I'm not disagreeing with this.

We know what we believe in the sense that we know it because we believe it. We do not know it in the sense that we have carried out some chain of reasoning. — boethius

You seem to be contradicting yourself, to know is to give a justification in some form. I'm saying and I believe Wittgenstein is saying that we don't know it period, i.e., in any form of knowing.

Where did you get this idea from? — Sam26

I read the Tractatus to be motivated by hyper-pschologizing philosophy, which are forms of scientism. But as I mention, I do not foundationally believe that's true.

You seem to be contradicting yourself, to know is to give a justification in some form. — Sam26

Yes, but you can give justification to what you already believe without contradiction. It is knowledge in this sense, it is not "new knowledge", reasons to believe it apart from already believing it, nor "more reasons" to believe it.

I've been pretty clear that ordinary use of language does not address this issue, therefore if someone makes an ordinary statement to express their belief I have no issue. If you want to bait and switch the ordinary meaning for a technical philosophical one, that's not my problem.

If we specify knowledge as only conclusions distinct from foundational beliefs, then, sure, foundational beliefs aren't knowledge, but this distinction is not given to us in the ordinary word knowledge. It makes sense to me if someone says "I know I have two hands".

I read the Tractatus to be motivated by hyper-pschologizing philosophy, which are forms of scientism. But as I mention, I do not foundationally believe that's true. — boethius

You've now switched back to Wittgenstein's early philosophy, which really has nothing to do, or very little to do with his last work called On Certainty. Moreover, the Tractatus is not motivated by "hyper-psychologizing philosophy." I have a thread that summarizes the Tractatus, that should give you some idea of what the Tractatus is about.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/8056/a-summary-of-the-tractatus-logico-philosophicus/p1

You've now switched back to Wittgenstein's early philosophy, which really has nothing to do, or very little to do with his last work called On Certainty. — Sam26

Wittgenstein doesn't abandon his early philosophy, only mellows out a bit about it; maybe backing away from his claim "every philosophical problem is a language problem" and that he's literally solved every philosophical problem and can go garden. But, insofar as he's looking at philosophical problems as language problems, he is saying all we can hope to do is express what we already believe. "This is the general form of a proposition. What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence." is to me a profound rebuke to pschologizing belief which was a total rage when he's writing, which I assume he was knowledgeable of what's going on in philosophy and psychology and smart enough to be aware of the implication of what he's saying (you cannot go deeper, you cannot psychologize the proposition, you must be silent). But I maybe wrong about what he thought, as I mention above.

I have a thread that summarizes the Tractatus, that should give you some idea of what the Tractatus is about. — Sam26

I will look into your summary, but here's also a summary:

Having developed this analysis of world-thought-language, and relying on the one general form of the proposition, Wittgenstein can now assert that all meaningful propositions are of equal value. Subsequently, he ends the journey with the admonition concerning what can (or cannot) and what should (or should not) be said (7), leaving outside the realm of the sayable propositions of ethics, aesthetics, and metaphysics. — Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Psychologizing philosophy in the sense I am using is exactly to explain, and even to judge "really true or false" (i.e. that our foundational beliefs are more valid), what someone believes is their ethic, aesthetic and/or metaphysics. For instance, "Republicans like authority and so want family values and a strong leader etc. and prefer negative rights over positive" is a sort of pseudo-aesthetic psychologization of what kind of ethic and metaphysic they gravitate to resulting in what they believe; I reject such kinds of meta-theories offering new knowledge about what people believe and why, and I would assume Wittgenstein would say similarly (as I assume, so would you).

I don't see Wittgenstein abandoning this basic idea, and it's clearly incompatible with scientism in general and in particular psychologizing forms of scientism.

(Also, in the same summary, "Other writings of the same period, though, manifest the same anti-dogmatic stance, as it is applied, e.g., to the philosophy of mathematics or to philosophical psychology." so I will try to find these writing and see how he directly addresses psychology, which I wasn't aware he did, but can't imagine he'd be suddenly promoting dogmatic psychologization of belief, presuming to know the true nature of the noumena that is other people in themselves, of exactly what they believe and why.)

Yes, Wittgenstein even met Freud in Vienna, didn't agree as I suspected.

I don't know why I didn't consider he would have just directly commented on Freud at some point.

Freud in his analysis provides explanations which many people are inclined to accept. He emphasizes that people are dis-inclined to accept them. But if the explanation is one which people are disinclined to accept, it is highly probable that it is also one which they are inclined to accept. And this is what Freud had actually brought out. Take Freud’s view that anxiety is always a repetition in some way of the anxiety we felt at birth. [...] It is an idea which has a marked attraction. It has the attraction which mythological explanations have, explanations which say that this is all a repetition of something that has happened before. And when people do accept or adopt this, then certain things seem much clearer and easier for them. — Wittgenstein 1966, p. 43

Freud has not given a scientific explanation of the ancient myth—what he has done is to propound a new myth.” — Wittgenstein (1966, p. 47)

Quotes I lifted from this essay (in a journal-psychoanalysis.eu, which seems to be making some sort of psycho-analytic apologetic of some sort in view of this criticism). There seems to be a whole tiny cottage industry discussing Wittgenstein's views on Freud; revolving around to what extent Freud is useful even if obviously untrue. However, it's quite clear Wittgenstein rejects all forms of scientism and pscychologization of belief, as is implied in Tractacus, but there's varying opinion to the extent he rejects the new symbolic language game of psycho-analysis as inherently useless (that it is not a science but "being good at it" could be a form of practical knowledge, in a sense).

You've now switched back to Wittgenstein's early philosophy, which really has nothing to do, or very little to do with his last work called On Certainty. — Sam26

I posted this in another discussion here recently but got no response. Perhaps it will find more readers here since it refers to the common thread of grammar that runs throughout all of Wittgenstein's work. I find this quote especially salient in terms of this discussion:

The later Wittgenstein will extend the list of the sayable to include non-truth-conditional uses of language (e.g., spontaneous utterances, questions, imperatives), but he will never give up the idea that some things cannot be said in the sphere of language – that is, 'in the flow of the language-game'; or the idea that some things cannot be put into words at all but can only show themselves through words (and, he will add, through deeds). In fact, he will add certainties to the list of the ineffable – the grammatical ineffable. Like regulative nonsense, certainties cannot be said because they constitute the scaffolding of sense, not its object. Basic certainties (e.g., ‘There exist people other than myself’, ‘I have a body’, ‘Human beings need nourishment’) are 'removed from the traffic' (OC 210); they cannot meaningfully be said in the flow of the language-game as if they were open for discussion because they are bounds of sense (rules of grammar), not objects of sense.

In fact, the Tractatus sets the stage for what Wittgenstein will later call 'grammar': grammar is that which enables or regulates sense (and so is itself nonsensical) and cannot meaningfully be said in the flow of the language-game but only heuristically articulated. — Daniele Moyal-Sharrock

I read almost all of that article (Wittgenstein's grammar: through thick and thin, by Danièle Moyal-Sharrock), and find it fascinating, thanks. I see it as another thread linking his early philosophy with his later philosophy. It would be interesting to explore this further. My understanding of the Tractatus is very general, and I'll have to admit I haven't seen this aspect before, i.e., the grammar of the Tractatus. I do see the connection, albeit rather vaguely, with what this thread is about. So, if I understand that article, Moore's propositions lack sense in that they don't properly reflect the rules of grammar, i.e., in Wittgenstein's broad use of the term.

It's a difficult thing to see, viz., that grammar goes beyond the proper use of, say, the verbs was and were, and extends into the arena of sense itself. The logic of sense is a grammar in and of itself. One can see this in his later works, especially in On Certainty.

I like this because it expands my thinking a bit more.

Glad you liked the article too.

I do see the connection, albeit rather vaguely, with what this thread is about. — Sam26

At least part of the reason for my posting this was because I tend to agree with what others have said re: your comments on beliefs not being in line with Wittgenstein's philosophy; or a "shifting away from your Wittgensteinian core", as @mcdoodle put it.

So, if I understand that article, Moore's propositions lack sense in that they don't properly reflect the rules of grammar — Sam26

I think what Moyal-Sharrock is saying is that Moorean propositions lack sense because they are rules of grammar (in the "thick" sense). As I quoted in my previous post, propositions such as Moore's "cannot meaningfully be said in the flow of the language-game as if they were open for discussion because they are bounds of sense (rules of grammar), not objects of sense."

I like this because it expands my thinking a bit more. — Sam26

Me too. :smile:

At least part of the reason for my posting this was because I tend to agree with what others have said re: your comments on beliefs not being in line with Wittgenstein's philosophy; or a "shifting away from your Wittgensteinian core", as mcdoodle put it. — Luke

You'll have to explain this a bit more. Keep in mind that I'm not necessarily trying to keep my thoughts in line with Wittgenstein. I disagree with some of Wittgenstein's ideas, and I'm trying to go my own way on some of his thinking, for better or worse.

You'll have to explain this a bit more. — Sam26

I'm not sure what you're asking me to explain, but I don't think Wittgenstein had any interest in exploring the "prelinguistic" or "non-linguistic". I'm not going to try and prevent you from doing so, but I have to admit I still don't know what point you're trying to make in this thread.

The point of me saying, "keep in mind that I'm not necessarily trying to keep my thoughts in line with Wittgenstein," is that they are my thoughts, not necessarily Wittgenstein's. It doesn't concern me if Wittgenstein had an interest in prelinguistic beliefs or not. I'm exploring the idea because I find it interesting in terms of what is bedrock.

The only point I'm trying to make about prelinguistic beliefs, is that they are the starting points of all beliefs. They are the most basic of all beliefs. The structure of all beliefs rests on prelinguistic or nonlinguistic beliefs.

Danièle Moyal-Sharrock — Sam26

The best interpreter of Wittgenstein I've found.

It was a very good article. I'm glad Luke pointed it out to me.

Her book on On Certainty is very good too.

I'll have to find that book.

Currently a rather pricey $53 from Amazon

While it is true that Wittgenstein doesn't delineate the idea that there are prelinguistic or nonlinguistic beliefs, this doesn't mean that the idea is not present within the scope of his writings. For example, as I have pointed out on numerous occasions, OC 284 clearly states that actions clearly point to beliefs apart from saying or expressing such beliefs. Moreover, the idea of showing a belief also contains this idea, i.e., one shows what one believes by doing, or by acting in a certain way. For instance, the act of praying shows that one has certain mystical or religious beliefs. Or, as Wittgenstein pointed out in OC 285, "If someone is looking for something and perhaps roots around in a certain place, he shows [my emphasis] that he believes that what he is looking for is there."

The structure would look something like the following:

(1) The World
(2) Minds
a) Beliefs (prelinguistic and/or nonlinguistic)
b) Beliefs (linguistic and nonlinguistic)

Are you suggesting that there are beliefs which cannot be stated?

That is, not just beliefs which have not been stated, but beliefs which are un-statable?

How would such ineffable beliefs differ from beetles in boxes?

The point of me saying, "keep in mind that I'm not necessarily trying to keep my thoughts in line with Wittgenstein," is that they are my thoughts, not necessarily Wittgenstein's. It doesn't concern me if Wittgenstein had an interest in prelinguistic beliefs or not. I'm exploring the idea because I find it interesting in terms of what is bedrock.

The only point I'm trying to make about prelinguistic beliefs, is that they are the starting points of all beliefs. They are the most basic of all beliefs. The structure of all beliefs rests on prelinguistic or nonlinguistic beliefs. — Sam26

Yep.

Are you suggesting that there are beliefs which cannot be stated? — Banno

Do language less creatures state anything?

How would such ineffable beliefs differ from beetles in boxes? — Banno

To followup on creativesoul's comment, other animals can't state their beliefs in language. They might communicate them in a variety of other ways. But not necessarily and not always. Think of how long people have argued over what exactly their pet dog or cat thinks.

I can't think of any beliefs that are un-statable. What prompted this question?

I'm in agreement with the thrust of Sam's thoughts here, or at least what I think they are based upon what's been said by him, and my own reading and/or understanding of Witt's On Certainty, which was of course published posthumously.

Witt was an adherent of JTB, and was looking to avoid the problem of justificatory regress. Hinge propositions were his attempt. They are defined as the ones(beliefs) that lie beyond the scope of justification... somehow. They need no justification. Witt never clarified how. Witt also seemed to believe that all knowledge is dubitable. Being able to doubt 'X', was part of Witt's own personal criterion for being classified as a bit of knowledge(as knowing 'X'). His remarks on Moore support this interpretation as well.

Sam's participation here seems to be shedding some much needed light upon pre-linguistic belief. It is worth noting that it exists in it's entirety prior to being named. It certainly does not consist of propositions.

As mentioned earlier, Witt was a proponent of JTB, and as such also held that all belief content is propositional. Hence... the most basic and foundational beliefs were dubbed - in Witt's framework - "hinge propositions".

This is where I part ways with Witt upon this matter. I suspect Sam may agree, at least in part.

???

Are you suggesting that there are beliefs which cannot be stated?

That is, not just beliefs which have not been stated, but beliefs which are un-statable?

How would such ineffable beliefs differ from beetles in boxes? — Banno

Language less creatures do not make claims about private ineffable beliefs(or meaning). Witt's beetle in a box is all about such claims.

:brow:

Right?

As mentioned earlier, Witt was a proponent of JTB, and as such also held that all belief content is propositional. — creativesoul

I don't think this is true. I pointed out where in OC 284 and 285 where Wittgenstein seems to hold to the notion that some beliefs aren't propositional at all, i.e., they are reflected in our actions. But of course this isn't the thrust of OC.

I don't think this is true. I pointed out where in OC 284 and 285 where Wittgenstein seems to hold to the notion that some beliefs aren't propositional at all, i.e., they are reflected in our actions. But of course this isn't the thrust of OC. — Sam26

Perhaps Sam. That would seem to be incommensurate with his talk of hinge propositions... wouldn't it?

Clearly he did not finish that part of his project, so his thoughts on the matter are only as has been recorded. Too bad we can't ask him. It seems he had not yet come to acceptable terms with all of it(concerning basic beliefs and/or hinge propositions and how they did not require justification).

Well grounded true belief does not always consist of language.

How would such ineffable beliefs differ from beetles in boxes?
— Banno

To followup on creativesoul's comment, other animals can't state their beliefs in language. — Marchesk

Exactly. Yet they have beliefs. Those beliefs do not have propositional content. Our reports of them do. It would behoove us all to keep that in mind.