Because ‘ownership’ is not per se aggressive.
— Virgo Avalytikh
Haha. Because 'trespassing' is not per se aggressive? (I am just standing there). I get that that libertarians would respond: — ZhouBoTong
No, trespassing is aggressive, and prohibited under the NAP. Notice that ‘trespass’ presupposes property rights. I am trespassing on someone’s land because it is their land. If the land were unowned, or owned by me, it would not be trespass. This is actually rather a tidy illustration of what I have just argued. — Virgo Avalytikh
Because ‘ownership’ is not per se aggressive. — Virgo Avalytikh
No, ownership is aggressive, and prohibited under my understanding of the NAP (you use 'the NAP' like that means the same thing to everyone). Notice that 'ownership' presupposes property rights. Someone 'owns' the land, because there is a power that allows them to hold onto it. If land cannot be 'owned', then one cannot 'trespass'. This is actually a rather tidy illustration of what I have been arguing the whole time. — ZhouBoTong
If you take issue with my thesis that voluntary trade works for mutual benefit, then what I would expect you to do is to provide a counter-instance. But the example you have given actually isn’t. If you trade away a house for a loaf of bread, it is because you value the loaf of bread more than you value the house. You are better off for having made the trade rather than not having made it. This is perfectly compatible with what I have argued. — Virgo Avalytikh
This analysis is true, but makes no claim to comprehensiveness. Being in the position of having to sell one’s house for bread is regrettable, but I would simply say this of it: if you want to help the poor, what you certainly should not do is look at the option that they have actually chosen, and deprive them of that option (advice from which a good many legislators would benefit). — Virgo Avalytikh
Fraud (and misinformation, if it be relevantly fraudulent) is prohibited under the NAP (it is really just a form of theft). As for addiction and brand loyalty, these are not counter-instances to my thesis, either. The addict who pays for heroin values the heroin more than the money. — Virgo Avalytikh
Just so with the brand-loyalist, and the particular brand of something (heroin?) to which he is eccentrically attached. Value is a subjective relation; different people value different things differently (trade could not occur except on this basis). You might think that my commercial decisions are poor, but you aren’t the one making them. — Virgo Avalytikh
It is perhaps worth clarifying: when I speak of mutual benefit, I am speaking from an ex ante rather than ex post perspective (this is an important distinction when trying to understand the rationality axiom in Austrian economics). Voluntary trade is mutually beneficial because we both enter into a transaction with the anticipation of personal benefit. It is possible that our preferences may change after the transaction and we regret our decisions. — Virgo Avalytikh
Why ‘no ground to stand on’? There would be rights-enforcement and dispute-resolution services in a voluntary society; they would simply be private competing firms rather than an agency of monopolistic coercion. The question ‘Where does negligible pollution end and meaningful damage to property begin?’ is a difficult question, but not for distinctively libertarian reasons. Whatever answer one gives is no more or less arbitrary in a Stateless or Statist society. Practically, it would be determined by whichever arbitrator settles a dispute if it came to it. Any court – Statist or private – must draw the line, and that line will no doubt disappoint some people. So this isn’t a ‘libertarian’ problem.
However, a virtue of the private justice system is that it is polylegal. It may be that A and B take their dispute to one arbitrator, and A and C take their dispute to a different arbitrator. ‘Law’ is simply a function of dispute-resolution administered by the arbitrator. So there is no need for a ‘one size fits all’ solution. Multiple crossing lines of legal rules may apply over a single territory, which is of course far more conducive to the satisfaction of justice-consumers than a single set of legal rules being imposed uniformly over an arbitrary territory. — Virgo Avalytikh
This is true enough. But the observations I made about private property, communal property and the State, and their relative tendencies towards market failures, are true regardless of scale (though, the problems associated with communal property and the State become more and more prevalent as the scale increases). — Virgo Avalytikh
An ‘idea’ does not have agency. If the State is nothing more than an ‘idea’ then it cannot engage in concrete instances of purposeful action. ‘Ideas’ cannot tax, or implement justice, let alone bestow rights. The things we refer to as States are human associations, (the members of) which act in ways that are impermissible for non-States. I still do not see what is supposed to be so special about a State that it has unique right-bestowing capabilities. This has not been made clear at all. — Virgo Avalytikh
I’m sorry, I’m not being difficult. I just really don’t understand what you’re getting at here. — Virgo Avalytikh
This is frankly absurd. You're not "better off" if you sell your house for a loaf of bread. The next day, you will be hungry and homeless. Being "better off" requires your objective material situation to improve. Using it to mean simply "you gain something that you currently value" is a sleight of hand and turns your argument circular again. What you're actually saying is "if you engage in peaceful trade, you will receive whatever you trade for" which is trivially true but also completely meaningless in the context of this topic.
Claiming that situational value is the same as overall well-being is simply false. Your argument rests on overall well-being, not on situational value. — Echarmion
The problem doesn't lie with ex-ante and ex-post. Buying heroin to fuel your addiction is not good for you from an ex-ante position either. If you sell your house for a loaf of bread, it's clear ex-ante that your material wealth will decrease sharply. — Echarmion
There'd be no ground to stand on because there'd be no principles to apply. You need a starting point, some moral order that provides the axioms of the particular resolution. Usually, these are provided by constitutions or similarly central ideas, like environmentalism. Alternative dispute resolution mostly relies on the actors operating in some specific framework, like a business relationship, which had identifiable goals and overlapping interests. But what is supposed to provide this basis in the pollution example? How do you even start to formulate a rule? — Echarmion
There is nothing "unique" about a state. It's just an actually existing human association that serves as the necessary higher order to grant rights and is able to enforce them. You were the one that made this about states, specifically. My argument is that rights need to be granted by some higher order. — Echarmion
The difference between rights and interests,very simply put, is that your interest is what you want, and your right is what you deserve. If you are going to pay someone to enforce, you'd pay them to get what you want, not what you deserve. — Echarmion
The NAP is a libertarian principle. If you want to know what it means, you go ad fontes. — Virgo Avalytikh
But we are discussing libertarianism, so I have defined it as libertarians define it. — Virgo Avalytikh
Coercive aggressor, which has an inevitable growth and 'limited government' is utopian?Yes, it may, must and would be enforced. The important point to note here is that the NAP applies equally to everyone, everyone should be subject to it, and anyone should be able to enforce it. But the State is an aggressor, which reserves for itself (coercively) monopolistic privileges. This is where the difference lies. It violates the NAP, and uses force to reserve for itself the monopolistic privilege to do so. - What is more, 'limited government' is utopian. Once a government exists, its growth is inevitable. — Virgo Avalytikh
:smile:I don’t ‘hate’ the State
Coercive aggressor, which has an inevitable growth and 'limited government' is utopian? — ssu
Well, this seems not to be an economic debate, but simply an ideological debate where you put the NAP on a pedestal and treat it as a religious icon.
I've noticed that discourse nowdays tends to go in the way of a religious mantra. The state, central banks, large corporations, the free market all seem to become these incarnations of evil, just depending on what side you are (or sometimes on both sides). In the Soviet socialist bloc there was a perfect word for this. It was called a "lithurgy". All the correct words and endless nonsensical chatter without any true meaning. But it sounded politically correct (in the right circles). — ssu
Have you by the way ever read Max Weber? — ssu
Who are you to say that they are worse off for making the trade? — Virgo Avalytikh
Why are they doing it, if they do not value the bread more than they value the house? I am not saying it is a prudent decision. I couldn’t imagine doing it. But I couldn’t imagine paying for all sorts of things that other people pay for. If a person trades away their house for a loaf of bread, it is because they value the bread more than the house. This is a self-evident praxeological reality. — Virgo Avalytikh
alue is subjective, not objective. Value does not ‘inhere’ within the material substance of an object, like a physical quality. You cannot deduce the ‘value’ of an object from examining or dissecting it, as you could its mass or its chemical composition. It is a subjective relation, between (valuing) subject and (valued) object. It is a psychic phenomenon. As such, it varies from person to person, and (importantly here) from moment to moment. The only definitive measure of the ‘value’ of something is: how many units of some other resource is a person willing to part with in order to attain it? And this may change. As such, there is no such thing as value simpliciter. There is only value to a particular person at a particular moment. — Virgo Avalytikh
Since value is a subjective praxeological phenomenon which determines that individuals will pursue this purposeful action rather than that one, the mutual benefit which results from voluntary trade is one that is ex ante, rather than ex post. Now, it is also true that there is a general tendency to ex post benefit, since, as I have argued, individual persons tend to be the best judges of their own affairs, but this is more of a tendency than a praxeological axiom. — Virgo Avalytikh
This is simply paternalism. Do I think that taking heroin is a poor life decision? I certainly do. I think that paying hundreds of dollars (or equivalent) on vacations abroad is a poor decision. I think that eating at Macdonalds (ever!) is a poor decision. Other people might think that paying for an expensive degree is a poor decision. There might be a ‘right’ answer here, or there might not be. I’m not sure. But I have the humility to recognise that I don’t know what is best for other people. And even if I think that I do, I could very well be wrong. Reasoned humility is the essence of the libertarian position; it is precisely that which makes liberty important. My life is my business, and your life is yours. If someone wants to take heroin, I might make a private judgement about them, but it would be presumptuous for me to prohibit them from doing so. The right to self-determination implies a right to self-destruction. — Virgo Avalytikh
Suppose that we agree that people sometimes do make decisions which make themselves worse off. What is the Statist solution? Preventing people who are in desperate situations from taking the decisions which they actually choose? — Virgo Avalytikh
I don’t see how this has a bearing on the libertarianism/Statism discussion, for a number of reasons. Libertarianism does have principles to apply; the ones I have mentioned. To be sure, these principles do not yield a specific resolution to the question of precisely where negligible pollution drifts into meaningful damage to property, but neither does any constitution that I know of, nor a general commitment to ‘environmentalism’. Formulating a non-arbitrary resolution to such a dispute is no less difficult for a State’s judicial system. — Virgo Avalytikh
When you don't have absolutely any example of the ideal state of the society (the non-state libertarian paradise) which you model and every state ever is too suffocating for you, isn't that idealism?I said the concept of ‘limited government’ is utopian. My point is that a State with clearly circumscribed limits remaining within those limits in perpetuity is too much to reasonably hope for. The usual ‘checks and balances’ to which apologists for the State typically make appeal (the democratic process, the separation of powers, a written constitution) are not up to the task. — Virgo Avalytikh
But this is a purely semantic observation, rather than bearing any real philosophical substance. — Virgo Avalytikh
There's a salient difference between theft and murder. In the case of the former, some form of compensation, or even restitution, is possible. In the case of the latter, it's plainly not. — Constrained Maximizer
If my grandfather was a murderer, I may not justifiably lose my own life. — Constrained Maximizer
Regarding "aggressive marketing campaigns", I have to confess that I am having a hard time grasping just what in the world the argument is supposed to be. Yes, things can be colloquially described as "aggressive". No, that doesn't mean that they are aggressive in the philosophically relevant sense. One might as well accuse libertarians of illicitly "changing the language!" because the libertarian principle doesn't prohibit "passive-aggressive behavior" and doesn't compel us to be particularly kind to our fellows. — Constrained Maximizer
There are few problems with this. — Virgo Avalytikh
First, I would ask how much standardisation you believe to be necessary. Must it be absolute? — Virgo Avalytikh
If two nation-States both believe themselves (or their citizens) to have some sort of rightful claim over a territory, by what higher standard do they resolve their dispute? There is none, and so, just as two individuals with competing conventions would break out into violence and the winner would be determined by arbitrary force, so too would the two nations break out into war and, once again, justice would be the advantage of the stronger. Even a multinational political union could only ever be a partial solution. In order for a State to do the work you need it do philosophically, there really can be only one of them, and its scale must be global. Anything short of that, and the standardisation problem which you seem to be levelling at the an-cap position is equally applicable to a Statist situation. — Virgo Avalytikh
If, on the other hand, the standardisation does not strictly have to be absolute, then there is no reason why a State is necessary at all to preserve and enforce it. Once we establish the precedent that a convention can exist and be enforced at something less than a global scale, there is no longer any in-principle reason why its enforcement can only be done by the kind of thing that a State is. This is especially the case since, as I have pointed out on a number of occasions, the services of rights-enforcement and dispute-resolution can be (and, to a significant extent, are) provided by private agencies. — Virgo Avalytikh
Moreover, we ought not to underestimate the tendency of individuals to arrive at a spontaneous order in the absence of coercive institutions. — Virgo Avalytikh
Spontaneous order occurs because it is in individuals’ interests to enter into peaceful constant dealings with others, and it is private property and non-aggression which allows this to take place. And, while the integrity of such a system requires the means of enforcing one’s rights against aggressors, the very system of private property and non-aggression is capable of producing such services without violating anyone’s rights, by the standards of the system. — Virgo Avalytikh
When you don't have absolutely any example of the ideal state of the society (the non-state libertarian paradise) which you model and every state ever is too suffocating for you, isn't that idealism? — ssu
I've always seen libertarians as good and rather harmless people. Because in reality their society or state likely closest to their ideals would be a huge disappointment for... the libertarians. Social Democrats would enjoy very much a classic liberal state. What better environment for a social activist than a society with a functioning healthy economy and prosperity?
Let's face it, the society where Virgo Avalytikh would confine every one else here participating in this debate into a "re-education camp" where starting from the morning to the night the libertarian creed and NAP would be taught to us to mold us into true believers of libertarian values is simply an oxymoron. — ssu
how do our examples we have discussed NOT show that this semantic problem does indeed have philosophical implications? (I think trespassing is wholly non-violent - you think it is a definite example that violates the NAP - have you shown me I am wrong? or just pointed out that according to your definition, you are right?) — ZhouBoTong
I don't see that this is a good argument. — Metaphysician Undercover
Essentially you are arguing that if two nation-States come to war over an issue of territory rights, (like the Falklands Islands for example), this is no better than having all human beings acting like wild animals or very young children, running around fighting with each other over every single object which they seek to use. — Metaphysician Undercover
Notice that in the former case, the majority of people are living in peace for the majority of the time, with a few issues arising which might cause battles, while in the latter case, the majority of people are battling each other for the majority of the time. That is why I consider the former situation to be better than the latter. — Metaphysician Undercover
This is done through the educational institutions, not enforcement. Enforcement is only for the few who step out of line of the laws. If we stop funding educational institutions because they are an expensive State-run enterprise, and educate in other fragmented ways, standardized conventions will be lost to a multiplicity of fragmented conventions. — Metaphysician Undercover
Anyway, the idea of "spontaneous order" was disproven by science in its original form of "spontaneous generation", though some people have rejuvenated the idea as abiogenesis. Regardless of how you present it, "spontaneous order" is illogical and inconsistent with fundamental metaphysical principles. — Metaphysician Undercover
Here you go, wandering around in your circle, lost. You have explained the conventions as coming into existence through "spontaneous order", and now you say that the system of private property along with non-aggression is capable of producing the spontaneous order. See the circle? — Metaphysician Undercover
Since you seem not to see the significance of some of the concepts of which I have made use in this discussion (I don’t mean this in a condescending way, I’m just reading this off what you have said), let me restate the argument in more detail.
I have made the claim that voluntary trade works towards mutual benefit. This is true in at least two (related) senses. One of these senses corresponds to the perspective of entering into the trade in the first place (this is the ex ante perspective), and one of the senses corresponds to the perspective of having made the trade (ex post). — Virgo Avalytikh
At any given moment, conscious agents are engaged in purposeful behaviour. Man acts. Action is motivated by purpose, by a desire or want, which we aim to achieve, even if such a purpose is not always at the forefront of our conscious awareness. Purposeful action may be distinguished from involuntary action, like a muscular spasm. There isn’t much to say about involuntary action, since we cannot (directly) control it, so I will just restrict myself to purposeful action. At any given moment, we have a multitude of wants, and these wants are, in a sense, in conflict with one another. My desire to take a sip from my coffee cup and my desire to type a message are in conflict, in the sense that they are both competing for my time. No doubt there are at least two activities which I could conceivably engage in simultaneously without compromising either, but the important point is that I cannot do everything I want; my wants are insatiable, and resources (time, attention, physical space) are scarce. This is the fundamental economic problem.
So why do I end up doing what I do? Because my wants exist in a hierarchy, and, at a given moment, I will always act in such a way that aims at realising my highest want. This is the doctrine of ‘demonstrated preferences’. And it is self-evident: it is senseless to speak of someone prioritising a ‘lesser’ want over a ‘greater’ want, for, if it is prioritised, it is not really the ‘lesser’ want at all. It stands to reason, then, that in a trade, we each act in such a way that aims to attain something we value more at the expense of something we value less.
This is axiomatically true (which, I assume, is why you have used words like ‘circular’ and ‘trivial’ to describe it). But, to say that something is trivially true implies that it is true. There would be no need to repeat the fact that it is true if no one ever denied it. It is the fact that it is disputed that creates the need to repeat it. If you are happy to concede its truth, then I am happy to concede its triviality, and we can drop the point. But, until then, its axiomatic self-evidence is a point in its favour, not a point against it. — Virgo Avalytikh
‘Value’ is an important concept here too. Value is subjective, as I argued above. To speak of a ‘material worsening’ of someone’s condition presupposes an objective theory of value, which is wrong. If I trade away a house for a loaf of bread, it is because ‘having a loaf of bread’ was higher in my preference hierarchy than ‘having a house’. You might think that I am crazy for making such a trade, but that is beside the point. The question of what I value is demonstrated by my preferences. — Virgo Avalytikh
Having said this, there is still a meaningful sense in which I might be said to make ‘bad’ decisions. But this requires us to shift our perspective from ex ante to ex post. Our preferences may change from moment to moment, and this is especially the case when what was previously my highest want has been satisfied. Having traded away my house, I may immediately regret my decision. I might now have a whole host of new wants which only my old house could satisfy, and which my bread cannot. This does not serve as a counter-instance to what I have just argued about the logic of purposeful action. My claim is that purposeful agents aim at satisfying their highest want at a given moment. This is perfectly compatible with the fact that we might change our preferences, change our minds, regret past decisions, and so on. So we now have the question, ‘How likely is it that people are going to trade and interact with each other in such a way that they will not regret their decision later?’ And this returns us to the question of who knows what is best for me. And the answer is: me. I know what is best for myself better than anybody else does. I believe you were happy to agree to this point earlier. — Virgo Avalytikh
With this in mind, we can see that there is also an ex post sense in which voluntary trade works towards mutual benefit. If I know what is best for myself, then I know better than anyone else which trades I should enter into. This claim is weaker than the first, for it is a contingent generalisation with possible counter-instances, not a praxiological axiom. But it is true, and on this much we seem to have previously agreed. If, in general, individuals know what is best for themselves, then a fortiori they know what is best for themselves with regard to trade (and other interactions). — Virgo Avalytikh
So what is to be done about the fact that some people make decisions which are ‘bad’ for themselves? In the first place, we must have some basis upon which to recognise such a thing, and this is not as easy as you seem to think it is. That heroin is addictive and dangerous to your health does not imply that it is always ‘bad’ for someone to consume it. All it implies is that there is a cost to consuming it. But there is a cost to all actions, and often there are benefits too. Someone who desires to take heroin will no doubt make appeal to its recreational use; the pleasure it brings, or whatever reason people take it for (I don’t know). So now it has been complicated by the fact that there are net-considerations of benefit and cost. This is where subjective value is important: you might value the recreational benefits of heroin less than avoiding its costs, but someone else may not.
What you say of heroin is also true of fast food. It’s dangerous and it’s addictive (which is why I avoid it). Not to the same degree, of course, but in a way, this is precisely the point. This is a relative issue, and not an absolute one. And it is impossible to draw a line in a non-arbitrary way. The only natural resting point is simply to allow people to do what they want with their own lives.
What is the alternative? Only paternalism: only the use of ‘benevolent’ aggression, ‘kindly’ initiating force against people for their own good. Remember, I have been invoking the mutually beneficial nature of voluntary trade as an argument for private property and the NAP. If you think that my argument for these principles is undermined by the fact that some people make bad decisions for themselves, this only has any bearing if you are going to propose the 'kindly' use of force. Can I at least nail you down on this? Are you arguing paternalism here? If not, then all of this looks moot. — Virgo Avalytikh
I don't refer here to an utopia being equivalent to paradise, when I talk about utopia here. Perhaps better would be to talk about a fictional or a theoretic model of a society, because there is no record of this kind of non-state society having ever existed or emerged and the idea that it would (or could) emerge seems doubtful.No, for the simple reason that libertarianism is non-utopian (or non-paradisiacal). — Virgo Avalytikh
So it's modest for you to say there cannot be a state that is more closer to the minarchist state than to a totalitarian state, that all states are statist? That limited government is utopian, cannot happen because every government ever has simply grown and grown?Libertarianism is not so much a structural vision for ‘fashioning’ an ideal society, so much as a set of really very modest conditions on the basis of which it is possible for individuals to fashion their lives largely as they wish. — Virgo Avalytikh
I haven't made or intended to make any ad hominem attacks to my knowledge. What's so bad in saying that a libertarian society simply cannot morph into totalitarianism?Is it just my imagination, or are you getting steadily more ad hominem each time? — Virgo Avalytikh
But is that true? You do have the right to use violence for self defence. And isn't a State made from people that uphold the idea of that State so much, that even others also accept the existence of the state?I made the point above that the fundamental philosophical objection to the State is that it apparently has license to engage in acts of aggression which it prohibits others from engaging in — Virgo Avalytikh
Perhaps this Roman Catholic ought to be reminded of the Schism of 1054, which has lasted and divided the Christian Church since then. (And likely there are many Protestant Churches that have never throughout their own history experienced schism or division after their emergence, just like the Roman Catholic Church.)I once witnessed a debate between a Roman Catholic and a Protestant. The Catholic argued that his church, the Roman church, is single and unified, and has never throughout its history experienced schism or division. — Virgo Avalytikh
This is why I asked if the standardisation to which you make appeal must be absolute. If the argument is something like ‘standardisation beats disunity, the State breeds standardisation, anarchy breeds disunity, therefore the State beats anarchy’, then the argument is defeated fairly definitively simply by pointing out that Statism gives rise to its own kind of disunity. — Virgo Avalytikh
But there is more to it. What if the aggression to which Statism gives rise is of a scale that no anarchistic situation could ever dream of? Just look at the 20th century, the bloodiest century in history. 40 million dead in WW1, 85 million dead in WW2, and (estimates vary) probably more than 90 million deaths across various communist regimes. These are Statist phenomena. If anarchy obtained, and this was the death toll that resulted, I am sure you would see this as proof-positive that anarchy tends towards animalistic aggression. No doubt, this is passed off as a ‘blip’, as Statism ‘going wrong’. After all, not all States are created equal, and ours are the good guys. We can trust them to use their monopoly on force in the right way, rather than in a corrupt or murderous way. Well, the numbers are what they are, and this century is still young. We may see worse still before we’re through. By the time we do, it will be too late to recant. Send the ring back to Mordor and destroy it. No one can be trusted with it. That is just wisdom. — Virgo Avalytikh
One of the reasons why the State’s monopoly on force has perdured for so long is because it has successfully persuaded the vast majority of people that a State is absolutely necessary, and that there could not be a functioning society without one. — Virgo Avalytikh
For that very State to be the principal agent of ‘educating’ entire generations of people is as bone-chillingly Orwellian as the State dictating the language by which we may formulate such criticism. — Virgo Avalytikh
In effect, you have simply been making Hobbes’s argument: human interaction, in its natural state, is a war of all and against all, in which everyone aggresses against everyone else to benefit at another’s expense, and the only escape from this situation is for there to be a State which maintains order. There is already ample reason for doubting that States do in fact maintain any adequate degree of order, given that they are agencies of aggression, and are responsible for more violence and death than any private agent could dream of. — Virgo Avalytikh
The State only emerges in the second level. Prior to this, at the first level, there is cooperation, people being helpful, caring, loving and agreeable. But this attitude only exists if it's cultured. From this general attitude of caring for each other, comes communion, sharing, having things in common. A State can only come from this, having things in common.I will add, that I think this culturing consists of two important parts. One is a demonstration of unity, people working together in cooperation which shows that agreement is good, in Christianity this is referred to as love. The other is the standardized principles which are taught in schools, these help us to see things in the same way, facilitating agreement. So we have two levels of conditions which facilitate agreement. First there is the deep level, this is a disposition to be friendly, helpful, caring and loving. This provides the person with an attitude that agreement is good, and inspires the person to be agreeable. The first level provides the foundation, the conditions by which the second level may come into existence. When people have the underlying disposition to be agreeable, they will agree to having things in common, like schools and other institutions which are mostly State-run, or follow principles provided by the State. — Metaphysician Undercover
This is why I posted the essay by Friedman. ‘A Positive Account of Property Rights’ is concerned precisely with the question of how individuals bargain themselves up out of the Hobbesian state of nature. — Virgo Avalytikh
If nothing else, please read Friedman’s essay and watch the video on the iterated prisoner’s dilemma (10 minutes only). — Virgo Avalytikh
I think it's useful, in this context, to draw a parallel to moral relativism. I think what you are arguing here is a form of complete economic relativism that ultimately boils down to a complete moral relativism. — Echarmion
If I cannot argue that it's bad economically to have to give away your house essentially for free or starve, I cannot argue that it's morally bad to let people starve. — Echarmion
I don't refer here to an utopia being equivalent to paradise, when I talk about utopia here. — ssu
(the non-state libertarian paradise) — ssu
Perhaps better would be to talk about a fictional or a theoretic model of a society, because there is no record of this kind of non-state society having ever existed or emerged and the idea that it would (or could) emerge seems doubtful. — ssu
So it's modest for you to say there cannot be a state that is more closer to the minarchist state than to a totalitarian state, that all states are statist? — ssu
I haven't made or intended to make any ad hominem attacks to my knowledge. — ssu
Let's face it, the society where Virgo Avalytikh would confine every one else here participating in this debate into a "re-education camp" where starting from the morning to the night the libertarian creed and NAP would be taught to us to mold us into true believers of libertarian values is simply an oxymoron. — ssu
But is that true? You do have the right to use violence for self defence. And isn't a State made from people that uphold the idea of that State so much, that even others also accept the existence of the state? — ssu
All these killings and yet many would argue that the world has already passed into overpopulation. — Metaphysician Undercover
You talk about the State as if it is a person with the power of persuasion. It is not, and this is another good example of your doublespeak. — Metaphysician Undercover
Clearly I do not agree with the Hobbesian description. — Metaphysician Undercover
The State only emerges in the second level. Prior to this, at the first level, there is cooperation, people being helpful, caring, loving and agreeable. But this attitude only exists if it's cultured. From this general attitude of caring for each other, comes communion, sharing, having things in common. A State can only come from this, having things in common. — Metaphysician Undercover
Simple: I have defined ‘aggression’ in a particular way, in a way that is consonant with how the term is conventionally used in the libertarian tradition, and have argued that trespass does indeed constitute aggression on that definition. You may respond that you are defining ‘aggression’ in a different way, and that, on your definition, trespass is not aggression. To which I respond, ‘That’s fine’. I’m not claiming that trespass is aggression in the way you are defining it. I am claiming that trespass is aggression in the way I am defining it (and the way in which libertarians define it). I happily concede that, if I were defining ‘aggression’ in the way you are, I might be wrong. But since I’m not, I’m not. — Virgo Avalytikh
Medieval Iceland? Likely Iceland was then somewhat anarchistic (likely not as much as present Hollywood with it's silly biker-gang Vikings depict the societies to be). So was my country, definately! After all, here there was no king, no formal state, and no feudalism, yet the Vikings didn't conquer this place (hence a common defence existed).This actually isn’t true. Iceland was anarchistic for the first three centuries of its existence, and had quite an elegant justice system. — Virgo Avalytikh
This isn't an answer to my question at all. I asked if a state can be more closer to the minarchist state than to a totalitarian state, or if you argue that all states cannot be anything else than statist.Libertarianism is modest in the sense that it requests only that persons not be aggressed against; a modest request indeed. It’s really not much to ask. — Virgo Avalytikh
Sorry then for trying to make the point that libertarianism cannot lead to totalitarianism.I took this as rather ad hominem, as it was directed at me, — Virgo Avalytikh
Suppose, on the other hand, that we are talking about somebody being in a position where they ‘have to’ trade away their house for a loaf of bread. Again, for what is this an argument, exactly? If you are on the brink of starvation, and the only way to save your life is to make such a trade, then you are better off for having made it, and this is consistent with my thesis. — Virgo Avalytikh
Libertarianism is modest in the sense that it requests only that persons not be aggressed against; a modest request indeed. It’s really not much to ask. — Virgo Avalytikh
Your argument hinges on the claim that the State gives rise to a greater degree of standardisation than does a Stateless situation; that, under Statism, peaceful order is the norm and aggression is the exception, and that, under anarchy, we are wild animals engaged in perpetual aggression. — Virgo Avalytikh
It would be helpful for us to remind ourselves that the ‘standardisation’ we are concerned with is of a specific kind, namely a system of rights. This is the only reason why ‘convention’ entered the discussion, because rights are a convention, and convention requires at least some measure of standardisation for it to be meaningful. So the question before us is whether a State really does do the job that your argument needs it to do, in terms of creating a standardised system of rights, relative to anarchy. — Virgo Avalytikh
I have attacked your argument at both ends. First, I have argued that the State is a miserable candidate for being a rights-standardiser, rights-protector, rights-bestower, or however you would wish to phrase it. I argued that States are engaged in perpetual aggression towards their citizens (a point to which you have not responded at all), and that the historical record excites serious distrust of the claim that battle is some sort of occasional exception to a State’s normally ordered activity. The hundreds of millions of deaths which I enumerated in my previous post are to be accounted for by wars between States, and States murdering their own citizens. Does this give you a moment’s pause? It seems not. all you have to say is: — Virgo Avalytikh
To be sure, the State does not have its own inherent agency. Only individual persons have this. There is nothing objectionable in speaking about ‘collective agency’ so long as we recognise that it is an abstraction, and that we be careful not to smuggle in any untoward ontological commitments (like the idea that groups have their own independent capacity for purposeful action). As Murray Rothbard says, ultimately, there are no ‘governments’; there are only certain individuals who act in a manner that is recognised as ‘governmental’. Recognising this is much more of a threat to Statism than an apologetic for it. It dispels the notion that there is anything peculiar about a State (or the individuals comprising it) which grants it license to engage in activities which non-States do not. You yourself have spoken of the State as though it has agency, on numerous occasions. — Virgo Avalytikh
So it looks like we agree on this much: peaceful cooperation, and standardisation regarding rights, are possible independently of the State. You extoll the virtues of education in further cultivating this standardisation, but there is no reason why this education could not occur under anarchy (indeed, hardly any education really occurs under Statism, see Caplan’s book I mentioned). — Virgo Avalytikh
Where does this leave us in the trajectory of the discussion? We began with the principles of right-libertariansm, private property rights and the NAP. You claimed that the NAP was useless (deceptive!) in the absence of a system of rights. ‘Rights’ are a service bestowed on an individual by the State, a service provided by the State (there is the State as agent!). I have agreed that the NAP does depend on a system of rights, and that rights are conventions, which of course require a certain measure of standardisation. The disagreement from this point has seemed to involve the question of whether I can sensibly hold to a system of rights, given my disavowal of the State. My response has been to point out that, not only is the State a truly miserable candidate for rights-bestower (or whatever job it is supposed to do here), it is also perfectly possible for spontaneous order and cooperation to arise in the absence of a State. This latter point is one which you now seem prepared to concede. So, as things stand, I feel like my position is vindicated. — Virgo Avalytikh
Supposing that we establish some criterion by which a house is ‘better’ than a loaf of bread, so that trading away the former for the latter is ‘bad’. This is something that anybody may do, poor or rich, desperate or not. Alright, then it is logically conceivable that somebody might enter into a peaceful trade and emerge ‘worse off’, by the criterion we have stipulated. So what? For what would this be an argument? I have used the fact that people typically know what is best for themselves as a pro-liberty argument, as an argument for the non-aggression principle. So the only way in which these unusual counter-instances actually have a bearing on the discussion if you are going to use them as an argument for aggression, i.e. sometimes, people must be forcibly protected from themselves, and coerced into doing the right thing. This is why I raised paternalism. Paternalism is the placing of limitations on someone’s liberty or autonomy for their own good. A paternalistic government does not recognise the right of individuals to engage in self-destructive behaviour, but considers it necessary to coerce them into doing the ‘right thing’. I am not sure if you are endorsing this, but if you are not, then such counter-instances are moot.
Suppose, on the other hand, that we are talking about somebody being in a position where they ‘have to’ trade away their house for a loaf of bread. Again, for what is this an argument, exactly? If you are on the brink of starvation, and the only way to save your life is to make such a trade, then you are better off for having made it, and this is consistent with my thesis. We might bemoan the fact that someone might be in such a desperate situation in the first place, but I don’t see how this has any immediate bearing on our discussion. Unless you are just taking for granted that the only way of alleviating poverty is through the instrumentality of the State (which is false). — Virgo Avalytikh
I said that I would happily concede the triviality of the rationality axiom if you concede its truth. I was hoping that you would cooperate with this and concede its truth so that we can move on. Instead, you have simply restated its triviality, which doesn’t advance us at all. As I pointed out, its axiomatic self-evidence is only an objection if the principle is accepted uncontroversially. It is only because it is disputed that it bears restating. — Virgo Avalytikh
Contrary to your characterisation, the rationality axiom is not simply that ‘humans act in the way humans act’. If it were, I would have formulated it that way. It might be an implication of the axiom, but that is nothing special, since all tautologies are implications of everything (including contradictions). Humans act is such a way that aims at achieving their highest want at a given moment. Is this new information? Is this a valuable insight? That depends on whether you already knew it. If you did, then surely it is trivial. If you didn’t, then you have achieved a new insight. So let us just agree ‘The rationality axiom is true’, and then move on to more interesting insights (of which there are many; see Ludwig von Mises’s magnum opus, ‘Human Action: A Treatise on Economics’). — Virgo Avalytikh
Economics is relative in the following sense: an economist is able to tell you (fallibly) that a particular course of action will boost GDP, but they cannot tell you that boosting GDP is objectively a ‘good’ thing. Or, if they can, they can do so only in reference to some higher criterion that has been stipulated. Whether that criterion is objectively ‘good’ is, again, a judgement that lies outwith the purview of the economist qua economist. As any introductory textbook will tell you, economics is a Wertfrei discipline. — Virgo Avalytikh
This does not imply moral relativism at all, nor have I argued for moral relativism. My focus has been predominantly on rights, which is a different logical sphere. There are many things which I consider to be morally wrong, but not rights-violations (like committing adultery), and even certain things that are clear rights-violations, but are still probably the right thing to do, all things considered (like fraudulently over-charging somebody by a penny if doing so would prevent World War 3). Moral relativism is a red herring here, since I have not argued for it, nor is it an implication of anything I have argued. I am not a relativist in the moral sense, so we can just drop it there. — Virgo Avalytikh
Hold on – there is an equivocation here which needs to be ironed out. It is one thing to imagine somebody foolishly trading away a house for a loaf of bread, and then using this as an example of how, sometimes, people enter into voluntary trades from which they emerge ‘worse off’. It is another thing to speak of someone being in a position where they have to give away their house for a loaf of bread, due to the desperation of their situation. They are two completely different points. — Virgo Avalytikh
Supposing that we establish some criterion by which a house is ‘better’ than a loaf of bread, so that trading away the former for the latter is ‘bad’. This is something that anybody may do, poor or rich, desperate or not. Alright, then it is logically conceivable that somebody might enter into a peaceful trade and emerge ‘worse off’, by the criterion we have stipulated. So what? For what would this be an argument? I have used the fact that people typically know what is best for themselves as a pro-liberty argument, as an argument for the non-aggression principle. So the only way in which these unusual counter-instances actually have a bearing on the discussion if you are going to use them as an argument for aggression, i.e. sometimes, people must be forcibly protected from themselves, and coerced into doing the right thing. This is why I raised paternalism. Paternalism is the placing of limitations on someone’s liberty or autonomy for their own good. A paternalistic government does not recognise the right of individuals to engage in self-destructive behaviour, but considers it necessary to coerce them into doing the ‘right thing’. I am not sure if you are endorsing this, but if you are not, then such counter-instances are moot.
Suppose, on the other hand, that we are talking about somebody being in a position where they ‘have to’ trade away their house for a loaf of bread. Again, for what is this an argument, exactly? If you are on the brink of starvation, and the only way to save your life is to make such a trade, then you are better off for having made it, and this is consistent with my thesis. We might bemoan the fact that someone might be in such a desperate situation in the first place, but I don’t see how this has any immediate bearing on our discussion. Unless you are just taking for granted that the only way of alleviating poverty is through the instrumentality of the State (which is false). — Virgo Avalytikh
We can conduct similar thought-experiments about violations of the NAP. For every conceivably possible case in which someone enters into a peaceful trade and emerges ‘worse off’ by whatever criterion you care to stipulate, I can give you one in which an act of aggression make one party ‘worse off’ by that same criterion. We are talking about tendencies. Relatively speaking, mutual benefit is a norm and unilateral loss an exception when it comes to peaceful trade. The reverse is the case when it comes to aggression. — Virgo Avalytikh
You were happy to agree that individuals tend to make decisions which are best for themselves, on the grounds that they are better acquainted with their respective situations than anyone else is. All I am doing is deducing the implications of this. — Virgo Avalytikh
If we look at the kinds of things which the NAP permits, they tend to work for the benefit of all voluntary participants (e.g. trade, friendships), and if we look at those things which are prohibited by the NAP, they tend to produce a clear loser (e.g. rape, murder, theft). I see this as being very difficult to argue with. — Virgo Avalytikh
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