So then are you saying facts are propositions. Propositions that describe states of affairs. They are not, at least ostensively judgements, just statements of fact, so neither true nor false (I initially thought why not all true, since they can't be other than what they are, but I think ascription of truth to these statements gives them a valuation that they don't warrant, facts just are).

Facts exist separately from mind, they describe the world, current and in the past. Truths are made up of facts. So, if no mind then no truth, just facts.

So then are you saying facts are propositions. — Cavacava

I haven't the faintest idea how you'd get that from what I just wrote. I'm not saying anything like that. Facts and propositions are two different things.

Propositions that describe states of affairs . . . — Cavacava

Those would be propositions. Facts are the states of affairs.

They are not, at least ostensively judgements, just statements of fact, — Cavacava

They=facts? propositions?

At any rate, neither facts nor propositions are judgments. Truth-value is a judgment.

Facts exist separately from mind,

Yes, although there are facts about minds, too.

they describe the world,

Facts do not describe anything. They're not descriptions. They ARE the world.

Truths are made up of facts. — Cavacava

The received view in analytic philosophy, at least, is that truth-value is a property of propositions. The view that truth-value is actually a judgment, or in other words, that the way the property of propositions in question obtains is via a judgment we make about propositions, is my own idiosyncratic view.

At any rate, clearly you've gone from asking for clarification on my view to giving your own, highly idiosyncratic view.

So, if no mind then no truth, just facts. — Cavacava

That I agree with (obviously--given everything I wrote about it above), but if on your view, truths are made up of facts, I have no idea how you'd get to "If no mind then no truth, just facts."

Facts do not describe anything. They're not descriptions. They ARE the world.

I don't understand that statement. Can you explain.

Well, what is it that you're describing when you utter a description? You're describing how the world is, right? That "how the world is" is what facts are. Facts aren't the descriptions. They're what you're describing.

Ok, then what you are saying is that the word "fact" has two senses,

a) as actuality, reality, the world
b) as a statement about what is comprised in "a"

"a" isn't beholding to us, except in so far as we fit into it
"b" assumes the ability to conceptualize what is sensed in "a" to give it a place in our construction of the world. Judgement takes facts, as we understand them and relates them to other facts & conclusions, which yield truths. Only humans do this cognitively, so if no mind, no truths, just facts, just the world.

b) as a statement about what is comprised in "a" — Cavacava

No, facts are not statements. Facts are (a) only.

You seem to be conflating facts and propositions. They're two different things.

If Facts, states of affairs, the world are not us, then how do we connect to them? I think we connect immediately and mediately with sensually, conceptually, and linguistically.

We're not separate from the world. Facts are everything with respect to the way the world is, including the way that humans are.

We connect to facts that are not us via our abilities to move, to manipulate things, etc., as well as via perception.

,

Can we say that facts are the objects of true propositions - i.e., that which they represent? I guess this gets tricky on the view that truth is a subjective judgment. What other word can we substitute for true? Correct? Accurate?

We connect to facts that are not us via our abilities to move, to manipulate things, etc., as well as via perception.

So by sensation, we become aware of what is apparent, what is sensed, which we attempt to fit into our conception of what is in the world. The straight stick looks bent in the jar of water only apparently, conceptually we understand the optics, we understand that in order for something to seem the way it is there must be something behind it, something which may not be as it seems.

Hi, no I don't think so, but I'll think about it. TS probable has a ready answer.

Can we say that facts are the objects of true propositions - i.e., that which they represent? I — aletheist

I'd say that it's what they're taken to represent, and add "just in case someone is using correspondence theory." What they're taken to represent is an important distinction in my view, because a major aspect of my view is that I'm rejecting the idea that propositions represent anything "on their own" so to speak. And a fortiori, I'd reject the idea that anything represents anything else non-mentally. Representation is a way of thinking about things. Representation is not a feature of non-mental existents.

So by sensation, we become aware of what is apparent, what is sensed, which we attempt to fit into our conception of what is in the world. The straight stick looks bent in the jar of water only apparently, conceptually we understand the optics, we understand that in order for something to seem the way it is there must be something behind it, something which may not be as it seems. — Cavacava

I don't want to get into a philosophy of perception debate yet again, at least not just yet. We did it in what seemed to be tens of different threads within the past few months. Anyway, I'm a naive/direct realist. I think that representationalism is incoherent.

I'd say that it's what they're taken to represent, and add "just in case someone is using correspondence theory." — Terrapin Station

Fair enough, given your views.

Representation is a way of thinking about things. Representation is not a feature of non-mental existents. — Terrapin Station

It depends on exactly what we mean by "representation"; but again, I understand that this is your view.

I don't want to get into a philosophy of perception debate yet again, at least not just yet. We did it in what seemed to be tens of different threads within the past few months. Anyway, I'm a naive/direct realist. I think that representationalism is incoherent.

Ok we have run into an impasse regarding both what and how reality is constituted, yet we both agree that without mind there is no truth, even though we disagree on what constitutes that judgement. I think we also agree that what is, is...even if we differ about what reality entails for us and how it can be known (we are not idealists).

If a mind-independent world can consist in "states of affairs", and in facts about those states of affairs, then why would there not be truths about those states of affairs?

For example, say that after humanity has become extinct, the Sun is now twenty times its 2016 size, and the average temperature of Earth is much hotter, wouldn't you say that it will then be fact that the Sun is twenty times its 2016 size and the temperature is thus much hotter on Earth, and that there will be an enormous number of other attendant facts besides? And wouldn't you say that it will then be true that the Sun is twenty times its 2016 size and the temperature is thus much hotter on Earth and that there will be an enormous number of other attendant truths?

Otherwise explain what is the difference between the facts that will then obtain that the Sun is twenty times its present diameter and the temperature is much hotter, and it being true at that time that the Sun is twenty times its present? To me it seems to be perfectly in accordance with ordinary usage to say that they are the same.

You say truth-value is a judgement about the relation between a proposition and "something else". If truth-value is conceptual and it relates to the "something else", does that mean that the relationship between truth and the "something else" is also conceptual? Wouldn't that entail that the "something else" is also conceptual, at least in part? If not then how could there be a relation between a conceptual thing (the proposition), a relation which is itself conceptual (the truth-relation can't be physical so what else could it be but conceptual?) and something entirely non-conceptual; the presumably purely physical 'something else'?

I want to just address this part first, because I want to clarify what you're asking here:

Otherwise explain what is the difference between the facts that will then obtain that the Sun is twenty times its present diameter and the temperature is much hotter, and it being true at that time that the Sun is twenty times its present? To me it seems to be perfectly in accordance with ordinary usage to say that they are the same. — John

Are you wondering why truths wouldn't be the same thing as facts?

That's really a side issue. There are at least two senses of 'fact'. There are ostensive facts and there are semantic facts. The former are more like actualities or states of affairs and the latter are more like truths.

"It is a fact that the Sun is a certain distance from the Earth" expresses the semantic sense of 'fact', and is conceptually no different than saying "it is true that the Sun is a certain distance from the Earth".

"The distance form the Sun to the Earth is a fact" expresses the ostensive sense of 'fact'.

I am not claiming there is a truly coherent demarcation between ostensive and semantic senses of 'fact', either, and if there is not such a clear demarcation it is even more problematic for your position.

In any case, ostensive facts cannot be brutely physical entities, because if you claim they are then the difficulty of how there could be a truth relation to them arises. In fact the difficulty of how there could be any semantic relation to them at all would need to be explained if you want assert that facts in the ostensive sense are utterly non-semantic; which you would need to assent to if you want to claim that facts can be in the total absence of percipients that employ conceptualizing language.

That's really a side issue . . . — John

Alright, then I'll take that as a "no" to the question I asked.

So to answer your questions:

If a mind-independent world can consist in "states of affairs", and in facts about those states of affairs, then why would there not be truths about those states of affairs? — John

Because truths, as I noted above, are judgments about the relation of propositions to other things (again, just what other things depends on the truth theory someone employs). There are no minds to make judgments in a mind-independent world.

For example, say that after humanity has become extinct, the Sun is now twenty times its 2016 size, and the average temperature of Earth is much hotter, wouldn't you say that it will then be fact that the Sun is twenty times its 2016 size and the temperature is thus much hotter on Earth, and that there will be an enormous number of other attendant facts besides? — John

Yes, I'd say that.

And wouldn't you say that it will then be true that the Sun is twenty times its 2016 size and the temperature is thus much hotter on Earth and that there will be an enormous number of other attendant truths? — John

No, I wouldn't say that, since truth is a judgment about the relation of propositions. There would be no one to make such judgments.

If truth-value is conceptual — John

Well, it's judgmental, but judgments have to involve concepts, sure.

does that mean that the relationship between truth and the "something else" is also conceptual? — John

Yes. The relationship hinges on the way the person assigns meanings to words, phrases, sentences, etc.

Wouldn't that entail that the "something else" is also conceptual, at least in part? — John

That depends on the truth theory in question. If we're talking about a relationship to facts--so if we're talking about correspondence theory, no. If we're talking about coherence theory, then yes.

If not then how could there be a relation between a conceptual thing (the proposition), a relation which is itself conceptual (the truth-relation can't be physical so what else could it be but conceptual?) — John

Everything is physical. So I obviously don't agree with "the truth-relation can't be physical." Concepts are physical. Beyond that, I can't say I understand you being perplexed by how there can be a relation between propositions and other things. The way that obtains in this case is via an individual assigning meanings and, for example (if we're talking about correspondence), observing facts.

There are at least two senses of 'fact'. There are ostensive facts and there are semantic facts. — John

As you predicted, I don't buy that distinction.

"It is a fact that the Sun is a certain distance from the Earth" expresses the semantic sense of 'fact', — John

If you're talking about the part in quotation marks as a statement, that's a proposition, not a fact (well, besides the fact that it's that proposition for example). I agree that people call true propositions "facts," but that's based on a misunderstanding of the terms. It's a bit similar to how folks conflate, say, speed and velocity. That's not to suggest that my analysis of truth is the received view, but that there's a difference between facts and propositions, and that truth-value is a property of propositions, is certainly the received view in analytic philosophy.

In fact the difficulty of how there could be any semantic relation to them at all would need to be explained if you want assert that facts in the ostensive sense are utterly non-semantic; which you would need to assent to if you want to claim that facts can be in the total absence of percipients that employ conceptualizing language. — John

Again, the relation is a matter of how meanings (which are subjective, assigned by individuals, and not literally shareable) correlate to facts, or one's other propositions that have been assigned "T," etc.--that's one what is making a judgment about with truth-value.

There are no minds to make judgments in a mind-independent world. — Terrapin Station

Are there any mind-independent worlds to speak of?

We were talking about possible worlds, or you could just say we were talking about counterfactuals.

HIstorically, of course, we had a mind-independent world, and we might have one again in the future. I wouldn't say there are any actual mind-independent worlds at present though. Of course, I'd say there's just one actual world at present.

HIstorically, of course, we had a mind-independent world, and we might have one again in the future. — Terrapin Station

Again, you're picturing 'a world in which there are no mind' - the early earth, drifting silently through the empty void. But that is still a concept, an idea, ordered according to the intuitions of space and time. The point about realism - whether scientific or naive - is that it supplies that human perspective, situates the concept in a temporal and spatial matrix - and then doesn't realise it is doing so. Whatever we say about 'reality' assumes a perspective, but then forgets that it is actually supplying the perspective. It is analogous to wearing a pair of spectacles, without which nothing can be seen, and then looking through them, and demanding 'show me where in this picture there are spectacles'.

Here's a passage in Magee's book on Schopenhauer which explains this exact point:

'Everyone knows that the earth, and a fortiori the universe, existed for a long time before there were any living beings, and therefore any perceiving subjects. But according to Kant ... that is impossible.'

Schopenhauer's defence of Kant on this score was twofold. First, the objector has not understood to the very bottom the Kantian demonstration that time is one of the forms of our sensibility. The earth, say, as it was before there was life, is a field of empirical enquiry in which we have come to know a great deal; its reality is no more being denied than is the reality of perceived objects in the same room.

The point is, the whole of the empirical world in space and time is the creation of our understanding, which apprehends all the objects of empirical knowledge within it as being in some part of that space and at some part of that time: and this is as true of the earth before there was life as it is of the pen I am now holding a few inches in front of my face and seeing slightly out of focus as it moves across the paper.

This, incidentally, illustrates a difficulty in the way of understanding which transcendental idealism has permanently to contend with: the assumptions of 'the inborn realism which arises from the original disposition of the intellect' enter unawares into the way in which the statements of transcendental idealism are understood [what I am referring to above as the 'unseen spectacles'].

Such realistic assumptions so pervade our normal use of concepts that the claims of transcendental idealism disclose their own non-absurdity only after difficult consideration, whereas criticisms of them at first appear cogent which on examination are seen to rest on confusion. We have to raise almost impossibly deep levels of presupposition in our own thinking and imagination to the level of self-consciousness before we are able to achieve a critical awareness of all our realistic assumptions, and thus achieve an understanding of transcendental idealism which is untainted by them.

Bryan Magee Schopenhauer's Philosophy, Pp 106-107

Concepts are physical. — Terrapin Station

Firstly, by 'truth' you seem to understand only "truth value". Which would be very much like limiting facts to semantic kinds.

There are certainly cases in which people use 'truth' in a sense similar to that of ostensive facts. 'Climate change is true" would be an example.

As you predicted, I don't buy that distinction. — Terrapin Station

But you say you don't buy the distinction. So that means that you must think people are speaking nonsense when they say "It is a fact that X".

But the real weakness of your position is that you seem to be unable to offer any explanation at all as to:

• In what sense it could be said that truth is "physical". Physical things can be seen, touched, heard smelled, tasted and felt, quantified and modeled and so on; can any of these be done with truth?

• In what sense what is normally thought as a semantic entity such as the content of a proposition, could be both a physical and a semantic entity (as opposed to merely being a semantic entity which is expressed in physical forms). And for that matter how is it possible for a semantic entity to be expressed in physical form at all, according to you? And lastly how is it possible for a semantic entity such as a proposition, to correspond with something that is not semantic at all? You say that truth is physical; does that mean you deny that there is anything truly semantic at all; and say the semantic is just a semblance of some kind?

I expected something grander from post #2000 than a rehash of Hegel's position with regards to concepts and reality ... :D

Again, you're picturing 'a world in which there are no mind' - the early earth, drifting silently through the empty void. But that is still a concept, an idea, ordered according to the intuitions of space and time. — Wayfarer

Yeah, my picturing it is a concept, etc. but the facts in question aren't a concept.

The point about realism - whether scientific or naive - is that it supplies that human perspective, situates the concept in a temporal and spatial matrix - and then doesn't realise it is doing so. — Wayfarer

Realism is an ontological stance. I'm not sure what the heck "it supplies that human perspective" is saying exactly, however. And you're saying the ontological stance "situates the concept in a temporal and spatial 'matrix'"?? What the heck does that amount to? "And then doesn't realize it is doing so"--as if an ontological stance is itself conscious or something?

Whatever we say about 'reality' assumes a perspective, — Wayfarer

Over and over again, you conflate concepts and what they're concepts of, what we say and what we're talking about, etc.

But yeah, we have a perspective in saying something. A perspective is a type of reference point. And reference points can't be "gotten free of," whether we're talking about sentient beings or not.

Anyway, I don't really know what you're on about overall, but apparently per the Magee passage, you're arguing for idealism somehow. That's just what we need, because we haven't done that over and over enough in tons of different threads.

But you say you don't buy the distinction. So that means that you must think people are speaking nonsense when they say "It is a fact that X". — John

Not at all. When someone says "It is a fact that x," they are claiming that states of affairs are such and such. Why would that be nonsense?

In what sense it could be said that truth is "physical". — John

My analysis of truth in no way hinges on some meta analysis of what it is ontologically in terms of physical versus nonphysical. You brought up that issue, so I commented on it.

You seem to be wanting to argue about physicalism rather than understanding the analysis of truth versus facts, etc.

Over and over again, you conflate concepts and what they're concepts of, what we say and what we're talking about, etc. — Terrapin Station

It's not 'conflating' anything. It is the observation that you can't ultimately separate facts and concepts, reality and perception.

Yeah, my picturing it is a concept, etc. but the facts in question aren't a concept. — Terrapin Station

Problems of Philosophy 101.

Concepts are physical. — Terrapin Station

Good! Please parcel me one up, and ship it. But first, weigh it and measure it.

Realism is an ontological stance. I'm not sure what the heck "it supplies that human perspective" is saying exactly, however. And you're saying the ontological stance "situates the concept in a temporal and spatial 'matrix'"?? What the heck does that amount to? "And then doesn't realize it is doing so"--as if an ontological stance is itself conscious or something? — Terrapin Station

Kant's is an ontological argument. Read that passage I quoted again. This is the exact point it's making. You're simply assuming 'the reality of the world'. What that passage is doing, calling it into question, and you respond with 'what the heck'.

I don't know why you refer to "post #2000", nor why you think that what is a really just common sense critical objection to Terrapin's hopelessly incoherent position is a "rehash of Hegel". If you know your German Idealism you should be well aware that Kant made the point before Hegel.

My analysis of truth in no way hinges on some meta analysis of what it is ontologically in terms of physical versus nonphysical. You brought up that issue, so I commented on it. — Terrapin Station

This is obviously not true, since it was you that claimed that truth is "physical" as a way of wriggling out of the conceptual difficulties involved in your position. If that is not an ontological claim then what kind of claim is it? All I am asking for is an explanation as to how truth can be understood to be physical; and if you can't offer one then your assertion is as empty as can be.

physical — John

By physical do you think he means external instead? Physical substance isn't really physical afaik and doesn't exist how we think it does, so how could anyone say it has truth if all it is is a misunderstood system in/of existence?

It's not 'conflating' anything — Wayfarer

Yes it is.

It is the observation that you can't ultimately separate facts and concepts, reality and perception. — Wayfarer

There are facts about concepts of course, but in general, it's not an "observation," it's simply a conflation. You always talk about ideas like picturing something as if picturing is identical to what we're picturing. That's a simple conflation, as confused as if you were to say that a painting of a building is identical to the building. You could say, "It's an observation that you can't separate the painting and the building," but that wouldn't make it not a conflation where you simply do not understand that the painting and what it's a painting of are not the same thing.

Problems of Philosophy 101. — Wayfarer

Which makes it curious that you haven't managed to tackle it yet.

Good! Please parcel me one up, and ship it. But first, weigh it and measure it. — Wayfarer

Is that from Idiotic Arguments 101?

Yeah, I'll place it in a box made of neutrinos for you. Oh wait--you couldn't receive a neutrino in a box, so they must not be physical per that script from your Stupid Arguments 101 course.

Kant's is an ontological argument. — Wayfarer

Alert the press.

This is the exact point it's making. — Wayfarer

It's arguing that ontological stances have cognition as if they're sentient entities? Nice.

What that passage is doing, calling it into question, and you respond with 'what the heck'. — Wayfarer

I like how you assume that your inability to write clearly is identical to a much more well-written passage from the likes of Magee.