It's not. Knowledge by skill is simply the means of testing, or justifying, your knowledge as a belief, by applying it.That's my point - knowledge as a skill is different from knowledge as a belief - as you point out. — Sam26
I don't disagree because as Ildefonso shows, he had both beliefs and skills in being a gardener. He had no formal teaching. He taught himself by experience without any language. Organizing nature into neat little groups is what the mind does and language is a tool that helps us do that more efficiently - especially for communicating. Observing plants grow over time provides you with the same information as some professor and textbook does. Using what you have learned tests your knowledge. There are gardeners of varying skill - all based on the beliefs that they have about plants which were accumulated through learning by doing and/or taught. Even the best still learn new things. Your skill is a reflection of what you know.The reason I brought this subject up, is that not only are there beliefs that are non-linguistic, there is also knowledge that's nonlinguistic (knowledge as a skill). How do we know this is the case, we can observe it in the actions of others. This is how we know there are other minds, we observe the actions of others, which are the same or similar to our own actions. — Sam26
some of the reasons why they are referred to as bedrock beliefs or foundational beliefs. — Sam26
As I've said I don't understand the primacy you give to 'belief'. What for example is added to the above phrase by the word 'beliefs'? It seems to me 'bedrock' and 'foundation' would be perfectly clear without them, as metaphors. — mcdoodle
It feels like you are shifting away from your Wittgensteinian core, as in my eyes language games are all about knowing-how: skilful use. 'Belief' is relatively unimportant then. As Harry says, to proclaim a belief is to exhibit the skill in making such proclamations; it's the tying the shoelaces that counts. It counts for me, as something the shoelace-tier knows. They may believe they are solving the final problem that makes the universe whole, but to me they are tying shoes, and their beliefs are their own affair. — mcdoodle
The structure as I see it, consists of the world, minds, and language; and the relationship between these three. The world is the backdrop, and we find ourselves existing in it. Our mind helps us to interpret the world (it's in the relationship between our minds and the world that bedrock or basic beliefs form); so in a sense our mind is the center between the world and language. — Sam26
If I open a door, this action, shows that I believe there is a door there. — Sam26
For myself I think 'prelinguistic' is a red herring, though I know many are wedded to it. Instead I feel that it's a mistake to distinguish the linguistic from action. To use or interpret language is to act, it's not an alternative to action. — mcdoodle
Prelinguistic is just a way of talking about particular kinds of beliefs "wedded" to actions apart from linguistic actions. — Sam26
Saying "I know..." often means that I have the proper grounds, as Wittgenstein points out. — Sam26
What Wittgenstein found interesting about Moore's propositions is that they seem to play a peculiar role in our epistemological framework. Bedrock beliefs fulfill a special logical role in epistemology. They support the structure of epistemology. Understanding this, solves two problems, 1) the infinite regress problem, and 2) the problem of circularity. — Sam26
Saying "I know..." often means that I have the proper grounds, as Wittgenstein points out. — Sam26
Yes, Wittgenstein is simply correct. "I know I have a hand" or then more basic sense experience that makeup that "knowledge" if you prefer (i.e. I know there's something I grab things with that people call "a hand"), is not knowledge but belief. It's simply the axioms that makeup our knowledge framework. It's knowledge in the sense that we believe it to be true, but it's not knowledge in the sense that we have prior knowledge to justify it. — boethius
As a caveat: Being a fallibilist, I could come up with a general argument for why this belief is not infallible. — javra
and our foundational belief that some things are true and what that means has no further analytic content. — boethius
My emphasis, however, was on bedrock beliefs holding the capacity of being justified to be true. — javra
I'll argue that we are psychologically incapable, even in principle, of forsaking the notion of truth as that which is in accordance with what is real. — javra
We might abstract the term truth in multiple ways, going even so far as to say there is no truth, but in all these cases there will remain our psychological dependency on what is existentially real. — javra
That there cannot be a justification is the concept of bedrock beliefs. — boethius
Sure, but this adds no content to our idea of truth. Real is just another word for truth to add to our list; useful in certain situations to clarify ordinary language but adding no new content. — boethius
However, as to so termed bedrock beliefs such as that of experiencing having two hands, I gave an example of how such may be justified. — javra
Our foundational beliefs contain all the attributes of knowledge and justification. — boethius
Have to go soon, however: If a so deemed bedrock belief - such as that of experiencing two hands - can be justified, why do you then object to it being termed a known? — javra
As a reminder, it is widely held that the law of non-contradiction cannot be justified on account of being a first principle. Again though, if it can, why would it not then be a known? — javra
I don't. Both "belief" and "knowledge" and "justified" are applicable to our "foundational belief"; our ordinary language has no normal utility to name what we won't normally ever inspect. — boethius
Wittgenstein was addressing the various psychological scientisms that was the rage of his day; pointing out it's mostly just confusing and new knowledge beyond ordinary understanding of these things is impossible. — boethius
When it comes to bedrock beliefs or foundational beliefs, my point has been consistently that they are not beliefs that can be known, i.e., they are not epistemological. They are beliefs that are shown in our actions. The best way to understand this, is to think of them nonlinguistically, as I have already pointed out in other posts. The difference is connected with Wittgenstein's saying and showing. — Sam26
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