Lol when someone calls Witty an empricist what is one to do but throw one's hands up and laugh; "The limit of the empirical -- is concept formation" (RFM). And all of Witty is an exploration of how concepts take hold; an exploration of the limits of empiricism. It'd be like if one were to call Plato a materialist. How much more idiotically off-base can one get? — StreetlightX

Here is something for you, and I'm going to keep this very broad for a reason- what is Schopenhauer's conception of Will to you and to Witty (or how you conceive Witty to have thought of it based on his philosophy)?

What do the issues of existential "radical freedom", suffering (specific cases and the general idea of human suffering), and Camus' idea of Sisyphus' mean to Witty and yourself? Are they just nonsensical? Are they valid in its context-dependency? Are they something which should not be spoken? Simply poetry? Saying something about the world? What would saying anything about the world mean to Witty and yourself? You can answer with Tractatus, PI, both, none, your own thing, I don't care. I'd like to see constructive statements rather than scoffery. But scoffery about being called out on scoffery does not negate the scoffery for you (sad face). Heaping piles of scoffery just add to it unfortunately.

I take schopenhauer1's point to be that the limits of Wittgenstein's philosophical inquiry should not mark the limits of philosophy. — Fooloso4

Sure, but what strikes me as absurd is that the admission of the limits of Wittgenstein's inquiries are then called upon as a critique of them; as if one were to say: "what I say does not apply to X"; only to be responded with: "Ha, look! What you say does not apply to X!, therefore, what you say has nothing to say about X!"; To which one can only reply: of course you fucking imbecile.

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I've nothing to say about Witty and Schopenhauer as their relation doesn't interest me. I do recall a well known remark by Witty on Schop though, though I mention it only for trivia's sake, and I make nothing philosophical of it: "One could call Schopenhauer an altogether crude mind. I.e., he does have refinement, but at a certain level this suddenly comes to an end and he is as crude as the crudest. Where real depth starts, his finishes." (Witty, Culture and Value)

In other words, is all epistemology or is there ever room for accounting for an ontology? — schopenhauer1

Can we separate ontology and epistemology? If I make ontological claims, you will want me to justify them. But it's hard to imagine justifying anything without some things. And kind of system has to be in place for us to talk epistemology or ontology? What do we assume (though not clearly or consciously) in order to debate anything theoretical? In this case at least that we share in the meaning well enough of 'ontology' and 'epistemology' in this living context.

"A is a physical object" is a piece of instruction which we give only to someone who doesn't yet understand either what "A" means, or what "physical object" means. Thus it is instruction about the use of words, and "physical object" is a logical concept. (Like colour, quantity,...) And that is why no such proposition as: "There are physical objects" can be formulated.
...,
It is quite sure that motor cars don't grow out of the earth. We feel that if someone could
believe the contrary he could believe everything that we say is untrue, and could question
everything that we hold to be sure.

But how does this one belief hang together with all the rest?

We should like to say that someone who could believe that does not accept our whole system of verification.

This system is something that a human being acquires by means of observation and instruction. I intentionally do not say "learns."
...

If my name is not L.W., how can I rely on what is meant by "true" and "false"?

If something happened (such as someone telling me something) calculated to make me
doubtful of my own name, there would certainly also be something that made the grounds of these doubts themselves seem doubtful, and I could therefore decide to retain my old belief.
...
Admittedly, if you are obeying the order "Bring me a book", you may have to check whether
the thing you see over there really is a book, but then you do at least know what people mean by a "book"; and if you don't you can look it up, - but then you must know what some other word means.

And the fact that a word means such-and-such, is used in such-and-such a way, is in turn an
empirical fact, like the fact that what you see over there is a book.

Therefore, in order for you to be able to carry out an order there must be some empirical fact about which you are not in doubt. Doubt itself rests only on what is beyond doubt.
...
"If my memory deceives me here it can deceive me everywhere."

If I don't know that, how do I know if my words mean what I believe they mean?

"If this deceives me, what does 'deceive' mean any more?"

What can I rely on?

I really want to say that a language-game is only possible if one trusts something
(I did not say "can trust something"). — On Certainty

Yes, I never stated nor believe Wittgenstein's whole project should be discounted. ... These are all jargony terms and have to be clarified in their contexts. I don't believe every jargony term is senseless. It has their uses. — schopenhauer1

Just to be clear, I wasn't reading you as anti-Wittgenstein.

Also I'm not anti-jargon in general. Jargon is just one of those things that can go wrong. Seems to me like a question of targeting. What is important? What is secondary? Is anything really being said? Is it being dressed up to look more difficult and novel than it is?

I'm reading Metaphors We Live By (Lakoff). It's great. Lakoff doesn't connect what he's saying to the philosophers he reminds me of, but the book is philosophy in its ambition and content. It's like Heidegger w/o a trace of the questionable style. It's not that jargony philosophy hasn't been great. It's just impressive when someone can employ the words already at hand. It's like they are resisting the urge to sign everything.

In my opinion, Wittgenstein wanted to use the word "grammar" to refer to the pre-theoretical, intuitive, ineffable and phenomenological aspects of meaning - but found himself unable to do so — sime

I agree, except he succeeded well enough for you to grasp what he was aiming at.