That's my point - knowledge as a skill is different from knowledge as a belief - as you point out.

That's my point - knowledge as a skill is different from knowledge as a belief. — Sam26

I totally agree with you. Practical skills have nothing to do with belief. How you apply your skills does but that is something entirely different.

The reason I brought this subject up, is that not only are there beliefs that are non-linguistic, there is also knowledge that's nonlinguistic (knowledge as a skill). How do we know this is the case, we can observe it in the actions of others. This is how we know there are other minds, we observe the actions of others, which are the same or similar to our own actions.

That's my point - knowledge as a skill is different from knowledge as a belief - as you point out. — Sam26

It's not. Knowledge by skill is simply the means of testing, or justifying, your knowledge as a belief, by applying it.

The reason I brought this subject up, is that not only are there beliefs that are non-linguistic, there is also knowledge that's nonlinguistic (knowledge as a skill). How do we know this is the case, we can observe it in the actions of others. This is how we know there are other minds, we observe the actions of others, which are the same or similar to our own actions. — Sam26

I don't disagree because as Ildefonso shows, he had both beliefs and skills in being a gardener. He had no formal teaching. He taught himself by experience without any language. Organizing nature into neat little groups is what the mind does and language is a tool that helps us do that more efficiently - especially for communicating. Observing plants grow over time provides you with the same information as some professor and textbook does. Using what you have learned tests your knowledge. There are gardeners of varying skill - all based on the beliefs that they have about plants which were accumulated through learning by doing and/or taught. Even the best still learn new things. Your skill is a reflection of what you know.

When Ildefonso learned what words were for, he started asking what the shared name was for door, window, etc. He already knew what a door was, he just didn't know it's shared name. He already had beliefs about the door, but simply didn't know the symbol that we use to communicate the idea of them. When he learned what words were for, he wasn't shocked that there were suddenly doors and windows. He was shocked that there was a shared symbol for those things, and that people use those symbols to communicate the idea for those things. He could already use doors. He just couldn't use the word, "door". He had a belief in doors, but not in words.

Let me say a few more things about basic or bedrock beliefs, and I'm mainly thinking of prelinguistic or nonlinguistic beliefs. First, Moore's claim that he knows he has a hand, is one such belief, i.e., we know that Moore is incorrect to say that he knows such a belief for many of the reasons Wittgenstein points out. The reason Moore is making such a claim is to attack the skeptic (extreme skepticism), who claims that one can't know such a thing. One cannot know, for example, that there are physical objects. Thus, Moore starts out by making a claim that most everyone seems to agree with, viz., "Here is one hand," and "Here is another," and I know it. After all who would deny such a claim.

Second, how do we know that Moore's beliefs are not knowledge? We know for various reasons. As I pointed out above we know this belief is formed without justification, it's part of our inherited background. I find myself believing that I have hands as I interact with them in the world around me. These beliefs are causally formed through sensory experience. It has nothing to do with knowledge as a belief, especially since knowledge as a belief requires language.

Another reason that these beliefs are not what Moore thinks they are is that they cannot be doubted sensibly, which is why Wittgenstein points out the negation of Moore's propositions - "I don't know this is a hand." Remember we are talking about normal circumstances. Wittgenstein points out that there are instances where it would make sense to doubt such a claim, but Moore's context is not such a context. What would a doubt or mistake look like in Moore's context. Moore is giving a lecture before an audience and holding up his hands.

If you know something such as Moore is suggesting, then you are able to justify how it is that you know it, but what would such a justification look like? Do I observe the hand from different angles to make sure it's my own? Do I feel it or pinch it to make sure I know it's my hand? No, none of this happens. We find that we believe such things and many others as part of the world around us, outside the language-games of epistemology. These are some of the reasons why they are referred to as bedrock beliefs or foundational beliefs.

We just disagree when it comes to knowledge as a skill. I have to move on, I don't want to get stuck on that particular disagreement.

You probably need to resolve the disagreement in order to move on. You can't move on when you have a disagreement. Well, you can, but it would be by yourself, or only with those that agree with you, but that would just be preaching to the choir.

I'm not really writing to debate with people on this subject. Although I'll entertain a challenge or two. I'm just writing to explain what I've gleaned from my study of On Certainty. People will either see the points or they won't. I do appreciate the input though.

some of the reasons why they are referred to as bedrock beliefs or foundational beliefs. — Sam26

I'm interested in what you're saying and hope you don't mind continuing comments.

As I've said I don't understand the primacy you give to 'belief'. What for example is added to the above phrase by the word 'beliefs'? It seems to me 'bedrock' and 'foundation' would be perfectly clear without them, as metaphors.

It feels like you are shifting away from your Wittgensteinian core, as in my eyes language games are all about knowing-how: skilful use. 'Belief' is relatively unimportant then. As Harry says, to proclaim a belief is to exhibit the skill in making such proclamations; it's the tying the shoelaces that counts. It counts for me, as something the shoelace-tier knows. They may believe they are solving the final problem that makes the universe whole, but to me they are tying shoes, and their beliefs are their own affair.

As I've said I don't understand the primacy you give to 'belief'. What for example is added to the above phrase by the word 'beliefs'? It seems to me 'bedrock' and 'foundation' would be perfectly clear without them, as metaphors. — mcdoodle

I don't understand this mcdoodle, the whole subject revolves around the idea of beliefs, if we're not talking about foundational or bedrock beliefs, what are we talking about?

It feels like you are shifting away from your Wittgensteinian core, as in my eyes language games are all about knowing-how: skilful use. 'Belief' is relatively unimportant then. As Harry says, to proclaim a belief is to exhibit the skill in making such proclamations; it's the tying the shoelaces that counts. It counts for me, as something the shoelace-tier knows. They may believe they are solving the final problem that makes the universe whole, but to me they are tying shoes, and their beliefs are their own affair. — mcdoodle

You're correct, languge-games do involve skills, Wittgenstein was skillful in showing us the different uses of words in different language-games. However, Wittgenstein not only showed us his skills in doing this kind of philosophy, he also showed us his beliefs about what language-games told us about language as a whole. His beliefs about language are what's important, and that's what I've focused on.

The structure as I see it, consists of the world, minds, and language; and the relationship between these three. The world is the backdrop, and we find ourselves existing in it. Our mind helps us to interpret the world (it's in the relationship between our minds and the world that bedrock or basic beliefs form); so in a sense our mind is the center between the world and language. — Sam26

Keep in mind that I am not trying to give a Wittgensteinian view, although I am using some or many of Wittgenstein's ideas, i.e., I am trying to expand on the idea of bedrock beliefs.

I asked in the OP, "What is the structure of our beliefs?" In a later post I suggested that the structure consisted of three things (the world, minds, and language). There is a kind of scaffolding of beliefs that takes place between these three. However, if we look at history, the world and minds come first, i.e., before language (at least before a sophisticated language). This is why I have talked about prelinguistic beliefs, which I believe is essential to understanding bedrock beliefs, at least prelinguistic bedrock beliefs. My idea of beliefs is that beliefs extend beyond language, and that the best evidence of the existence of such beliefs is in our actions. Our actions show what we believe. If I open a door, this action, shows that I believe there is a door there. Our actions are a constant source of what we believe apart from statements or propositions. Wittgenstein suggests this very thing, "...we can see from their actions that they [primitive man] believe certain things definitely, whether they express this belief or not [my emphasis] (OC, 284)."

If we want a good representation of what a prelinguistic bedrock belief looks like, then we simply need to look at those actions that express beliefs apart from statements or propositions. Almost any interaction with the world (the background) shows that we believe certain things. Even moving from point A to point B within the world shows that we believe in certain relationships between ourselves and the world.

What is the significance of these beliefs? The significance is that these beliefs arise quite apart from any conceptual or linguistic framework, which, I believe, is partly why Wittgenstein imparts a certain status to Moorean propositions. The belief, "This is my hand," although expressed linguistically using a statement, arises quite apart from language, i.e., my actions everyday demonstrate or show my belief that I have hands. A further point of significance is that such beliefs (bedrock) are outside any epistemological justification. Why? Because these kinds of beliefs arise quite apart from epistemology. Epistemology is linguistic, and the concepts used in epistemology are linguistic. There is no sense of justification when I open the door, I just do it. Many actions are like this, especially when looking back before language.

Wittgenstein talks about bedrock or foundational beliefs within the scope of language (for the most part), and it is with this scope that many other kinds of bedrock beliefs are formed. For example, the game of chess is based on rules, and these rules are foundational to the game. However, the difference between these foundational or bedrock rules, and the ones I demonstrated above, is that the rules of chess are expressed in language. The context drives the difference between these kinds of bedrock or foundational beliefs. This is partly what I mean by a scaffolding of these beliefs.

If I open a door, this action, shows that I believe there is a door there. — Sam26

You can say that this type of action requires "belief", but is that really true? Perhaps it's better to say that there is something categorically similar to belief involved with these actions, which are not necessarily "belief" as we normally use the word.

We see that plants respond to sunlight. Would you say that this means that the plant believes that the sun is there? If not, then how does this differ from your door example?

For myself I think 'prelinguistic' is a red herring, though I know many are wedded to it. Instead I feel that it's a mistake to distinguish the linguistic from action. To use or interpret language is to act, it's not an alternative to action. — mcdoodle

Prelinguistic is just a way of talking about particular kinds of beliefs "wedded" to actions apart from linguistic actions. — Sam26

I would go as far as saying prelinguistic beliefs are the foundation of all thought. I explain with example:

1. Baby is hungry
2. Mother comes in room, turns on light
3. Baby is happily drinking milk
4. Mother stops feeding, turns off light, and leaves room

Darkness -> Light = good
Lignt -> Darkness - bad
Persistence of association: permanent.

Yabba dabba doo!

In Wittgenstein's critique of Moorean propositions (common sense propositions) he points out over and over again that it is improper to use the word know in reference to them (at least generally). For example, it is generally improper to say "I know I have hands," but one can say, "I believe it." I need not give grounds when I say "I believe p," but when saying "I know p," it is normally a requirement, i.e., how do you know. Saying "I know..." often means that I have the proper grounds, as Wittgenstein points out.

What is known rests on a chain of reasoning, however, that chain comes to an end at some point. That end point is what is bedrock, viz., a bedrock belief. No further grounds can be given, no further doubts entertained.

What Wittgenstein found interesting about Moore's propositions is that they seem to play a peculiar role in our epistemological framework. Bedrock beliefs fulfill a special logical role in epistemology. They support the structure of epistemology. Understanding this, solves two problems, 1) the infinite regress problem, and 2) the problem of circularity.

Saying "I know..." often means that I have the proper grounds, as Wittgenstein points out. — Sam26

Yes, Wittgenstein is simply correct. "I know I have a hand" or then more basic sense experience that makeup that "knowledge" if you prefer (i.e. I know there's something I grab things with that people call "a hand"), is not knowledge but belief. It's simply the axioms that makeup our knowledge framework. It's knowledge in the sense that we believe it to be true, but it's not knowledge in the sense that we have prior knowledge to justify it. It's a confusion that results from simply having no practical need to distinguish between what is fundamental and we believe true and everyone agrees with what we believe is true that is not fundamental.

We can also criticize the word belief because we only "use" the word belief when a choice is involved. For instance "I believe the witness" implies there's a plausible choice not be believe, just as "I believe in Christ" implies there's a plausible choice not to believe. Foundational beliefs aren't this type of belief either, they are closer to knowledge as is colloquially used. "I know I have a hand" makes more sense in common situations than "I believe I have a hand".

What Wittgenstein found interesting about Moore's propositions is that they seem to play a peculiar role in our epistemological framework. Bedrock beliefs fulfill a special logical role in epistemology. They support the structure of epistemology. Understanding this, solves two problems, 1) the infinite regress problem, and 2) the problem of circularity. — Sam26

Obviously this is true, but it's not a new analysis (it's just the categories of Aristotle), rather (I would argue) it's rediscovered analysis after descriptive historical-psychological theories of our beliefs created a philosophical paradox that we need beliefs to understand those psychological theories of one sort or another. In an age where foundational beliefs are no longer widely agreed (philosophers before didn't have this issue because they had enough foundational beliefs that everyone did actually agree on to have constructive debates) a meta-explanation of people's beliefs and even our own becomes tempting (I don't know what's true, but I am comforted by a feeling that at least I know why people believe incompatible things and my own beliefs are at least explained by this same meta-theory even if I don't feel my own beliefs are really true).

However, we can't actually get to a meta understanding of how our beliefs emerge personally, psychologically, dialectically or historically without beliefs that make sense of those theories. The attempt at a meta understanding of ourselves as a "true theory" is useless as we already need foundational beliefs for a theory about foundational beliefs to be intelligible (therefore it resolves nothing other than that our foundational beliefs imply our foundational beliefs; which we should expect, it would only be a concern if this wasn't the case, and therefore our beliefs about how foundational beliefs emerge cannot be knowledge as there is no option for analysis to lead to different conclusions that chains of reasoning will resolve; we can already know we are going to believe what we already believe at the start of the knowledge process (i.e. we already foundationally believe the beliefs and that our meta-analysis will conform to these beliefs; it is to claim otherwise, that I have meta-knowledge that leave my own foundational beliefs open, as any meta theory would need to actually do to be a meta theory, that is the analytical mistake that we can know we shouldn't ever believe); I believe a key point of Wittgenstein, though I don't foundationally believe it to be so, as I could be wrong about what I think I know about him).

Wittgenstein also clearly understood that you can make as many symbolic substitutes for foundational beliefs as you want, but that never creates new knowledge, just mostly new philosophical sounding babbling (coming up with new words to replace old words), nor does it ever create new options of different foundational belief, only new options to confuse ourselves (about what we think we know and why, including what we think we know about ourselves).

I'm not sure if Wittgenstein or Moore ever placed things in the context of culturally what goes wrong if you try to prove or deny foundational beliefs (as happens in every scientism), but After Virtue is a good discussion of what happens culturally when foundational beliefs are no longer in sufficient agreement to have constructive debate.

In simpler terms, a meta theory of beliefs we can know exists, but is to us an intellectual noumena of which our self-justification is the phenomena we observe (including our speculation about the belief process thing in itself).

Saying "I know..." often means that I have the proper grounds, as Wittgenstein points out. — Sam26


Yes, Wittgenstein is simply correct. "I know I have a hand" or then more basic sense experience that makeup that "knowledge" if you prefer (i.e. I know there's something I grab things with that people call "a hand"), is not knowledge but belief. It's simply the axioms that makeup our knowledge framework. It's knowledge in the sense that we believe it to be true, but it's not knowledge in the sense that we have prior knowledge to justify it. — boethius

I can think of a way around this, at least for some aspects of experience. As you later note, belief is hard to pin down, so I'll here be assuming something along the lines that all experiences are tacitly believed.

That “I know I have two hands” might not be the best example, so, instead, I’ll make use of “I know that I experience having two hands”.

As a caveat: Being a fallibilist, I could come up with a general argument for why this belief is not infallible. Rather than saying it outright, inklings of this argument might indirectly show up in what follows. That said:

The tacit belief that I experience myself to have two hands, upon enquiry, is something for which I cannot find any justifiable alternative to once I explicitly address this belief (let an unjustifiable alternative be, for example, the just-so statement that I make, without grounding in either experience or reasoning, stipulating that “I don’t so experience having two hands). Firstly, any conceived (and justifiable) alternative to the given state of affairs introduces some degree of potential error, irrespective of how small this degree of error might be. Nevertheless, one can go so far as BIVs and Cartesian daemons – and my experience of having two hands would still lack justifiable alternatives to me which so experiences having two hands. That my experience of having two hands is, to me, devoid of any justifiable alternative I can fathom relative to this experience will not of itself prove the truth of my so experiencing to have two hands with infallible certainty: The lack of justifiable alternatives can well be due to my subjective faculties of imagination being, by their very nature, limited; and were someone to hypothetically know everything there is to know in principle, maybe such alternative would then be fathomed. Notwithstanding, it could also be the case that I cannot fathom justifiable alternatives to this experience on grounds that no such alternatives in fact exist – and if no conceivable alternatives to my so experiencing can in principle exist, then my so experiencing would necessarily be true. (A tangential emphasis: this doesn't hold vice versa: sometimes what is true can be fathomed to have alternatives.) This state of affairs would then necessarily be the only actual state of affairs that is ontologically, even metaphysically, possible – and not even a supposed omniscient being could discover a scenario of how it could be otherwise.

So, I (or anybody else for that matter) can thereby obtain a JTB account of “I experience having two hands”. I cannot fathom any possible (and justifiable) alternative to my experiencing having two hands while I experience having two hands, which is what would occur were this experience to be true. My bedrock, and typically tacit, belief that I experience having two hands is thereby justified to be true. And, here taking a shortcut, I have as much reason to believe it’s true as I do to believe anything else is true. That I experience having two hands thereby is a JTB and, hence, a known.

The only potential flaw I see in this argument is going from something being justified to be true to something being in fact true. But this has more to do with epistemology in general than with particular bedrock beliefs such as that of “I know I experience having two hands”.

As a caveat: Being a fallibilist, I could come up with a general argument for why this belief is not infallible. — javra

This is not really an issue. There is no problem in knowing that the noumena maybe otherwise than what we are inclined to imagine about it, that whatever my hands are "in themselves" maybe different to what I naturally assume (a Cartesian Demon induced hallucination or the modern ersatz equivalent of a simulation); the "foundational belief" is that, whatever society calls them or I call them and whatever it is in itself that I don't really know: I experience having two hands and this is a foundational belief.

Yes, I can't conceive of believing I don't have two hands right now, but this isn't a meta-theory explaining why I believe I have two hands, it is simply the definition of believing I have two hands and nothing else.

A scenario that would lead me to believe I don't have two hands wouldn't invalidate my foundational belief I was experiencing having two hands before (assuming I remember so experiencing), it would just reveal I have other foundational beliefs that allow me to interpret the experience of not having two hands and the experience of realizing I was under such intense hallucination that I previously experienced something else. The truth value is not about the noumena of the hands, but about the phenomena of experiencing and believing those experiences in a foundational sense. I can conceive of new experience, including hallucination and simulation, but I cannot conceive of new experience that would not be the new foundational belief of what I would then be experiencing: I think with the category of time and I conceive of every experience at every moment as foundationally informative.

The point Wittgenstein, and Kant before him and Aristotle before him, are all making is that our foundational beliefs (our categories of thought) cannot be analysed beyond a simple clarification of ordinary language. To say something "is true", "is actually true", "is the case", "is the case that's it's true", "corresponds to a state of affairs that exists", "obtains", "a valid and sound conclusion", "coheres to everything else I know and the alternatives would be incompatible with every other thing I believe or know", and so on, do not create new philosophical content; they may usefully clarify ordinary language on occasion, but are just different ways of saying "it's true", and our foundational belief that some things are true and what that means has no further analytic content.

I agree with the contents of your reply. My emphasis, however, was on bedrock beliefs holding the capacity of being justified to be true. And, by extension, of certain bedrock beliefs then holding the capacity to constitute knowledge in the JTB sense of the term.

and our foundational belief that some things are true and what that means has no further analytic content. — boethius

I'll argue that we are psychologically incapable, even in principle, of forsaking the notion of truth as that which is in accordance with what is real. We might abstract the term truth in multiple ways, going even so far as to say there is no truth, but in all these cases there will remain our psychological dependency on what is existentially real.

Would this not qualify as "further analytic content"?

My emphasis, however, was on bedrock beliefs holding the capacity of being justified to be true. — javra

That there cannot be a justification is the concept of bedrock beliefs.

I'll argue that we are psychologically incapable, even in principle, of forsaking the notion of truth as that which is in accordance with what is real. — javra

Sure, but this adds no content to our idea of truth. Real is just another word for truth to add to our list; useful in certain situations to clarify ordinary language but adding no new content.

We might abstract the term truth in multiple ways, going even so far as to say there is no truth, but in all these cases there will remain our psychological dependency on what is existentially real. — javra

This kind of process as not creating any knew knowledge, just potential confusion, is exactly what Wittgenstein is talking about from what I understand. Certainly what I'm talking about.

Not that it's false, that's the key to understand, it can be a trivial true extension of what we already believe. However, it is easy to make a false analytic step and enter confusion -- we cannot abstract our concept of truth away without our current concept at every step and at the end: a proposition cannot be true and false at the same time and with the same respect.

That it's enticing to try to "make" new knowledge with the sort of meta-theory you describe is what's to be guarded against. Our meta-theory about belief cannot but confirm what we already believe, the reasons for believing our meta-theory is "actually true" are trivial extensions of what we believe without the meta theory; we cannot find new knowledge there, we only risk confusion by extending trivial implication beyond what we are able to properly analyse.

That there cannot be a justification is the concept of bedrock beliefs. — boethius

In a way I agree. Yet, as per Aristotle, this addresses the laws by which beliefs become justified. However, as to so termed bedrock beliefs such as that of experiencing having two hands, I gave an example of how such may be justified.

Sure, but this adds no content to our idea of truth. Real is just another word for truth to add to our list; useful in certain situations to clarify ordinary language but adding no new content. — boethius

I'll acknowledge that for all of Wittgenstein's sometimes profound insights, I don't find things to be a game of words all the way down - such that turtles are replaced with words. To me, meaningful words have referents to their users - and sometimes, as with the word "real", these referents hold objective existence, rather than being the concoction of individuals who find agreement in that which they invent, or create . "What is real" is therefore to me not a word game. I'm hoping, or presuming, that we don't find too much disagreement in this.

If "real" as a conceptual abstraction has a referent that impartially applies to all - thereby, imv, making truth likewise meaningful - this referent will occur regardless of the words used, or even if any words are used at all. Yet there clearly occurs numerable disagreements of what "real" as sign signifies. That a coffee mug is real in no way addresses, for example, whether or not physicalism is real. So analysis of what is and is not real seem to me to be appropriate.

If language use via word-game rules was all there is to it, to me it would be on par to saying, "stop thinking about things and be ignorant". Yet this implicit commandment of what one must do is antagonistic to, at the very least, any and all discovery - rather than, as you say in your latter post, to the "making" of new knowledge.

However, as to so termed bedrock beliefs such as that of experiencing having two hands, I gave an example of how such may be justified. — javra

This is the tricky part in all this; there's no problem in conceiving of a justification for our foundational beliefs. It is not incoherent to add to a system in which A is true a justification that A is true (insofar as it does nothing else); we can add as many such justifications as we want. What those justifications don't do is give reason or "more reason" to believe what we already believe.

If I start with a proposition A in a system, and later on I prove that A is true using other propositions; I have created a justification of A which (can be, but is not necessarily) true. But, I haven't created new reasons to believe A, "nor more reasons to believe it", it was already there, I've just re-extracted it from other propositions it was already contained within.

Our foundational beliefs contain all the attributes of knowledge and justification. It doesn't matter whether we say "I foundationally believe it", "I have complete justification for believing it", "I know it and can't conceive it's wrong", "this is just really, actually true", "it's the real reality", "I am totally committed to this axiom", "this is me". One or another expression may clarify our ordinary language in one situation or another, but they can all be the same behind the linguistic expressions (if there is difference, it's because it's not foundational belief, just expression of high degree of confidence we haven't made a mistake; that we engage in such hyperbole is why we need to clarify our language on occasion: "I'm absolutely certain I will win the game" is obviously not an expression of absolute certainty; the beliefs we would use to recognize a mistake are the "real foundational beliefs").

Also tricky, that we cannot access a meta-theory which explains our beliefs does not mean such a meta-theory does not exist and is not true and does not explain all our beliefs; indeed, we must assume such a thing must exist. That we cannot access the noumena (know it's true-true) does not mean the noumena does not exist in a true form.

Our foundational beliefs contain all the attributes of knowledge and justification. — boethius

Have to go soon, however: If a so deemed bedrock belief - such as that of experiencing two hands - can be justified, why do you then object to it being termed a known? This, btw, is what my initial post was in reply to.

As a reminder, it is widely held that the law of non-contradiction cannot be justified on account of being a first principle. Again though, if it can, why would it not then be a known?

Have to go soon, however: If a so deemed bedrock belief - such as that of experiencing two hands - can be justified, why do you then object to it being termed a known? — javra

I don't.

"Belief" and "knowledge" and "justified" are applicable to our "foundational belief"; our ordinary language has no normal utility to name what we won't normally ever inspect.

Wittgenstein was pointing out it's not knowledge in the sense of resulting in a chain of reasoning nor ever could result from a chain of reasoning. He would not object to say "I know it" in the sense of "I super believe it". He's focused on the word knowledge to emphasize we can't create new knowledge using a theory about our knowledge (that of believing we can justify what we already believe and make it new knowledge is the path to confusion).

As a reminder, it is widely held that the law of non-contradiction cannot be justified on account of being a first principle. Again though, if it can, why would it not then be a known? — javra

Yes, it's a foundational belief. You can try to justify it without first using the law of non-contradiction. What's widely held is that no one ever has nor anyone ever will; first principle is again just another word for foundational belief (in this context).

I don't. Both "belief" and "knowledge" and "justified" are applicable to our "foundational belief"; our ordinary language has no normal utility to name what we won't normally ever inspect. — boethius

When it comes to bedrock beliefs or foundational beliefs, my point has been consistently that they are not beliefs that can be known, i.e., they are not epistemological. They are beliefs that are shown in our actions. The best way to understand this, is to think of them nonlinguistically, as I have already pointed out in other posts. The difference is connected with Wittgenstein's saying and showing.

Wittgenstein was addressing the various psychological scientisms that was the rage of his day; pointing out it's mostly just confusing and new knowledge beyond ordinary understanding of these things is impossible.

Aristotle was addressing Plato and the theory of forms. Yes, we have first principles from which we reason; no we can't therefore conclude there is a world of true forms and we "re-remember everything we learn" precisely because we believe what we already believe and therefore cannot come to new knowledge without extending our existing beliefs which mean we already believed it and it isn't new.

Wittgenstein was addressing the various psychological scientisms that was the rage of his day; pointing out it's mostly just confusing and new knowledge beyond ordinary understanding of these things is impossible. — boethius

Where did you get this idea from? On Certainty, which was written in the last year and half of his life was addressing Moore's propositions.

When it comes to bedrock beliefs or foundational beliefs, my point has been consistently that they are not beliefs that can be known, i.e., they are not epistemological. They are beliefs that are shown in our actions. The best way to understand this, is to think of them nonlinguistically, as I have already pointed out in other posts. The difference is connected with Wittgenstein's saying and showing. — Sam26

I'm not disagreeing with this.

We know what we foundationally believe in the sense that we know it because we believe it. We do not know it in the sense that we have carried out some chain of reasoning.

Since we cannot make a meta-theory that results in new knowledge content, I will agree with any meta-theory that simply reiterates what is already believed.