A pragmatic presupposition, really.

What is mind? Is a good question; do you think your mind is solitary? — Qwex

No, but I think my mind is IN solitary. 66 years so far, and some more to come, as it is a life-sentence.

Otherwise, such a state of disconnected being is like having no language or models to describe (imagine) what “I” am about, so I’d be more like a reptile (just acting) than like a human (self-reflecting/introspection). — Sir Philo Sophia

I'll throw out a third options. Other minds are both other minds and also part of the same mind. A bit like a subpersonality in one of us. — Coben

A conglomerate of minds. I wonder if the parts, the sub-minds talk to each other? I think they do since we, the parts, do communicate with each other - language..

I am sure he assumed other minds existed most of the time, — Coben

Yes, I think Descartes had the notion of clear and distinct ideas which he put to the task of inferring the rest of philosophy: his own existence, god and pretty much everything else followed from these two, including the existence of other minds. It was an imperative for Descartes to restore faith in his mind and senses and I think god's existence, being that god is truthful, allowed Descartes to do that - he came to the conclusion that he wasn't being deceived.

Some solipsists are saying there are not other minds, period. — Coben

These solipsists would then, I think, not be physicalists or even dualists, but idealists or something similar. — Coben

Hard solipsism, if there's such a thing, would deny the very existence of other minds and that's exactly one more step from where Descartes would've found himself without the aid of his clear and distinct ideas, especially god's existence and undeceiving nature. Descartes could only doubt the existence of external reality, inclusive of other minds and never arrive at certainty of its and their non-existence. Hard or strong solipsism, if it claims the non-existence of other minds, must furnish further proof of how it came to be certain that other minds don't exist. What is this proof?

Any such proof would require that we have unequivocal evidence that the world is "different": only you exist and the external world is an illusion or everyone else is a p-zombie. It's impossible to know whether the world is an illusion or not because our mind and our senses, the only access points we have to knowing the truth, are unreliable. So is everyone except you a p-zombie? Since you can't trust your mind or your senses, it follows that you can't know that either. So hard solipsism is untenable - certainty on the matter is impossible.

A pragmatic presupposition, really. — Wallows

:chin:

It's impossible to know whether the world is an illusion or not because our mind and our senses, the only access points we have to knowing the truth, are unreliable. So is everyone except you a p-zombie? Since you can't trust your mind or your senses, it follows that you can't know that either. So hard solipsism is untenable - certainty on the matter is impossible. — TheMadFool

I tend to agree with that. It is not too different, IMHO, from Earthlings saying that we are the only sentient life in the whole universe, and the religious going even further saying the whole universe was created to serve us. No matter what illusions your belief system operates under, we can all agree on the math of probabilities makes such beliefs exceedingly improbable.


More generally, I'd say the only reason why we believe in our own consciousness as being real and existing is because we have no strong experiential evidence to the contrary. In my current model, consciousness is a resonant condition within the internal and external boundaries the “I” operates within. However, the self-awareness aspect of experiential/qualia consciousness also tracks the time evolution of this resonant consciousness wave function (currently, I’m modelling that as a quantum pilot wave) and we call that (quantum knot) history as defining our unique thinking existence as a coherent, self-consistent emanation of the same consciousness cognitive agent, so we are completely calling that time evolved resonant wave pattern the “I” ‘story’ and concluding that we exist at least as a thinking being. This is at least one way that I believe Descartes gets it wrong. For example, in brain with a multiple personality disorder, I’d says that they do not have a single resonant consciousness wave function that collapses into one coherent, self-consistent emanation of the same consciousness cognitive agent, but many. So, any one of the resonant consciousness wave functions will only resonate with the resonant consciousness wave function (of its multiple personality choices) that is a coherent time evolution (quantum knot) history with its own wave function signature. That resonant consciousness would still be aware of the other a time evolution (quantum knot) histories (of the other people/personalities in their head) but ascribe those to supernatural hijacking of their brains/thoughts (e.g., demonic possession, spirits, other ‘people’ in their brains, etc.), thus they would not say that those other, equally valid versions of themselves, are part of them, but foreign mental invaders.

In this way, I’d say that consciousness can never be self-assess as a snapshot in time, but has to be part of a self-consistent path history (like a story/narrative) that all points to the same resonant focal point/pattern that you call you. Mess with that, and your sense of self consciousness/identity should degrade and vanish into a chaos ideas, facts, memories but without any form, function, or purpose, which I not call that ‘thought’ or ‘thinking’, so a problem to the Descartes way of evidencing oneself.

Furthermore, under my framework, to establish one self-consciousness we have to be able to explore all our boundary conditions that ware resonating within and their nature must be accessible/determinable wrt their form, function, or purpose in influencing the landscape that the consciousness agent in question is resonating with and within. Then, the consciousness agent in question would have to observe a time-evolution history path where their ‘thought’ could in-fact modify those boundary conditions and that had a correlated, esp. if *expected*, effect on their conscious state of being to ‘feel’ they are alive and the executive center of the (resonating) system. Then, the consciousness agent in question would have to learn and use those associations as tools to manipulate itself (the best it can) to achieve goal states of being. Towards a definition qualia consciousness, I’m thinking that the degree that the consciousness agent in question can do the above, it has ever higher orders of qualia consciousness.

In the context of the Cogito Ergo Sum vs. Solipsism points of view, I’d say that my above model applies to both, but both are malformed hypothesis b/c they lack to true mechanics of how consciousness works, so both are far to simplistic ways of forcing a circle into a square, and there will be arguments and evidence for/against each b/c neither is a suitable, complete model. To extend my largely Solipsism supporting framework to the Cogito Ergo Sum view, I believe I just extend the sensory motor boundary of one’s consciousness resonance condition to include other humans of like mind and all the same above mechanics work, and to the extreme case you get a mob, acting as one mind/ consciousness towards a unified form, function, and purpose. They lose individuality and together become the new consciousness of a superorganism much like individual atoms can become lost into a Bose-Einstein condensate fifth state of (consciousness) matter. Once they get out of the superorganism (Bose-Einstein condensate) consciousness state they almost have no memory or explanation of how they could come to think or act to kill/destroy/eradicate/etc. and go back to their comparatively boring mundane lives as individual consciousness agents. I’d say the human ability for this superorganism consciousness state of mind/being evidences against the purist Solipsism views.
I could go on and on, but these are my basic ideas so far on the subject.

Cheers!

Hard or strong solipsism, if it claims the non-existence of other minds, must furnish further proof of how it came to be certain that other minds don't exist. What is this proof? — TheMadFool

The kind of people employing radical doubt like Descartes does tend to be justificationists, without even knowing what that word means: they think that you ought to reject all beliefs that you do not have good reason to accept. So being able to doubt something is, to them, reason enough to reject belief in it, to say it doesn't exist.

I applaud you for implicitly rejecting such justificationism, as your comment suggests that you think in terms of critical rationalism, the view that one ought to accept whatever beliefs one wants unless it can be shown that one must reject them. Which is the right way to think about things, because justificationism inevitably ends in nihilism, and nihilism is just giving up.

It was an imperative for Descartes to restore faith in his mind and senses and I think god's existence, being that god is truthful, allowed Descartes to do that - he came to the conclusion that he wasn't being deceived. — TheMadFool

Maybe. I don't read philosophy, so maybe you can back this up with quotes from his writing?

I think, however, that a totally different thing happened. Descartes happened on this thought, irrespective of his motivations or where he wanted to go or what he wanted to prove, and he simply marvelled at the truth of his own almost randomly thought-up creation.

I can't prove this at all. It's just that the creative thinking process starts with the creation, and then it embellishes it. This seems to have happened, it seems to me, to Descartes.

I applaud you for implicitly rejecting such justificationism, as your comment suggests that you think in terms of critical rationalism, the view that one ought to accept whatever beliefs one wants unless it can be shown that one must reject them. Which is the right way to think about things, because justificationism inevitably ends in nihilism, and nihilism is just giving up. — Pfhorrest

I am not sure if you are applauding the rejection of hard or soft solipsism, or of Descartes "cogito..." maxim?

Hard or soft solipsism is hard to reject, in fact, impossible to rule out. There is no test to test it, much like there is no test to test the opposite of it, which is that we experience reality directly.

There is no assurance either way. You or anyone can decide for himself or herself to believe in this or that, but ultimately the two are equally likely to be the true case (but not at the same time).

The kind of people employing radical doubt like Descartes does tend to be justificationists — Pfhorrest

Yes. Descartes also had a proof of god, an ontological proof. I looked up its wording somewhere, and it had a clause, something to the effect that "God made it, I don't know how, because god's ability to do this exceeds my meagre understanding compared to his." This was a cop-out, and it renders the proof completely meaningless and powerless. But people quote to me sometimes, deists and religionists, that Descartes himself proved that God must necessarily exist.

This I can't deny is justificationism.

But the Cogito Ergo Sum maxim is pure instant genius.

It's impossible to know whether the world is an illusion or not because our mind and our senses, the only access points we have to knowing the truth, are unreliable. So is everyone except you a p-zombie? Since you can't trust your mind or your senses, it follows that you can't know that either. So hard solipsism is untenable - certainty on the matter is impossible. — TheMadFool

Yes, certainty on the matter is impossible. Totally, wholeheartedly agree. But where do you see that hard solipsism is untenable? It is possible, so it is tenable. Sure you can't know whether you can trust your senses. But knowledge has nothing to do with what reality is. Because, precisely because, you can't know. Hence the "unsure" in the first place.

So hard solipsism is untenable - certainty on the matter is — TheMadFool

Maybe we need to see what you mean by "hard solipsism". Can you differentiate it for me from "solipsism"?

I think you misunderstood what I meant by justificationism. It's not any of the particular things we've been talking about, but something quietly underlying some of them.

The justificationist thinks that you should reject all beliefs from the get go, and then only let in ones that can be proven worthy, i.e. justified. This is the common, naive view of "rationalism".

The opposite approach, critical rationalism, says you should admit any beliefs you want (and agree to disagree with others who want to admit other ones), until they can be proven unworthy, or falsified.

I was applauding you for pointing out that "hard solipsism ...must furnish further proof of how it came to be certain that other minds don't exist". The hard solipsist doesn't just get to say "you can't prove other minds exist, therefore they don't!" Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence: the person who says something doesn't exist isn't automatically right until proven wrong. It would be justificationist to think so, and I'm glad you're implicitly thinking otherwise.

thanks, PFHorrest, for the clarification.

A justificationist does not believe anything at first. A skeptic in the common sense of the word.

A rationalist believes everything. Accepting, inclusive, in the common sense of the word.

A justificationist will only believe that, which is shown to be justified or proven.

A rationalist will reject those beliefs, and those beliefs only, that are proven to be impossible.

I was applauding you for pointing out that "hard solipsism ...must furnish further proof of how it came to be certain that other minds don't exist". — Pfhorrest

I don't remember saying this, but let's go with it. This is a rationalistic demand. Exclude only that which can't be possible.

However, it is also rationalistic to say "other minds may or may not exist; we don't know." This inherently carries the possibility that no other minds exist -- a perfectly acceptable proposition for the rationalist.

Hard solipsism never claimed that other minds don't exist... it claims that the self can't be sure of it either way.

I am still struggling with the term and the conceptual meaning of "hard solipsism". It is not something I have ever considered or came across. It's either solipsism or not ... hard or soft, is a boiled egg, not solipsism.

However, let's assume hard solipsism claims that there are no other minds, let's assume this is what hard solipsism means. Then it is not rational, since it has not accepted all possible cases that are not excluded, but I daresay it is not justificationist, either, because a justificationist does not believe anything that is not proven positively and irrefutably. It has not been proven positive to him, that other minds don't exist... he is not a justificationist. He is not rationalist. He is just being simply irrational. (NOT an "irrationalist". Hezus. Let's stop the buck somewhere.)

Maybe we need to see what you mean by "hard solipsism". Can you differentiate it for me from "solipsism"? — god must be atheist

I'm just shooting in the dark here but to me the difference between hard solipsism and solipsism is that the former claims that is certain that other minds don't exist and the latter just isn't sure on the matter.:lol: As is obvious the former would need proof but the latter just follows from Descartes' skepticism.

As is obvious the former would need proof but the latter just follows from Descartes' skepticism. — TheMadFool

The proof would have to be an argument that other minds are incoherent, since empirically there is no way to prove such a thing. It would be similar to Berkeley's proof that matter is inconceivable, I would think.

That is, I would say that the whole premise that you have any sense of certainty of knowledge or existence within one’s own mind cannot happen without knowledge of one’s embodiment within some external context — Sir Philo Sophia

The solipsist does not deny that the idea of the "I" is constructed in opposition from the idea of the world. What he claims is that I have evidence that I exist, but that the idea that the world exists is not evident. Usually the hard solipsist is supposed to go one step further and deny that the world exists.

As Schopenhauer said, the solipsist is like the one who locks himself in his castle and covers all the windows and knocks down the moat bridges. No one can attack him. But he can't get out. As soon as he takes a step he betrays himself. And he takes it from the moment he tries to defend his solipsism outside himself.

So we have a logical problem with no practical consequences. It's not the only one.

I believe that the only way to overcome solipsism or extreme subjectivism is by starting from Husserl's intentionality. That is, consciousness is always to be aware of the world. There is no pure self. Now, let's talk about what the world is.

I believe that the only way to overcome solipsism or extreme subjectivism is by starting from Husserl's intentionality — David Mo

good explanation/summary, thanks. I can why you'd want to attack it this way, but I'm not so sure that is the best way b/c I do believe that consciousness exist internally w/o external reference. I believe there are (at least) two major problems/flaws w/ the cogito and solipsism (beyond the presumption of 'I'), that is they assume two things which break down in their framework. That is, they false define/assume what 'Thinking' actually is, and they mistake what cognitive agency is all about. Also, I believe there many levels of consciousness, which also depend of your level of cognitive development in an external world (or not). In my current framework, it is a complete illusion and misnomer to talking about 'thinking' implying 'existing' of anything. For example, among others, the existence of agency requires creative intention and the control of the flow and nature of the thought. In this aspect, I like your instinct to look for intentionality, but I would redirect it internally and add a few (maybe at least 2) other dynamic requirements to establish one's existence as an "I" without presupposing it.

I seriously doubt that qualia of conscious experience of you as “I” can happen without resonating with other external embodiments/minds. — Sir Philo Sophia

I seriously doubt that qualia of conscious experience of you as “I” can happen without THE APPEARANCE OF resonating with other external embodiments/minds.

I fixed that for ya.

without THE APPEARANCE OF resonating with other external embodiments/minds — Arne

nope. That is not the hypothesis I am positing there. See my reply to TheMadFool for some detailed mechanics of my hypothesis on the qualia conscious experience.

Cogito ergo sum does establish that "Thought" exists now: There is thought now, is how I like to generalize that aphorism. However the "I" seems like an add-on. — Pantagruel

I agree that the "I" portion of "Cogito, ergo sum" is gratuitous and very weak.

Specifically: If the conclusion is that "I exist", then how can "I" be used in the premise, since it was not yet established that "I" exists!

What I'm able to extract from that famous quotation is this:

"Because there are experiences, something exists."

(Thoughts are just one type of experience, so I see no reason to limit the interpretation to thoughts alone.)

Is "I" an appropriate axiom?

I'm afraid I don't know what makes an axiom appropriate, but also I don't know what an axiom without a verb means.