So then are you saying facts are propositions. — Cavacava
Those would be propositions. Facts are the states of affairs.Propositions that describe states of affairs . . . — Cavacava
They are not, at least ostensively judgements, just statements of fact, — Cavacava
Yes, although there are facts about minds, too.Facts exist separately from mind,
they describe the world,
Truths are made up of facts. — Cavacava
So, if no mind then no truth, just facts. — Cavacava
Facts do not describe anything. They're not descriptions. They ARE the world.
b) as a statement about what is comprised in "a" — Cavacava
We connect to facts that are not us via our abilities to move, to manipulate things, etc., as well as via perception.
Can we say that facts are the objects of true propositions - i.e., that which they represent? I — aletheist
So by sensation, we become aware of what is apparent, what is sensed, which we attempt to fit into our conception of what is in the world. The straight stick looks bent in the jar of water only apparently, conceptually we understand the optics, we understand that in order for something to seem the way it is there must be something behind it, something which may not be as it seems. — Cavacava
I'd say that it's what they're taken to represent, and add "just in case someone is using correspondence theory." — Terrapin Station
Representation is a way of thinking about things. Representation is not a feature of non-mental existents. — Terrapin Station
I don't want to get into a philosophy of perception debate yet again, at least not just yet. We did it in what seemed to be tens of different threads within the past few months. Anyway, I'm a naive/direct realist. I think that representationalism is incoherent.
Otherwise explain what is the difference between the facts that will then obtain that the Sun is twenty times its present diameter and the temperature is much hotter, and it being true at that time that the Sun is twenty times its present? To me it seems to be perfectly in accordance with ordinary usage to say that they are the same. — John
That's really a side issue . . . — John
If a mind-independent world can consist in "states of affairs", and in facts about those states of affairs, then why would there not be truths about those states of affairs? — John
For example, say that after humanity has become extinct, the Sun is now twenty times its 2016 size, and the average temperature of Earth is much hotter, wouldn't you say that it will then be fact that the Sun is twenty times its 2016 size and the temperature is thus much hotter on Earth, and that there will be an enormous number of other attendant facts besides? — John
And wouldn't you say that it will then be true that the Sun is twenty times its 2016 size and the temperature is thus much hotter on Earth and that there will be an enormous number of other attendant truths? — John
If truth-value is conceptual — John
does that mean that the relationship between truth and the "something else" is also conceptual? — John
Wouldn't that entail that the "something else" is also conceptual, at least in part? — John
If not then how could there be a relation between a conceptual thing (the proposition), a relation which is itself conceptual (the truth-relation can't be physical so what else could it be but conceptual?) — John
There are at least two senses of 'fact'. There are ostensive facts and there are semantic facts. — John
"It is a fact that the Sun is a certain distance from the Earth" expresses the semantic sense of 'fact', — John
In fact the difficulty of how there could be any semantic relation to them at all would need to be explained if you want assert that facts in the ostensive sense are utterly non-semantic; which you would need to assent to if you want to claim that facts can be in the total absence of percipients that employ conceptualizing language. — John
There are no minds to make judgments in a mind-independent world. — Terrapin Station
HIstorically, of course, we had a mind-independent world, and we might have one again in the future. — Terrapin Station
'Everyone knows that the earth, and a fortiori the universe, existed for a long time before there were any living beings, and therefore any perceiving subjects. But according to Kant ... that is impossible.'
Schopenhauer's defence of Kant on this score was twofold. First, the objector has not understood to the very bottom the Kantian demonstration that time is one of the forms of our sensibility. The earth, say, as it was before there was life, is a field of empirical enquiry in which we have come to know a great deal; its reality is no more being denied than is the reality of perceived objects in the same room.
The point is, the whole of the empirical world in space and time is the creation of our understanding, which apprehends all the objects of empirical knowledge within it as being in some part of that space and at some part of that time: and this is as true of the earth before there was life as it is of the pen I am now holding a few inches in front of my face and seeing slightly out of focus as it moves across the paper.
This, incidentally, illustrates a difficulty in the way of understanding which transcendental idealism has permanently to contend with: the assumptions of 'the inborn realism which arises from the original disposition of the intellect' enter unawares into the way in which the statements of transcendental idealism are understood [what I am referring to above as the 'unseen spectacles'].
Such realistic assumptions so pervade our normal use of concepts that the claims of transcendental idealism disclose their own non-absurdity only after difficult consideration, whereas criticisms of them at first appear cogent which on examination are seen to rest on confusion. We have to raise almost impossibly deep levels of presupposition in our own thinking and imagination to the level of self-consciousness before we are able to achieve a critical awareness of all our realistic assumptions, and thus achieve an understanding of transcendental idealism which is untainted by them.
Concepts are physical. — Terrapin Station
As you predicted, I don't buy that distinction. — Terrapin Station
Again, you're picturing 'a world in which there are no mind' - the early earth, drifting silently through the empty void. But that is still a concept, an idea, ordered according to the intuitions of space and time. — Wayfarer
The point about realism - whether scientific or naive - is that it supplies that human perspective, situates the concept in a temporal and spatial matrix - and then doesn't realise it is doing so. — Wayfarer
Whatever we say about 'reality' assumes a perspective, — Wayfarer
But you say you don't buy the distinction. So that means that you must think people are speaking nonsense when they say "It is a fact that X". — John
In what sense it could be said that truth is "physical". — John
Over and over again, you conflate concepts and what they're concepts of, what we say and what we're talking about, etc. — Terrapin Station
Yeah, my picturing it is a concept, etc. but the facts in question aren't a concept. — Terrapin Station
Concepts are physical. — Terrapin Station
Realism is an ontological stance. I'm not sure what the heck "it supplies that human perspective" is saying exactly, however. And you're saying the ontological stance "situates the concept in a temporal and spatial 'matrix'"?? What the heck does that amount to? "And then doesn't realize it is doing so"--as if an ontological stance is itself conscious or something? — Terrapin Station
My analysis of truth in no way hinges on some meta analysis of what it is ontologically in terms of physical versus nonphysical. You brought up that issue, so I commented on it. — Terrapin Station
physical — John
It's not 'conflating' anything — Wayfarer
It is the observation that you can't ultimately separate facts and concepts, reality and perception. — Wayfarer
Problems of Philosophy 101. — Wayfarer
Good! Please parcel me one up, and ship it. But first, weigh it and measure it. — Wayfarer
Kant's is an ontological argument. — Wayfarer
This is the exact point it's making. — Wayfarer
What that passage is doing, calling it into question, and you respond with 'what the heck'. — Wayfarer
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