the argument that this particular POV is contrasting to and calling into question.

I think the same is true throughout human history. Many cultures have stories of a golden age that has been lost. This is tied to technological advances - agriculture was perhaps the most disruptive, tying people to a patch of land, but tool making and weapons is another. — Fooloso4

So we have a tendency for improvement of our conditions through cultural accumulation. This can be applied to all types of spheres. However, there is something different when it is observing how the world is operating itself, perhaps. Yeah it can be "for us" because we have our epistemological tendencies for systematizing, but I guess I'm wondering if there can ever be an indication of the things-themselves through this science outlook.

Perhaps an extreme form of this, which I can certainly see as being considered "scientisim" is Max Tegmark's theory of mathematical realism. I do not see much justification for it, but it is an example that is definitely opposed to the more epistemological approach like that of Wittgenstein.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematical_universe_hypothesis

But what are these facts compared to science? — schopenhauer1

The facts that concern the woodworker may overlap in some cases with the facts that concern someone doing materials science, but the woodworker's main concern is making something from wood whereas the materials scientist studying wood is concerned with the properties of wood and may have no idea what a scarf joint or a kerf is.

By simply saying it is a different human inquiry, so requires different language games, is misleading. — schopenhauer1

How so? Human languages developed in a world that is very different than what the sciences encounter and investigate. Physics can no longer be done without sophisticated mathematics. Biochemistry, although not as reliant on mathematical models, requires a vocabulary that is incomprehensible for those without the necessary education.

The practical applications of use, the recreational applications of use, and simply the social applications of use, seem different in kind and not degree. — schopenhauer1

If that is the case then that supports the claim that they require different concepts and vocabularies.

This a good formulation of the argument that this particular POV is contrasting to and calling into question. — schopenhauer1

Which POV? The one you have not been able to clearly articulate? I really am having a hard time trying to figure out what you are trying to say. What is it in that formulation that this POV is calling into question? What is the contrasting POV?

However, there is something different when it is observing how the world is operating itself, perhaps. — schopenhauer1

The farmer observes how the world is operating. The ships captain observes how the world is operating. The climatologist observes how the world is operating. The astrophysicist observes how the world is operating.

Yeah it can be "for us" because we have our epistemological tendencies for systematizing, but I guess I'm wondering if there can ever be an indication of the things-themselves through this science outlook. — schopenhauer1

It is "us" who observe and experiment and theorize and conceptualize. We see the world as we do not simply because it is the way it is but because we are the way we are. This holds for both our ordinary experience and for science.

Perhaps an extreme form of this, which I can certainly see as being considered "scientisim" is Max Tegmark's theory of mathematical realism. I do not see much justification for it, but it is an example that is definitely opposed to the more epistemological approach like that of Wittgenstein. — schopenhauer1

The fundamental difference is that Wittgenstein considers mathematics to be a human invention, a human construct. Tegmark is a mathematical Platonist. I think they agree, however, that, in Tegmark's words: there exists an external physical reality completely independent of us humans.

The question then is not about the existence of reality but about how we are to understand it. Is there some way to understand it that is independent of us? Tegmark thinks there is because mathematics is independent of us. But even if that were the case, it seems to me that our knowledge of mathematics may be limited, that given its complexity we even with the aid of our most powerful computers will never grasp the whole of it.

It is "us" who observe and experiment and theorize and conceptualize. We see the world as we do not simply because it is the way it is but because we are the way we are. This holds for both our ordinary experience and for science. — Fooloso4

So I first juxtaposed this "for us" approach against Speculative Realism, as they do not take stock in the "critical" approach which Kant really started and has been with us up through Wittgenstein and beyond. They think that philosophy should turn back to ontological speculation again, pace Leibniz, pace Decartes, pace Medievalists, pace Stoics, pace Aristotle, pace Plato, etc. They do not like this "critical turn" of epistemology limiting speculation, so to say.

Here is a really good article that might elucidate some of the concerns of the Speculative Realist and their critique of the critical turn. https://deontologistics.wordpress.com/2009/08/26/critique-and-correlationism/ . This particular writer is interesting, because though he has sympathies with the anti-critical tendencies of the SR camp, he equally critiques their anti-critical tendencies as well.

So I first juxtaposed this "for us" approach against Speculative Realism, as they do not take stock in the "critical" approach which Kant really started and has been with us up through Wittgenstein and beyond. They think that philosophy should turn back to ontological speculation again, pace Leibniz, pace Decartes, pace Medievalists, pace Stoics, pace Aristotle, pace Plato, etc. They do not like this "critical turn" of epistemology limiting speculation, so to say. — schopenhauer1

I am having a hard time deciphering this. As I said in my initial post, I am not familiar with Speculative Realism. If you explained it, I missed it. "They" (I assume you mean the speculative realists) reject Kantian philosophy and want to return to ontological speculation, but then you say they also disagree ("pace") with Leibniz, Descartes, Medievalists, Stoics, Aristotle, and Plato. Perhaps you mean in accord with rather than politely disagree with?

The term ontological speculation is too broad for me to comment in general. It has a variety of meanings ranging from Aristotle's being qua being, to questions about God, to necessary and contingent beings, to universals, to hierarchies, to questions about physical objects, imaginary objects, and so on. Then there are questions about the activity and constraints on speculation.

It is our agreed upon, that is, shared or common, form of life that is the scaffolding. Our agreed upon definitions and judgments are part of our form of life. It is not simply that we share the same opinions, but that both our agreement and disagreement regarding opinions rests on our form of life. And this means, in part, not only that we agree on the definition of a meter but that there is a certain constancy of results when we measure. When the woodworker measures the length of a board it is not first one meter then two or three. It is not human agreement that determines that the length of the board does not change, but we agree when we say that it is true that it does not change. — Fooloso4

Right. Or, as Wittgenstein expresses it:

...if things were quite different from what they actually are —– if there were, for instance, no characteristic expression of pain, of fear, of joy; if rule became exception, and exception rule; or if both became phenomena of roughly equal frequency —– our normal language-games would thereby lose their point. — The procedure of putting a lump of cheese on a balance and fixing the price by the turn of the scale would lose its point if it frequently happened that such lumps suddenly grew or shrank with no obvious cause. — PI 142

but then you say they also disagree ("pace") with Leibniz, Descartes, Medievalists, Stoics, Aristotle, and Plato. Perhaps you mean in accord with rather than politely disagree with? — Fooloso4

No I meant the opposite, that those philosophers speculative philosophers.

This lecture by a speculative realist philosopher, Graham Harmon does a pretty good job explaining explaining speculative realism. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hK-5XOwraQo&list=PLttdsDToT81-Do8-J0iKiMwnT6fOgzYzM&index=5

I don't understand the meaning of your question. — Luke

I am not asking for justification or certainty, but to look at the idea that there are facts that we derived from experience, that we can perceive of the world, but also indicates something characteristic about the world and not the mind's interpretation of it perhaps. In other words, ontology.

Wittgenstein brings up a good point about the fact that we already assume a position by using certain tools and language-games. We have certain tendencies of human nature that can't really be disputed without going outside of common sense. Beyond this framework, there are the mutable language-games transforming our foundational common sense notions into the stuff of our projects and ways of life. Science is just one of these, used for a purpose in a community. Things in-themselves, can never exist then, so we can never make a statement about ontology, just human nature.

But does use itself tell us about an ontology of sorts? Is it merely contingent that humans have the common sense that we do? Evolution works contingently, but the rules themselves don't necessarily change with contingent circumstances. It will still be the case, that the species shaped by evolution may have echoes of what is the case in reality. Perhaps it was the necessary qualities of human epistemology that lead to and are connected with understanding the necessary qualities of ontology that shaped it. It is the anthropic principle on steroids here. Humans cannot help but understand the universe being what humans have been shaped by. It is the scientific and manifest images of Sellars combined.

Of course, then you have completely opposite points of view of someone like Meillasoux, Harmon, Brassier, and others who have ideas of a world foreign to human understanding yet real in their own sense. Harmon's is a bit more straightforward- he brings back the occasionalist idea that objects are withdrawn from each other but interact in some vicarious object that allows them to interact. Usually, these sorts of non-anthropomorphic realisms end up circling into themselves vis-a-vis panpsychism as objects have their own experience-ness that is beyond human experienceness but then also explains human experienceness.

The thing is that we could have the same predictive ability and technology with very different language-games. It is a matter of convention whether we consider that there is such a thing as atoms and subatomic particles or not, we could explain observations differently. Rather than saying "we observe such result because electrons were deflected by the magnetic field", we could say "we observe such result when we heat a metal surface in a vacuum tube and there is a magnet nearby". — leo

True, but that is more about the nature of science. It is more the inferencing factor that is not so contingent.

To create his masterpiece furniture the carpenter would be implicitly applying his theories of how his tools work and how wood behaves in various situations, he just wouldn't call them theories because he would have internalized all that from his experience, each of his past experience with wood being experiments he carried out, from which he inferred generalities and expectations and predictions. Which is what scientists do, they carry out experiments, they infer generalities, expectations, predictions, and they share their results with one another. — leo

Right, that inferencing thing again. Scientists are turning it on principles of the world itself though, not just "for us" objects like furniture.

The difficult question is how much of what we see is a convention? There are plenty of so-called optical illusions, where we see different things depending on our state of mind. Plenty of examples of so-called shared delusions, where something seen by an individual becomes seen by a few other people, while others don't see it and interpret it as a delusion. But then if that "delusion" spread to everyone it would become reality, and then how do we know we're not living in a shared "delusion", how do we know how much of nature is man-made, how much it is not nature imposing constraints on us but ourselves imposing constraints on ourselves? — leo

It could be a shared delusion, but perhaps that things "work" is saying something about the world. A persistent delusion that inferences about the world in such a way that it is useful, and not just some chaotic mess, may tell us something.

I am not asking for justification or certainty, but to look at the idea that there are facts that we derived from experience, that we can perceive of the world, but also indicates something characteristic about the world and not the mind's interpretation of it perhaps. In other words, ontology. — schopenhauer1

How would you ever know? What comparison can you make in order to determine this? You can't compare our mind-dependent concepts to the mind-independent world-in-itself and say "we got pretty close that time". Hence the Wittgenstein quote I posted:

"But does it [an hypothesis] certainly agree with reality, with the facts? — With this question you are already going round in a circle."

The best that we can do or know, from within our all too human language-games, is "if everything speaks for an hypothesis and nothing against it". At least, that's my reading of it.

Ew, ew, ew. Why is anybody here talking about 'mind' independence (or dependence) in relation to Witty? As if one of the virtues of Witty's work were not to undo the very idea of such a lame distinction.

Why is anybody here talking about 'mind' independence (or dependence) in relation to Witty? — StreetlightX

To dismiss the notion.

I hope so. The next step would be to dismantle the equally silly distinction between ontology and epistemology that's supposed to apply to Wittgenstein here as well.

I am not asking for justification or certainty, but to look at the idea that there are facts that we derived from experience, that we can perceive of the world, but also indicates something characteristic about the world and not the mind's interpretation of it perhaps. In other words, ontology. — schopenhauer1

This is otherwise known as the tinted glass analogy. If the glass through which I look at the world is tinted, it will affect the way the world appears to me. Since all human beings have a similar composition we cannot avoid the problem by comparing with one another. Comparison actually shows significant difference, and confirms that the glass is tinted. The resolution is to just forget about understanding "the world", "ontology" and such, and focus directly on the glass itself. Until we completely understand the lens through which we view "the world" (and this for Wittgenstein is language), it is pointless to speculate about "the world", because we have no way of knowing what the lens adds, or takes away from 'the world".

Wittgenstein brings up a good point about the fact that we already assume a position by using certain tools and language-games. We have certain tendencies of human nature that can't really be disputed without going outside of common sense. Beyond this framework, there are the mutable language-games transforming our foundational common sense notions into the stuff of our projects and ways of life. Science is just one of these, used for a purpose in a community. Things in-themselves, can never exist then, so we can never make a statement about ontology, just human nature. — schopenhauer1

You need to respect the dual purpose of language which I described above. Language may be used for describing things and understanding "the world", but it is also used for communion. These two are distinct and not necessarily compatible. If the prior, principal, or fundamental use of language is communion, then the evolutionary forces which have shaped language to be useful for this purpose, may have rendered it not so useful for that other purpose. This very aspect of language, that it may be shaped by competing purposes, makes it extremely difficult to understand. For instance, it has the capacity to express any purpose, so that I can tell you my purpose, and you can tell me yours, thus communication is enabled, but also it may be shaped towards one particular purpose (describing 'the world' for example). Notice though, that under this description, shaping language for a particular purpose is unnatural in the sense of creating an artificial language.

It will still be the case, that the species shaped by evolution may have echoes of what is the case in reality. Perhaps it was the necessary qualities of human epistemology that lead to and are connected with understanding the necessary qualities of ontology that shaped it. — schopenhauer1

You display a huge problem here. You jump from "may have echoes of what is really the case", to 'the necessary qualities of ontology that shaped it". Do you recognize a problem with concluding necessity from a premise of probability? Suppose that the lens through which we apprehend "the world" consistently provides us with probabilities, and never provides us with necessities. Why would you start with an ontological premise of necessity, such as, there is necessarily something which shaped the lens? Since we cannot get beyond probability we must consider the possibility that the lens shaped itself. And until this is answered, there is the possibility that something extra-worldly shaped the lens, and so we have all sorts of possible ontologies like many-worlds and computer simulations etc.. We'd better just focus on the lens itself and not speculate about "the world" which you believe we are looking at through the lens.

I find Wittgenstein's examples of such irregularities interesting because he does not claim that such improbable things are impossible. From On Certainty:

505. It is always by favour of Nature that one knows something.

508. What can I rely on?

509. I really want to say that a language-game is only possible if one trusts something (I did not say "can trust something").

And from Philosophical Investigations:

84. But that is not to say that we are in doubt because it is possible for us to imagine a doubt. I can easily imagine someone always doubting before he opened his front door whether an abyss did not yawn behind it, and making sure about it before he went through the door (and he might on some occasion prove to be right) a but for all that, I do not doubt in such a case.

Ew, ew, ew. Why is anybody here talking about 'mind' independence (or dependence) in relation to Witty? As if one of the virtues of Witty's work were not to undo the very idea of such a lame distinction. — StreetlightX

So I'm positive if I look back on these forums, I have seen you mention something about speculative realism. What is your take when compared to Witty's critiques? Is the whole SR adventure a big misadventure in your view? I take their critique of Kant to apply just as much to Wittgenstein.

Also, @fdrake I know you have mentioned speculative realism. Can you elucidate on this view, and how it matches up with Witty's critique, or vice versa?

The best that we can do or know, from within our all too human language-games, is "if everything speaks for an hypothesis and nothing against it". At least, that's my reading of it. — Luke

Yes we can never get outside our human perspective. some SR think that objects interact in many ways that are not necessarily knowable to the human, but can perhaps be gleaned at through human lens.

I think, if people have time, they should watch this video of an actual SR philosopher, Graham Harman so that we can be somewhat on the same page as to what we are discussing. Feel free to skip through if you can only watch a little.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hK-5XOwraQo&list=PLttdsDToT81-Do8-J0iKiMwnT6fOgzYzM&index=5