First Virgo, thanks for arguing with me. I appreciate that you do not get ruffled and frustrated in these discussions...but I still don't agree :smile:

Because ‘ownership’ is not per se aggressive.
— Virgo Avalytikh

Haha. Because 'trespassing' is not per se aggressive? (I am just standing there). I get that that libertarians would respond: — ZhouBoTong

No, trespassing is aggressive, and prohibited under the NAP. Notice that ‘trespass’ presupposes property rights. I am trespassing on someone’s land because it is their land. If the land were unowned, or owned by me, it would not be trespass. This is actually rather a tidy illustration of what I have just argued. — Virgo Avalytikh

ok? I can play it that way too:

Because ‘ownership’ is not per se aggressive. — Virgo Avalytikh

No, ownership is aggressive, and prohibited under my understanding of the NAP (you use 'the NAP' like that means the same thing to everyone). Notice that 'ownership' presupposes property rights. Someone 'owns' the land, because there is a power that allows them to hold onto it. If land cannot be 'owned', then one cannot 'trespass'. This is actually a rather tidy illustration of what I have been arguing the whole time.

No, ownership is aggressive, and prohibited under my understanding of the NAP (you use 'the NAP' like that means the same thing to everyone). Notice that 'ownership' presupposes property rights. Someone 'owns' the land, because there is a power that allows them to hold onto it. If land cannot be 'owned', then one cannot 'trespass'. This is actually a rather tidy illustration of what I have been arguing the whole time. — ZhouBoTong

I use the NAP as I have defined it, and consonantly with how libertarians in general define it. There is some dispute over who coined the term; it was either Ayn Rand or Murray Rothbard. But they both define it the same way. The NAP is a libertarian principle. If you want to know what it means, you go ad fontes.

This is Murray Rothbard:

The libertarian creed rests upon one central axiom: that no man or group of men may aggress against the person or property of anyone else. This may be called the “nonaggression axiom.” “Aggression” is defined as the initiation of the use or threat of physical violence against the person or property of anyone else. Aggression is therefore synonymous with invasion.

And the encyclopedia of libertarianism:

The libertarian creed rests upon one central axiom: that no man or group of men may aggress against the person or property of anyone else. This may be called the “nonaggression axiom.” “Aggression” is defined as the initiation of the use or threat of physical violence against the person or property of anyone else. Aggression is therefore synonymous with invasion.

You have every right to define any term how you wish. But we are discussing libertarianism, so I have defined it as libertarians define it. That's not to say that there aren't alternative and competing definitions (though, I have not encountered such a thing). They are just a red herring.

If you take issue with my thesis that voluntary trade works for mutual benefit, then what I would expect you to do is to provide a counter-instance. But the example you have given actually isn’t. If you trade away a house for a loaf of bread, it is because you value the loaf of bread more than you value the house. You are better off for having made the trade rather than not having made it. This is perfectly compatible with what I have argued. — Virgo Avalytikh

This is frankly absurd. You're not "better off" if you sell your house for a loaf of bread. The next day, you will be hungry and homeless. Being "better off" requires your objective material situation to improve. Using it to mean simply "you gain something that you currently value" is a sleight of hand and turns your argument circular again. What you're actually saying is "if you engage in peaceful trade, you will receive whatever you trade for" which is trivially true but also completely meaningless in the context of this topic.

Claiming that situational value is the same as overall well-being is simply false. Your argument rests on overall well-being, not on situational value.

This analysis is true, but makes no claim to comprehensiveness. Being in the position of having to sell one’s house for bread is regrettable, but I would simply say this of it: if you want to help the poor, what you certainly should not do is look at the option that they have actually chosen, and deprive them of that option (advice from which a good many legislators would benefit). — Virgo Avalytikh

You're also not making the poor "better off" by leaving things as they are, so this comment is irrelevant to the topic.

Fraud (and misinformation, if it be relevantly fraudulent) is prohibited under the NAP (it is really just a form of theft). As for addiction and brand loyalty, these are not counter-instances to my thesis, either. The addict who pays for heroin values the heroin more than the money. — Virgo Avalytikh

It is nevertheless blindingly obvious that no-one is "better off" by trading their money for heroin that they intend to consume themselves. In case you are unaware, these kinds of addictions destroy lives and kill people. No-one is better off dead.

Just so with the brand-loyalist, and the particular brand of something (heroin?) to which he is eccentrically attached. Value is a subjective relation; different people value different things differently (trade could not occur except on this basis). You might think that my commercial decisions are poor, but you aren’t the one making them. — Virgo Avalytikh

Value is subjective, being "better-off", i.e. material well-being is not. Your argument requires the latter, not the former.

It is perhaps worth clarifying: when I speak of mutual benefit, I am speaking from an ex ante rather than ex post perspective (this is an important distinction when trying to understand the rationality axiom in Austrian economics). Voluntary trade is mutually beneficial because we both enter into a transaction with the anticipation of personal benefit. It is possible that our preferences may change after the transaction and we regret our decisions. — Virgo Avalytikh

The problem doesn't lie with ex-ante and ex-post. Buying heroin to fuel your addiction is not good for you from an ex-ante position either. If you sell your house for a loaf of bread, it's clear ex-ante that your material wealth will decrease sharply.

Why ‘no ground to stand on’? There would be rights-enforcement and dispute-resolution services in a voluntary society; they would simply be private competing firms rather than an agency of monopolistic coercion. The question ‘Where does negligible pollution end and meaningful damage to property begin?’ is a difficult question, but not for distinctively libertarian reasons. Whatever answer one gives is no more or less arbitrary in a Stateless or Statist society. Practically, it would be determined by whichever arbitrator settles a dispute if it came to it. Any court – Statist or private – must draw the line, and that line will no doubt disappoint some people. So this isn’t a ‘libertarian’ problem.

However, a virtue of the private justice system is that it is polylegal. It may be that A and B take their dispute to one arbitrator, and A and C take their dispute to a different arbitrator. ‘Law’ is simply a function of dispute-resolution administered by the arbitrator. So there is no need for a ‘one size fits all’ solution. Multiple crossing lines of legal rules may apply over a single territory, which is of course far more conducive to the satisfaction of justice-consumers than a single set of legal rules being imposed uniformly over an arbitrary territory. — Virgo Avalytikh

There'd be no ground to stand on because there'd be no principles to apply. You need a starting point, some moral order that provides the axioms of the particular resolution. Usually, these are provided by constitutions or similarly central ideas, like environmentalism. Alternative dispute resolution mostly relies on the actors operating in some specific framework, like a business relationship, which had identifiable goals and overlapping interests. But what is supposed to provide this basis in the pollution example? How do you even start to formulate a rule?

This is true enough. But the observations I made about private property, communal property and the State, and their relative tendencies towards market failures, are true regardless of scale (though, the problems associated with communal property and the State become more and more prevalent as the scale increases). — Virgo Avalytikh

This is simply another claim.

An ‘idea’ does not have agency. If the State is nothing more than an ‘idea’ then it cannot engage in concrete instances of purposeful action. ‘Ideas’ cannot tax, or implement justice, let alone bestow rights. The things we refer to as States are human associations, (the members of) which act in ways that are impermissible for non-States. I still do not see what is supposed to be so special about a State that it has unique right-bestowing capabilities. This has not been made clear at all. — Virgo Avalytikh

There is nothing "unique" about a state. It's just an actually existing human association that serves as the necessary higher order to grant rights and is able to enforce them. You were the one that made this about states, specifically. My argument is that rights need to be granted by some higher order.

I’m sorry, I’m not being difficult. I just really don’t understand what you’re getting at here. — Virgo Avalytikh

The difference between rights and interests,very simply put, is that your interest is what you want, and your right is what you deserve. If you are going to pay someone to enforce, you'd pay them to get what you want, not what you deserve.

This is frankly absurd. You're not "better off" if you sell your house for a loaf of bread. The next day, you will be hungry and homeless. Being "better off" requires your objective material situation to improve. Using it to mean simply "you gain something that you currently value" is a sleight of hand and turns your argument circular again. What you're actually saying is "if you engage in peaceful trade, you will receive whatever you trade for" which is trivially true but also completely meaningless in the context of this topic.

Claiming that situational value is the same as overall well-being is simply false. Your argument rests on overall well-being, not on situational value. — Echarmion

Who are you to say that they are worse off for making the trade? Why are they doing it, if they do not value the bread more than they value the house? I am not saying it is a prudent decision. I couldn’t imagine doing it. But I couldn’t imagine paying for all sorts of things that other people pay for. If a person trades away their house for a loaf of bread, it is because they value the bread more than the house. This is a self-evident praxeological reality.

Value is subjective, not objective. Value does not ‘inhere’ within the material substance of an object, like a physical quality. You cannot deduce the ‘value’ of an object from examining or dissecting it, as you could its mass or its chemical composition. It is a subjective relation, between (valuing) subject and (valued) object. It is a psychic phenomenon. As such, it varies from person to person, and (importantly here) from moment to moment. The only definitive measure of the ‘value’ of something is: how many units of some other resource is a person willing to part with in order to attain it? And this may change. As such, there is no such thing as value simpliciter. There is only value to a particular person at a particular moment.

Since value is a subjective praxeological phenomenon which determines that individuals will pursue this purposeful action rather than that one, the mutual benefit which results from voluntary trade is one that is ex ante, rather than ex post. Now, it is also true that there is a general tendency to ex post benefit, since, as I have argued, individual persons tend to be the best judges of their own affairs, but this is more of a tendency than a praxeological axiom.

The problem doesn't lie with ex-ante and ex-post. Buying heroin to fuel your addiction is not good for you from an ex-ante position either. If you sell your house for a loaf of bread, it's clear ex-ante that your material wealth will decrease sharply. — Echarmion

This is simply paternalism. Do I think that taking heroin is a poor life decision? I certainly do. I think that paying hundreds of dollars (or equivalent) on vacations abroad is a poor decision. I think that eating at Macdonalds (ever!) is a poor decision. Other people might think that paying for an expensive degree is a poor decision. There might be a ‘right’ answer here, or there might not be. I’m not sure. But I have the humility to recognise that I don’t know what is best for other people. And even if I think that I do, I could very well be wrong. Reasoned humility is the essence of the libertarian position; it is precisely that which makes liberty important. My life is my business, and your life is yours. If someone wants to take heroin, I might make a private judgement about them, but it would be presumptuous for me to prohibit them from doing so. The right to self-determination implies a right to self-destruction.

Suppose that we agree that people sometimes do make decisions which make themselves worse off. What is the Statist solution? Preventing people who are in desperate situations from taking the decisions which they actually choose?

There'd be no ground to stand on because there'd be no principles to apply. You need a starting point, some moral order that provides the axioms of the particular resolution. Usually, these are provided by constitutions or similarly central ideas, like environmentalism. Alternative dispute resolution mostly relies on the actors operating in some specific framework, like a business relationship, which had identifiable goals and overlapping interests. But what is supposed to provide this basis in the pollution example? How do you even start to formulate a rule? — Echarmion

I don’t see how this has a bearing on the libertarianism/Statism discussion, for a number of reasons. Libertarianism does have principles to apply; the ones I have mentioned. To be sure, these principles do not yield a specific resolution to the question of precisely where negligible pollution drifts into meaningful damage to property, but neither does any constitution that I know of, nor a general commitment to ‘environmentalism’. Formulating a non-arbitrary resolution to such a dispute is no less difficult for a State’s judicial system.

One option available to a private arbitrator, in distinction from the Statist alternative, is to engage in market research so as to determine what kind of service justice-consumers are prepared to pay for. The profit-and-loss system provides a reasonable (though shifting) basis upon which arbitrators may make non-arbitrary decisions regarding what kind of penalties to administer. This is actually a really complex topic in the economics of law, and David Friedman is virtually the only person who works with the concept of economically efficient law, so if you are interested to explore how the nut and bolts of such a system would work, please do look at ‘The Machinery of Freedom’.

There is nothing "unique" about a state. It's just an actually existing human association that serves as the necessary higher order to grant rights and is able to enforce them. You were the one that made this about states, specifically. My argument is that rights need to be granted by some higher order. — Echarmion

If there is nothing unique or special about a State, then there is nothing ‘higher order’ about it, which might afford it unique rights-bestowing prerogatives. I have long-since agreed that rights are higher-order in the sense that they are principles, and therefore abstractions. If we can also agree that such does not imply or require a State then I am happy to move on from this.

The difference between rights and interests,very simply put, is that your interest is what you want, and your right is what you deserve. If you are going to pay someone to enforce, you'd pay them to get what you want, not what you deserve. — Echarmion

Fine, I already allowed that it is possible for interest-enforcing services to exist even if they violate rights (I used the example of assassins). But, also, rights-enforcing services can exist independently of a State. That is all I mean to argue.

The NAP is a libertarian principle. If you want to know what it means, you go ad fontes. — Virgo Avalytikh

Fair enough. But libertarians use the term with people who are not libertarian and expect them to arrive at the same meaning.

But we are discussing libertarianism, so I have defined it as libertarians define it. — Virgo Avalytikh

And I am pointing out reasons why people who are not libertarian will not accept that definition (will not agree with the principle is perhaps more accurate). We are discussing the merits of libertarianism and most of the people in the discussion are not libertarian....if we were a bunch of libertarians hashing out the minutia of libertarianism then it would make sense to just throw that term around. But otherwise, the NAP is one of the main components of libertarianism that opponents of libertarianism disagree with (despite us all agreeing that not initiating violence is generally a good thing)...it is problematic to state it as a given.

Yes, it may, must and would be enforced. The important point to note here is that the NAP applies equally to everyone, everyone should be subject to it, and anyone should be able to enforce it. But the State is an aggressor, which reserves for itself (coercively) monopolistic privileges. This is where the difference lies. It violates the NAP, and uses force to reserve for itself the monopolistic privilege to do so. - What is more, 'limited government' is utopian. Once a government exists, its growth is inevitable. — Virgo Avalytikh

Coercive aggressor, which has an inevitable growth and 'limited government' is utopian?

And then you say

I don’t ‘hate’ the State

:smile:

Well, this seems not to be an economic debate, but simply an ideological debate where you put the NAP on a pedestal and treat it as a religious icon.

I've noticed that discourse nowdays tends to go in the way of a religious mantra. The state, central banks, large corporations, the free market all seem to become these incarnations of evil, just depending on what side you are (or sometimes on both sides). In the Soviet socialist bloc there was a perfect word for this. It was called a "lithurgy". All the correct words and endless nonsensical chatter without any true meaning. But it sounded politically correct (in the right circles).

Have you by the way ever read Max Weber?

Because your idea that "anyone should be able to enforce it" goes along the lines of Weber's thinking, and the most important issue is that the people accept the monopoly of violence, and this monopoly violence isn't only of the state. I agree with Weber in many cases and think he's one of the smartest philosophers/thinkers around in the late 19th Century early 20th Century (if you can depict him in that way).

The term 'aggression' is not as important as the concept it designates. The most important thing is for us to be clear on how we are using it. Libertarians are clear in how they use it (as per the citations I posted above). You may well observe that 'aggression' has alternative uses in other contexts. But this is a purely semantic observation, rather than bearing any real philosophical substance.

Coercive aggressor, which has an inevitable growth and 'limited government' is utopian? — ssu

I said the concept of ‘limited government’ is utopian. My point is that a State with clearly circumscribed limits remaining within those limits in perpetuity is too much to reasonably hope for. The usual ‘checks and balances’ to which apologists for the State typically make appeal (the democratic process, the separation of powers, a written constitution) are not up to the task.

Well, this seems not to be an economic debate, but simply an ideological debate where you put the NAP on a pedestal and treat it as a religious icon.

I've noticed that discourse nowdays tends to go in the way of a religious mantra. The state, central banks, large corporations, the free market all seem to become these incarnations of evil, just depending on what side you are (or sometimes on both sides). In the Soviet socialist bloc there was a perfect word for this. It was called a "lithurgy". All the correct words and endless nonsensical chatter without any true meaning. But it sounded politically correct (in the right circles). — ssu

It is a philosophical and praxeological/economic debate, at least for me. I oppose the State because it is an aggressor, and there is no non-arbitrary reason why this particular human association should be able to use force in such a way that would be impermissible for any other agent. This isn’t hatred, I haven’t used words like ‘evil’ or anything with religious connotations. I aim simply at philosophical consistency.

Have you by the way ever read Max Weber? — ssu

I certainly have.

Who are you to say that they are worse off for making the trade? — Virgo Avalytikh

Those are simply the economic facts. Their wealth decreased, their ability to make future decisions decreased, their comfort decreased etc. Are you claiming there is no such thing as economic facts? That it's all just opions? Because in that case I think any philosophy of economics just implodes.

Why are they doing it, if they do not value the bread more than they value the house? I am not saying it is a prudent decision. I couldn’t imagine doing it. But I couldn’t imagine paying for all sorts of things that other people pay for. If a person trades away their house for a loaf of bread, it is because they value the bread more than the house. This is a self-evident praxeological reality. — Virgo Avalytikh

This is simply a self evident truism. Circular reasoning in it's purest form. It tells us nothing at all.

alue is subjective, not objective. Value does not ‘inhere’ within the material substance of an object, like a physical quality. You cannot deduce the ‘value’ of an object from examining or dissecting it, as you could its mass or its chemical composition. It is a subjective relation, between (valuing) subject and (valued) object. It is a psychic phenomenon. As such, it varies from person to person, and (importantly here) from moment to moment. The only definitive measure of the ‘value’ of something is: how many units of some other resource is a person willing to part with in order to attain it? And this may change. As such, there is no such thing as value simpliciter. There is only value to a particular person at a particular moment. — Virgo Avalytikh

Obviously. But we weren't talking about subjective value. We were talking about how libertarianism supposedly makes everyone "better off". In order for that claim to mean anything, it must refer to some kind of measurable state of affairs.

Since value is a subjective praxeological phenomenon which determines that individuals will pursue this purposeful action rather than that one, the mutual benefit which results from voluntary trade is one that is ex ante, rather than ex post. Now, it is also true that there is a general tendency to ex post benefit, since, as I have argued, individual persons tend to be the best judges of their own affairs, but this is more of a tendency than a praxeological axiom. — Virgo Avalytikh

I still have no idea what you think ex-ante and ex-post have to do with this. This would only be relevant if we were talking about how predictable the outcomes where, but we are not.

This is simply paternalism. Do I think that taking heroin is a poor life decision? I certainly do. I think that paying hundreds of dollars (or equivalent) on vacations abroad is a poor decision. I think that eating at Macdonalds (ever!) is a poor decision. Other people might think that paying for an expensive degree is a poor decision. There might be a ‘right’ answer here, or there might not be. I’m not sure. But I have the humility to recognise that I don’t know what is best for other people. And even if I think that I do, I could very well be wrong. Reasoned humility is the essence of the libertarian position; it is precisely that which makes liberty important. My life is my business, and your life is yours. If someone wants to take heroin, I might make a private judgement about them, but it would be presumptuous for me to prohibit them from doing so. The right to self-determination implies a right to self-destruction. — Virgo Avalytikh

This is not about poor life decisions. It's a scientific fact that Heroin is addictive and highly dangerous. Objectively, if you are taking Heroin, you are killing yourself, regardless of whether or not you think doing so is a good idea. This is not about what should or should not be legal or criminal. This is about whether or not you're "better off" if you take Heroin, and you very obiously are not. The talking point about self-determination is irrelevant.

Suppose that we agree that people sometimes do make decisions which make themselves worse off. What is the Statist solution? Preventing people who are in desperate situations from taking the decisions which they actually choose? — Virgo Avalytikh

No, the statist solution is preventing desperate situations.

I don’t see how this has a bearing on the libertarianism/Statism discussion, for a number of reasons. Libertarianism does have principles to apply; the ones I have mentioned. To be sure, these principles do not yield a specific resolution to the question of precisely where negligible pollution drifts into meaningful damage to property, but neither does any constitution that I know of, nor a general commitment to ‘environmentalism’. Formulating a non-arbitrary resolution to such a dispute is no less difficult for a State’s judicial system. — Virgo Avalytikh

The way judges get to decisions is complex, but a lot of it has to do with the system they envision themselves upholding. Obviously the principles do not yield concrete solutions. But they tell the brains of people how to value things, and that ultimately leads to a decision. Since the LIbertarian principles are all about letting self-interest decide things, they would not provide sufficient ground to make value judgements.

I said the concept of ‘limited government’ is utopian. My point is that a State with clearly circumscribed limits remaining within those limits in perpetuity is too much to reasonably hope for. The usual ‘checks and balances’ to which apologists for the State typically make appeal (the democratic process, the separation of powers, a written constitution) are not up to the task. — Virgo Avalytikh

When you don't have absolutely any example of the ideal state of the society (the non-state libertarian paradise) which you model and every state ever is too suffocating for you, isn't that idealism?

I've always seen libertarians as good and rather harmless people. Because in reality their society or state likely closest to their ideals would be a huge disappointment for... the libertarians. Social Democrats would enjoy very much a classic liberal state. What better environment for a social activist than a society with a functioning healthy economy and prosperity?

Let's face it, the society where Virgo Avalytikh would confine every one else here participating in this debate into a "re-education camp" where starting from the morning to the night the libertarian creed and NAP would be taught to us to mold us into true believers of libertarian values is simply an oxymoron.

Now totally oxymoronic societies can perhaps exist, but this case I find very unlikely.

But this is a purely semantic observation, rather than bearing any real philosophical substance. — Virgo Avalytikh

how do our examples we have discussed NOT show that this semantic problem does indeed have philosophical implications? (I think trespassing is wholly non-violent - you think it is a definite example that violates the NAP - have you shown me I am wrong? or just pointed out that according to your definition, you are right?)

There's a salient difference between theft and murder. In the case of the former, some form of compensation, or even restitution, is possible. In the case of the latter, it's plainly not. — Constrained Maximizer

For thousands of years revenge was compensation. The concept has rightly been mostly rejected in modern society, but there are all sorts of things that one whose loved one was killed might consider 'compensation'. You are thinking direct, like for like, compensation. That doesn't need to be the only type.

If my grandfather was a murderer, I may not justifiably lose my own life. — Constrained Maximizer

No but maybe the property you inherited can be given to the descendants of the person your grandpa killed. It doesn't entirely compensate, but it does compensate. Considering murder is worse than theft, shouldn't this be the minimal compensation in that example?

Regarding "aggressive marketing campaigns", I have to confess that I am having a hard time grasping just what in the world the argument is supposed to be. Yes, things can be colloquially described as "aggressive". No, that doesn't mean that they are aggressive in the philosophically relevant sense. One might as well accuse libertarians of illicitly "changing the language!" because the libertarian principle doesn't prohibit "passive-aggressive behavior" and doesn't compel us to be particularly kind to our fellows. — Constrained Maximizer

I just think they used poor judgement in their word choice. When I hear, non-aggression, I do not think non-violent except for self defense. And this semantic problem highlights libertarians blindness to other instances of aggression.

There are few problems with this. — Virgo Avalytikh

That's good, few problems is good, many problems is bad.

First, I would ask how much standardisation you believe to be necessary. Must it be absolute? — Virgo Avalytikh

Clearly, "absolute" in standardization is impossible.

If two nation-States both believe themselves (or their citizens) to have some sort of rightful claim over a territory, by what higher standard do they resolve their dispute? There is none, and so, just as two individuals with competing conventions would break out into violence and the winner would be determined by arbitrary force, so too would the two nations break out into war and, once again, justice would be the advantage of the stronger. Even a multinational political union could only ever be a partial solution. In order for a State to do the work you need it do philosophically, there really can be only one of them, and its scale must be global. Anything short of that, and the standardisation problem which you seem to be levelling at the an-cap position is equally applicable to a Statist situation. — Virgo Avalytikh

I don't see that this is a good argument. Essentially you are arguing that if two nation-States come to war over an issue of territory rights, (like the Falklands Islands for example), this is no better than having all human beings acting like wild animals or very young children, running around fighting with each other over every single object which they seek to use. Notice that in the former case, the majority of people are living in peace for the majority of the time, with a few issues arising which might cause battles, while in the latter case, the majority of people are battling each other for the majority of the time. That is why I consider the former situation to be better than the latter.

If, on the other hand, the standardisation does not strictly have to be absolute, then there is no reason why a State is necessary at all to preserve and enforce it. Once we establish the precedent that a convention can exist and be enforced at something less than a global scale, there is no longer any in-principle reason why its enforcement can only be done by the kind of thing that a State is. This is especially the case since, as I have pointed out on a number of occasions, the services of rights-enforcement and dispute-resolution can be (and, to a significant extent, are) provided by private agencies. — Virgo Avalytikh

Again, this is a very bad argument. You've mentioned the possibility of "as many rights-conventions as there are individuals", but that's not really possible because a "convention" requires agreement amongst individuals. So the issue is not enforcing the convention, it is a matter of creating and maintaining agreement. This is done through the educational institutions, not enforcement. Enforcement is only for the few who step out of line of the laws. If we stop funding educational institutions because they are an expensive State-run enterprise, and educate in other fragmented ways, standardized conventions will be lost to a multiplicity of fragmented conventions.

You really cannot portray conventions as being enforced, because conventions are a matter of freely agreeing. This is why the existence of conventions relies on standardized education, not the use of force. When I say that the State upholds the conventions through the means of its institutions, there are many more institutions than the ones I mentioned.

Moreover, we ought not to underestimate the tendency of individuals to arrive at a spontaneous order in the absence of coercive institutions. — Virgo Avalytikh

You might refer to educational institutions as "coercive institutions", but if you call this aggression, I think it is outside the NAP definition, so I think that would be equivocation. Anyway, the idea of "spontaneous order" was disproven by science in its original form of "spontaneous generation", though some people have rejuvenated the idea as abiogenesis. Regardless of how you present it, "spontaneous order" is illogical and inconsistent with fundamental metaphysical principles. I think that what you call "the tendency of individuals to arrive at spontaneous order" is really mostly the result of standardized education.

Spontaneous order occurs because it is in individuals’ interests to enter into peaceful constant dealings with others, and it is private property and non-aggression which allows this to take place. And, while the integrity of such a system requires the means of enforcing one’s rights against aggressors, the very system of private property and non-aggression is capable of producing such services without violating anyone’s rights, by the standards of the system. — Virgo Avalytikh

Here you go, wandering around in your circle, lost. You have explained the conventions as coming into existence through "spontaneous order", and now you say that the system of private property along with non-aggression is capable of producing the spontaneous order. See the circle? The system of property rights is a convention, which you have said could come into existence through spontaneous order. However, you here say that having a system of property rights is a condition which is conducive to such a spontaneous order. The "circle" is always a problem with this illogical concept of "spontaneous order". The so-called "spontaneous" order only comes into existence under the right conditions, but "the right conditions" itself requires an ordering. This ordering, to create the necessary conditions, is actually created by the thing which is supposed to come into existence from the spontaneous order. So the claim of "spontaneous order" really just reflects a completely different, unobserved ordering at a deeper level which is not immediately evident. In any case, I'm really surprised that a person of your intelligence would suggest the ridiculous idea that a system of property rights could come into existence through spontaneous order. And I'm even more surprised that you would also say that a system of property rights would be the favourable condition for such spontaneous order to occur.

I think we've made substantial progress towards understanding each other, though it's a slow process. Let me see if I can summarize where we stand. I dismiss the NAP as a principle which could be applied in practise upon abolition of the State, because the NAP requires a system of rights, which is provided for by the institutions of the State. You have proposed that the conventions required for such a system could come into existence through spontaneous order. I think that conventions consist of freely made agreements, and that people must be cultured in a particular way to be agreeable with one another in order for such conventions to exist. And, I think that this way of culturing people is provided for by the institutions of the State.

I will add, that I think this culturing consists of two important parts. One is a demonstration of unity, people working together in cooperation which shows that agreement is good, in Christianity this is referred to as love. The other is the standardized principles which are taught in schools, these help us to see things in the same way, facilitating agreement. So we have two levels of conditions which facilitate agreement. First there is the deep level, this is a disposition to be friendly, helpful, caring and loving. This provides the person with an attitude that agreement is good, and inspires the person to be agreeable. The first level provides the foundation, the conditions by which the second level may come into existence. When people have the underlying disposition to be agreeable, they will agree to having things in common, like schools and other institutions which are mostly State-run, or follow principles provided by the State.

The system of rights, which the NAP presupposes, requires both levels of agreement. Notice that the second level of agreement, from which conventions like "rights" emerge, already requires agreement on having things in common, which emerges from the first level of agreement. Therefore any proposed system of rights, with any real applicability, must be based in a principle of having things in common. To base a system of rights in private ownership would undermine the foundation, (what is provided for by the first level, having things in common), leaving all conventions such as 'rights" which are derived from the second level, as untenable. Agreement on having things in common is necessary to any system of rights.

Since you seem not to see the significance of some of the concepts of which I have made use in this discussion (I don’t mean this in a condescending way, I’m just reading this off what you have said), let me restate the argument in more detail.

I have made the claim that voluntary trade works towards mutual benefit. This is true in at least two (related) senses. One of these senses corresponds to the perspective of entering into the trade in the first place (this is the ex ante perspective), and one of the senses corresponds to the perspective of having made the trade (ex post).

At any given moment, conscious agents are engaged in purposeful behaviour. Man acts. Action is motivated by purpose, by a desire or want, which we aim to achieve, even if such a purpose is not always at the forefront of our conscious awareness. Purposeful action may be distinguished from involuntary action, like a muscular spasm. There isn’t much to say about involuntary action, since we cannot (directly) control it, so I will just restrict myself to purposeful action. At any given moment, we have a multitude of wants, and these wants are, in a sense, in conflict with one another. My desire to take a sip from my coffee cup and my desire to type a message are in conflict, in the sense that they are both competing for my time. No doubt there are at least two activities which I could conceivably engage in simultaneously without compromising either, but the important point is that I cannot do everything I want; my wants are insatiable, and resources (time, attention, physical space) are scarce. This is the fundamental economic problem.

So why do I end up doing what I do? Because my wants exist in a hierarchy, and, at a given moment, I will always act in such a way that aims at realising my highest want. This is the doctrine of ‘demonstrated preferences’. And it is self-evident: it is senseless to speak of someone prioritising a ‘lesser’ want over a ‘greater’ want, for, if it is prioritised, it is not really the ‘lesser’ want at all. It stands to reason, then, that in a trade, we each act in such a way that aims to attain something we value more at the expense of something we value less.

This is axiomatically true (which, I assume, is why you have used words like ‘circular’ and ‘trivial’ to describe it). But, to say that something is trivially true implies that it is true. There would be no need to repeat the fact that it is true if no one ever denied it. It is the fact that it is disputed that creates the need to repeat it. If you are happy to concede its truth, then I am happy to concede its triviality, and we can drop the point. But, until then, its axiomatic self-evidence is a point in its favour, not a point against it.

‘Value’ is an important concept here too. Value is subjective, as I argued above. To speak of a ‘material worsening’ of someone’s condition presupposes an objective theory of value, which is wrong. If I trade away a house for a loaf of bread, it is because ‘having a loaf of bread’ was higher in my preference hierarchy than ‘having a house’. You might think that I am crazy for making such a trade, but that is beside the point. The question of what I value is demonstrated by my preferences.

Having said this, there is still a meaningful sense in which I might be said to make ‘bad’ decisions. But this requires us to shift our perspective from ex ante to ex post. Our preferences may change from moment to moment, and this is especially the case when what was previously my highest want has been satisfied. Having traded away my house, I may immediately regret my decision. I might now have a whole host of new wants which only my old house could satisfy, and which my bread cannot. This does not serve as a counter-instance to what I have just argued about the logic of purposeful action. My claim is that purposeful agents aim at satisfying their highest want at a given moment. This is perfectly compatible with the fact that we might change our preferences, change our minds, regret past decisions, and so on. So we now have the question, ‘How likely is it that people are going to trade and interact with each other in such a way that they will not regret their decision later?’ And this returns us to the question of who knows what is best for me. And the answer is: me. I know what is best for myself better than anybody else does. I believe you were happy to agree to this point earlier.

With this in mind, we can see that there is also an ex post sense in which voluntary trade works towards mutual benefit. If I know what is best for myself, then I know better than anyone else which trades I should enter into. This claim is weaker than the first, for it is a contingent generalisation with possible counter-instances, not a praxiological axiom. But it is true, and on this much we seem to have previously agreed. If, in general, individuals know what is best for themselves, then a fortiori they know what is best for themselves with regard to trade (and other interactions).

So what is to be done about the fact that some people make decisions which are ‘bad’ for themselves? In the first place, we must have some basis upon which to recognise such a thing, and this is not as easy as you seem to think it is. That heroin is addictive and dangerous to your health does not imply that it is always ‘bad’ for someone to consume it. All it implies is that there is a cost to consuming it. But there is a cost to all actions, and often there are benefits too. Someone who desires to take heroin will no doubt make appeal to its recreational use; the pleasure it brings, or whatever reason people take it for (I don’t know). So now it has been complicated by the fact that there are net-considerations of benefit and cost. This is where subjective value is important: you might value the recreational benefits of heroin less than avoiding its costs, but someone else may not.

What you say of heroin is also true of fast food. It’s dangerous and it’s addictive (which is why I avoid it). Not to the same degree, of course, but in a way, this is precisely the point. This is a relative issue, and not an absolute one. And it is impossible to draw a line in a non-arbitrary way. The only natural resting point is simply to allow people to do what they want with their own lives.

What is the alternative? Only paternalism: only the use of ‘benevolent’ aggression, ‘kindly’ initiating force against people for their own good. Remember, I have been invoking the mutually beneficial nature of voluntary trade as an argument for private property and the NAP. If you think that my argument for these principles is undermined by the fact that some people make bad decisions for themselves, this only has any bearing if you are going to propose the 'kindly' use of force. Can I at least nail you down on this? Are you arguing paternalism here? If not, then all of this looks moot.

When you don't have absolutely any example of the ideal state of the society (the non-state libertarian paradise) which you model and every state ever is too suffocating for you, isn't that idealism? — ssu

No, for the simple reason that libertarianism is non-utopian (or non-paradisiacal). I don’t know what is best for you, I don’t know how you should be living your life, educating your children, parting your hair, or what you should be having for dinner. Individuals tend to be the best judges of their own affairs (I explore this in more detail in some of my responses to Echarmion). This is why coercion is, in net-terms, unlikely to make the world a better place (relative to non-aggression). Libertarianism is not so much a structural vision for ‘fashioning’ an ideal society, so much as a set of really very modest conditions on the basis of which it is possible for individuals to fashion their lives largely as they wish. It’s not a matter of opposing all existing societies because they are sub-optimal or unideal. I am simply making consistent application of the non-aggression principle. Libertarianism is not a paradise, it does not claim to be a road to paradise, its defenders frequently deny that there is such a thing as a realisable paradise, and someone who believes otherwise just needs to read the libertarians more carefully (it’s worth pointing out: the ‘Utopia’ in Robert Nozick’s ‘Anarchy, State, and Utopia’ is facetious).

I've always seen libertarians as good and rather harmless people. Because in reality their society or state likely closest to their ideals would be a huge disappointment for... the libertarians. Social Democrats would enjoy very much a classic liberal state. What better environment for a social activist than a society with a functioning healthy economy and prosperity?

Let's face it, the society where Virgo Avalytikh would confine every one else here participating in this debate into a "re-education camp" where starting from the morning to the night the libertarian creed and NAP would be taught to us to mold us into true believers of libertarian values is simply an oxymoron. — ssu

Is it just my imagination, or are you getting steadily more ad hominem each time?

how do our examples we have discussed NOT show that this semantic problem does indeed have philosophical implications? (I think trespassing is wholly non-violent - you think it is a definite example that violates the NAP - have you shown me I am wrong? or just pointed out that according to your definition, you are right?) — ZhouBoTong

Simple: I have defined ‘aggression’ in a particular way, in a way that is consonant with how the term is conventionally used in the libertarian tradition, and have argued that trespass does indeed constitute aggression on that definition. You may respond that you are defining ‘aggression’ in a different way, and that, on your definition, trespass is not aggression. To which I respond, ‘That’s fine’. I’m not claiming that trespass is aggression in the way you are defining it. I am claiming that trespass is aggression in the way I am defining it (and the way in which libertarians define it). I happily concede that, if I were defining ‘aggression’ in the way you are, I might be wrong. But since I’m not, I’m not.

I don't see that this is a good argument. — Metaphysician Undercover

Let me use an analogy. I once witnessed a debate between a Roman Catholic and a Protestant. The Catholic argued that his church, the Roman church, is single and unified, and has never throughout its history experienced schism or division. Meanwhile, Protestantism is divided into more than 33,000 denominations around the world. Christ’s church is unified and not divided, and therefore the Roman church is the true church. The Catholics all stand together in a unified tradition, and the Protestants are scrambling all over the place, unable to agree on even the minutia of doctrine. Unity beats division, Catholicism beats Protestantism. Only, the source from which the ‘33,000’ number came from, some encyclopaedia of world Christianity (I don’t know which, I believe the editor was someone named Barret) also listed 214 Catholic denominations (e.g. Dominicans, Franciscans, Sedevacantists). This point was brought up by the Protestant apologist. To which the Catholic responded, ‘Well, there you go: 33,000 versus 214. Protestantism gives rise to greater disunity than Catholicism.’ Now, he may be right, and his argument may even be a good one, but it is also obvious that he is now making a new and different argument, and that his first argument has been defeated. Either the Roman church is a unified church or it isn’t! And, according to his own source, it isn’t. It is no longer a question of ‘unity versus division’. Now it is a question of degrees of division.

This is why I asked if the standardisation to which you make appeal must be absolute. If the argument is something like ‘standardisation beats disunity, the State breeds standardisation, anarchy breeds disunity, therefore the State beats anarchy’, then the argument is defeated fairly definitively simply by pointing out that Statism gives rise to its own kind of disunity. So if the debate is set up as one of ‘standardisation versus disunity’, both Statism and anarchy are equally embarrassed; neither is vindicated over the other. They are both equally non-absolutely standardised (there aren’t degrees of non-absoluteness). Now, you have clarified that this is not the argument you are making, that standardisation does not have to be absolute, in which case we can drop the point. I raised it as a possible interpretation of your argument, so as to clarify your position. You must be making the weaker claim, that the degree of standardisation which is made possible by the State is greater than that which is possible in the absence of a State.

Essentially you are arguing that if two nation-States come to war over an issue of territory rights, (like the Falklands Islands for example), this is no better than having all human beings acting like wild animals or very young children, running around fighting with each other over every single object which they seek to use. — Metaphysician Undercover

I really never did say this. If it were true that Statism gives rise to an adequate degree of order, and that conflict and disorder are exceptions under Statism rather than the norm, and if it were true that, in the absence of the State, we would all be wild animals constantly engaged in a war of all against all, then the argument would have some mileage. But these two premises are precisely what are in dispute.

I made the point above that the fundamental philosophical objection to the State is that it apparently has license to engage in acts of aggression which it prohibits others from engaging in. I cannot tax, I cannot wage wars, I cannot pass laws or execute my own private justice (except within the limits which the State permits me to). The State reserves for itself the monopolistic prerogative to do all of these things, and it uses force to do so. It is undoubtably a coercive monopoly, and it is so essentially. I doubt that it would be possible to distinguish States from non-States, were it not for these particular characteristics which they exhibit. A State persists by perpetually aggressing against its citizens. This is not necessarily to say that resorting to physical force is the State’s first port of call, but it is always the background threat. A highwayman may never actually shoot anyone, but, in demanding ‘Your money or your life’, he is an aggressor nonetheless. This is clouded by the fact that the State has its own distinct vocabulary for describing its activities. The State taxes, I steal. The State defends the homeland, I am a terrorist. The State conscripts or subpoenas you, I put you to forced labour. It is propagandistic double-think from start to finish. The State cannot be an effective protector of rights, for one very simple reason: if we judge the State’s actions by the standards of a non-State, we would consider it a rights-violator on an unparalleled scale. I have not even talked about the war on drugs, the prison-industrial complex, paternalistic bans on life-saving drugs . . .

Supposing we ignore all of this, and consider the State to be an effective maintainer of order most of the time, occasionally engaging in acts of conflict. Anarchy produces perpetual aggression, Statism produces occasional aggression, so Statism is preferable to anarchy. This is what I understand you to be arguing here:

Notice that in the former case, the majority of people are living in peace for the majority of the time, with a few issues arising which might cause battles, while in the latter case, the majority of people are battling each other for the majority of the time. That is why I consider the former situation to be better than the latter. — Metaphysician Undercover

But there is more to it. What if the aggression to which Statism gives rise is of a scale that no anarchistic situation could ever dream of? Just look at the 20th century, the bloodiest century in history. 40 million dead in WW1, 85 million dead in WW2, and (estimates vary) probably more than 90 million deaths across various communist regimes. These are Statist phenomena. If anarchy obtained, and this was the death toll that resulted, I am sure you would see this as proof-positive that anarchy tends towards animalistic aggression. No doubt, this is passed off as a ‘blip’, as Statism ‘going wrong’. After all, not all States are created equal, and ours are the good guys. We can trust them to use their monopoly on force in the right way, rather than in a corrupt or murderous way. Well, the numbers are what they are, and this century is still young. We may see worse still before we’re through. By the time we do, it will be too late to recant. Send the ring back to Mordor and destroy it. No one can be trusted with it. That is just wisdom.

This is done through the educational institutions, not enforcement. Enforcement is only for the few who step out of line of the laws. If we stop funding educational institutions because they are an expensive State-run enterprise, and educate in other fragmented ways, standardized conventions will be lost to a multiplicity of fragmented conventions. — Metaphysician Undercover

One of the reasons why the State’s monopoly on force has perdured for so long is because it has successfully persuaded the vast majority of people that a State is absolutely necessary, and that there could not be a functioning society without one. Its success in so-persuading people is owing to its involvement in shaping the minds of the young. It is plain as can be that for the State to have any involvement whatsoever in the education of the young (which, presumably, is when most of our ‘conventions’ are formed) is an enormous conflict of interest. I would no sooner have a government department of education than I would have a government department of language. A minimal requirement for a functioning democracy (not that I concede the existence of such a thing) is the possibility of directing independent intellectual criticism towards the State. For that very State to be the principal agent of ‘educating’ entire generations of people is as bone-chillingly Orwellian as the State dictating the language by which we may formulate such criticism.

(This is all leaving aside the fact that government schools are quite simply terrible; see Bryan Caplan’s ‘The Case Against Education: Why the Education System is a Waste of Time and Money’).

Anyway, the idea of "spontaneous order" was disproven by science in its original form of "spontaneous generation", though some people have rejuvenated the idea as abiogenesis. Regardless of how you present it, "spontaneous order" is illogical and inconsistent with fundamental metaphysical principles. — Metaphysician Undercover

In effect, you have simply been making Hobbes’s argument: human interaction, in its natural state, is a war of all and against all, in which everyone aggresses against everyone else to benefit at another’s expense, and the only escape from this situation is for there to be a State which maintains order. There is already ample reason for doubting that States do in fact maintain any adequate degree of order, given that they are agencies of aggression, and are responsible for more violence and death than any private agent could dream of. But there are at least two other reasons why this argument is dubious. First, one must explain how a State may first form, if it is really the case that order cannot occur spontaneously. If the State is a human association with a unified purpose, and if such associations are impossible in the absence of a State and its various institutions, then in order for such an association to form there must have already been a State in existence, to allow for it to come about. But this is not the case, since we are talking about how a State first formed. In other words, the very existence of the State serves as a counter-instance to the Hobbesian claim that spontaneous order is impossible. Indeed, we know that spontaneous order is possible, because if it were not, we would still be atomised aggressors engaged in perpetual war.

This is why I posted the essay by Friedman. ‘A Positive Account of Property Rights’ is concerned precisely with the question of how individuals bargain themselves up out of the Hobbesian state of nature. We know that it did happen, because we couldn’t be where we are now otherwise. The question is ‘How?’, and Friedman invokes the logic of Schelling points to explain (persuasively, to my mind), how property rights can be recognised and enforced by societies of organisms in the absence of a formalised institution. This is praxeology we are discussing. ‘Spontaneous generation’ and ‘abiogenesis’ are complete red herrings, and there is nothing metaphysically objectionable about what I have argued, either. The video I posted about the iterated prisoner’s dilemma is actually a very nice illustration of how the discipline of constant dealings tends towards self-enforcing arrangements (we might think of them as proto-contracts) which work towards mutual advantage.

Here you go, wandering around in your circle, lost. You have explained the conventions as coming into existence through "spontaneous order", and now you say that the system of private property along with non-aggression is capable of producing the spontaneous order. See the circle? — Metaphysician Undercover

It is not so much a circle as an iteration. Looking again at the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, we can illustrate in game-theoretic conditions how, in a community of aggressors, one or two peaceful agents very quickly spread their example to others, so that peaceful voluntarism becomes firmly established and very difficult to dislodge, whereas aggressors cannot get a foothold. In the complexity of the ever-growing 'market' of peaceful interaction, it may not be entirely clear whether x is a precondition of y or y is a precondition of x. But it does happen, and so the circle is a virtuous one rather than a vicious one.

If nothing else, please read Friedman’s essay and watch the video on the iterated prisoner’s dilemma (10 minutes only). I will happily read or watch whatever you would like to send me.

http://www.daviddfriedman.com/Academic/Property/Property.html

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BOvAbjfJ0x0

Since you seem not to see the significance of some of the concepts of which I have made use in this discussion (I don’t mean this in a condescending way, I’m just reading this off what you have said), let me restate the argument in more detail.

I have made the claim that voluntary trade works towards mutual benefit. This is true in at least two (related) senses. One of these senses corresponds to the perspective of entering into the trade in the first place (this is the ex ante perspective), and one of the senses corresponds to the perspective of having made the trade (ex post). — Virgo Avalytikh

I don't think our disagreement is due so much on having different concepts of ex-ante and ex-post, as it is due to the way one establishes mutual benefit, either individually or on the scale of entire societies. I think that in order to make the claim that a certain system is beneficial, you have to present the impact the system has on measurable factors (like, say, GDP) and then make a reasoned value judgement as to why this change in measurable factors i desirable. It is not sufficient, in order to establish mutual benefit, to simply state that people will have made the decision that had the highest subjective, situational value.

This is precisely because the latter is a self-evident "praxeological axiom", as you call it. One cannot discuss self-evident axioms, one can only state them. If that is all you're doing, philosophy is impossible. I will go into more detail when adressing the points you brought up.

At any given moment, conscious agents are engaged in purposeful behaviour. Man acts. Action is motivated by purpose, by a desire or want, which we aim to achieve, even if such a purpose is not always at the forefront of our conscious awareness. Purposeful action may be distinguished from involuntary action, like a muscular spasm. There isn’t much to say about involuntary action, since we cannot (directly) control it, so I will just restrict myself to purposeful action. At any given moment, we have a multitude of wants, and these wants are, in a sense, in conflict with one another. My desire to take a sip from my coffee cup and my desire to type a message are in conflict, in the sense that they are both competing for my time. No doubt there are at least two activities which I could conceivably engage in simultaneously without compromising either, but the important point is that I cannot do everything I want; my wants are insatiable, and resources (time, attention, physical space) are scarce. This is the fundamental economic problem.

So why do I end up doing what I do? Because my wants exist in a hierarchy, and, at a given moment, I will always act in such a way that aims at realising my highest want. This is the doctrine of ‘demonstrated preferences’. And it is self-evident: it is senseless to speak of someone prioritising a ‘lesser’ want over a ‘greater’ want, for, if it is prioritised, it is not really the ‘lesser’ want at all. It stands to reason, then, that in a trade, we each act in such a way that aims to attain something we value more at the expense of something we value less.

This is axiomatically true (which, I assume, is why you have used words like ‘circular’ and ‘trivial’ to describe it). But, to say that something is trivially true implies that it is true. There would be no need to repeat the fact that it is true if no one ever denied it. It is the fact that it is disputed that creates the need to repeat it. If you are happy to concede its truth, then I am happy to concede its triviality, and we can drop the point. But, until then, its axiomatic self-evidence is a point in its favour, not a point against it. — Virgo Avalytikh

What I mean to convey when I call this axiom "trivial" is that it does not get us anywhere. It provides no insight and advances no argument. All deductive logic, no matter how complex, can only rephrase information that was already inherent in the premises. It cannot generate new information. So the difference between a useful logical deduction and a trivial one, or truism, is that one rephrases the information in such a way as to provide some non-obvious insight, while the other merely repeats the same information.

What I see in this praxeological axiom is simply this: Humans act in the way humans act. The highest want is, by definition, simply the thing any given actor ends up doing. You do whatever is your highest want, and whatever you do is your highest want. All we are doing is renaming "the reason for doing X" to "the highest want". But what do we gain from this exercise? Does it provide some novel insight? Does it advance some argument? None that I can see.

‘Value’ is an important concept here too. Value is subjective, as I argued above. To speak of a ‘material worsening’ of someone’s condition presupposes an objective theory of value, which is wrong. If I trade away a house for a loaf of bread, it is because ‘having a loaf of bread’ was higher in my preference hierarchy than ‘having a house’. You might think that I am crazy for making such a trade, but that is beside the point. The question of what I value is demonstrated by my preferences. — Virgo Avalytikh

I do not disagree that value, understood as market value, is purely subjective, that is, a preference. What I do not agree with is that there is nothing beyond this. Goods that are traded have values beyond their market value. They may have instrumental value, they may have value in terms of the labor invested in them. Similarly, we are not limited to viewing a persons situation purely through the lens of their preferences. We can also measure various indicators concenring their material, physical and psychological situation. We can then use these indicators to make reasoned judgements about their situations.

This process, gathering data and then making reasoned value judgements about the data, is at the core of any moral philosophy, and therefore also of economic philosophy, which is ultimately a subset of the former. The results of such a process are not "objective", since they do not refer to objects. Asking for objective standards in this context is really just nonsense. They are judgements which are accessible to human reason, and if they are ultimately reasonable, they are a form of truth distinct from empirical truth.

It is not possible to have any economic philosophy if all you rely on is preference. In that case, your statement that "libertarianism makes people better off" is no different from stating "blue is my favorite color". Neither statement would be accessible to reason.

Having said this, there is still a meaningful sense in which I might be said to make ‘bad’ decisions. But this requires us to shift our perspective from ex ante to ex post. Our preferences may change from moment to moment, and this is especially the case when what was previously my highest want has been satisfied. Having traded away my house, I may immediately regret my decision. I might now have a whole host of new wants which only my old house could satisfy, and which my bread cannot. This does not serve as a counter-instance to what I have just argued about the logic of purposeful action. My claim is that purposeful agents aim at satisfying their highest want at a given moment. This is perfectly compatible with the fact that we might change our preferences, change our minds, regret past decisions, and so on. So we now have the question, ‘How likely is it that people are going to trade and interact with each other in such a way that they will not regret their decision later?’ And this returns us to the question of who knows what is best for me. And the answer is: me. I know what is best for myself better than anybody else does. I believe you were happy to agree to this point earlier. — Virgo Avalytikh

The ex-post view, as you outline it, has the same problem that I outlined concerning subjectivity. You're still only looking at preferences, and the logic of these preferences is not accessible to human reason. If all we are talking about is preferences, it's not just that you know what is "best" for you better than anybody else does. You are actually the only one who knows what i best for you. "Best" in this context only refers to a contingent preference you had in a specific situation.

With this in mind, we can see that there is also an ex post sense in which voluntary trade works towards mutual benefit. If I know what is best for myself, then I know better than anyone else which trades I should enter into. This claim is weaker than the first, for it is a contingent generalisation with possible counter-instances, not a praxiological axiom. But it is true, and on this much we seem to have previously agreed. If, in general, individuals know what is best for themselves, then a fortiori they know what is best for themselves with regard to trade (and other interactions). — Virgo Avalytikh

In addition to what I said before, there is a futher problem here. Even if I know what is best for me, i.e. what my current preferences are, that still doesn't mean I will be able to actually realize these goals. But then of course for every preference I cannot realize, a new preference, contingent on me failing the previous one(s) will pop up, and this will then be what is "best". This is as self evident as it's, again, trivial. The term "best" becomes completely meaningless if it can apply equally well to any conceivable outcome.

So what is to be done about the fact that some people make decisions which are ‘bad’ for themselves? In the first place, we must have some basis upon which to recognise such a thing, and this is not as easy as you seem to think it is. That heroin is addictive and dangerous to your health does not imply that it is always ‘bad’ for someone to consume it. All it implies is that there is a cost to consuming it. But there is a cost to all actions, and often there are benefits too. Someone who desires to take heroin will no doubt make appeal to its recreational use; the pleasure it brings, or whatever reason people take it for (I don’t know). So now it has been complicated by the fact that there are net-considerations of benefit and cost. This is where subjective value is important: you might value the recreational benefits of heroin less than avoiding its costs, but someone else may not.

What you say of heroin is also true of fast food. It’s dangerous and it’s addictive (which is why I avoid it). Not to the same degree, of course, but in a way, this is precisely the point. This is a relative issue, and not an absolute one. And it is impossible to draw a line in a non-arbitrary way. The only natural resting point is simply to allow people to do what they want with their own lives.

What is the alternative? Only paternalism: only the use of ‘benevolent’ aggression, ‘kindly’ initiating force against people for their own good. Remember, I have been invoking the mutually beneficial nature of voluntary trade as an argument for private property and the NAP. If you think that my argument for these principles is undermined by the fact that some people make bad decisions for themselves, this only has any bearing if you are going to propose the 'kindly' use of force. Can I at least nail you down on this? Are you arguing paternalism here? If not, then all of this looks moot. — Virgo Avalytikh

I think it's useful, in this context, to draw a parallel to moral relativism. I think what you are arguing here is a form of complete economic relativism that ultimately boils down to a complete moral relativism. If there is no way to assess "bad economic decisions", this must be equally true for "bad moral decisions" in general. If I cannot argue that taking Heroin is bad for you, I cannot argue that selling Heroin to people is morally bad. If I cannot argue that it's bad economically to have to give away your house essentially for free or starve, I cannot argue that it's morally bad to let people starve. If this is your stance, all of this really is moot, because there is no way to argue with complete relativism.

What I argue is that we can form certain intersubjective truths, by looking at the facts and making reasoned value judgements about these facts. I think this is distinct from paternalism. Paternalism is, to me, a stance that enfeebles others by making them unable to participate in a decision. It's arguing from authority. What I want to do is argue from reason. Reason is not enfeebling but empowering, because it opens up the process to everyone with the ability to understand human reason.

In conclusion, what I argue is not merely that people make bad decisions according to my personal preferences. What I argue is that, even in voluntary trade, people can end up worse off, and that it's possible to establish, with sufficient clarity, what being worse-off means between humans. Your theory seems unable to even recognise negative outcomes, and thus I think it cannot be reasonably argued that it will produce positive outcomes.

No, for the simple reason that libertarianism is non-utopian (or non-paradisiacal). — Virgo Avalytikh

I don't refer here to an utopia being equivalent to paradise, when I talk about utopia here. Perhaps better would be to talk about a fictional or a theoretic model of a society, because there is no record of this kind of non-state society having ever existed or emerged and the idea that it would (or could) emerge seems doubtful.

Libertarianism is not so much a structural vision for ‘fashioning’ an ideal society, so much as a set of really very modest conditions on the basis of which it is possible for individuals to fashion their lives largely as they wish. — Virgo Avalytikh

So it's modest for you to say there cannot be a state that is more closer to the minarchist state than to a totalitarian state, that all states are statist? That limited government is utopian, cannot happen because every government ever has simply grown and grown?

Is it just my imagination, or are you getting steadily more ad hominem each time? — Virgo Avalytikh

I haven't made or intended to make any ad hominem attacks to my knowledge. What's so bad in saying that a libertarian society simply cannot morph into totalitarianism?

I made the point above that the fundamental philosophical objection to the State is that it apparently has license to engage in acts of aggression which it prohibits others from engaging in — Virgo Avalytikh

But is that true? You do have the right to use violence for self defence. And isn't a State made from people that uphold the idea of that State so much, that even others also accept the existence of the state?

I once witnessed a debate between a Roman Catholic and a Protestant. The Catholic argued that his church, the Roman church, is single and unified, and has never throughout its history experienced schism or division. — Virgo Avalytikh

Perhaps this Roman Catholic ought to be reminded of the Schism of 1054, which has lasted and divided the Christian Church since then. (And likely there are many Protestant Churches that have never throughout their own history experienced schism or division after their emergence, just like the Roman Catholic Church.)

I can't see the point of the analogy. Consider a deck of 52 playing cards. You might argue that the 52 parts of the deck are all divided and distinct, and not parts of one deck. But then you are not talking about a deck anymore, you are talking about a bunch of distinct things. You can emphasize the separation between the parts which constitute the whole, or you can emphasize the union of the parts which make up the whole, but if you deny the union, you have no right to talk about the whole. So if you deny the union between Protestants and Catholics you have no right to talk about Christians.

This is why I asked if the standardisation to which you make appeal must be absolute. If the argument is something like ‘standardisation beats disunity, the State breeds standardisation, anarchy breeds disunity, therefore the State beats anarchy’, then the argument is defeated fairly definitively simply by pointing out that Statism gives rise to its own kind of disunity. — Virgo Avalytikh

So this is false. The "disunity" which you refer to here is artificial, manufactured by your way of speaking. You are talking about Protestants and Catholics as if they are not unified in Christianity, and you imply that the distinct forms of Protestantism are not unified as Protestant. That's like talking about the 52 distinct playing cards as if they are not one deck. Sure, you can talk about things in this way, but your conclusion that the parts of a whole are a "kind of disunity" is completely unacceptable because you have simply chosen an inappropriate description. The unity exists whether you recognize it, or choose to talk about the parts as distinct, calling them a disunity.

But there is more to it. What if the aggression to which Statism gives rise is of a scale that no anarchistic situation could ever dream of? Just look at the 20th century, the bloodiest century in history. 40 million dead in WW1, 85 million dead in WW2, and (estimates vary) probably more than 90 million deaths across various communist regimes. These are Statist phenomena. If anarchy obtained, and this was the death toll that resulted, I am sure you would see this as proof-positive that anarchy tends towards animalistic aggression. No doubt, this is passed off as a ‘blip’, as Statism ‘going wrong’. After all, not all States are created equal, and ours are the good guys. We can trust them to use their monopoly on force in the right way, rather than in a corrupt or murderous way. Well, the numbers are what they are, and this century is still young. We may see worse still before we’re through. By the time we do, it will be too late to recant. Send the ring back to Mordor and destroy it. No one can be trusted with it. That is just wisdom. — Virgo Avalytikh

All these killings and yet many would argue that the world has already passed into overpopulation.

One of the reasons why the State’s monopoly on force has perdured for so long is because it has successfully persuaded the vast majority of people that a State is absolutely necessary, and that there could not be a functioning society without one. — Virgo Avalytikh

You talk about the State as if it is a person with the power of persuasion. It is not, and this is another good example of your doublespeak. People persuade other people, groups of people persuade people, the State doesn't persuade anyone. If people are persuaded that a State is absolutely necessary, they have persuade each other. But this is to be expected, as I explained the learning institutions ensure that we see things in a similar way. And that's what learning is, learning is standardization. So I wouldn't really call this persuasion, it's just a matter of learning the accepted conventions.

For that very State to be the principal agent of ‘educating’ entire generations of people is as bone-chillingly Orwellian as the State dictating the language by which we may formulate such criticism. — Virgo Avalytikh

More of the same doublespeak. The State is not an agent, nor does the State educate people. People educate each other, and they generally follow the conventions. But even the conventions themselves allow people to go outside of the conventions. These are conventions of freedom. So when we educate ourselves for example, we are free to consider things which are unconventional. This is why anarchism may be discussed and explored, it is unconventional, but the conventions do not force us to remain within the conventions. The conventions actually allow for freedom of thought and expression.

In effect, you have simply been making Hobbes’s argument: human interaction, in its natural state, is a war of all and against all, in which everyone aggresses against everyone else to benefit at another’s expense, and the only escape from this situation is for there to be a State which maintains order. There is already ample reason for doubting that States do in fact maintain any adequate degree of order, given that they are agencies of aggression, and are responsible for more violence and death than any private agent could dream of. — Virgo Avalytikh

That is not what I have said at all. I said this:

I will add, that I think this culturing consists of two important parts. One is a demonstration of unity, people working together in cooperation which shows that agreement is good, in Christianity this is referred to as love. The other is the standardized principles which are taught in schools, these help us to see things in the same way, facilitating agreement. So we have two levels of conditions which facilitate agreement. First there is the deep level, this is a disposition to be friendly, helpful, caring and loving. This provides the person with an attitude that agreement is good, and inspires the person to be agreeable. The first level provides the foundation, the conditions by which the second level may come into existence. When people have the underlying disposition to be agreeable, they will agree to having things in common, like schools and other institutions which are mostly State-run, or follow principles provided by the State. — Metaphysician Undercover

The State only emerges in the second level. Prior to this, at the first level, there is cooperation, people being helpful, caring, loving and agreeable. But this attitude only exists if it's cultured. From this general attitude of caring for each other, comes communion, sharing, having things in common. A State can only come from this, having things in common.

This is why I posted the essay by Friedman. ‘A Positive Account of Property Rights’ is concerned precisely with the question of how individuals bargain themselves up out of the Hobbesian state of nature. — Virgo Avalytikh

Clearly I do not agree with the Hobbesian description.

If nothing else, please read Friedman’s essay and watch the video on the iterated prisoner’s dilemma (10 minutes only). — Virgo Avalytikh

Well, I looked over the essay, I can't say I read it thoroughly. It doesn't seem to say anything about loving, caring, sharing, developing an agreeable attitude, and having things in common, which as I described is necessary for the existence of rights. The author seems to be obsessed by some Hobbesian fantasy.

I said that I would happily concede the triviality of the rationality axiom if you concede its truth. I was hoping that you would cooperate with this and concede its truth so that we can move on. Instead, you have simply restated its triviality, which doesn’t advance us at all. As I pointed out, its axiomatic self-evidence is only an objection if the principle is accepted uncontroversially. It is only because it is disputed that it bears restating.

Contrary to your characterisation, the rationality axiom is not simply that ‘humans act in the way humans act’. If it were, I would have formulated it that way. It might be an implication of the axiom, but that is nothing special, since all tautologies are implications of everything (including contradictions). Humans act is such a way that aims at achieving their highest want at a given moment. Is this new information? Is this a valuable insight? That depends on whether you already knew it. If you did, then surely it is trivial. If you didn’t, then you have achieved a new insight. So let us just agree ‘The rationality axiom is true’, and then move on to more interesting insights (of which there are many; see Ludwig von Mises’s magnum opus, ‘Human Action: A Treatise on Economics’).

I think it's useful, in this context, to draw a parallel to moral relativism. I think what you are arguing here is a form of complete economic relativism that ultimately boils down to a complete moral relativism. — Echarmion

Economics is relative in the following sense: an economist is able to tell you (fallibly) that a particular course of action will boost GDP, but they cannot tell you that boosting GDP is objectively a ‘good’ thing. Or, if they can, they can do so only in reference to some higher criterion that has been stipulated. Whether that criterion is objectively ‘good’ is, again, a judgement that lies outwith the purview of the economist qua economist. As any introductory textbook will tell you, economics is a Wertfrei discipline. It is analogous to how natural science can tell you that putting arsenic in your mother’s drink will kill her, but not whether or not you should do so. This does not imply moral relativism at all, nor have I argued for moral relativism. My focus has been predominantly on rights, which is a different logical sphere. There are many things which I consider to be morally wrong, but not rights-violations (like committing adultery), and even certain things that are clear rights-violations, but are still probably the right thing to do, all things considered (like fraudulently over-charging somebody by a penny if doing so would prevent World War 3). Moral relativism is a red herring here, since I have not argued for it, nor is it an implication of anything I have argued. I am not a relativist in the moral sense, so we can just drop it there.

If I cannot argue that it's bad economically to have to give away your house essentially for free or starve, I cannot argue that it's morally bad to let people starve. — Echarmion

Hold on – there is an equivocation here which needs to be ironed out. It is one thing to imagine somebody foolishly trading away a house for a loaf of bread, and then using this as an example of how, sometimes, people enter into voluntary trades from which they emerge ‘worse off’. It is another thing to speak of someone being in a position where they have to give away their house for a loaf of bread, due to the desperation of their situation. They are two completely different points.

Supposing that we establish some criterion by which a house is ‘better’ than a loaf of bread, so that trading away the former for the latter is ‘bad’. This is something that anybody may do, poor or rich, desperate or not. Alright, then it is logically conceivable that somebody might enter into a peaceful trade and emerge ‘worse off’, by the criterion we have stipulated. So what? For what would this be an argument? I have used the fact that people typically know what is best for themselves as a pro-liberty argument, as an argument for the non-aggression principle. So the only way in which these unusual counter-instances actually have a bearing on the discussion if you are going to use them as an argument for aggression, i.e. sometimes, people must be forcibly protected from themselves, and coerced into doing the right thing. This is why I raised paternalism. Paternalism is the placing of limitations on someone’s liberty or autonomy for their own good. A paternalistic government does not recognise the right of individuals to engage in self-destructive behaviour, but considers it necessary to coerce them into doing the ‘right thing’. I am not sure if you are endorsing this, but if you are not, then such counter-instances are moot.

Suppose, on the other hand, that we are talking about somebody being in a position where they ‘have to’ trade away their house for a loaf of bread. Again, for what is this an argument, exactly? If you are on the brink of starvation, and the only way to save your life is to make such a trade, then you are better off for having made it, and this is consistent with my thesis. We might bemoan the fact that someone might be in such a desperate situation in the first place, but I don’t see how this has any immediate bearing on our discussion. Unless you are just taking for granted that the only way of alleviating poverty is through the instrumentality of the State (which is false).

We can conduct similar thought-experiments about violations of the NAP. For every conceivably possible case in which someone enters into a peaceful trade and emerges ‘worse off’ by whatever criterion you care to stipulate, I can give you one in which an act of aggression make one party ‘worse off’ by that same criterion. We are talking about tendencies. Relatively speaking, mutual benefit is a norm and unilateral loss an exception when it comes to peaceful trade. The reverse is the case when it comes to aggression. You were happy to agree that individuals tend to make decisions which are best for themselves, on the grounds that they are better acquainted with their respective situations than anyone else is. All I am doing is deducing the implications of this. If we look at the kinds of things which the NAP permits, they tend to work for the benefit of all voluntary participants (e.g. trade, friendships), and if we look at those things which are prohibited by the NAP, they tend to produce a clear loser (e.g. rape, murder, theft). I see this as being very difficult to argue with.

I don't refer here to an utopia being equivalent to paradise, when I talk about utopia here. — ssu

But you used the word 'paradise'

(the non-state libertarian paradise) — ssu

right there.

Perhaps better would be to talk about a fictional or a theoretic model of a society, because there is no record of this kind of non-state society having ever existed or emerged and the idea that it would (or could) emerge seems doubtful. — ssu

This actually isn’t true. Iceland was anarchistic for the first three centuries of its existence, and had quite an elegant justice system.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Icelandic_Commonwealth#Legacy

So it's modest for you to say there cannot be a state that is more closer to the minarchist state than to a totalitarian state, that all states are statist? — ssu

Libertarianism is modest in the sense that it requests only that persons not be aggressed against; a modest request indeed. It’s really not much to ask.

I haven't made or intended to make any ad hominem attacks to my knowledge. — ssu

I took this as rather ad hominem, as it was directed at me, and not at any argument I have presented:

Let's face it, the society where Virgo Avalytikh would confine every one else here participating in this debate into a "re-education camp" where starting from the morning to the night the libertarian creed and NAP would be taught to us to mold us into true believers of libertarian values is simply an oxymoron. — ssu

But is that true? You do have the right to use violence for self defence. And isn't a State made from people that uphold the idea of that State so much, that even others also accept the existence of the state? — ssu

Yes, it is true. You quoted the first sentence of a paragraph in which I give numerous examples of such. This understanding of the State, by the way, is perfectly consonant with Weber’s.

Let’s forget the analogy. I used it as an illustration of one possible interpretation of your position which turned out not to be the correct one. We needn't dwell on it.

Your argument hinges on the claim that the State gives rise to a greater degree of standardisation than does a Stateless situation; that, under Statism, peaceful order is the norm and aggression is the exception, and that, under anarchy, we are wild animals engaged in perpetual aggression. It would be helpful for us to remind ourselves that the ‘standardisation’ we are concerned with is of a specific kind, namely a system of rights. This is the only reason why ‘convention’ entered the discussion, because rights are a convention, and convention requires at least some measure of standardisation for it to be meaningful. So the question before us is whether a State really does do the job that your argument needs it to do, in terms of creating a standardised system of rights, relative to anarchy.

I have attacked your argument at both ends. First, I have argued that the State is a miserable candidate for being a rights-standardiser, rights-protector, rights-bestower, or however you would wish to phrase it. I argued that States are engaged in perpetual aggression towards their citizens (a point to which you have not responded at all), and that the historical record excites serious distrust of the claim that battle is some sort of occasional exception to a State’s normally ordered activity. The hundreds of millions of deaths which I enumerated in my previous post are to be accounted for by wars between States, and States murdering their own citizens. Does this give you a moment’s pause? It seems not. all you have to say is:

All these killings and yet many would argue that the world has already passed into overpopulation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Astonishing. Are you saying that the death toll isn’t yet high enough?

You talk about the State as if it is a person with the power of persuasion. It is not, and this is another good example of your doublespeak. — Metaphysician Undercover

To be sure, the State does not have its own inherent agency. Only individual persons have this. There is nothing objectionable in speaking about ‘collective agency’ so long as we recognise that it is an abstraction, and that we be careful not to smuggle in any untoward ontological commitments (like the idea that groups have their own independent capacity for purposeful action). As Murray Rothbard says, ultimately, there are no ‘governments’; there are only certain individuals who act in a manner that is recognised as ‘governmental’. Recognising this is much more of a threat to Statism than an apologetic for it. It dispels the notion that there is anything peculiar about a State (or the individuals comprising it) which grants it license to engage in activities which non-States do not. You yourself have spoken of the State as though it has agency, on numerous occasions.

Clearly I do not agree with the Hobbesian description. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your argument resembles that of Hobbes in the sense that you have claimed that, in the absence of the State, we act like ‘wild animals’ (i.e. a state of nature), and that it is the State which brings order. Maybe you are not really arguing this, but it certainly seems that you are, and if you are not, then as I pointed out above when you denied that you were seeking to justify Statism, you are not really threatening my thesis.

The State only emerges in the second level. Prior to this, at the first level, there is cooperation, people being helpful, caring, loving and agreeable. But this attitude only exists if it's cultured. From this general attitude of caring for each other, comes communion, sharing, having things in common. A State can only come from this, having things in common. — Metaphysician Undercover

So it looks like we agree on this much: peaceful cooperation, and standardisation regarding rights, are possible independently of the State. You extoll the virtues of education in further cultivating this standardisation, but there is no reason why this education could not occur under anarchy (indeed, hardly any education really occurs under Statism, see Caplan’s book I mentioned).

Where does this leave us in the trajectory of the discussion? We began with the principles of right-libertariansm, private property rights and the NAP. You claimed that the NAP was useless (deceptive!) in the absence of a system of rights. ‘Rights’ are a service bestowed on an individual by the State, a service provided by the State (there is the State as agent!). I have agreed that the NAP does depend on a system of rights, and that rights are conventions, which of course require a certain measure of standardisation. The disagreement from this point has seemed to involve the question of whether I can sensibly hold to a system of rights, given my disavowal of the State. My response has been to point out that, not only is the State a truly miserable candidate for rights-bestower (or whatever job it is supposed to do here), it is also perfectly possible for spontaneous order and cooperation to arise in the absence of a State. This latter point is one which you now seem prepared to concede. So, as things stand, I feel like my position is vindicated.

Simple: I have defined ‘aggression’ in a particular way, in a way that is consonant with how the term is conventionally used in the libertarian tradition, and have argued that trespass does indeed constitute aggression on that definition. You may respond that you are defining ‘aggression’ in a different way, and that, on your definition, trespass is not aggression. To which I respond, ‘That’s fine’. I’m not claiming that trespass is aggression in the way you are defining it. I am claiming that trespass is aggression in the way I am defining it (and the way in which libertarians define it). I happily concede that, if I were defining ‘aggression’ in the way you are, I might be wrong. But since I’m not, I’m not. — Virgo Avalytikh

Gotcha. Let's see if I can try another approach:

Do you think the NAP is a perfect principle with no flaws, inconsistencies, ambiguity, or potential loopholes?

Do libertarians care whether property was originally acquired according to the NAP, or was that centuries ago, so it doesn't matter?

If a country takes land using aggression, do all of its citizens have the right to that newly acquired property?

What percent of owned land was acquired without aggression? (obviously this is not answerable, but I am suggesting that a significant percent of the 'owned' land on earth was acquired using aggression)

This actually isn’t true. Iceland was anarchistic for the first three centuries of its existence, and had quite an elegant justice system. — Virgo Avalytikh

Medieval Iceland? Likely Iceland was then somewhat anarchistic (likely not as much as present Hollywood with it's silly biker-gang Vikings depict the societies to be). So was my country, definately! After all, here there was no king, no formal state, and no feudalism, yet the Vikings didn't conquer this place (hence a common defence existed).

But Iceland, a community of 50 000 people of basically settlers that came to an uninhabited island in the Middle Ages? Seems that it has been found by right-wing libertarians, who have noticed some resemblance to an anarcho-capitalist legal system. However, from the link you gave, Friedman himself writes: "It is difficult to draw any conclusion from the Icelandic experience concerning the viability of systems of private enforcement in the twentieth century. Even if Icelandic institutions worked well then, they might not work in a larger and more interdependent society. And whether the Icelandic institutions did work well is a matter of controversy; the sagas are perceived by many as portraying an essentially violent and unjust society, tormented by constant feuding. It is difficult to tell whether such judgments are correct." Tip my hat for Friedman that he understands that it's difficult to compare a medieval society to later more modern ones.

So that's your refutation to my argument that there hasn't been an historical example. I was hoping that you might give as an example some British colony (for a brief period of time, at least) perhaps in the 17th or 18th Century, but there seems to be none. This just enforces my thinking that this whole discussion is far more about ideological issues of especially anarcho-capitalism and isn't so much about actual historical facts (or classical liberalism for that matter).

Libertarianism is modest in the sense that it requests only that persons not be aggressed against; a modest request indeed. It’s really not much to ask. — Virgo Avalytikh

This isn't an answer to my question at all. I asked if a state can be more closer to the minarchist state than to a totalitarian state, or if you argue that all states cannot be anything else than statist.

I took this as rather ad hominem, as it was directed at me, — Virgo Avalytikh

Sorry then for trying to make the point that libertarianism cannot lead to totalitarianism.

Suppose, on the other hand, that we are talking about somebody being in a position where they ‘have to’ trade away their house for a loaf of bread. Again, for what is this an argument, exactly? If you are on the brink of starvation, and the only way to save your life is to make such a trade, then you are better off for having made it, and this is consistent with my thesis. — Virgo Avalytikh

This is doublespeak. Sure, you are "better of" not to be starving at that moment in time, than to be starving at that moment, but If there is someone else around the corner, willing to trade two, or five, or ten loaves of bread for that house, you are not necessarily "better of" for making that trade. You could have walked around the corner and gotten a much better deal, in which case you would be even "better off"..

Libertarianism is modest in the sense that it requests only that persons not be aggressed against; a modest request indeed. It’s really not much to ask. — Virgo Avalytikh

Try saying this to an aggressive person. Please, don't be so aggressive. I'm just making a modest request. Good luck with that!

Your argument hinges on the claim that the State gives rise to a greater degree of standardisation than does a Stateless situation; that, under Statism, peaceful order is the norm and aggression is the exception, and that, under anarchy, we are wild animals engaged in perpetual aggression. — Virgo Avalytikh

No, you don't seem to get my point. I am not arguing for Statism, I've told you this already, I am arguing that your principles are wrong. I did not say that without the State we are wild animals engaged in aggression. In fact, I said the very opposite. I said that in order for a State to come into existence, we must have an attitude of loving, caring and sharing, and having things in common. A State can only come into existence from these prerequisite conditions, because it requires agreement amongst people, and this can only occur if people are agreeable, and this requires the attitude I just described, not an attitude of wild animals engaged in aggression. Therefore, prior to the existence of the State, the conditions which were conducive to bringing the State into existence, and these conditions were therefore in existence without a State, were conditions of loving, caring, and sharing. These are the only conditions which could bring a State into existence, because a State requires agreement amongst its members.

It would be helpful for us to remind ourselves that the ‘standardisation’ we are concerned with is of a specific kind, namely a system of rights. This is the only reason why ‘convention’ entered the discussion, because rights are a convention, and convention requires at least some measure of standardisation for it to be meaningful. So the question before us is whether a State really does do the job that your argument needs it to do, in terms of creating a standardised system of rights, relative to anarchy. — Virgo Avalytikh

Right, "standardization" is part of the second level of agreement which I referred to. This includes State, as well as rights. These things, State, and rights, can only come into existence following the first level of agreement which I described as loving, caring and sharing, generally having the disposition of being agreeable.

I have attacked your argument at both ends. First, I have argued that the State is a miserable candidate for being a rights-standardiser, rights-protector, rights-bestower, or however you would wish to phrase it. I argued that States are engaged in perpetual aggression towards their citizens (a point to which you have not responded at all), and that the historical record excites serious distrust of the claim that battle is some sort of occasional exception to a State’s normally ordered activity. The hundreds of millions of deaths which I enumerated in my previous post are to be accounted for by wars between States, and States murdering their own citizens. Does this give you a moment’s pause? It seems not. all you have to say is: — Virgo Avalytikh

I am not defending Statism, I am showing that your principles are wrong, so this ranting against States is irrelevant. As I already explained, your principles are wrong because loving, caring, sharing, and generally having things in common, are fundamental necessities for the existence of conventions (which are agreements), including conventions on rights. Therefore, sharing and having things in common must be the top priority of any system of rights because caring and having things in common is necessary in order for any system of rights to exist. Your NAP which gives top priority to personal ownership is inconsistent with this, it doesn't pay respect to having things in common. In fact it opposes this. It is therefore the proposal of a right designed to support the things which are incompatible with the existence of rights. It is an unacceptable proposal.

To be sure, the State does not have its own inherent agency. Only individual persons have this. There is nothing objectionable in speaking about ‘collective agency’ so long as we recognise that it is an abstraction, and that we be careful not to smuggle in any untoward ontological commitments (like the idea that groups have their own independent capacity for purposeful action). As Murray Rothbard says, ultimately, there are no ‘governments’; there are only certain individuals who act in a manner that is recognised as ‘governmental’. Recognising this is much more of a threat to Statism than an apologetic for it. It dispels the notion that there is anything peculiar about a State (or the individuals comprising it) which grants it license to engage in activities which non-States do not. You yourself have spoken of the State as though it has agency, on numerous occasions. — Virgo Avalytikh

OK, if you respect this, then you ought to quit talking about the State being an aggressor. Or is it that difficult for you to quit the doublespeak? I've tried not to speak of the State as if it has agency, though it is difficult because it is common parlance. I think that the closest I've come is to refer to things like state-run institutions. The common parlance tends to make us blame the faults of human beings on the State. The State has bad laws. If we separate these, we can ask whether a State is really a bad thing, or whether a State (which could be a good thing) is overrun by bad people.

So it looks like we agree on this much: peaceful cooperation, and standardisation regarding rights, are possible independently of the State. You extoll the virtues of education in further cultivating this standardisation, but there is no reason why this education could not occur under anarchy (indeed, hardly any education really occurs under Statism, see Caplan’s book I mentioned). — Virgo Avalytikh

I really don't see the principles here. How is it possible to have standardized education throughout a vast land without an organization like the State? The anarchists could set up an organization like a State, and call it something other than a State, but how would this be different?

Where does this leave us in the trajectory of the discussion? We began with the principles of right-libertariansm, private property rights and the NAP. You claimed that the NAP was useless (deceptive!) in the absence of a system of rights. ‘Rights’ are a service bestowed on an individual by the State, a service provided by the State (there is the State as agent!). I have agreed that the NAP does depend on a system of rights, and that rights are conventions, which of course require a certain measure of standardisation. The disagreement from this point has seemed to involve the question of whether I can sensibly hold to a system of rights, given my disavowal of the State. My response has been to point out that, not only is the State a truly miserable candidate for rights-bestower (or whatever job it is supposed to do here), it is also perfectly possible for spontaneous order and cooperation to arise in the absence of a State. This latter point is one which you now seem prepared to concede. So, as things stand, I feel like my position is vindicated. — Virgo Avalytikh

The point is that making the basis of the hierarchy (the principal right), the right to private ownership, undermines the very thing which makes a system of rights possible, and this is having things in common. So the NAP is backward. It belittles the very thing which makes a system of rights possible, yet it requires a system of rights itself. A true system of rights must start in (be based in) commonality (that which strengthens any system of rights because rights are agreements), what we all have in common, and proceed from there toward the properties of individuals. it cannot start from the properties of individuals.

I do not at all concede to your concept of "spontaneous order". I think it is illogical. As I said, in the absence of State, can come people with a loving, caring, and sharing disposition, and this must be cultured, it is not spontaneous. Further, a claim to the right of private property is inconsistent with this loving, caring and sharing, and so is not conducive to any cooperation.. That's why the NAP is fool's play, it induces disagreement.

Supposing that we establish some criterion by which a house is ‘better’ than a loaf of bread, so that trading away the former for the latter is ‘bad’. This is something that anybody may do, poor or rich, desperate or not. Alright, then it is logically conceivable that somebody might enter into a peaceful trade and emerge ‘worse off’, by the criterion we have stipulated. So what? For what would this be an argument? I have used the fact that people typically know what is best for themselves as a pro-liberty argument, as an argument for the non-aggression principle. So the only way in which these unusual counter-instances actually have a bearing on the discussion if you are going to use them as an argument for aggression, i.e. sometimes, people must be forcibly protected from themselves, and coerced into doing the right thing. This is why I raised paternalism. Paternalism is the placing of limitations on someone’s liberty or autonomy for their own good. A paternalistic government does not recognise the right of individuals to engage in self-destructive behaviour, but considers it necessary to coerce them into doing the ‘right thing’. I am not sure if you are endorsing this, but if you are not, then such counter-instances are moot.

Suppose, on the other hand, that we are talking about somebody being in a position where they ‘have to’ trade away their house for a loaf of bread. Again, for what is this an argument, exactly? If you are on the brink of starvation, and the only way to save your life is to make such a trade, then you are better off for having made it, and this is consistent with my thesis. We might bemoan the fact that someone might be in such a desperate situation in the first place, but I don’t see how this has any immediate bearing on our discussion. Unless you are just taking for granted that the only way of alleviating poverty is through the instrumentality of the State (which is false). — Virgo Avalytikh

I feel like we are starting to talk past each other here. My argument in the last post, which to me seems more or less still unadressed, is that in order to support the claim that "market failure is less common and less severe in libertarian systems compared to any other system", you need to establish some measurable criteria for the overall well-being of an economy and show how these criteria are improved. That people are actually "better off", and not just "gaining something they contingently value given their current options".

It seems to me your argument can be briefly summarized as: People are the best judges of what they value the most. When engaging in trade, you will always get something that currently has value to you. Since you always get something you value, and you are the best judge of value (for yourself), you will always be "better off" by trading.

The problem with that argument is that it's always true. That is to say, given this logic, any conceivable outcome is being "better off". If the label "better off" can apply to any possible situation, it's meaningless.

I said that I would happily concede the triviality of the rationality axiom if you concede its truth. I was hoping that you would cooperate with this and concede its truth so that we can move on. Instead, you have simply restated its triviality, which doesn’t advance us at all. As I pointed out, its axiomatic self-evidence is only an objection if the principle is accepted uncontroversially. It is only because it is disputed that it bears restating. — Virgo Avalytikh

Disputed by whom, exactly?

Contrary to your characterisation, the rationality axiom is not simply that ‘humans act in the way humans act’. If it were, I would have formulated it that way. It might be an implication of the axiom, but that is nothing special, since all tautologies are implications of everything (including contradictions). Humans act is such a way that aims at achieving their highest want at a given moment. Is this new information? Is this a valuable insight? That depends on whether you already knew it. If you did, then surely it is trivial. If you didn’t, then you have achieved a new insight. So let us just agree ‘The rationality axiom is true’, and then move on to more interesting insights (of which there are many; see Ludwig von Mises’s magnum opus, ‘Human Action: A Treatise on Economics’). — Virgo Avalytikh

I am not quite sure how one is supposed to "know" that "Humans act is such a way that aims at achieving their highest want at a given moment". The statement is not "information" at all. It tells us nothing about actual human behavior. But sure, it's still true.

Economics is relative in the following sense: an economist is able to tell you (fallibly) that a particular course of action will boost GDP, but they cannot tell you that boosting GDP is objectively a ‘good’ thing. Or, if they can, they can do so only in reference to some higher criterion that has been stipulated. Whether that criterion is objectively ‘good’ is, again, a judgement that lies outwith the purview of the economist qua economist. As any introductory textbook will tell you, economics is a Wertfrei discipline. — Virgo Avalytikh

I agree. I was talking in the context of economic philosophy, but I didn't quite make that clear. The philosophy of economics is not "wertfrei", would you agree? I'd say it's a subset of moral philosophy, since it deals with what economic system we ought to adopt.

This does not imply moral relativism at all, nor have I argued for moral relativism. My focus has been predominantly on rights, which is a different logical sphere. There are many things which I consider to be morally wrong, but not rights-violations (like committing adultery), and even certain things that are clear rights-violations, but are still probably the right thing to do, all things considered (like fraudulently over-charging somebody by a penny if doing so would prevent World War 3). Moral relativism is a red herring here, since I have not argued for it, nor is it an implication of anything I have argued. I am not a relativist in the moral sense, so we can just drop it there. — Virgo Avalytikh

I am aware you have not explicitly argued for moral relativism. My argument was that your argument parallels that of moral relativism, just in the sphere of economic philosophy, and that it would ultimately lead to moral relativism.

Hold on – there is an equivocation here which needs to be ironed out. It is one thing to imagine somebody foolishly trading away a house for a loaf of bread, and then using this as an example of how, sometimes, people enter into voluntary trades from which they emerge ‘worse off’. It is another thing to speak of someone being in a position where they have to give away their house for a loaf of bread, due to the desperation of their situation. They are two completely different points. — Virgo Avalytikh

I am not sure how my example of a starving man that trades his house for a loaf of bread can be seen as anything other than an act of desperation? Obviously if you are starving, you are forced to accept almost any trade in exchange for food. That circumstances can be exploited by people with a better bargaining position to force other people to make bad trades is exactly my point.

Supposing that we establish some criterion by which a house is ‘better’ than a loaf of bread, so that trading away the former for the latter is ‘bad’. This is something that anybody may do, poor or rich, desperate or not. Alright, then it is logically conceivable that somebody might enter into a peaceful trade and emerge ‘worse off’, by the criterion we have stipulated. So what? For what would this be an argument? I have used the fact that people typically know what is best for themselves as a pro-liberty argument, as an argument for the non-aggression principle. So the only way in which these unusual counter-instances actually have a bearing on the discussion if you are going to use them as an argument for aggression, i.e. sometimes, people must be forcibly protected from themselves, and coerced into doing the right thing. This is why I raised paternalism. Paternalism is the placing of limitations on someone’s liberty or autonomy for their own good. A paternalistic government does not recognise the right of individuals to engage in self-destructive behaviour, but considers it necessary to coerce them into doing the ‘right thing’. I am not sure if you are endorsing this, but if you are not, then such counter-instances are moot.

Suppose, on the other hand, that we are talking about somebody being in a position where they ‘have to’ trade away their house for a loaf of bread. Again, for what is this an argument, exactly? If you are on the brink of starvation, and the only way to save your life is to make such a trade, then you are better off for having made it, and this is consistent with my thesis. We might bemoan the fact that someone might be in such a desperate situation in the first place, but I don’t see how this has any immediate bearing on our discussion. Unless you are just taking for granted that the only way of alleviating poverty is through the instrumentality of the State (which is false). — Virgo Avalytikh

I think you analysis here is - literally - one sided. You don't seem to be considering that there is another angle to look at these "bad trades". Not as bad decisions someone happens to make, but as exploitation of the weaker by the stronger. Protecting those in vulvnerable positions from being taken advantage of is not paternalism. And this is relevant to our discussion because this protection is not something that the NAP covers. So while you can say that a state is not required to protect people from desperate situations, something in addition to the NAP is nevertheless necessary.

We can conduct similar thought-experiments about violations of the NAP. For every conceivably possible case in which someone enters into a peaceful trade and emerges ‘worse off’ by whatever criterion you care to stipulate, I can give you one in which an act of aggression make one party ‘worse off’ by that same criterion. We are talking about tendencies. Relatively speaking, mutual benefit is a norm and unilateral loss an exception when it comes to peaceful trade. The reverse is the case when it comes to aggression. — Virgo Avalytikh

Listing examples would be a context of creativity, but not an argument. I am still not sure what standard you apply for "mutual benefit", either. Is "mutual benefit" distinct from "everyone received something they contingently value"?

You were happy to agree that individuals tend to make decisions which are best for themselves, on the grounds that they are better acquainted with their respective situations than anyone else is. All I am doing is deducing the implications of this. — Virgo Avalytikh

I am not seeing the deduction. Could you spell it out for me in more detail?

If we look at the kinds of things which the NAP permits, they tend to work for the benefit of all voluntary participants (e.g. trade, friendships), and if we look at those things which are prohibited by the NAP, they tend to produce a clear loser (e.g. rape, murder, theft). I see this as being very difficult to argue with. — Virgo Avalytikh

It is difficult to argue with, but it's also not the thing we're arguing. I am not saying aggression is better than non-aggression in principle. I am questioning whether just non-aggression is sufficient to actually produce positive outcomes.